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ABSTRACT. 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the history of modern 
continental philosophy by establishing a structural link between the thoughts of 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I argue that this link lies in the 
question of truth: both thinkers criticise the traditional concept of truth as 
objectivity. However, they both find in the existence of this very concept a 
problem that its rejection alone does not solve. What is it in our natural axistence 
that gave rise to the notion of truth? It is this questioning which I call the 
"question of truth". I locate three ways in which the question of truth informs 
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty's thoughts. Firstly, both thinkers propose a 
genealogy of the concept of "truth," one in which they suggest that our natural 
existence is structured in a pre-objective way: existing means making implicit truth-
claims. Further, they each explain the appearance of our belief in truth in terms of 
a radicalisation of this implicit attribution of truth (Chapters I and IV). Secondly, 
both thinkers seek to recover the pre-objective ground from which truth as an 
erroneous concept arose. They propose strikingly similar methods to do so 
(Chapters II and V). This ground, once uncovered, must be examined. This 
investigation leads both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty to ontological 
considerations. They both ask how we must conceive of a Being whose structure 
allows for the existence of the belief in truth, or as I argue, error. As a conclusion, 
I suggest that both thinkers' investigations of the question of truth lead them to 
conceive of Being in a similar way, as the process of self-falsification by which 
indeterminate Being presents itself as determinate (Chapters III and VI). 
 xvii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. 
Throughout the thesis, the titles of works by Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty are 
abbreviated as follows. I added the date of writing, or when applicable, publication for 
reference (note that all published works received new Prefaces in 1885-1886). For full 
notice, please see the bibliography.   
 
WORKS BY NIETZSCHE (chronologically): 
N. B. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Nietzsche’s writings signal the 
sections, not the pages. When applicable, Latin numbers refer to sections and Arabic 
numbers to subsections. 
 
BT: the Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, 1872 
RL: Rhétorique et Langage, 1872-1875. 
UMI: David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer, 1873 
UMII: on the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, 1874 
UMIII: Schopenhauer as Educator, 1874 
UMIV: Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, 1876 
HATH: Human All too Human, 1878 
WS: the Wanderer and his Shadow, 1879 
D: Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, 1881 
GS: the Gay Science, 1882 (Book V from 1886) 
Z: thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1883-1884 
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil, 1886 
GM: the Genealogy of Morality, 1887 
CW: the Case of Wagner, 1888 
 xviii 
TI: Twilight of the Idols, 1888-1889 
AC: the Antichrist, 1888-1889 
EH: Ecce Homo, 1888-1889 
WP: the Will to Power, 1883-1889 
Entries from the Will to Power are referred as follows: WP, number [Date]. 
All other unpublished notes are referred as follows: Notebook number (in Latin 
numbers), (Date). The numbers are taken from the standard edition Kröner (KGW). 
 
WORKS BY MERLEAU-PONTY (chronologically):  
N. B. The first number refers to pages in the English translation, the second one to the 
original French. “t.a.” signals personal amendments to the translations. When only one 
page number is provided, it refers to the French, and the English translation is mine.  
 
P: Parcours, 1935-1951. 
SC: La Structure du Comportement, 1942. 
PP: Phenomenology of Perception/Phenomenologie de la Perception, 1945. 
PriP: The Primacy of Perception/le Primat de la Perception et ses Conséquences 
Philosophiques, 1946. 
IS: The Incarnate Subject/l’Ame et le Corps, 1947-1948. 
SNS: Sense and Nonsense/Sens et Non-Sens. 
Causeries: Causeries, 1948. 
CAL: Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language/la Conscience et l’Acquisition 
du Langage, 1949-1950. 
PW: The Prose of the World/la Prose du Monde, 1951-1952. 
P2: Parcours Deux, 1951-1961. 
 xix 
TL: Themes from the Lectures/Résumés de Cours, 1952-1960. 
Praise: Praise of Philosophy/Eloge de la Philosophie, 1953. 
IP: l’Institution, la Passivité, 1954/1955. 
N: la Nature, 1956-1960. 
AD: Adventures of the Dialectic/les Aventures de la Dialectique, 1955. 
NC: Notes de Cours, 1959-1960. 
NL: Notes de Lecture et Commentaire sur Théorie du Champ de la Conscience de 
Aron Gurwitsch, 1960. 
S: Signs/Signes, 1960. 
OE: l’Oeil et l’Esprit, 1960. 
VI: The Visible and the Invisible/ le Visible et l’Invisible, 1961. 
 
 
 1 
  
  INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-
1961) could hardly be more different men, and indeed different thinkers. 
Initially, it seems only contrasts can be drawn between them. Jean-François 
Lyotard calls Merleau-Ponty “one of the least arrogant of all philosophers”1, a 
description anyone would hardly apply to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s radical 
temperament gave birth to a ‘hammer’ philosophy that most consider to be 
irreconcilable with both Merleau-Ponty’s mild, conciliatory temperament and his 
entire  philosophical edifice which is often based upon subtle differences of 
degree and emphasis. In the Anglo-American world, Nietzsche was often denied 
the status of Philosopher, at least until Arthur C. Danto’s Nietzsche as 
Philosopher2. Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, has been described as “the 
philosopher’s existentialist”3 in opposition to those thinkers-writers identified 
with the existentialist movement, and with whom Nietzsche has often been 
associated. The list of such more or less prima facie contrasts could be 
continued, including the sheer differences in writing styles, historical contexts, 
and relations with the philosophical contexts of their times and with the 
                                                 
1 Jean-François Lyotard, “Philosophy and Painting in the Age of their Experimentation, 
Contribution to an idea of postmodernity," In the Lyotard Reader, Andrew, E. Benjamin (Ed.), 
Blackwell, New York & London, 1989, 189. 
2 Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, MacMillan, New York, 1965 & 2005. 
3 Mary Warnock, Existentialism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970, 71. 
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traditions of the past. Most important, I think, is that the differences in their lives 
and writing styles express a clear opposition in their relations with the 
institutional tools of knowledge at their disposal. Both philosophers were active 
during periods when, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “the modern philosopher [was] 
frequently a functionary”4, times of  professional, institutionalised philosophy. 
Merleau-Ponty spent all his working life under these institutions, from secondary 
education Lycées to the consecration of the Collège de France. He founded, 
edited and wrote in several academic journals, taking theoretical stances in the 
current philosophical debates with those other ‘functionaries’ he considered his 
colleagues. Nietzsche, the wanderer, left his chair at Basel shortly before the 
completion of the last of the Untimely Meditations, never to return5. By this time, 
one motif was already entrenched in his outlook: he would be, indeed, an 
‘untimely’ thinker. This has important philosophical consequences, as is 
demonstrated by the sustained frequency of the untimely motif in his subsequent 
works. Timeliness, for the young Nietzsche, means transitoriness, superficiality, 
and herd mentality; it is defined by fashions and trends that distract us from 
reality and numb our inquisitive powers. Timeliness is the opposite of 
philosophy. More than most other philosophers, Merleau-Ponty was timely. He 
wrote several articles in newspapers, gave circumstantial papers around the 
world, dedicated a good half of SNS and S to essays relating to current, national, 
international, and sometimes merely Parisian affairs, not to mention the two 
                                                 
4 Praise, 33. 
5 The fourth untimely was published in 1876, Nietzsche did not formally retire until 1879, 
however. 
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remarkably political and indeed timely HT and AD. In fact, Merleau-Ponty at 
least once voiced his preference for philosophical timeliness. At a congress of 
thinkers from both sides of the Iron Curtain, Merleau-Ponty refused the terms of 
his ‘Soviet interlocutor’ who spoke, he declared, in “an untimely [hors de saison] 
language, an intemporal language”. “Those terms”, he continued, “worried” him, 
because they blocked the way to the intellectual’s political “commitment 
[engagement]”6. This takes us to what I think is the most interesting opposition 
one may draw between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty: their opposition on the 
question of politics. When I say the ‘question’ of politics, I really mean two 
‘questions.' One is what this politics entail for the rest of a philosopher’s thought: 
what are the politics of this or that thinker, and what is its relation to their 
philosophy? For example, in what way, if any, can we still draw a parrallel 
between two thinkers who disagree politically? The other is the question of what 
should be the philosophical (perhaps even ontological) place, role and 
importance of politics.  
In his Zarathustra, Nietzsche passionately pleads against the ‘most 
despicable’ of possible human types, whom he calls the ‘last human.' The last 
human knows how to live in community; he does not seek domination or power, 
be it political or financial, and he has “invented happiness”. This, Nietzsche 
thinks, is exemplified by the spirit of progress and humanism which he sees with 
a shiver spread over Europe. There is little doubt that Nietzsche would see this 
‘despicable’ spirit at work in the very endeavours Merleau-Ponty actively 
supported and engaged in. In his “Preface” to SNS, Merleau-Ponty takes stock of 
                                                 
6 P2, 175 
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the failure of Marxism as practiced in the Eastern bloc. Yet, he claims, this 
failure is precisely the failure to live up to its promises. For him, the “task” has 
not changed, and this task was always for “men of all countries” to “find the 
ways to recognize and join each other. Prehistory would finish. A word was said 
which expected a response from this immense virtual humanity which had since 
ever kept silent. We were going to witness this absolutely unheard-of world 
where every human counts." The rebirth of “this expectation," writes Merleau-
Ponty, “is expressed here [in SNS] in several studies”7. Here, we find Merleau-
Ponty longing for Nietzsche's last human.  
Of course, Merleau-Ponty’s commitment to the politics of the last human 
must be nuanced; observed through time, from Soviet Marxism to the ‘non-
communist left,' from the activist enthusiasm of the early days to the meditative 
spirit of the analyses of the items of news in S, for example. It has been claimed 
(wrongly, I think) that Merleau-Ponty, at some point, ‘retired’8 from politics, 
only to prompt questions about whether retiring from politics without 
disavowing the past is not itself an eminently political act, or whether one should 
not see the insistence on doing philosophy as a sign of continued political 
concern (what are the late analyses on the ontology of history, or the enigmatic 
references to ‘the militant infinite’ in the context of a discussion of fundamental 
ontology, if not a deepening of the political question?), and so forth. It remains, I 
                                                 
7 SNS, 4/8 
8 For example: Lydia Goehr, “Understanding the Engaged Philosopher” in Taylor Carman, and 
Mark B. N. Hansen, the Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, Cambridge, 2004, 344. 
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think, that Merleau-Ponty’s political project committed him to an egalitarian, 
state-based, happiness-seeking society. And Nietzsche’s did not.  
There is more: this political disagreement may be seen as a sign of a 
deeper difference. There is underlying it a profound divergence of views 
regarding the mutual roles of the political and the philosophical. The later 
Nietzsche repeatedly defines his own project as seeking “an ordering of rank”9, 
through a “reversal [Umwertung] of all values”10. In this account, his whole 
philosophy is politically directed. If the political divergence between the two 
philosophers posed some questions as to the relevance of drawing parrallels 
between them, it seems that Nietzsche’s philosophical decision to build the 
political into the horizon of his philosophy transforms this divergence into a clear 
and systematic opposition. This would indeed follow if Merleau-Ponty as well 
considered his political convinctions to be the horizon of his own philosophy. 
This, however, is not the case. It is clear that Merleau-Ponty’s investigations on 
language, perception, and ontology, although not without political consequences, 
are not subjected to a political project; on the contrary, they are quite 
traditionally directed towards truth and knowledge.  
There is also a factual argument which allows us not to reduce Nietzsche 
or Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies to mere political projects: it is us, readers. A 
quick glance at any library shelf testifies that we read, admire and are inspired by 
these thinkers beyond what they have to say about politics. We look to Nietzsche 
for insight into metaethics and gender theory, but also for views on ontology, 
                                                 
9 WP, 287 [1887] 
10 WP, 957 [1885] 
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metaphysics, the theory of knowledge or history. Likewise, most recent Merleau-
Ponty scholarship is (rightly I think) occupied with the way he connects 
perception with ontology and language with history, or any combination of the 
above. In this context, I do not think that an awareness of the political divergence 
between the two thinkers condemns to the mere anecdotic level any attempt to 
build a bridge between their contribution.  
 
Objectives. 
 In view of the numerous oppositions mentioned above, the few recent 
signs hinting at the fruitfulness of establishing a link between these two thinkers 
are all the more remarkable. This intuition is in part an expression of the peculiar 
self-awareness of our modern age. Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty are now 
established as two forces behind the present paradigm  of most continental 
philosophy, and modern philosophy’s passion for self-analysis leads it to 
examine this double lineage with renewed attention. The relationships and the 
more-or-less avowed debt of authors like Jacques Derrida or Gilles Deleuze 
towards both thinkers, the importance for Merleau-Ponty’s development of his 
encounter with Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink and, to a lesser extent, Max 
Scheler and Karl Jaspers combined with these thinkers’ own well-known 
engagement with Nietzsche—these all establish a certain kinship by association 
between the two thinkers. As two seminal moments in modern philosophy, they 
are often found associated with its many developments in critical theory, gender 
studies, investigations on the question of the body and incarnation, the theory of 
knowledge or aesthetics. For example, in her interesting Nietzsche and 
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Embodiment, Kristen Brown devotes a chapter to Merleau-Ponty, entitled 
strikingly, “Nietzsche after Nietzsche”11. There, she likens Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of the body as a self-sufficient explanatory principle for life and 
experience to Nietzsche’s. In an ambitious study, Deborah Carter Mullen has 
attempted to establish a link between Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger’s 
works through a joint analysis of their treatment of the work of art12. In what is 
to my knowledge the most sustained effort to build upon the encounter of the two 
philosophers, Rosalyn Diprose's the Bodies of Women and Corporeal 
Generosity13 propose an original philosophy of sexual and social difference 
based upon Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the constitution of 
identity out of differentiation through intersubjectivity. It is noteworthy that 
Diprose readily admits that her project is not, strictly speaking, Nietzschean or 
Merleau-Pontian. Instead it is the elaboration of an original philosophy which 
utilises these thoughts towards addressing contemporary challenges14. In this 
sense, the works I have just mentioned aim beyond a question that they do not 
solve: is there an intrinsic link between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophies? For several reasons this question is worth asking with some degree 
                                                 
11 Kristen Brown, Nietzsche and Embodiment, Discerning Bodies and Non-Dualism, SUNY 
Press, Albany, 2006, 121 ff. 
12 Deborah Carter Mullen, Beyond Subjectivity and Representation, University Press of America, 
1999. 
13 Rosalyn Diprose, the Bodies of Women, Ethics, Embodiment and Sexual Difference, Routledge, 
London, New York, 1994; Corporeal Generosity, on Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas, SUNY Press, Albany, 2002 
14 Rosalyn Diprose, Corporeal Generosity, op. Cit. 11 
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of urgency. Firstly, the interest in Merleau-Ponty continues to grow in the Anglo-
American world, while at the same time the field of Nietzsche studies remains 
impressive in diversity and intensity. Secondly, in addition to the monographs 
cited above, we must note the appearance in recent scholarship of articles 
focusing on establishing parallels between specific claims in Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty.15 Such contributions often offer fruitful advances in the themes 
they investigate, but their very nature precludes a wider contextualisation which 
alone would provide the very justification for offering parrallels in the first place. 
In the cases of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, even more than elsewhere, 
differences of contexts, styles of writing and modes of thinking are so great that 
one cannot be content with point-by-point comparisons and parrallels. In this 
context, such prima facie parallels may conceal second-analysis contradictions. 
Such considerations point to the necessity to move away from the anecdotic level 
towards the question of the intrinsic links between the two thinkers.  
The aim of this project is thus to establish an intrinsic and systematic link 
between the works of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty. The difficulty, of course, is 
                                                 
15 See for example: David Schenck,  “Merleau-Ponty on Perspectivism, with References to 
Nietzsche” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, Issue 2, 1985, 307-314; Galen 
A. Johnson, “Generosity and Forgetting in the History of Being: Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche” 
in Hugh J. Silverman (ed.) Questioning Foundations; Truth/Subjectivity/Culture, Routledge, 
New York and London, 1993; Bernard Flynn, “Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche on the Visible and 
the Invisible” in Veronique Foti (ed.) Merleau-Ponty: Difference, Materiality, Painting, 
Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J, 1996 and Fred Evans “‘Solar Love’: Nietzsche, 
Merleau-Ponty and the Fortunes of Perception,” Continental Philosophy Review, 1998, Vol. 31 
Issue, 2; Clive Cazeaux, “Sound and Synaesthesia in Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty,” Sound 
Practice, 2001, 35-40 
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in the term ‘systematic.' If by this I mean a full exposition of the two 
philosophies and the establishment of their link, failure will of course be 
inevitable and such an ambition will only amount to greater confusion. When 
drawing strong parallels between authors, it is often possible and useful to be 
guided by the (sometimes mutual) references made by the authors themselves. In 
this case however, this way is also blocked. If Merleau-Ponty did not totally 
ignore Nietzsche, it is manifest that his knowledge of him was partial and 
indirect. All we have are inconsequential allusions to only four or five primary 
texts by Nietzsche, and only once do these references signal without ambiguity a 
direct reading of Nietzsche.16  
                                                 
16 In addition, we find references—implicit or explicit—to Löwith and Heidegger’s readings of 
Nietzsche, and of course, Merleau-Ponty, as editor of the reference project on les Philosophes de 
l’Antiquité au XXè Siècle included Löwith’s remarkable essay on UM II as a presentation of 
Nietzsche, which he had decided to include in the section entitled “the Discovery of History.” 
The textual references are: GS, “Preface,” in NC, 278 f. (the only textual reference). In the 
working note to VI, we find an allusion to the enigmatic ‘Circulus Vitiosus Deus’ from BGE, 56 
(VI, 179/231, also in Heidegger, Nietzsche, II, 65 and 258, and in Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy 
of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, 54 and 
219). In another note, Merleau-Ponty writes that the visible “comes on the scene laterally, it does 
so ‘noiselessly’-in the sense that Nietzsche says great events are born noiselessly” (VI, 246/295). 
The source is in Z, II, “On the Great Events,” where Zarathustra declares: “And believe me, 
friend Hellishnoise! The greatest events––those are not our loudest but our stillest hours. Not 
around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values does the world 
revolve; inaudibly it revolves” This thought is mentioned by Löwith, op. Cit. 64. In his notice on 
Jean-Marie Guyau, Merleau-Ponty writes: “ like Nietzsche who attacked the ‘cultural camels,' the 
‘Philistines’ in the name of a disquieted immoralism, Guyau regards analysis as a ‘dissolving 
force’”(les Philosophes, “ Jean-Marie Guyau,” 989). The reference is to Zarathustra’s 
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Throughout Merleau-Ponty’s minimal allusions to Nietzsche however, 
one idea remains constant: Nietzsche is the philosopher of the end of traditional 
philosophy. With him, philosophy renounced the ‘thing-in-itself,' transcendence 
and any form of absolute. This is why in PP, Merleau-Ponty credits Nietzsche—
along with others—for having “started”17 phenomenological philosophy. This is 
not much, but what is being said, I think, is that the significance of Nietzsche is 
in the present. Indeed, there is no doubt that his thought encounters Merleau-
                                                 
“ Prologue” and probably to UM, I, 2 where Nietzsche inaugurates the expression ‘Cultural 
Philistines.' It may also be found in Heidegger’s Nietzsche, I, 124. Finally, we find a quick 
allusion to BT in Merleau-Ponty’s presentation of Greek Philosophy: “Apollo, as Nietzsche said, 
would have nothing to do if it weren’t for Dionysus, or Socrates if it weren’t for Oedipus” 
(Philosophes, “ the Founders” 122, also in Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, 94 ff.). There is an allusion of 
the Dionysus-Apollo duality in Merleau-Ponty’s commentary of GS, Preface mentioned above. 
In an interview from 1958, Merleau-Ponty expresses his disagreement with Nietzsche on the 
question of the timeliness of the philosopher. There, he clarifies what he does not mean by his 
expression “the philosophical life”: “ Nietzsche thought that a married philosopher is a comical 
character [un personnage de vaudeville], that one cannot be a philosopher and take part in secular 
life, it is not what I have meant to say” (P2, 285). The reference is to GM, III, 7. I did not detail 
the few allusions to the ‘Death of God’ (PriP, 72/27, NC, 279) or the mentions of Nietzsche’s 
name, always in an enumeration including Marx, Freud and/or Kierkegaard and Hegel. (See for 
example VI, 183/234, TL, 100-102/140-144, and PP, viii/ii). Merleau-Ponty's first engagement 
with Nietzsche was—to my knowledge—his review of the French translation of Max Scheler's 
Ressentiment (in French, l'Homme du Ressentiment). Merleau-Ponty's short review, entitled 
“Christianisme et Ressentiment” (1935) offers three indirect allusions to Nietzsche, which we can 
find reminiscences of in 1945's PriP, 72/27, where Merleau-Ponty repeats that Nietzsche's 'dead 
God' is equivalent to the dead God of Christianity. See P, 9-33. 
17 PP, viii/ii. 
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Ponty’s in the crucible of modern and post-modern continental philosophy. It is 
not my purpose to offer an analysis of modernity in philosophy, but I think it is a 
commonplace that one of the essential features of philosophy after Nietzsche is a 
certain distrust of truth-discourses, truth practices and of the very concept of 
truth. 
 
The ‘Question’ of Truth 
 
“[I]t is by borrowing from the structure ‘world’ [la structure monde] that 
is constituted for us the universe of truth and of thought [l’univers de la vérité et 
de la pensée]”  
Merleau-Ponty, VI, 13/29.18 
  
“The repudiated world versus an artificially built ‘true,' ‘valuable’ 
one.—Finally: one discovers of what material one has built the ‘true world’ and 
now all one has left is the repudiated world”  
Nietzsche, WP 37 [Spring-Fall 1887]. 
                                                 
18 t.a. See also Résumés de cours, 168-9 on the “ground”  (“ Boden” ) “ étant le fonds sur lequel 
se détache tout repos et tout mouvement.” this argument, according to which science is always 
secondary, is strikingly already put forward in the very article where the “origin of truth” is first 
mentioned. In a note, again, Merleau-Ponty praises Bergson for having “perfectly defined the 
metaphysical approach of the world” as “the deliberate exploration of this world prior to the 
object of science to which science refers”. As will be discussed later, the context of the article 
leaves no doubt that “metaphysical” qualifies the project Merleau-Ponty is assigning to himself. 
(SNS, “the metaphysical in Man” 97 note #15/118, note # 2) 
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The view that “there is no truth”19 is of course central to both Nietzsche 
and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. Yet, it is almost a triviality to say that 
criticising truth is a somewhat paradoxical thing to do because it involves that 
one tells the truth against truth. The sheer rejection of truth is insufficient 
because it dispenses with an account of the phenomenon of belief whilst at the 
same time (because it presents itself as true) confirming it. This paradox means 
that we must think of truth as having two guises. Firstly, there is a truth that is 
rejected: it is error. Secondly, there is the truth which remains, even in the 
refutation of truth: it is what I shall call the ‘phenomenon of truth.'  
Let me clarify this. For both philosophers, a belief in X is a taking-X-to-
be-true and a taking-X-to-be-true is a taking-X-to-be-exemplified in reality.20 
Both thinkers see the truth of X as the predication of X to be ‘like’ what we 
experience, that is to say, reality. This means that even if there is no truth, the 
concept of truth has meaning, it denotes a fundamentally compelling experience 
of reality.21 It is this experience which gives their meaning to truth-claims. 
                                                 
19 For example, Nietzsche, WP, 13, [Spring-Fall 1887] 
20 Let me stress that both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s critiques of truth are critiques of truth 
qua correspondence. This has been covered convincingly in the past, and I think we can convince 
ourselves of this by recalling that their critiques of truth are always related to the critique of the 
thing-in-itself. One sufficient example is Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. Even though I disagree with Clark’s account on 
several key issues which I shall discuss in Chapter One, I remain convinced by her overall 
arugment that Nietzsche conceives of truth as correspondence.  
21 PP, 213/246 
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Merleau-Ponty calls this primary experience the ‘origin of truth’ and Nietzsche 
calls it the experience  of the ‘only’ or ‘repudiated’ world, the world of 
experience. Thus, all beliefs contain a reference to this ground of reality; they are 
instances of the ‘phenomenon of truth.' This phenomenon is a faktum which 
cannot be refuted. The critique of truth means not that truth does not exist (it 
exists as a phenomenon—the belief in truth), but that it is erroneous. Here, we 
encounter a disjunction of truth and reality: belief in truth is erroneous, yet it is 
real, it is grounded in experience. If truth is an error, we must ask ourselves how 
error is possible in reality. Here, we are on ontological ground. The task is to 
include error among the real possibilities of Being22. How must we think of 
Being so as to include within it the possibility of error? 
Consider for example Nietzsche’s conundrum:  
“ And if this moral judging and discontent with the real were indeed, as has been 
claimed, an ineradicable instinct, might that instinct not then be one of the ineradicable 
stupidities or indeed presumptions of our species? –But by saying this we’re doing exactly what 
we rebuke: the standpoint of desirability, of unwarrantedly playing the judge, is part of the 
character of the course of things” 23 
 This prompts the question: “What is a belief? How does it originate? 
Every belief is a holding-to-be-true”24. The reality of beliefs (even though they 
                                                 
22 In the whole of the thesis, I shall capitalise the ‘b’ of ‘Being’ when it refers to the object of 
ontological inquiries. I shall not capitalise it (mainly in the Nietzsche sections), when it refers to 
the fact of being or the being of such and such singular being. I shall use the plural ‘beings,’ 
without capitalisation, to designate singular ontic objects. This does not apply to quotations, 
where I maintain the original spelling. 
23 VII, [62] Late 1886-Spring 1887. 
24 XI [41] Fall 1887. 
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are erroneous) cannot be rejected, it prompts the question of its possibility. 
Merleau-Ponty states the question in even clearer terms:  
“If reflection is to justify itself as reflection, that is to say, as progress towards the truth, 
it must not merely put one view of the world in place of another, it must show us how the naive 
view of the world is included in and transcended by the sophisticated one [la vue réfléchie].”25  
Here Merleau-Ponty, like Nietzsche, seeks to ‘include’ errors within his 
view of reality. I shall refer to this question—that is to say, the question of the 
ground of truth as error—as ‘the question of truth.'  
 
Ambiguity. 
“By definition, it seems there cannot be any consciousness of ambiguity 
without some ambiguity of consciousness.” 
Merleau-Ponty, P2, 331. 
 
“One should not want to divest existence of its rich ambiguity.” 
Nietzsche, GS 373. 
 
The implication of the question of truth is that we cannot reduce 
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s views on truth to their mere critique. The critique 
of truth is not the end of their thinking on truth, it is the beginning. It frames their 
driving question: 'what makes belief and non-belief in truth equally mistaken?' 
Here, we arrive, I think, at the core of what has been emphatically called 
                                                 
25 PP, 213/247 
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Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche’s ‘ambiguities.' In an article from 194726, 
Ferdinand Alquié gave an account of Merleau-Ponty’s work thus far entitled “A 
Philosophy of Ambiguity." The expression was so accurate that Merleau-Ponty 
himself is said to have endorsed it, and Alphonse de Waelhens entitled his own 
remarkable book on Merleau-Ponty likewise27. It is well-known to anyone with a 
passing interest in Nietzsche that his work distinguishes itself by a singular lack 
of univocity. Often Nietzsche has been called “contradictory” and “ambiguous." 
Most perceptive readers however have detected in this feature more than a lack 
of rigour, a philosophical insight: Nietzsche’s philosophy, like Merleau-Ponty’s, 
is not an ambiguous philosophy, it is a philosophy of ambiguity28.  
The question concerning truth has a privileged relationship with the 
problematic of ambiguity because the ‘phenomenon of truth’ escapes the 
alternative of the true and the false, the empirical and the intellectual, and 
instead, opens up a space beyond these dichotomies where these dichotomies are 
explicated. Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty agree to call this ambiguous 
space ‘existence.’ Existence is ambiguity, and consequently, it is also the 
awareness of ambiguity. As Merleau-Ponty explains in the quote above, in order 
                                                 
26 Ferdinand Alquié, “une Philosophie de l’Ambiguité, l’Existentialisme de Merleau-Ponty,”in 
Fontaine, XI, Issue 59, 47-70. 
27 Alphonse de Waelhens, une Philosophie de l’Ambiguité, l’Existentialisme de Merleau-Ponty, 
Publications Universitaires de Louvain, Leuwen, 1951. 
28 The most explicit example is Wolfgang Müller-Lauter’s Nietzsche, the Contradictions in his 
Philosophy and his Philosophy of Contradictions, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and 
Chicago, 1999. Müller-Lauter opens his book with a survey of the positions of Nietzsche 
scholarship on the question of Nietzsche’s contradictions, ambiguities and equivocities. See 1-6.  
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to conceive of ambiguity our consciousness must be more than a pure conceptual 
power: it must be ambiguous itself. For consciousness to be ambiguous means it 
must be dependent on the non-conceptual and be aware of this dependence. By 
showing its own dependence on the ground of experience, consciousness exposes 
the reality of the non-conscious. In short, it poses the question of truth. Reality 
(the ground for the predication of truth) does not exist in concepts, consequently 
our very consciousness of it involves our experience of it. The ambiguity of our 
existence lies in the ambiguity of the question of truth: why do we experience 
phenomenal reality as conceptual truth?  
My hypothesis is that the question of truth and its treatment by Nietzsche 
and Merleau-Ponty constitute a systematic link running between their two 
philosophies, and it shall be the guiding thread of my argument. My aim 
therefore will be to address Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of this 
question in such a way that an intrinsic and systematic link between their 
philosophies becomes apparent. Of course, the very nature of the comparative 
approach requires making two arguments. A) Firstly, it demands that I come to 
some consequential conclusions regarding Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s views 
on the question of truth as defined above. B) Secondly, it requires that these 
conclusions establish a kinship between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophies in a consequential way. In turn, this second requirement will be 
fully fulfilled under two conditions. B, i) Firstly, I need to demonstrate that the 
question of truth as defined above does indeed hold a similarly important place 
within both thinkers’ philosophies. B, ii) Secondly, I must show the similarity of 
their solutions to the problems posed by this question.  
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These three requirements apply at different levels. A) requires an in-depth 
engagement with each of these philosophers on his own terms. B, i) requires a 
comparative analysis of the structure of each thinker’s philosophy, and B, ii), a 
comparative examination of both thinkers’ positions. It is impossible in the thesis 
to offer a direct treatment of all three questions. The treatment of A) is a 
necessary condition for the treatment of the other two and therefore, I shall focus 
mainly on A). I will limit my comments on B, ii) only pointing out the similarity 
between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s results in the Conclusion. As regards B, 
i), I shall not provide any explicit argument as to the strategic importance of the 
question of truth in both philosophers’ worldviews or their development, even 
though, as I shall discuss in the conclusion, there is an implicit argument for this 
claim. My giving priority to A) and limiting the space of my discussion of B) 
entails a certain reduction of the scope of the comparison between Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty, but it lends it greater solidity. As I mentioned earlier, the danger 
of such a project is to offer a collection of more or less mere anecdotic 
comparisons.  
Textual comparisons, for example, although tempting, leave too much to 
the intuition of the reader if they make us dispense with an analysis of the 
context of each author’s individual work. Merleau-Ponty himself warned against 
expressing the potential links between thinkers in purely textual terms. After 
having presented Nietzsche as one of his predecessors, he adds, however, that 
“[a] purely linguistic examination of the texts in question would yield no proof; 
we find in texts only what we put into them.”29 By the same token, a thematic 
                                                 
29 PP, viii/ii  
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treatment, which would break down Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s views on the 
question of truth into a number of themes, would run the risk of taking for 
granted what is to be established, i. e. the comparability between the two 
philosophies. Moreover, such a ‘transversal’ structure may fail to render the 
unity of one philosopher’s views, and this unity is I think crucial in any reading 
of such enigmatic and prematurely interrupted thoughts as Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty’s. In these cases especially, the only test of the soundness of our 
readings is consistency. My priority therefore is to establish that it is both good 
Nietzsche and good Merleau-Ponty to build a link between their philosophies. 
This requires me to treat each author on his own terms, and within his own 
specific context. 
As a consequence, the greater part of this thesis appears as a juxtaposition 
of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the question of truth. In the first 
part (chapters I-III), I examine Nietzsche’s efforts to offer a worldview which 
takes stock of the possibility of the erroneous belief in truth. Chapters IV-VI are 
devoted to Merleau-Ponty’s efforts towards the same end. The juxapositional 
structure presents some formal inconvenience, but I think no truly philosophical 
one. I see two disadvantages to it. First, of course, it forces the reader through a 
sharp change of context, when moving from chapter III to IV. In order to ease 
this contrast, I propose a short transitional discussion. This contrast however is 
also a guarantee of the success of the thesis. As I have emphasised, this project is 
entirely dependent on the validity and self-sufficiency of my analyses of each 
philosopher and it furthers my purpose if the discussion succeeds in immersing 
the reader in the universe of each thinker. This means that I have kept mutual 
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references between the two philosophers to a minimum, and that only when it 
applied directly to the other author’s treatment of the question of truth have I 
pointed briefly towards the relations. This highlights the second difficulty 
presented by the juxtapositional structure. Any reader with more than a passing 
acquaintance with both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty will find many possible 
links ignored. For example, I do not pursue in detail the relations between 
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of events, of ‘interest,’ or of dialectics. 
Each of these issues, and others, would deserve a separate project. However, my 
present aim is to contribute to making such future inquiries possible and 
unfortunately I shall not be able to pursue these issues here.  
 
The Thesis. 
This is the conclusion Merleau-Ponty reaches at the end of his 
investigation into the question of truth. As I show at the end of chapter III, it is 
also Nietzsche’s conclusion. Demonstrating this, I think, provides a satisfactory 
and systematic link between the two thinkers’ philosophies. It thereby satisfies 
the objective of this project. The core question of this project is the question of 
truth, and the thesis I defend is that both Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche respond 
to this question in the same way. I think this link satisfies the requirement of 
being sytematic and intrinsic because it is placed at the ontological level. This 
means that it is intrinsically connected with every aspect of each thinker’s 
worldview.  
Of course, this involves some presuppositions that I would like to clarify. 
I think that for this thesis to establish a systematic link between Nietzsche and 
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Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies, it must be shown that both philosophies are a) 
systematic, and b) organised around their ontology. Addressing these two points 
requires me to return to a point I have not yet made explicit.  
I have indicated that I shall not provide any explicit argument for my 
claim that the question of truth has structural importance in the works of the two 
authors. Recall that it was only under this condition—which I labelled B, i)—that 
my argument can be said to establish an intrinsic link between the two 
philosophies. I would like to briefly make explicit two arguments (which will 
remain implicit in the rest of the thesis) in favour of this claim. The first one is 
that the question of truth leads both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty into a similar, 
if unusual, ontology. The structural role assumed by this question for their 
ontology indicates, I think, that it is a question that goes beyond the simple 
anecdotic level. The second one is related to the structure of the development of 
both thinker’s ideas on the question of truth. Even though this is not the central 
concern of this thesis, I would like to point out that not only do their treatments 
arrive at similar conclusions but also that they do so in a similar way. As I 
explained, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the question of truth are 
organised around three key ideas. In each part, I have devoted a chapter to each. 
Firstly, Nietzsche encounters the ground from which the phenomenon of truth 
arises (chapter I). Like Merleau-Ponty who calls this ground the ‘origin of truth’ 
(chapter IV), Nietzsche finds this ground to include a pre-objective, intentional 
structure30. He then seeks a method to attain this authentic ground beyond the 
                                                 
30 It is worth clarifying in which sense the word "intentional" is used here. Largely under the 
influence of commentators influenced by the Philosophy of Mind, such as John Richardson and 
Peter Poellner, the term "intentionality" which traditionally belongs to the context of 
phenomenology, has been increasingly applied to Nietzsche's philosophy. In this context, it 
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false beliefs to which it has given rise: the thing-in-itself, subjects, objects, selves 
and values. He finds this method in what he calls the ‘incorporation of truth’ (II). 
Like Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the phenomenological ‘reduction’ (V), the 
incorporation of truth is intended as a means of obtaining direct knowledge of 
the ground of truth and to undo our belief in sedimented objects. Finally, Both 
Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche recognize in this ground the ground of Being, and 
consequently integrate its characteristics in their ontologies. As a result, Being is 
conceived as the very movement of the self-differentiation from which originates 
the phenomenon of truth (III and VI).  
                                                 
denotes the essential activity of the will to power which is to structure itself by positing an 
implicit object for itself. In other words, the will to power pre-objectively points to an intentional 
object. See for example, John Richardson, op. Cit. (1996), 35 ff. 
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CHAPTER I: 
NIETZSCHE ON SELF-DIFFERENTIATION AND 
GENEALOGY 
In Chapter One, I examine Nietzsche’s genealogy of the predication of 
truth. Nietzsche encounters the question of truth as the question of the meaning 
of ‘truth.' How do we even conceive of something such as truth?  
Concepts for Nietzsche are sublimations of our experiences. They are a 
result of our simplifying and solidifying a perceptual reality which is always 
indeterminate. This process that Nietzsche calls ‘sublimation’ makes it possible 
(theoretically, at least) to trace a concept back to an original experience. The 
question Nietzsche asks is: if the concept of truth did arise from a primary 
experience, what may this experience have been? If we wish to relate truth to an 
original experience, Nietzsche thinks, it means that we need to conceive of 
experience in a new way. It is no longer possible to envisage experience as the 
experience of pure immanence. Doing so would make it impossible to explain 
the separation of truth and experience, that is to say, the fact that we can apply 
the concept true to what is not experienced. Nietzsche claims that any experience 
involves an implicit predication of truth. (Merleau-Ponty will call such a gap a 
“zone of subjectivity” ). The explicitation of this predication, which requires 
concepts, is thus only a radicalisation of the implicit one through language. It is 
only because we needed to attain mutual comprehension at a linguistic level that 
this basic form of consciousness expanded.  
 23 
For Nietzsche, primary consciousness and implicit predication are 
correlative. Nietzsche expresses this point most strikingly in his genealogy of 
human consciousness. For him, human consciousness and self-consciousness are 
two sides of the same coin. Consciousness is represented as a ‘gap’ between the 
human subject and the object of consciousness, whereas self-consciousness is 
represented as a ‘gap’ within the self. For Nietzsche, this double gap is 
genealogically primary. It cannot be conceived as derived from any anterior 
principle. 
 Nietzsche conceives of this primary ‘gap’ as establishing a certain 
reversibility of the subject-object relation. I shall refer to this reversibility as 
‘self-differentiation.' The human ‘subject’ is self-differentiated because it can 
take itself as an object and adopt an external outlook towards itself. For 
Nietzsche, neither the subject (self) nor the object is primary. Anterior to them is 
a purely intentional structure described as ‘interest.' Another name for interest is 
‘will to power.' It is this structure which is at the root of the experience of truth: 
something is true if I have a relation of interest with it. This interest can be 
directed towards an external object (for conquest) or towards the self (for self-
preservation). In the first case, I am the subject of the interest; in the latter, I am 
its object. For Nietzsche, this reversibility of interest is prior even to any subject 
or object of interest. By contrast, subject and objects are fictions induced by the 
structure of interest. This is because Nietzsche not only places self-
differentiation within the self, but he places it as anterior to the self too. In terms 
of the question of truth, this suggests two points: firstly, truth, as structured by 
objectivity is impossible (by objectivity, I shall mean the view that sees subject 
 24 
and object as two opposed, real and self-identical entities) because neither the 
subject nor the object, nor their separation is primary. Secondly, it demonstrates 
how even this error is informed by the real ground of experience: the belief in 
truth is the inauthentic expression of the authentic ground of interest.  
For Nietzsche, we must come to the recognition that truth is a 
falsification of reality because our belief in truth supports our belief in values, 
and these values make us sick. He defines sickness as an inner antagonism and 
health as inner harmony. As a consequence, Nietzsche seeks a way for us to live 
according to the truth that he proposes; namely, the truth that truth is a 
falsification of reality, and thus so are values.  
 
A.  TRUTH AND VALUES: from Perceptual Faith to Blind Faith 
“ Basic problem: whence this omnipotence of faith? Of faith in morality?” 
WP, 253 [1885-1886] 
Nietzsche's  Nietzsche’s method for disproving truth is to expose its concealed 
essence  through the genealogical inquiry. He uncovers that truth is valued not 
because it is true, but because it is useful, to the point that true has come to be 
said not of the true, but of the useful. here, truth and values collide. Yet, the 
very importance of the value of utility is warranted only with reference to 
reality, a reality which is presented as an object of interest or as a threat, and 
which, consequently, we must know the truth about. For Nietzsche, this 
uncovers the basic ground which I have called the experience of truth: the 
concept of truth is derived from an original experience which is the primal 
encounter with the world. This exposes our basic relation with the world as a 
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relation of interest, while at the same time, establishing that this relation of 
interest is also an epistemic relation: there is an equation between truth and 
interest.   It is necessary for us to examine further this relation for two reasons. 
First, it will help us understand the essence of truth itself, and give us access to 
the ground which produced the phenomenon of truth, and from which the 
concept of truth has been abstracted. Secondly, in relation with Merleau-Ponty, 
it will help us clarify what is meant when we talk of”intentionality" in 
Nietzsche. For the phenomenologists, it doesn't seem (at first sight, and we will 
see that this must be refined) that intentionality has anything to do with interest, 
on the contrary, in a typically Husserlian setup, intentionality comes through 
when personal interest is removed. Yet, as I will argue, we may see in 
Nietzsche' ultra-refined notion of interest, a way to reconcile the intentionality 
as interest with the intentionality of the phenomenologists. This is because for 
Nietzsche, interest is an expression of an intentionality which pre-exists any 
subject or object of this very interest, and therefore this intentionality is not 
defined by personal interest either.  
 
i. From Reality to Unreality. 
a.  GS 354 and GM, II, 16. 
In book V of GS and in GM31, Nietzsche is concerned with 
explaining “the whole inner world ”32 in the terms of a “piece of animal-
                                                 
31 The two texts are intimately linked; in GM III, 24, Nietzsche refers to “the whole fifth book of 
[GS]” as a development of his discussion.  
32 GM, II, 16. 
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psychology”33. This process unfolds in several steps, to which Nietzsche 
attributes different importance in different texts. In GS 354, for example, 
Nietzsche presents reflexive consciousness as the crucial event that determines 
the rest of human spiritual development. In GM, II, 16, by contrast, self-
consciousness is already established and Nietzsche draws from it to explain the 
phenomenon of “bad conscience.” In fact, these two texts seek to achieve two 
slightly different things. GS 354 is explicitly concerned with the appearance of 
predicative consciousness, and leads to a genealogical account of the will to 
knowledge and self-knowledge: man, “as the most endangered animal [...] 
needed to ‘know’ himself what distressed him, to ‘know’ how he felt, he needed 
to ‘know’ what he thought.” GM, II, 16, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
mechanism by which external constraints made their way into the individual, so 
that one directs oneself no longer spontaneously, but according to self-imposed 
external criteria. This piece of genealogy is concerned with the binding power of 
values:  
“those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the 
old instincts of freedom –punishment as a primary instance of these kinds of bulwarks, had the 
result that all these instincts of the wild, free, roving man, were turned backwards, against man 
himself.” 
Nietzsche calls “bad conscience” this self-antagonism of the human. This 
process is described as the “internalization of man” because it accounts for the 
human’s internalizing external constraints into self-constraints; that is to say, the 
human’s adhesion and collaboration to her own oppression. Although their focus 
is slightly different, it is clear that Nietzsche relates the same event in both texts. 
                                                 
33 GM, III, 20. 
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In GS, 354, the pressure from one’s hostile environment—and especially from 
other humans—leads one’s consciousness to expand and Nietzsche says, 
“consciousness is almost a disease.” In GM, II, 16, ‘bad conscience’ (the self-
accusation of the human thrown into the “social straitjacket”34) is also 
characterised as a ‘sickness’35. 
 
b. Needs and the Experience of Reality. 
There is a fundamental level which roots both the will to 
conscious knowledge (related in GS 354) and the striving for becoming moral 
(GM, II, 16). This level is the starting point of both genealogical accounts: it is 
the level of needs. In GS 354, Nietzsche affirms that “consciousness has 
developed only under the pressure for the need for communication,” but the need 
for communication is itself submitted to the need of needs, survival: “as the most 
endangered animal, [man] needed help and protection, he needed his peers, he 
had to learn to express his distress.” In GM, II, 9, needs present themselves as 
responses to threats. Threats come in two forms: the first one is the threat of a 
“savage” and warlike environment which causes the individual to seek the 
                                                 
34 GM, II, 2 
35 As a confirmation of this link, let me refer to Nietzsche’s earlier characterisation of the ‘evil 
man’ in D, 499. In this aphorism, Nietzsche characterises sociability as the origin of the 
“martyrdom of the evil man,” who is ‘evil’ only in society. In society, Nietzsche insists, the evil 
man learns self-reflexivity, and this is his ‘martyrdom’: “it is indeed a fact that in the midst of 
society and sociability, every evil inclination has to place itself under such great restraint, don so 
many masks, lay itself so often to the Procrustean bed of virtue, that one could well speak of the 
martyrdom of the evil man” D, 499 (my emphasis) 
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protection of society,36 the second is that of the repressive judicial structures of 
this very society.37 However, Nietzsche writes, the latter threat is only another 
version of the natural one.38 Hence, there is no other threat for the animal man 
than the threat of physical harm. It is her body that the individual seeks to 
preserve by entering society, and, subsequently, by internalizing her drives.  
The consubstantiality between natural and institutional hostility is echoed 
by the parallel between the self-torture described in GM, II, 16 as the birth of bad 
conscience and the torture described in GM, II, 3. In this section, Nietzche gives 
an account of the dramatic expansion of the human’s mnemonic capacities 
necessary for the functioning of a society based on promise. If bad conscience 
represents the expansion of a “thinly stretched internal world” through self 
torture,39 the same goes for “conscience.” The torture which created 
                                                 
36 “You live in a community, you enjoy the benefits of a community (oh, what benefits! 
Sometimes we underestimate them today), you live a sheltered, protected life in peace and trust, 
without any worry of suffering certain kinds of harm and hostility to which the man outside, the 
‘man without peace’ is exposed [...] you make pledges and take on obligations to the community 
with just that harm and hostility in mind” GM, II, 9 
37 “the lawbreaker [...] is reminded how important these benefits are. [...] the community makes 
him return to the savage and outlawed state from which he was sheltered hitherto: he is cast out –
and now any kind of hostile act can be perpetrated on him” GM, II, 9 
38 “punishment at this level of civilisation is simply a copy, a mimus, of normal behaviour 
towards a hated, disarmed enemy [...] which explains the fact that war itself (including the 
warlike cult of the sacrificial victim) has given us all forms in which punishment manifests itself 
in history” ibid. 
39 GM, II, 16. 
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“conscience” sought an expansion of the narrow and scarce mnemonic ability 
inherited from the originary animal psyche.40  
Let me emphasise at the outset that in none of these texts is Nietzsche 
concerned with accounting for a leap from the non-conscious to the conscious, 
from the absence of an internal world to its appearance, or from the absence of 
memory to its creation. Nietzsche’s is not a story of creation, it is a story of 
expansion. Nietzsche makes no attempt to account for the emergence of such an 
“animal psyche” out of anything anterior. Likewise, there is no difference made 
between a “need” and the perception of one. A need is not an external objective 
constraint, but it is a psychological state. The domain of needs is the only domain 
of the basic animal psyche. This amounts to saying that the emergence of 
consciousness is not equivalent to the emergence of thought: “man,” Nietzsche 
writes, “like every other human being, thinks continually without knowing it” 
and “we could think, feel, will and remember, and we could also ‘act’ in every 
sense of that word, and yet none of this would have to ‘enter our 
consciousness’.”41 By taking the basic animal psyche and nothing beyond (for 
example matter) as his starting point, Nietzsche offers an unusual 
characterisation of animality not as pure mechanics, but as an intentional form of 
life.42 The primacy of intentionality is signalled by the fact that Nietzsche 
regards need as the ultimate feature that informed human destiny. A need signals 
                                                 
40 GM, II, 3 
41 GS 354 
42 This basic intentionality is represented in different ways in the texts of 1886-1887: as basic 
memory in GM, II, 3, as the basic “internal world stretched thinly as between two layers of skin” 
in GM, II, 16, as subconscious agency in GS, 354, and as willful motricity in BGE 19. 
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the encounter of the world and the organism. As such, it is the most basic form of 
intentionality. Consequently, as I will discuss further, it is intentionality and 
nothing else which is at the root of the human trajectory towards truth and 
values.  
 
c. Sublimation and the Thing-in-Itself. 
Although these texts may be relating expansion only, Nietzsche 
puts considerable emphasis on this expansion. It is this expansion, for example, 
that created a new form of life (GM, II, 16). It seems that something is acquired 
in the process of this expansion from the animal psyche to the full-blown internal 
world of the sick animal man which turns a difference of degree (mere 
expansion) into an apparently radical difference. This question is related to an 
insight of the young Nietzsche’s. It is the question of the conceptualisation of 
experience. In 1873’s TL, Nietzsche gives a fictional43 account of the birth of 
concepts out of experience44: an experience becomes communicated, it becomes 
                                                 
43 This text may be viewed as genealogical. However, it is clear that genealogy should be taken in 
another sense in this case, insofar as it does not have any claim to historical verifiability. In GM, 
on the contrary, Nietzsche makes it clear that he intends ot offer “a real history of morality”, a 
“grey” history, “which is to say, that which can be documented, which can actually be confirmed, 
which has actually existed” (Preface, 7). It is for this reason that I prefer to describe this text as 
“fictional”.   
44 In my view, the importance of the early texts with regard to this question does not undermine 
the necessity of an emphasis on the texts of 1887. It simply requires that we consider the later 
texts as a genealogical consolidation of the claims of the early Nietzsche. In the Preface to GM, 
Nietzsche traces his interest for the genealogical form of inquiry to 1877’s Human all too 
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a ‘word,' and thereby, it becomes abstracted from its context. At this point, the 
word becomes a concept, and the experience is generalised:  
“Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve 
as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original [...]. Every concept arises from the 
equation of unequal things.”45  
The consequence of this process is that the experience becomes 
objectified. This objectification is expressed in HATH, I, 1 and WP, 640 as 
“sublimation”: sublimation “tears [...] judgments from their conditionality in 
which they have grown,” and thereby, they become “denaturalized.”46 As a 
result, there is abstraction from the context and generalisation: the experience is 
transformed into a piece of knowledge.47 Elsewhere, Nietzsche characterises this 
phenomenon as a “hardening,”48 a “simplification” and a “reduction.”49 This has 
great consequences: the de-contextualisation of the experience entails the 
                                                 
Human, and, he adds “the thoughts themselves go back further”. (Preface, 2), and BGE 2, is 
almost a litteral repetition of HATH 1.  
45 PT, 83. See also GS, 111: “Innumerable beings who made inferences in a way different from 
ours perished; for all that, their ways might have been truer. Those, for example, who did not 
now how to find often enough what is ‘equal’ as regards both nourishment and hostile animals-
those, in other words, who subsumed things too slowly and cautiously-were favoured with a 
lesser probability of survival” 
46 WP, 430 [March-June 1888] 
47 WP, 640 [1883-1888] 
48 WP, 608 [1886-1887] 
49 WP, 640 [1883-1888] 
 32 
forgetting of its essentially phenomenal nature, and its hardening into an 
objective “thing.”50 
In GS 354 this process is described as a necessary condition of language, 
and therefore, as a necessary consequence of the emergence of consciousness 
(consciousness is informed by the need for communication). This “reduction” of 
the particular (experience) to the common entails the illusion that the object of 
language is independent from the speaker, that is to say, the illusion of the 
“thing-in-itself.” 
In HATH, I, 1, Nietzsche sees the basic dualities that underly 
metaphysical thought as sublimations:  
“How can something originate in its opposite, for example rationality in irrationality, 
[...] truth in error? Metaphysical philosophy has hitherto surmounted this difficulty by denying 
that the one originates in the other and assuming for the more highly valued thing a miraculous 
source in the very kernel and being of the 'thing in itself.' Historical philosophy, [...] has 
discovered in individual cases (and this will probably be the result in every case) that there are no 
opposites, except in the customary exaggeration of popular or metaphysical interpretations, and 
that a mistake in reasoning lies at the bottom of this antithesis: according to this explanation there 
exists, strictly speaking, neither an unegoistic action nor completely disinterested contemplation; 
both are only sublimations, in which the basic element seems almost to have dispersed and 
reveals itself only under the most painstaking observation.”51  
                                                 
50 See Eugen Fink, Nietzsche’s Philosophy, (Trans. Goetz Richter) Continuum, New York & 
London, 2003, 145 ff. 
51 This thought from 1878 is remarkably echoed by the second aphorism of 1886’s BGE, 
demonstrating Nietzsche’s continued emphasis on this question, consider: “How could something 
arise from its opposite? Truth from error, for example? Or the will to truth from the will to 
deception? Or altruism from egoism? [...] Such origination is impossible, whoever dreams of it is 
a fool, or worse; those things of highest value must have a different orgin, their own; they cannot 
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The “basic element” which this exaggeration disperses is unaldurated 
experience. This, Nietzsche announces, is uncovered by “historical philosophy” 
(genealogy). In GS, 111, Nietzsche reverses the question concerning truth posed 
here by ‘metaphysics.' It is no longer a question of establishing how truth 
originated in error, but instead, how error originated in truth:  
“How did logic come into existence in man’s head? Certainly out of illogic, whose 
realm originally must have been immense. Innumerable beings who made inferences in a way 
different from ours perished. For all that, their ways might have been truer.” 
These ways were ‘truer’ because they did not have recourse to 
objectification: “those who subsumed things too slowly and cautiously—were 
favoured with a lesser probability of survival,” the aphorism says. This 
establishes the opposition between two unlikely conceptual pairs: truth and 
“illogic” on the one hand, and untruth and logic on the other. Nietzsche clearly 
considers consciousness to be a falsification of experience.  
                                                 
be derived from this perishable, seductive, deceptive, lowly world, from this confusion of desire 
and delusion! Rather, their basis must lie in the womb of existence, in the imperishable, in the 
hidden God, in the ‘thing-in-itself'—and nowhere else! Judgments of this kind constitute the 
typical prejudice by which we can always recognize the metaphysicians of every age; [...] The 
metaphysicians’ fundamental belief is the belief in the opposition of values...” BGE, 2. For an 
illuminating discussion of the implications of Nietzsche’s rejection of the opposition and its 
replacement by differences in degrees, see Jean Granier’s commentary on this aphorism: 
Nietzsche rejects the “Metaphysical thinking [which] overlooks all nuances, degrees and 
transitions. On the level of phenomena, it stresses systematically the virtual points of rupture and 
highlights all contrasts so as to exaggerate the differences into irreducible contradictions.” Jean 
Granier, Le problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche, Seuil, Paris, (1966); 41. See 
also the “Wanderer and his Shadow,” 67. 
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ii. The Objectivity of Values. 
 
a. Imagination. 
The process of conceptualisation I have just described involves a 
de-contextualisation of experience. This results in the disjunction of presence 
and reality: the human animal learns to consider as ‘real’ what she is not 
experiencing, and further, she learns to consider the perception of the concept as 
the perception of the ‘thing’: the thing may be absent but attributed reality as if it 
were present:  
 “First images—to explain how images arise in the spirit. Then words, applied to 
images. Finally concepts, possible only when there are words—the collecting together of many 
images in something nonvisible but audible (word). The tiny amount of emotion to which the 
"word" gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for which one word exists—this weak 
emotion is the common element, the basis of the concept. That weak sensations are regarded as 
alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact. Thus confusion of two sensations that 
are close neighbors, as we take note of these sensations; but who is taking note? Believing is the 
primal beginning even in every sense impression: a kind of affirmation the first intellectual 
activity! A "holding-true" in the beginning! Therefore it is to be explained: how "holding-true" 
arose! What sensation lies behind ‘true’?”52.  
Here, Nietzsche explains how we come to envisage multiple sensations in 
a unified way: through language and conceptuality, different sensations are 
identified to each other, because they are identified with the concept which is 
unique. In doing so, Nietszche attaches the basic act of perception with what one 
                                                 
52 WP, 506 [1884]. On the coincidence of the development of consciousness and the development 
of the faculty of imagination, see GM, I, 10 & 15, GM II, 18, 19 & 23, GM, III, 12, GS, 107, 294 
& 359.  
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may call in Merleau-Ponty's terms, our ‘perceptual faith.’ Compare Merleau-
Ponty: “it is because first I believe in the world and in the things that I believe in 
the order of the connections of my thoughts”53 and Nietzsche: “Believing is the 
primal beginning even in every sense impression.” Concepts rely on the 
similarity between the “sensation” that arises from the words and the sensation 
arising from the original object of “perceptual faith.” Let me note in passing that 
this similarity between the sensation of the word and the experience will 
precisely be investigated by Merleau-Ponty under the heading ‘sense.’ This 
similarity gives us access to an invisible world. The expansion of man’s basic 
animal psychology (which offered us memory, consciousness, and the soul) 
involves the expansion of perceptual faith (the sensation that “lies behind ‘true’”) 
into imagination.  
This accounts for the emergence of second-order knowledge. With it, the 
question of the witness, the “truth-sayer” becomes crucial. In Nietzsche’s terms, 
of course, the critical point becomes determining whether and how much a 
concept is truly a “close neighbour” of an experience. By this mechanism, reality 
(the object of experience) becomes doubled with truth (the degree of ‘closeness’ 
between a concept and a reality). This discussion, I believe, provides some 
clarification regarding what I have described above as the “pairing” of truth and 
illogic. In normative terms, this pair is dissymetric: truth derives its value from 
the illogic of experience, and not the reverse. This is crucial; something is true 
only if it corresponds to a real experience. The feeling of truth is derived from 
                                                 
53 VI, 51/75 
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the feeling of reality. In other words, the criterion of value remains in our 
attributing perceptual faith to an object, that is, in our affirming its reality. 
 
b. Backworlds.  
The emergence of the faculty of imagination entails the illusion of 
the coexistence of two realms: the empirical and the imagined. Thereby, it 
provides the structure for what Nietzsche calls other-worldliness. This 
coexistence however is flawed with a paradox: there are two realms but only one 
way to be real: the mode of perceptual faith, which is spatio-temporal. In the 
spatio-temporal mode of being, the coexistence itself is impossible (a certain 
time and space can be occupied by only one thing). This means that the realm of 
imagination and the realm of perception cannot be indifferent to each other; they 
are in competition. Consider:  
“Being and appearance, psychologically considered, yield no ‘being-in-itself,' no 
criterion of ‘reality,’ but only for grades of appearance measured by the strength of the interest 
we show in an appearance. There is no struggle for existence between ideas and perceptions but a 
struggle for dominion.”54  
The relations between these two realms are directed by a zero-sum rule. 
One realm’s increase in reality is the other realm’s loss. It is the individual who 
attributes reality to one or the other realm. As a result, the individual is placed 
before a choice and has to affirm a preference. Here, according to Nietzsche, we 
encounter the structure of valuation. The competition between values (the 
imaginary world) and empirical reality (‘appearance’) should not lead us to 
believe that Nietzsche treats them symmetrically. In fact, the superiority of the 
                                                 
54 WP, 588 [1883-886] 
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empirical world is unchallenged. Firstly, there is a genealogical priority of the 
empirical world; it is out of this world that the imaginary world arises, and not 
the reverse. There is also a necessary priority for the world of experience: we 
attribute truth to such and such idea because we experienced truth in the form of 
perceptual faith. However, we know that Nietzsche laments that the empirical 
world (‘this world,' the ‘only world’) is devaluated by our predominantly 
Christian-ascetic civilisation and that truth is on the contrary attributed to what 
he calls the ‘backworlds.' How is this reversal possible if the empirical world has 
such a double priority over the imagined world? 
N i e t z s c h e  remarks that no moral system has ever been able to 
liberatevalues from their dependence on reality. On the contrary, the world 
of values, which he often refers to ironically as the “real world,” is valuable 
precisely because it presents itself as real; that is, as “close neighbours” with the 
world of experience: “The ‘real world,' however one has hitherto conceived it—
it has always been the apparent world once again.”55
 
In fact, reality is the 
ground of value: we do not value reality because it is good; instead, we value 
values because they are real (or so we think). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 WP, 566 [Nov. 1887-March 1888], this is a question that intensely occupied Nietzsche in the 
second half of 1887. See in particular Notebooks 8, 9 and 11 of 1887. On the “real world” being 
an imitation of the world of experience, see also TI, IV.  
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B. SELF-DIFFERENTIATION. 
 
 So far, I have been drawing a picture of Nietzsche’s account of the 
relations of truth and values in his genealogical texts. It is now possible, I think, 
to draw some consequences as to the ontology which constitutes the theoretical 
basis for such accounts. In the remainder of this section, I would like to 
emphasise the structural importance of the view which I find in Nietzsche that 
both the self and reality are characterised essentially by self-differentiation. By 
self-differentiation, I shall mean no other thing than the ability to be 
simultaneously subject and object for oneself.  
 
i. Reality as Intentionality. 
 
Mankind’s ability to abstract ‘reality’ from the ‘real’ world and to 
subsequently attribute it to other fantastical objects such as values, so-called 
“backworlds” or “God,” used to puzzle Kant, who famously pointed out that 
“Being is evidently not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that can be 
added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or of certain 
determinations in themselves.”56 For Nietzsche, the problem is—if it is 
possible—even more acute. This faculty of abstraction is responsible for 
imagination, memory, sociability, consciousness, and self-consciousness. Those 
                                                 
56 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 598, B 626; Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
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intellectual faculties have ethical consequences: bad conscience, morals, and 
religion. This faculty of abstraction is also paradoxical. On the one hand, it 
presupposes the ability to experience reality as the identity of the thing and its 
existence  (faith as ‘perceptual faith’57); on the other hand, it involves the ability 
to break this identity in order to abstract the predicate ‘existence’ from it. The 
result is most disturbing: the world whose experience grounds our concept of 
reality is rejected in favour of another world whose reality is an usurpation 
“[w]hen one separates an ideal from what’s real, one casts down the real, 
empoverishes it, slanders it.”58 Mankind starts taking the original for the copy 
and the copy for the original. The world thereby established Nietzsche calls –not 
without irony, and quotation marks—the "real world"59 or the "true world."60 
 
a. The Truth of Error. 
Nietzsche spends a considerable amount of effort uncovering this 
fallacious process and undercutting its offsprings. Yet he spends even more time 
investigating the disturbing fact that this double faculty even exists; that no 
appeal to a duality of reality and ideality can obliterate the continuity which 
leads the one into the non-one, transforming the imagined world into the ‘real 
world,’ “immorality” into “morality”61 and the “only world” into the “world of 
                                                 
57 WP, 488 [Spring-Fall 1887]; 583 [March-June 1888] 
58 X, [194], see also WP, 37 [Spring-Fall 1887] 
59 WP, 507 [Spring-Fall 1887] 
60 TI, IV 
61 Nachlass X [154] Fall 1887. 
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appearance.”62 The very fact that it is possible for the world to be deprived of its 
reality makes any rejection of it by appeal to the “real” impossible. Consider 
Nietzsche’s puzzle:  
“And if this moral judging and discontent with the real were indeed, as has been 
claimed, an ineradicable instinct, might that instinct not then be one of the ineradicable 
stupidities or indeed presumptions of our species? –But by saying this we’re doing exactly what 
we rebuke: the standpoint of desirability, of unwarrantedly playing the judge, is part of the 
character of the course of things.”63  
There is something authentic about errors: it is part of the essential 
possibilities of mankind that it shall build backworlds for itself. My hypothesis is 
that Nietzsche envisages this paradoxical—but real—faculty which he finds in 
mankind as the possibility of consciousness and self-consciousness as described 
in GS 354 and GM, II, 16 and which he calls “animal consciousness”64. This 
faculty is “basic” because it constitutes the basis for further developments of the 
human psyche. It is presented in a minimal way in GM, II, 16, where it is 
described as “the whole inner world, originally [ursprünglich] stretched thinly as 
though between two layers of skin [zwei Häute].” In GS, 354, this ‘originary’ 
dimension is emphasised by the repetition of the notion of “development” 
[Entwicklung] (which appears five times in the aphorism) making it clearly a text 
                                                 
62 See WP, 488 [Spring-Fall 1887] “We have no categories at all that permit us to distinguish a 
'world in itself' from a 'world of appearance.' All our categories of reason are of sensual origin: 
derived from the empirical world.” 
63 VII, [62] Late 1886-Spring 1887. 
64 GS, 354. It is clear from the beginning of GS 354, that this faculty is, in anachronistic terms 
“subconscious” in the sense of “non-thematical”. However, it is unclear whether Nietzsche 
considers this faculty as a minimal form of consciousness or as a preconsciousness.  
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about the development of consciousness from a minimal yet consequential basis 
and not about its emergence out of the non-conscious or the purely physical. 
I have already argued that for Nietzsche the structure of other-worldliness 
stems from the disjunction between the predicate reality65 and that which is real 
(i.e. the “empirical world”). First of all then, we must ask what is meant here by 
“reality.” As my analysis of threats emphasised, reality is primarily encountered 
in terms of interests:  
“but we have only drawn the concept ‘real, truly existing’ from the ‘concerning us’; the 
more we are affected in our interest, the more we believe in the ‘reality’ of a thing or an entity. ‘It 
exists’ means: I feel myself as existing in opposition to it”66.  
 
b. Interest as Reality. 
In his Nietzsche and Metaphysics, Peter Poellner elaborates upon 
this note to offer a helpful discussion of reality as interest67. In his reading, 
Nietzsche considers reality to be essentially relative to a subject qua subject of 
interest; Nietzsche, he writes, “seems to maintain that the idea of objective 
reality essentially involves that of actual or possible ‘affections’ of a 
subject”68 and that there is a “Nietzschean (and idealist) claim that all 
conceivable objects have subject-implying properties.”69 Further yet, Poellner 
makes the “tentative interpretation” that “Nietzsche’s views seem in fact to be 
                                                 
65 VI, [23] Summer 1886-Spring 1887. 
66 KGW, VIII. 1.5.19. 
67 Peter Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, 89 ff.  
68 Ibid. 90. 
69 Ibid. 85 
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closer to idealism than to ontological phenomenalism.”70 There is no doubt that 
Nietzsche repeatedly places the subject as the source of any notion of reality, 
indeed, this is one of the most prominent new claims of the year 1887.71 
Consider: “Everywhere, [reason] believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in the 
ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things, 
only thereby does it create the concept of ‘thing’”72 or “[man] even took the 
concept of being from the concept of the ego [...] the thing itself, to say it once 
more, the concept of a thing is a mere reflex to the faith in the ego as cause. [...] 
The error of the spirit as cause mistaken for reality !”73 The “faith in the ego” is 
the originary experience from which the concept of a “thing” was derived, but 
also—and it is what concerns me here—it is also the source of the idea of 
“reality.” This seems to confirm Poellner’s “idealistic” hypothesis: there is no 
reality outside of the subject’s constituting activity.  
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 101 
71 To be sure, Nietzsche’s critique of the subject is hardly a late feature of his philosophy, since at 
least HATH, the subject is presented as an illusory unification of a multiplicity. However, I 
believe there is a radicalisation of this claim in the late notebooks. The earlier critique of the 
subject was a critique of our concept of the subject. Roughly, we were thinking of something (a 
multiplicity) as something else (a unity). In the later texts, it is no longer a question of correcting 
our idea of the subject in order to match it more closely to what it signifies; it is a question of 
denying that there even is such a thing. The very subjective pole is rejected.   
72 TI, II, 5 
73 TI, VI, 3 
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1. Critique of the Subject. 
However, is this “faith in the ego” to be taken at face value? 
Is there any such thing as a “subject” to begin with? Consider:  
“‘Everything is subjective,' you say: but that itself is interpretation, for the ‘subject’ is 
not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind. –Is it even necessary to posit the 
interpreter behind the interpretation? Even that is fiction, hypothesis.”74  
and: 
“[m]ust not all philosophy finally bring to light the assumptions on which the movement 
of reason depends? Our belief in the I as substance, as the only reality on the basis of which we 
attribute reality to things in general? At last, the oldest ‘realism’ comes to light: at the moment 
when the whole religious history of humanity recognizes itself in the history of the soul 
superstition. Here is a barrier: our thinking itself involves that belief “75.  
This latter note brings together the two aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of 
the subject: Firstly, the critique of the subject of action. As such, it relates to 
Nietzsche’s more general rejections of free-will, agency and further, guilt, 
punishment and judgment at large (the “doer” was invented so that humans can 
be held accountable and be revenged upon says Nietzsche). This critique is, 
broadly speaking, ethical. Secondly, there is Nietzsche’s critique of the 
subjective substratum: the soul, the ego. This critique is related to Nietzsche’s 
accounts of grammar and logic, and it is epistemological.  
In BGE, contemporaneous to this note, Nietzsche presents both critiques. 
The epistemic one is famously presented as a critique of Descartes’ Cogito. He 
writes:  
                                                 
74 VII, [60] Late 1886-Spring 1887 
75 VII, [63] Late 1886-Spring 1887 
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“it is falsifying the facts to say that the subject ‘I’ is the condition of the predicate 
‘think.' There is thinking, but to assert that there is the same thing as the famous old ‘I’ is, to put 
it mildly, only an assumption, a hypothesis, and certainly not an ‘immediate certainty.' And in the 
end ‘there is thinking’ is also going too far: even this ‘there’ contains an interpretation of the 
process and is not part of the process itself”76.  
 BGE, 54 presents the ethical version of his argument:  
“Since Descartes (and more in defiance of him than because of his example) all 
philosophers have attempted to assassinate the old concept of the soul, under the guise of 
criticizing the subject-predicate concept. That is to say, they have attempted to assassinate the 
basic conception of the Christian doctrine. [...] In earlier times, people believed in the ‘soul’ just 
as they believed in grammar and the grammatical subject [...] basically, Kant wanted to prove 
that the subject could not be proved by means of the subject, nor could the object be proved 
either. Perhaps he was already familiar with the possibility of an apparent existence of the 
subject (that is, of the soul).”  
In his commentary of this aphorism, Laurence Lampert rightly stresses 
that Nietzsche associated himself with the phrase “modern philosophy.” 
However, Lampert evades the reference to Descartes by asserting—rightly 
again—that Nietzsche may have not read Descartes “skeptically enough.” In 
Lampert’s view, this aphorism is related not to Descartes’ Cogito as presented in 
his Discourse and in his Second Meditation, but to his Treatise of Passions, “the 
book that sets forth the first modern account of soul as an epiphenomenon of the 
machinery of the human body.”77 I emphasise Lampert’s reading because it 
seems to me to typify those readings of Nietzsche that remain committed to an 
alternative between mechanism or naturalism on the one hand and post-
                                                 
76 BGE, 17 
77 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche’s Task, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2001, 112, ff. And ft. 
24. 
 45 
modernism, or idealism on the other, through a refusal to think outside of the 
alternative of the subject and the object78. Contrary to Lampert, it does not seem 
to me that Nietzsche criticises the non-physicality of the “soul” as much as he 
criticises the notion of an independent subject, incarnate or not. As a result, I 
read Nietzsche not as seeking support in Descartes’ account of the ‘passions of 
the soul,' but rather, as prolongating his earlier critique of Descartes’ “faith in 
grammar.” In this reading, Nietzsche’s critique of the subject is a clear departure 
from Poellner’s characterisation of the subject as the base of all interest, and 
thereby of the subject as constituting reality.  
It must be added, however, that Poellner does leave open the possibility 
of Nietzsche’s rejection of the subject. Poellner asks himself: “doesn’t 
Nietzsche’s approach, as I have interpreted it, involve [...] that there could 
conceivably be self-conscious subjects prior to the constitution, relative to them, 
of an external, objective sphere.”79 However, Poellner’s response is 
disappointing:  
“Nietzsche may very well concede that just as there can be no ‘real’ objects without a 
‘subject’ that has desires, or, in his terms, interests or values, so there can be no such potentially 
self-conscious subject without what it takes to be an external, objective sphere. Nietzsche does, 
                                                 
78 In a truly exhilarating article, Jane Bennett and William E. Connolly remark that: « Some 
representations of Nietzsche misrepresent his account of thinking as “idealistic” because they 
leave his prior transfiguration of the nature/culture pair out of the picture. » “Contesting 
Nature/Culture: the Creative Character of Thinking” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 24, 2002, 
158.  
79 Peter Poellner, op. Cit. 98 
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as far as I am aware, not explicitly say this, but nothing in what he does say rules out such a 
response, and this would seem sufficient to deflect the criticism.”80 
 This indeed, would deflect potential criticisms of Nietzsche’s position, 
Nietzsche, as is manifest from the passages quoted above, actually does say this. 
However, this would put Poellner’s own account in jeopardy because it would 
put interest itself and no longer the subject’s attribution of interest at the ground 
of experience. Consider:  
 “Finally, ‘the thing-in-itself’ also falls, because at bottom it is is the concept of a 
‘subject-in-itself,' yet we have understood that the subject is fictitious. The antithesis of ‘thing-in-
itself’ and ‘appearance’ is untenable.”81 
 The difference in the resulting accounts could not be overstated. In his 
discussion of Nietzsche’s supposed idealism, Poellner explicitly refers to the 
later Husserl’s “transcendental idealism .”82 As I will show in chapter V with 
regard to Husserl, the admission of my view (namely that neither the subjective 
pole nor the objective pole are constitutive of reality and experience) contrary to 
Poellner’s hypothesis (which still maintains the subject as the transcendental 
ground for constitution) is consequential because it involves a shift of priority 
from the poles of the intentional acts (subject and object) to intentionality itself83. 
                                                 
80 ibid. 99. 
81 IX, [91] Autumn 1887 
82 Peter Poellner, op. Cit. 85, Ft. 13. 
83 Hales and Welshon, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, 2000; 159f. declare: “of course, even if selves 
are bundles, it is not clear what individuates them” and conclude that “in fact, virtually all of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts about the self assume that there is some principle of individuation for the 
self intrinsic to it." The phenomenological importance of the experience of resistance, like in the 
case of Poellner’s account, evades a priori the possibility that the object be secondary. 
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This, as we shall see, constitutes the core of Merleau-Ponty’s departure from 
Husserl, and the essential and structural link that binds his philosophy with 
Nietzsche’s: intentionality is anterior to intentional objects or subjects.  
 
2. The primacy of intentionality. 
So, Nietzsche rejects the notion of the object because it is 
derived from that of the subject, and yet he rejects the notion of the subject too.84 
This is puzzling because it seems to question the very idea of reality as interest. 
In a strange way, however, perhaps are we closer to this idea now: it is not just 
reality for me which is interest (which would place the subject as a reality 
anterior to it) but interest itself is reality. Let me pause for a moment here to 
examine what this implies about the nature of Nietzsche’s commitment to truth. 
Nietzsche defines reality as interest. Not just as interest for me, but as interest 
itself (without reference to any subject for whom so and so is interesting in such 
and such a way). Maudemarie Clark’s Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy 
provides the most patient review of Nietzsche’s views on truth. Her core claim is 
that Nietzsche is committed to the idea of truth as correspondence even when he 
criticises it85. This is because, she says, Nietzsche considers our intellect (as 
described in GS 354, GS, 111 and elsewhere) not refined enough to provide an 
adequate picture of the thing-in-itself which is the object of truth-discourses. She 
                                                 
84 This reciprocal constitution of subject and object (and its dialectical implications) which leaves 
us wondering what came first, was announced in the richly ambivalent aphorism 48 of D: 
“‘Know yourself’ is the whole of science.- Only when he has attained a final knowledge of all 
things will man have come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man.” 
85 Maudemarie Clark, op. Cit. 117 
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thus concludes that Nietzsche criticises truth for not achieving correspondence, 
which would show Nietzsche to be committed to the view that truth must be 
corespondence. Of course, Clark is aware of Nietzsche’s rejection of the thing-
in-itself, and she says his views oscillate between claiming that truth qua 
correspondence is impossible and claiming that it is possible but rare (i. e. most 
often, only to be found in Nietzsche’s writings themselves). This however poses 
one problem which I think is clarified by our discussion above. Seeing reality as 
interest and values as arising from needs means that the experience of reality 
warrants the authority of values. It is impossible—even for Clark—to negate that 
Nietzsche sees values as binding. In my view, Nietzsche is committed to truth as 
correspondence only if we disagree with Clark in identifying “correspondence” 
with “correspondence with the thing-in-itself.”86 To be sure, the priority of 
interest over subject and object (as thing-in-itself) makes it the object of truth as 
correspondence; however, interest can be taken as an “in-itself” only in the sense 
of an “in-itself for us.”87 In other words, the object of truth, which Nietzsche 
claims truth conceals from us, is the experience of reality, not reality itself. This 
is made obvious by Nietzsche’s positing interest as a phenomenological and not 
a metaphysical ground for reality. Let me emphasise that this view does not 
contradict the idea that interest is ontologically anterior to subject and object. It 
is clear that interest has an intentional structure and thereby presents itself as an 
                                                 
86 Ibid.178 
87 The expression is Merleau-Ponty’s, in a strikingly similar context: PP, 97. I find a similar idea, 
without mention of Merleau-Ponty, in David B. Alison, “Nietzsche Knows no Noumenon” 
Boundary 2, Issue 3, Vol. 9, (Spring - Autumn, 1981), 295-310. 
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in-itself for a subject. My only claim is that this does not entail the existence of 
such an in-itself, or of a subject. 
 
c. Self-Differentiation 
1.  Self-falsification. 
Let me try to clarify this further. What does it mean for 
interest to be anterior to both subject and object? First of all, it means that there 
is interest before there is a subject and an object of interest. This also means that 
the notions “subject” and “object” somehow arise from interest itself. I believe 
that the most direct way to clarify this is to have recourse to Nietzsche’s 
hypothesis of the “will to power.” According to this thought, the essence of the 
world is “will to power, and that alone.”88 "That alone" and especially not a 
subject or an object of the will to power.89 As John Richardson rightly 
emphasises, the will to power has a “telic” and “intentional” structure, it is “end-
                                                 
88 BGE, 36; See also WP, 1059, where the hypothetical nuance is absent: “do you want a name 
for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, 
most intrepid, most midnightly men?—This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! 
And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!” John Richardson remarks 
that Nietzsche calls the will to power the ‘essence’ of the world, using both Wesen (BGE 259, 
GM, II, 12, WP 693 [1888]) and Essenz (BGE 189). See John Richardson, 1996, op. Cit. 18.  
89 WP 589 [1885-1886] see also WP, 635 [March-June 1888]: “The will to power not a being, not a 
becoming, but a pathos—the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first 
emerge_” 
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directedness.”90 Seen from a theoretical point of view then, it implies the thought 
of an end as a stable and self-identical object of striving. Likewise, it implies the 
thought of a subject of the will, which remains stable in time. These are as it 
were “analytically contained” in the concept of the will to power. This is not to 
say however, that their existence is in anyway affirmed by it.  
If we wish to explain how subject and object arise from the non-
subjective and the non-objective, it seems we must start here. The difficulty lies 
in accounting for this theoretical point of view from within the will to power. 
Indeed, it is only this theoretical point of view which accounts for the objective 
form of our thought. For Nietzsche, the will to power is essentially the drive to 
“make equal” (GS 354). In physical terms, it means assimilation in the sense of 
“digestion.” Nietzsche calls this process “incorporation” [Einverleibung] and I 
will discuss it in chapter II. However, we should already recall that the will to 
power is not more physical than it is “spiritual,” its equalising activity is 
intellectual too because it “posits things” in a predicative way91. Thus, it is 
plausible that the will to power itself acts as a falsifyer of itself (there is “nothing 
besides” will to power to falsify): it presents itself in terms of “subjects” and 
“objects.” For Nietzsche, of course, such oppositions as subject and object are 
impossible. In reality, drives merely imply a subject and an object by pointing 
towards them as their regulative horizons perhaps; but at any rate, not as actual 
realities. There is a gradual continuum that moves towards each pole 
                                                 
90 John Richardson, op. Cit. (1996), 35 ff. 
91 “The question is [...] whether this creating, logicising, trimming, falsifying is not itself the best-
guaranteed reality: in short, whether that which ‘posits things’ is not the sole reality” IX, [106] 
Autumn 1887 
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tangentially, but this continuum is made of differences of degrees, and refuses 
any leap: “if we give up the soul, ‘the subject,' there’s no basis for any 
‘substance.' One gets degrees of being, one loses being as such.”92 This model 
has crucial implications for the question of truth. Let me anticipate briefly the 
rest of the argument. If the will to power is a self-falsifying principle, it means 
that we have uncovered a certain absolute truth about the will to power (i. e. 
Being): it is self-falsifying. More importantly, we may understand better the 
ontological place of truth or the place of what I have called above, something 
‘authentic’ about errors. In this view, truth (as the falsification of experience) 
names the process by which the will to power falsifies itself. I will discuss this 
view in more detail later, but let me stress that it necessarily doubles the question 
of truth. We must ask whether it is indeed true (the traditional question), but also, 
whether it is real (that is to say, whether it is an essential feature of being as self-
falsification). For now, let me return to the question of interest.  
 
2.  Reflexivity and Resistance 
For Nietzsche, the external world can interest us in two 
different basic ways: conquest and threat.93 If I apprehend the world as an object 
of conquest, the object of my interest will be external. If I experience the world 
as a threat, the object of my interest will be myself. One important implication of 
this is that interest is essentially bi-directional: it may be directed to the outside 
world (towards conquest) or to the self (for defense). However, there is a certain 
                                                 
92 X, [19]Autumn 1887 
93“ in valuations, conditions of preservation and growth express themselves,” IX, [38] 
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disymetry between these two modes of interest. In common language, interest 
denotes desire more directly than it does self-defense. This is the case for 
Nietzsche too. Indeed, we remember that the epistemic and ethical critiques of 
the notion of subject are intertwined (the concept of subject is false, and it is 
designed to allows us to assign blame). This is because for Nietzsche, the 
hostility of the environment is always psychologised by the individual. Hostility 
is always linked to a deed, and a deed to a “doer.” In fact, then, my interest for 
self-defense presents itself as a form of desire, namely, the  desire expressed by 
the other person (or personified force).94 
This may bring some clarifications on the emergence of the concepts of 
subject and object. Nietzsche describes self-preservation in terms of “passivity” 
(or “reactivity”), and conquest in terms of “activity.” This uncovers the intimate 
relationships of the subject and the object at a deeper level. Their relation is 
chiasmatic: in “passivity,” the object of interest will be the self and its subject 
will be the outside world as threat. In “activity” it will be the reverse. It is thus 
through the notion of activity and passivity that we must understand subject and 
object: “What do active and passive mean? Is it not becoming master and being 
defeated? and subject and object?”95 This indicates that the notions of subject 
and object do not arise from the experience of the separation of self and world, 
but rather it emerges from the experience of their contact. This relationship is 
therefore reversible insofar as any act of will implies both activity and passivity. 
                                                 
94 See WP, 775 [Spring-Fall 1887] 
95 VII, [48] Late 1886-Spring 1887  
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Consider the following two contemporaneous claims. Firstly: “What is ‘passive’? 
resisting and reacting. Being hindered in one’s forward-reaching movement: thus 
an act of resistance and reaction [.] What is ‘active’? Reaching out for power.”96 
Secondly: “The will to power can only express itself against resistances; it seeks 
what will resist it—this is the original tendency of protoplasm in sending out 
pseudopodia and feeling its way.”97 In the experience of reality, the two opposing 
drives are almost simultaneously subject and object for each other, because they 
resist each other. As a result, we obtain a line of contact across which subject 
and object of interest indefinitely alternate: the conqueror (subject) is opposed 
some resistance and thereby becomes object of the resistance imposed to it by 
the resisting object of the conquest. Conversely, this object, by virtue of its own 
resistance, becomes subject.98 For Nietzsche, this ‘line of contact’ is the basis 
upon which we build the concepts of inside and outside, and further, of subject 
and object. Even though Nietzsche presents this process as essentially a hostile 
encounter, it also involves and informs the structure of perception. Indeed, 
Nietzsche regards perception as a function of the drives’ resistance-seeking 
(recall the identity of increase-seeking and perception in the case of the 
                                                 
96 V, [64] Summer 1886-Autumn 1887 
97 IX [151] Autumn 1887 my emphasis 
98 This line obviously, is not a place of stability insofar as total conquest is eventually possible. 
However, any process of subjection is always identical with a resistance. The disparition of a 
resistance is the end of the process, and the apparition of a new resistance, since the will to power 
is defined by its discharge and that discharge can only take place against resistance. See WP, 650 
[1885-1886] and 634 [March-June 1888]   
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protoplasm99). As I will discuss in chapter VI, Merleau-Ponty too encounters this 
chiasma and this reversibility between subject and object as the structure of 
perception and like Nietzsche, he will hold that this coincidence of perception 
and, the will to increase is correlative to the coincidence of activity and 
passivity.100 
 These unions of opposites are occasioned by the experience of a 
resistance. Here, we arrive at the question of externality. A resistance is the 
experience of the externality of the world. Nietzsche also claims that resistances 
lead to self-consciousness: if this resistance becomes “master” over me, I 
become “object” for myself. Let me emphasise this point which is essential to 
most of Nietzsche’s later worldview: consciousness is always an act of 
subjection, it involves a tension between the subject and the object of 
consciousness. Here, we understand in what sense Nietzsche thinks that 
consciousness is a “disease”101: “conscious thought,” Nietzsche writes, “is 
nothing but a certain behaviour of the instincts towards one another.”102 Here, 
we encounter the unity of “consciousness” as described in GS, 354 and the “bad 
conscience” of GM, II, 16. In both cases, it is a question of opposing drives.103 
                                                 
99 See also WP 702 [March-June 1888] 
100 For the identity of perception and passivity, see WP, 611 [1883-1887] 
101 GS, 354 
102 GS, 333, the same idea appears in BGE 36. See Graham Parkes, Composing the Soul, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996 353; Leslie Thiele, Nietzsche and the politics of the 
soul, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, 51, ff. 
103 Indeed, as early as 1881, when Nietzsche still seeks to draw the living from the inert matter, 
he defines the perceptive organism as both a separation from nature and a separation of the self 
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This is the structure that underlies the metaphor of the inner world 
mentioned in GM, II, 16. It is worth citing again:  
“the whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin 
[zwei Häute], was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in 
proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man’s instincts was obstructed.” 
Here, Nietzsche describes the originary inner world as the origin of the 
reflexivity of interest: because there is a (ever-so-small) gap within the 
individual, her drives have the ability be re-directed towards her other ‘half”: the 
self is structured in such a way that there is a potential object of domination 
within it. This setup allows for an inner relation of forces of the same type as the 
external one: there is externality within the self. This is made possible by the gap 
between the two “layers of skin,” allowing for passivity and activity within the 
self, and thereby allowing for aggressivity against oneself, which is what 
Nietzsche describes in the rest of GM, II, 16. Although the metaphor does not 
return in Nietzsche’s writings, he maintains in several instances that the rules 
that apply in external relations of power apply internally as well: “I maintain the 
phenomenality of the inner world too: [...]The ‘apparent inner world’ is governed 
by just the same forms and procedures as the ‘outer’ world.”104 This setup which 
shows the interconnection of consciousness (external interest) and self-
consciousness (internal interest) is similar to the “animal consciousness” 
                                                 
with itself: self-differentiation: “let us not think of the return to non-perception as a retrogression! 
We become completely true, we are perfected. Death must be reinterpreted! We thus are 
reconciled with reality, i. e. with the dead world”11[70]  (Spring-Fall 1881). 
104 WP, 477 [Nov. 1887-March 1888] 
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described in GS 354, where consciousness and self-consciousness are not 
distinct.105  
Let us recall that for Nietzsche, basic consciousness is originary. It is not 
derived from anything else. This characterisation of the human’s originary inner 
world (“animal consciousness” or “soul”) will have great consequences for 
Nietzsche’s ontology and cosmology. This is because, in my reading, 
Nietzsche’s positing of this internal separation within the individual, and his 
subsequent relativisation of the notions of internality and externality commit him 
to a worldview determined by self-differentiation. In what follows, I shall mean 
‘self-differentiation’ in the sense of the always-already present ability for one to 
be an object for oneself. In line with the above discussion, this involves (among 
other things) the primacy of intentionality over and above intentional poles like 
subject and object, and the reversibility of this intentionality. For Nietzsche, self-
identity is impossible precisely by virtue of the tangentiality of intentionality106:  
                                                 
105 In the first paragraph of the aphorism, Nietzsche describes “consciousness” as a “mirror.” In 
the third one, he writes: “[man] needed ‘consciousness,' first of all, he needed to ‘know’ himself 
what distressed him, he needed to ‘know’ how he felt, he needed to ‘know’ what he thought.” All 
features of what we would usually call “self-consciousness.” The conflation is of course, 
purposeful on Nietzsche’s part, it is the same need (arising from the hostility of the environment) 
which gave rise to both consciousness and self-consciousness.  
106In the whole of this thesis, I lay great emphasis on the notion of tangentiality. I mean 
tangentiality in the senseinherited from the Leibnizian infinitesimal  calculus. It denotes a 
linear movement, structured by two end points which it never reaches but approaches 
indefinitely. In this sense, tangentiality qualifies Being qua becoming. The tangentiality of 
becoming expresses  the tangentiality  of intentionality  in Merleau-Ponty  (the two end points 
being the subjective and objective poles) and the tangentiality of self-becoming (the healthy 
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“If we give up the effecting subject, then also the object on which effects are exerted. 
Duration, conformity with itself, being, inhere neither in what is called subject nor in what is 
called object. [...] All these are oppositions which don’t exist in themselves and in fact only 
express differences of degree that look like oppositions when viewed through a particular 
prism.”107 
 
ii. Origin and Becoming. 
This discussion of the originary “inner world” of the “animal 
man” commits me to three claims. Firstly, animal psychology must be 
understood as self-differentiation.108 Secondly, the animal psyche stands at the 
origin of the history told by Nietzsche’s genealogy. Thirdly, animal psychology 
imposes a heredity upon subsequent modes of being human. By heredity, I mean 
that its basic features loosely inform every subsequent mode of existence, fact 
and events, and that they will exhibit this structure too. In other words, animal 
psychology determines the range of human possibilities. I see two such basic 
                                                 
individual forever approaches herself) for Nietzsche. Tangentiality maintains both the 
relevance of the end points (they structure the movement and explicate it) and their 
inexistence (they are never reached):The  impossibility  of  attaining  either  pole  (or,  in  
Merleau-Ponty’s  terms‘horizons’)  is expressed  by Nietzsche  as the impossibility  of self-
identity  and by Merleau-Ponty  as the constant  presence  of a ‘zone  of subjectivity.'  The 
‘zone  of subjectivity’ is for Merleau-Ponty an implicit separation which the objective outlook 
establishes between the subject and the object. Like Nietzsche’s ‘inner gap,' the zone of 
subjectivity is reversible: in self-consciousness, the separation is within the self; in 
consciousness, it lies between the self and the world. 
107 IX, [91] Autumn 1887 First emphasis mine. 
108 GM, III, 20 
 58 
features: a) contingency: any mode of being is contingent upon circumstances; b) 
self-differentiation: self-identity is impossible. It is worth pointing out at the 
outset that these two features warrant the eternity of becoming: the instability of 
animal psychology will be passed on, and with it, becoming will be incapable of 
an end (for Nietzsche, becoming would end only in self-identity, but self-identity 
is impossible109). I will develop this point in Chapter III. 
Each of these three claims is controversial. Objections to them would 
come, I believe, from diametrically opposed sides. The postmodernist readings 
of Nietzsche after Foucault’s hugely influential “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 
of 1971 would oppose my second and third claims by denying that genealogy 
proposes any origin and arguing that, consequently, no starting point can present 
itself as an essential feature to any future. Moreover, in this reading, there is no 
continuity of history and therefore any talk of heredity is absurd. Secondly, the 
prominent « naturalistic » trend in Nietzsche scholarship may also object to my 
first claim: Nietzsche, these authors would say, sees psychology, political, and 
social behaviours as stemming from nature understood as the object of natural 
sciences. In this reading, the ground is nature, and by definition it is self-
identical. Before turning to this line of objection, let me address the first one, 
drawn from Foucault. 
a. Foucault on Genealogy. 
Foucault’s “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History » is an effort to 
remove the notion of continuity from the interpretations of Nietzsche’s 
                                                 
109 See for example, X, [19] Autumn 1887. 
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genealogies and to replace it with the notion of chance110. It is also a rejection of 
the idea that genealogy has anything to do with finding any origin.  
1. Continuity 
Let me start with the question of continuity. Foucault’s 
makes two points: a) there is no continuity from the past to the present, or from 
the present to the future. The chronological order is not continuous.111 From this, 
he infers b) there is no continuity from the present to the past; the genealogical 
order is not continuous.112 Hence Foucault’s emphasis on documentation: 
genealogy is not a deduction of the past from the present; rather it is past 
documents which will give us access to their times. There is no doubt that 
Nietzsche promotes «wirkliche Historie » in opposition to fantastical 
constructions of the type of Paul Rée’s.113 However, this does not seem to entail 
in Nietzsche’s mind the impossibility of using the present as a mode of accessing 
the past. In fact, Nietzsche’s genealogy, for all its praise for “gray history,” 
presents only one piece of documented erudition which has to do with the 
etymology of the words “good” and “bad .”114 Foucault’s emphasis on 
                                                 
110 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in Rabinow ed. The Foucault Reader, 
1984, 78. 
111 “Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that 
operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things. Its duty is not to demonstrate that the past 
actively exists in the present”  ibid. 83 
112 I see these two views also instantiated in Raymond Geuss’ Foucault-influenced “Nietzsche 
and Genealogy,” European Journal of Philosophy, Issue 2, 1994, 275-292.  
113 GM, Preface, 4, 7 
114 GM, I, 4 
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documentation reflects Nietzsche’s advertised intentions, but not his practice. In 
fact, Foucault overlooks that the rest of the genealogical accounts is filled with 
regressive deductions of the past from the present:  
“What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what 
can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. This history can be related even now; for 
necessity itself is at work here. This future speaks even now in a hundred signs, this destiny 
announces itself everywhere.”115  
 Not only can the past be read in the present, but the future too. We should 
not take Nietzsche’s self-attributed ability to predict too seriously: the prediction 
does not refer to minute facts, but to social, perhaps even cosmic cycles. In other 
instances, Nietzsche sharply opposes necessity and predictability. However, 
there is no question that Nietzsche believes in some sort of historical continuity 
warranted by necessity116.  
                                                 
115 WP, Preface, 2 [Nov. 1887-March 1888] second emphasis mine. See also WP, 257 [March-
June 1888] “I say of every morality: ‘it is a fruit by which I recognize the soil from which it 
sprang’” 
116 In fact, he does so to the point that genealogy looks strikingly like some transcendental 
deduction of the Kantian sort. Compare Kant’s famous claim from that “the principle of 
continuity forbade any leaps in the series of appearances (alterations) (in mundo non datur 
saltus)”  (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. Cit. B 281; see also B 172) with 
Nietzsche’s claim from WS, 198:  “Natura nonfacit saltum. However strongly man may develop 
upwards and seem to leap from one contradiction to another, a close observation will reveal the 
dovetails where the new building grows out of the old. This is the biographer's task: he must 
reflect upon his subject on the principle that nature takes no jumps.” Even though Nietzsche in 
this specific aphorism is concerned with the task of the biographer, there is no doubt that he 
endorses the Kantian affirmation of continuity. Besides, in the context of this aphorism, it seems 
highly plausible that what applies to the biographer would also apply to the genealogist.  
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2.  Necessity. 
For Nietzsche, the thread that runs throughout history is 
necessity. Necessity is truly a-temporal; it is the eternal that makes becoming 
possible as continuity. Nietzsche’s use of the term “necessity” crystallises our 
difficulty: for Nietzsche, necessity is this atemporal principle, yet, necessity 
merely stands for the impossibility for anything to be otherwise:  “‘mechanical 
necessity’ is not a fact [...] the rule proves only that one and the same event is not 
another event as well.”117 Necessity asserts absolute immanence: if something is, 
it is necessarily; if it is necessarily, it is necessity through and through. This 
raises the question: if an event is entirely spatio-temporal and necessity is not, 
how can there be necessary events? Nietzsche struggles with this question. In 
WP 552, he separates necessity and facts: “necessity is not a fact, but an 
interpretation.” This seems to contradict the previous passage where “necessity 
itself” was “at work” in actual events.  
In fact, Nietzsche seems to believe in two forms of necessity. One is 
absolute, but it is only interpretation, and comes “a posteriori”118: if an event 
occurred, its having been is inescapable and we may interpret it as an expression 
of necessity. The other one is meant in a stronger sense. It is not mere 
interpretation, (or at least, not in the same sense) however, it is only partial. It is 
efficient only as part of the apparently odd couple it forms with chance: for 
Nietzsche, conditions of existence result from “partly necessity, partly 
                                                 
117 WP, 552 [Spring-Fall 1887] 
118 WP, 530 [1883-1888] 
 62 
chance.”119 This second form of necessity structures and restricts the range of 
chance, I shall call it “structural necessity.” Structural necessity does not 
preclude chance but it embraces it120:  
“ Those iron hands of necessity which shake the dice-box of chance play their game for 
an infinite length of time so that there has to be throws which exactly resemble purposiveness [...] 
We ourselves do no more than play the game of necessity!”121 
In this aphorism from Daybreak, one of his most inspiring, Nietzsche 
abolishes the opposition between chance and necessity. In fact, events arise from 
their encounter and they are thus always partly indeterminate and partly 
determinate. In an early hint at the thought of eternal recurrence, the finite 
number of possibilities (dice-throws) is affirmed, while the infinity of time 
entails the infinity of dice-throws. This entails the actualisation, sooner or later, 
of every possibility. As the subsequent elaboration of Eternal Recurrence will 
make clear, this involves a restriction of the range of possibilities.122 There are 
fewer possibilities than there are dice-throws. Every event has an element of 
                                                 
119 WP, 898 [Spring-Fall 1887] 
120 Nietzsche goes back and fourth on the question of the existence of chance and necessity, 
however, he never questions their interdependence. In his view, if there is the one, there is the 
other too, he is undecisive only as to whether one should talk about chance and necessity at all. 
See for example, GS, 109. 
121 D, 130 
122 One of Nietzsche’s most accomplished substantiations of the thought of eternal recurrence is 
that it is the necessary result of the discrepancy between a limited number of possible events and 
the infinity of time. See for example WP 1063 [1887-1888]: “the law of conservation of energy 
demands eternal recurrence.” 
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necessity and an element of chance. Restriction represents necessity and the 
unpredictibility of dice-throws represents chance. Together, they create events123.  
As regards the question of genealogy, we may obtain some clarifications 
if we associate these remarks to Nietzsche’s other use of necessity as 
“interpretation.” As they happen, the dice-throws of chance turn into 
interpretative (a posteriori) necessity. As they become past, they become 
unchangeable. Chance does not survive the passing of time, and vanishes into 
necessity. Necessity, on the other hand, survives the passing of time, so that 
‘interpretative (a posteriori) necessity’ becomes an interpretation of ‘structural (a 
priori) necessity.' Interpretative necessity does not preclude chance; simply, it 
envisages chance after it has become necessity. This places the genealogist in a 
privileged position to interpret history: it is only a posteriori that events may be 
interpreted. This should partly satisfy and partly dissatisfy Foucault.124 In my 
view, Nietzsche does include chance in the unfolding of history, but not to the 
point that it breaks any continuity. On the contrary, structural necessity is not 
                                                 
123 See Z, I, 16; Z, III, “Seven Seals,” 3; GS, 277 and WP 673 [1883-1888]. 
124 In a noteworthy attack on some post-modern readings of Nietzsche’s theory of the self, Ken 
Gemes offers an interesting account of Nietzsche’s use of the term “unity” [Einheit] as a 
refutation of Foucault’s insistence on Nietzsche’s rejection of unities. However, it seems to me 
that Gemes misses the somewhat deeper implications of the ambivalence on the question of 
unity, namely that Nietzsche seeks unity as the source of diversity; or in one word, self-
differentiation. It is a general feature of the critiques of Foucault’s views on Nietzsche, that they 
tend to oppose Nietzsche’s fragmentation with unity, when it seems to me that it is their 
reconciliation which Nietzsche always sought. See Ken Gemes, “Postmodernism’s Use and 
Abuse of Nietzsche” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXII, No. 2, March 
2001. 
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inconsequential but defines and restricts the range of chance-possibilities. 
Chance and necessity are not incompatible; they cooperate. 
This view, I believe, makes structural necessity consequential enough to 
present it as a significant origin. Here, Foucault would be dissatisfied. For 
Foucault,  
“Nietzsche challenges the pursuit of the origin, at least on those occasions when he is 
truly a genealogist. First because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their 
purest possibilities and their carefully protected identities because this search assumes the 
existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession.”125 
 In short, the search for an origin would make Nietzsche a metaphysician. 
Nietzsche himself asserts clearly:  
“The world exists; it is not something that becomes, not something that passes away. Or 
rather, it becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased from 
passing away—it maintains itself in both”126.  
This seems to confirm Foucault’s rejection of any origin. Let me remark 
however that the mere idea of a “world” which would “maintain itself” 
throughout becoming points to some kind of cosmological structure which is 
quite foreign to Foucault’s account. So even if this argument surely suffices to 
refute any attempt to construe the origin as a single self-identical entity (because 
this entity would be a “beginning,” and as such, no becoming could ‘flow’ from 
it); it is however powerless if we posit the origin as self-differentiation itself. It is 
obvious from the previous discussion that the origin we seek is not to be found in 
self-identity. In my view, the basic animal-psyche (which constitutes the origin 
                                                 
125 Foucault, 79, my emphasis. 
126 WP, 1066 [March-June 1888] 
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brought to light by Nietzsche’s genealogy) is not the “essence of things”, nor is it 
an “immobile form.” It does “precede the external world of accidents and 
succession,” but probably not in the sense Foucault intends. In my reading, this 
origin determines nothing other than the condition of succession and of 
externality. As pre-consciousness, for example, it prefigures the division of the 
external and the internal. It allows the “animal man,” like all living things, to 
perceive the external world as resistance and as the object of its conquest. 
Thereby, it triggers the unfolding of time which Nietzsche’s genealogies relate; 
that is to say, the time of conquest.  
 
3. Possibilities 
 There is one feature of my account that Foucault explicitly 
rejects as characteristic of fantastical origins: possibility. It is a point dificult to 
oppose because it is unclear what Foucault means. Perhaps he means that we 
should not construe this origin in an ontological way, thereby reading in it the 
structure of all possible events. If this is Foucault’s claim, Nietzsche refutes it in 
many instances127. In my view, there is no doubt that the combination of chance 
and necessity must be expressed in terms of a restricted range of possibilities.128 
This restriction is not absolute, (this would make it a determinism); but it is 
efficient and applies its mark on every generation of events as a heredity. As I 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, there are two features of the structure 
                                                 
127 See for example WP 373 [1888],WP 379 [1887], WP 678 [1887], WP 687 [1887], WP 785 
[1887] 
128 I find a similar idea in Jane Bennett and William E. Connolly, op. Cit. 151 ff. 
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inherited from this origin: self-differentiation and contingency. In a nutshell, the 
possibilities are restricted to only the possibilities of becoming and in this sense 
they are ontological. There is an origin provided by the structure of animal 
psychology. It is indeed this determinant structure which ensures that “becoming 
does not flow into being.”129 
 
b. Naturalism. 
The notion of self-differentiation may offer us a way out of both 
determinism and relativism, but it exposes us to some other objections. These 
would come from one strand of the so-called “naturalistic” readings of 
Nietzsche.  
1. Self-Identical Nature.  
In his article entitled “The Paradox of Fatalism and self-
creation in Nietzsche," Brian Leiter presents a view similar to mine as outlined 
above, only to reject it. He writes:  
“So, the paradox [of fatalism and self-creation] is resolved, it seems, by simply 
recognizing the limited domain of creative work, while allowing for the underlying fatalism 
which entails only that one’s possibilities are circumscribed. A place for ‘self-creation’ is found 
precisely in the conceptual space between causal essentialism (the heart of Nietzsche’s fatalism), 
and classical determinism. Unfortunately, this seemingly attractive solution to the paradox 
                                                 
129 WP 708 [Nov. 1887-March 1888] 
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simply doesn’t square with the theory of action that underlies the basic deterministic doctrine [of 
Nietzsche’s].”130 
Leiter goes on to give his solution, which is to affirm fatalism over and 
above self-creation131 and to characterise his account as “[recapturing] Nietzsche 
the naturalist”132. The question of self-creation is only indirectly related to our 
topic and I will not pursue a discussion of Leiter’s controversial conclusions, 
however these remarks may help clarify the naturalist position on the question of 
self-differentiation. For Leiter, naturalism is equivalent to determinism. It 
opposes the notions of possibilities and chance, not only in their pure form (as in 
Foucault’s account), but also as circumscribed “in the conceptual space between 
causal essentialism and classical determinism” (as in my account). Leiter does so 
in the name of the self-identity of nature. The context of his claims is a 
discussion of agency framed by the question of the relationship of the subject 
and the object. Creation is the affirmation of the subject and her asserting herself 
over external objects. Fatalism, on the other hand, affirms the binding power of 
objects and material forces over human subjects. Leiter’s conclusion shifts all the 
weight on the side of the object, affirming “the unreality of free-will.” As I have 
shown in my discussion of Peter Poellner’s idealist reading, this sharp opposition 
                                                 
130 Brian Leiter, “The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Becoming in Nietzsche”, in C. Janaway (ed.) 
Willing and Nothingness, Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator, Oxford University Press, 1998, 
Section V. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Leiter goes as far as likening Nietzsche’s views to “biological materialism”: “Have we really 
done Nietzsche any favour by showing him to believe in ‘type-facts,' in ‘human nature,' in the 
epiphenomenality of consciousness, in the unreality of free-will, in the primacy of physiology? 
My answer is unequivocally ‘yes.'’” Ibid. Section VI.  
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of subject and object is the trademark of most naturalistic accounts perhaps even 
more than the preference for the objective world. Nietzsche sometimes seems to 
hold that self-identical objects exist. They belong, he says, to the realm of the 
inorganic: “everything organic differs from the inorganic insofar as it never is 
identical with itself,”133 elsewhere, he says “unity must be present in the 
inorganic for the organic already begins with separation.”134 Wolfgang Müller-
Lauter, who quotes these notes from 1883, is careful to emphasise that they 
should not be taken as Nietzsche’s final thoughts on the matter, largely because 
they involve a sharp separation between the inorganic and the organic which he 
emphatically repudiates in the later texts. There remains the idea that only the 
inorganic is self-identical. This means that a naturalist account of Nietzsche must 
either express nature as inorganic (with obvious difficulties), or nature as self-
differentiated, but this seems precluded by the idea that natural objects are the 
objects of  the physical sciences.  
2.  Naturalisation of the Spirit, Spiritualisation of Nature. 
   My suggestion is that we place the emphasis not on the 
opposition, but on the union of the subject and the object. This is possible if one 
places intentionality at the origin of the vicissitudes of mankind, and at the hinge 
between nature and culture. This is exactly what I take Nietzsche to be doing in 
GM, II, 16, when he refers to the “two layers of skin” which circumscribed the 
original “inner world” and made the internalization necessary for civilisation 
possible. I see the same motif in Nietzsche’s reference to “a basic piece of 
                                                 
133 KGW, VII, 1, 424, (Summer 1883) quoted by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, 1999, op. Cit. 146 
134 KGW, VII, 1, 422, (Summer 1883) quoted by Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, 1999, op. Cit. 146 
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animal psychology” in GM, III, 20: this expression affirms man’s animal 
ancestry whilst at the same time affirming the animal kingdom’s possession of a 
psyche.  
3.  Layers of Skin 
   My interpretation of the “two layers of skin,” of “animal 
psychology,” and of GS 354 being the account not of the emergence of 
consciousness but of its development [Entwicklung], boils down to this claim: for 
Nietzsche, the spiritual dimension of existence is and was always-already here. If 
this claim is right, then this creates a difficulty for the naturalist accounts of 
Nietzsche135. To my knowledge, only two authors have addressed (albeit 
allusively) the enigmatic metaphor of the “layers of skin” in GM. Remarkably, 
both belong to the naturalist tradition. In the article mentioned above, Mathias 
Risse writes in a footnote:  
“The image of the skins is curious. Clark/Swensen suggest that one may think of two 
layers of an onion. It is important that Nietzsche assumes that there already is a ‘small’ inner 
                                                 
135 Let me point out readily that one possible—albeit somewhat weak—way to maintain 
naturalism in this case is to introduce the “spiritual” within “nature,” as precisely this “non-
conscious, psychical life” but it is all too clear how this claim would be naturalistic in only an 
inconsequential sense; by this token, any monism, since it includes the natural world, would be a 
naturalism, and we would be taken back to the weak form of naturalism. Actually, it is worth 
remarking that the only times where Nietzsche accepts seeing nature as self-identical, it is in 
order to separate the human from it. There is a trade-off between humanity and self-identity, 
which, I think, belies naturalism insofar as naturalism is a monism which affirms nature qua self-
identity as reality. See Nietzsche’s note from 11[70]  Spring-Fall 1881: “let us not think of the 
return to non-perception as a retrogression! We become completely true, we are perfected. Death 
must be reinterpreted! We thus are reconciled with reality, i. e. with the dead world” 
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world. For that deprives him of the task to explain how there could be any form of inner life at 
all, as opposed to explaining how it could be expanded. [...] Plausibly, Nietzsche thought this bit 
of the development of consciousness happened at a pre-social stage. For the development of 
consciousness under social pressure, cf. also GS 354, and see also BGE 19.”136  
Alas, we know that GS 354 does not provide any account of this 
‘previous stage,' and neither does BGE, 19. Instead, both these texts start after 
the presumed original separation. In fact, Nietzsche does not give such an 
account. In their translation of GM, Clark and Swensen devote a footnote to this 
enigmatic metaphor without much philosophical emphasis.137 Characteristically, 
Risse’s dismissal of the question—although regrettable—is thorough and 
precise. It is a dismissal, because it evades difficulties by assuming that 
Nietzsche was thinking something that appears nowhere in his writings. In short, 
it privileges Nietzsche’s perceived intentions over and against his writings. I do 
not deny that the question of Nietzsche’s intentions is open and important. If 
Risse is right about Nietzsche’s intentions and I am right about Nietzsche’s text, 
it would follow that Nietzsche intended to write a naturalistic philosophy and 
actually wrote a non-naturalistic one instead. Here is why a dismissal will not do: 
the difference between an origin in self-identity (which is not in Nietzsche’s 
writings) and an origin in self-differentiation (which is) has structural 
consequences for Nietzsche’s entire philosophy. In fact, it is nothing but the 
string of these consequences that I will follow in my overall account of 
Nietzsche. For now, it might suffice to point out that this importance is expressed 
                                                 
136 Mathias Risse, (2003) op. Cit. 142 
137 See Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen’s “translator’s note”, On the Genealogy of 
Morals, Hackett, New York, 1998, 147. 
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by Risse’s remark that Nietzsche’s assumption “that there already is a ‘small’ 
inner world [...] deprives him of the task to explain how there could be any form 
of inner life at all, as opposed to explaining how it could be expanded.” This 
remark contains the essence of the problem of any naturalism and asks a question 
that Nietzsche asked himself many times138: how does one go about explaining 
the emergence of the different from the identical, or in this case, of the spiritual 
from the physical? This is nothing but a reformulation of the naturalistic attitude 
(which I pointed to earlier) which seeks monism within a dualistic structure of 
thought139: naturalism is on the side of the object in the alternative with the 
subject; on the side of the physical in the alternative with the spiritual; on the 
side of the natural in the alternative with the non-natural.140 Nietzsche, on the 
                                                 
138 See above, my quick remarks on HATH, I, 1 and BGE, 2.  
139 Consider for instance Risse’s later recognition that an essential feature of naturalism is 
Nietzsche’s rejection of the “juxtaposition of ‘man and world’” from GS, 346. I have argued that 
the rejection of the “opposition subject and the object” in GS 354 is really a rejection of the 
bipolarity, not the establishment of their identity. By the same token, GS, 346 is concerned to 
emphasise man’s inclusion within the world, not its identity with it. Indeed, such an identity 
would rule out the “question mark” which provides the title to the aphorism. This question is 
precisely how much the condemnation of man’s self-exclusion from the world entails a 
condemnation of the world, or in other words, how much man’s self-exclusion from the world is 
one of the intrinsic possibilities of the world. See Mathias Risse, op. Cit. (2007) 58, ft 2. 
140 Let me repeat that this argument involves the rejection of the idea that Nietzsche’s worldview 
reduces everything to nature as self-identical (as the object of physical sciences for instance). My 
view, in this sense, does not contradict Nietzsche’s project to translate man back into nature for 
example, or to reject the claim that our origin is “more dignified” than nature (BGE, 230). In fact, 
I propose another way to think of nature as self-differentiated. This opposes the naturalist 
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contrary, finds the origin of the becoming of mankind in self-differentiation, 
allowing for both chance and necessity (against both determinism and free-will), 
both becoming and eternity (the structure of life is both loose and 
unchangeable),141 and both nature and psychic life.142  
 
4.  Self-Differentiation and Perpetual Becoming 
In my view, Nietzsche’s placing of self-differentiation at 
the start of the genealogical unfolding warrants the eternity of becoming. 
Thereby, it excludes self-identity, in the sense in which a certain form of 
naturalism intends it, or in the form of any alternative between subjectivity and 
objectivity, whether it leads to an “idealist reading” or a “materialistic one.” For 
Nietzsche, there is no need to postulate self-identical terms as structuring drives 
that are tangential. He claims to owe this idea from his encounter with Ruggiero 
Boscovich’s dynamic conceptions of matter:  
“When I think about my philosophical genealogy [...] I recognize a family connection 
with the mechanistic movements (tracing all moral and aesthetic questions back to physiological 
                                                 
readings, while making Nietzsche’s appeals to translate man back into nature consistent with his 
contempporaneous critiques of natural sciences.  
141 Bennett and Connolly, op. Cit. 152, characterise Nietzsche as “the philosopher of duration as 
becoming.” Their article opens perspectives of a renewed form of naturalism, by precisely re-
building the concept of nature as self-differentiated, along the lines of physicist Ilya Prigogine’s 
worldview. One of their conclusions is that “thinking” permeates nature at large, not merely the 
human.  
142 Let me stress that none of this implies that Nietzsche is a dualist. The question is the nature of 
his monism. My claim is that he considers being to be homogenous (everything is will to power), 
without accepting that it is, was, or ever will be unified.  
 73 
ones, all the physiological to the chemical, all the chemical to the mechanical) though still with 
the difference that I do not believe in ‘material’ and hold Boscovich to be the great turning 
point.”143 
 
c. Truth and Values as the two Pillars of the Ideology of Survival.  
Before moving to the implications of these views for human 
existence, I would like to emphasise three key results from the discussion so far. 
Firstly, the entire development of « the spirit » stems from a concern for 
preservation in the physical sense. On this basis, I shall refer to the individual, 
the institutions, and the fictions informed by this development under the broad 
heading of ‘the ideology of survival.’ Secondly, the entire ‘ideology of survival’ 
relies on two main pillars: truth and values. Truth ensures that values are worth 
pursuing. Values ensure that we are not a threat for each other.144 Finally, and 
most importantly, the relations between truth and value are not symmetrical; 
values derive their efficient power from their reference to reality. This reference 
to reality is tested by truth-discourses, which are the only way to reconnect to a 
reality detached from presence. This genealogical dependence of values on truth 
translates into a logical posteriority. To be valuable, values must be truthful (they 
must present themselves as having a correlate in reality), but the reverse does not 
                                                 
143 KSA 11.26 [432] Summer-Fall 1884. Quoted by Laurence Lampert, op. Cit. 46. On 
Boscovich, see also BGE, 12.  
144 Apart from the discussion of the “internalization of man” in GM, II, 16 (which is a response to 
the human’s becoming peaceable), I have not addressed this latter (and rather uncontroversial) 
point. See for example, Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, 1983, 388 ff.  
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hold: truth does not need to be good in order to be true. This makes truth a more 
powerful (in the sense of ‘more independent’) concept.   
 
C. TANGENTIALITY AND ETERNAL BECOMING. 
It has become a lieu commun in recent Nietzsche scholarship that 
Nietzsche “presses power as his alternative to survival.”145 Indeed, Nietzsche’s 
definition of life is sufficiently explicit for there to be a broad consensus on the 
matter: life is “increase”, the will “to become more.”146 Let me say a word about 
what Nietzsche means by “increase”. As I will discuss in the next chapter, 
Nietzsche envisages increase as ‘incorporation.' For now, it is sufficient to point 
out that Nietzsche measures health according to our ability to incorporate, and 
conversely, that sickness is the inability to incorporate.147 Life-enhancement is 
Nietzsche’s overriding priority, and the greatest obstacles that confront it have 
been laid by the “ideology of survival”. This ideology has created sickness, two 
of its forms being consciousness148 and “bad conscience”. Yet, Nietzsche writes, 
“bad conscience is a sickness, there is no point in denying it, but a sickness 
                                                 
145 John Richardson, op. Cit. (2002), 147. See also, Mathias Risse (2003), op. Cit. 
146 WP, 688 [1888] see also WP, 125 [1885] “One must want to have more than what he has in 
order to become more, for this is the doctrine preached by life itself to all that has life: the 
morality of development. To have and to want to have more-growth in one word- that is life 
itself.”  
147 See Mark Letteri, “The Theme of Health in Nietzsche’s Thought,” Man and World, 1990, 
Issue 23, 405-417.  
148 “consciousness is a danger, and whoever lives among the most conscious Europeans knows 
even that it is a disease.” GS, 354. 
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rather like pregnancy.”149 This is because, Nietzsche predicts, the tensions 
intrinsic to the sick mode of life will lead it to its self-destruction, and thereby, 
will provide the opening for a new, stronger, and healthier kind of life. In the 
discussion so far, we have encountered one tension at the heart of the ideology of 
survival: the tension between truth and values. Both truth and values are 
necessary for the maintainment of the ideology of survival; however, Nietzsche 
diagnoses that Europe has entered its nihilistic phase, in which the European 
nihilist will have to choose between truth and values.  
 
i. End Types. 
I have mentioned above that Nietzsche saw no possible end to history. 
This was, I claimed, because of the irreducibility of consciousness. As I 
explained, consciousness is closely connected to the reversibility of drives, and 
consequently it stands for the compossibility of internalization and 
externalization. It seems thus that sickness is part of the essence of conscious 
(human) life. If this view is to hold, then I must give an interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s ‘great promise,’ which would not involve any break, or any end of 
human history. This claim seems to be in direct contradiction with two of 
Nietzsche’s key thoughts as exposed in Z: the “last human” and “the 
Übermensch.” The last human is Zarathustra’s name for the ultimate man of 
survival. He chose the path of values without truth. The Übermensch, in turn, is 
the ultimate man of life, who can bear truth without values. Both types in 
opposite ways present an end to human becoming. I think that these figures 
                                                 
149 GM, II, 19. 
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should be taken as abstractions, as fantastical endpoints to their respective 
dynamics: survival tends towards the last human and life tends towards the 
Übermensch, but neither is to be thought of as actually possible for Nietzsche 
(they are, as it were, mathematical limits). This claim is fairly uncontroversial 
and I shall not develop it here150. For my present purpose, I shall focus instead on 
demonstrating that the reason why neither the “last human” nor the Übermensch 
are possible is that they represent figures that have eradicated any chaos; and 
chaos is in the essence of things.  
 
a. The last human  
To my knowledge, the expression “last human” appears in the 
published works only four times and in two senses. In the enigmatic aphorism 49 
of D, it is given the biological sense of the last representative of the human 
species. It represents the extinction of mankind. I will return to this aphorism in a 
moment. In the other three mentions of the phrase, the “last human” is 
understood in a sharply different sense. The last human is she who won’t 
disappear. Far from being the “end of the human,” she rather represents the 
“human of the end," the individual who has attained the much-anticipated “realm 
of the ends”. All three other mentions of the last human are made in the context 
of Z.151 In Z, III the “last human” is associated with the “end” of creative 
                                                 
150 See for example Kathleen, M. Higgins, who also calls the “last man” a “caricature” in 
“Zarathustra’s Midlife Crisis: A Response to Gooding-Williams” in the Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies, 34: 2007, 48. 
151 Z, I, “Prologue”, 5; Z, III, “On the Old and New Tables," 27, EH, “Destiny,” 4. 
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existence and the “the greatest danger of all human future.”152 This associates the 
last human with sickness here understood as the inability to create. The theme of 
the last human was introduced by Zarathustra and given a prominent place as 
early as the book’s “prologue.” Here, Zarathustra describes the last human as 
sterile soil. This sterility comes not from a lack but from an excess of cultivation: 
the last human’s soil is “poor from cultivation, and no tall tree will be able to 
grow from it." Culture is sterility because it is internalization, the inability to 
create.153 Most importantly, the last human is a master of survival: “Its race is as 
inexterminable as the ground-flea; the last human lives the longest” says 
Zarathustra. Therefore, the “last human” typifies the ultimate product of the 
ideology of survival and provides a supplementary qualification for it: survival is 
the concern for longevity154. The last human is not subject to change, she is 
outside becoming, because she is an obstacle to the future. Of course, this is not 
                                                 
152 Z, III, “On the Old and New Tables,” 26-27. 
153 On the sterility of the last human, see Kathleen Higgins: “A second challenge for the potential 
creator of values has to do with the cultural climate. Zarathustra’s caricature of ‘the last man,’ the 
person so concerned with his own comfort that he aspires toward nothing, describes the condition 
of much of modern society. The strategy of the last man, geared as it is toward self-protection, is 
inimical to fervent involvement in anything. A society full of last men is incapable of generating 
new values because they lack the passionate basis for doing so. Indeed, Nietzsche sees many of 
the conditions of modern society as passion-eradicating. This raises the question of how 
Zarathustra could propose new values that would actually result in cultural transformation." 
Kathleen Marie Higgins, “Zarathustra’s Mid-Life Crisis,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 34, 
2007, 47 
154 See also, Z, I, “On Free Death” where Zarathustra refers to the “good” as “the preachers of 
slow death.” 
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to say that the last human’s life does not take place in time, but rather that the 
time in which she lives has lost its creative (incorporative) power. In the world of 
the last human, becoming (in the sense of creative time) becomes separated from 
timeliness. The last human has timeliness, but no becoming. She is a “standstill” 
says Zarathustra. He further expresses this by saying that the last human has 
eradicated all “chaos” from his being:  
“‘I say to you: one must still have chaos within, in order to give birth to a dancing star. I 
say to you: you still have chaos within you. ‘Alas! The time will come when the human will give 
birth to no more stars. [...] ‘Behold! I show to you the last human.” 
There is strong evidence in Nietzsche’s writings that he does not believe 
chaos can be entirely eradicated from an individual. In GS, 109, Nietzsche states 
explicitly that “the total character of the world is, [...] in all eternity, chaos,” and 
in a note contemporaneous to Z, he writes:  
“‘Timelessness’ to be rejected. At any precise moment of a force, the absolute 
conditionality of a new distribution of all its forces is given: it cannot stand still. ‘Change’ 
belongs to the essence, therefore also temporality: with this, however, the necessity of change has 
only been posited once more conceptually.”155 
 Moreover, even though Nietzsche describes the last human’s activities as 
very minimalistic, he nonetheless attributes her some activities (“One continues 
                                                 
155 WP 1064 [1885], See also for example, WP, 83 [Spring-Fall 1887]: “‘Without the Christian 
faith,’ Pascal thought, ‘you, no less than nature and history, will become for yourselves un monstre 
et un chaos.’ This prophecy we have fulfilled, after the feeble-optimistic eighteenth century had 
prettified and rationalized man” and WP 639 [Spring-Fall 1888]: “That the world is not striving 
toward a stable condition is the only thing that has been proved. Consequently one must conceive 
its climactic condition in such a way that it is not a condition of equilibrium—“  
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to work, for work is entertainment.”; “One has one’s little pleasure for the day 
and one’s little pleasure for the night”). Yet, for Nietzsche, “every activity is an 
overcoming of difficulties and resistances”156 any activity involves some degree 
of ‘chaos,' and indeed, there is no eradicating chaos.  
 
b. The Overhuman,  
The Overhuman stands opposed to the last man, as the figure of 
the accomplishment of what I have called above the ‘ideology of life.' They are 
both presented together as mirror-images in Z’s prologue.157 This symmetry 
involves opposition and resemblence: both types stand for an overcoming of 
chaos. The last human seeks to overcome chaos in the inertia of passivity; her 
drives neutralize each other. She is the ultimate internalized human while the 
Overman seeks absolute externalisation of drives.158 While internalization is 
sickness, the Overhuman is the human of the ‘great health’.159 Both of them 
                                                 
156 VII, [18] Late 1886-Spring 1888. See also WP, 661 [1883-1888] and XI, 111 [Nov. 1887-
March 1888]. In his Nietzsche, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter writes: “the resulting conflict of the 
drives is thus a condition for all events. This conflict can never come to a standstill” (p. 13). For 
an extensive demonstration of this point, see his chapter 9 entitled: “The Organism as Inner 
Struggle.” 
157 See also WP, 936 [Nov. 1887-March 1888] 
158 This is made obvious by the fact that the Overhuman possesses ‘great health’ which is defined 
as the harmony of drives. This harmony can only be directd outwards, lest it becomes an 
opposition.  
159 EH, “Books,” “Z”, 2. In this passage, which takes over GS 382, Nietzsche associates the 
‘great Health’ with Zarathustra and with those who announce the Overhuman. 
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however present an equilibrium of all drives which is chimaeric. Indeed, as John 
Richardson puts it: “the difficulty of such a synthesis [as the Overman], of 
achieving that oxymoronic ‘complex unity’ out of this overrich mix, could mean 
that no one can accomplish it.”160  
This remark raises the question of the continuity between increase and 
survival. This continuity is figured by the irreducibility of chaos. Nietzsche 
understands chaos as an internal opposition of drives. One has chaos in one’s 
soul if some of her drives are internalized and some other drives are externalised. 
This amounts to repeating that drives are essentially relative and seek a 
resistance. In other words no activity can occur without opposition, and any form 
of life involves chaos. This is why the internal harmonization the last human 
stands for is impossible. As regards the external harmonization of the Overman, 
it is unattainable because externalisation takes time. Ascending life is increase 
and externalisation: it is conquest. Nietzsche, however, is careful to point out that 
conquest takes time, and often a long time: “It is only within a great duration 
securely grounded and assured that a constant evolution and an ennobling 
inoculation are eventually possible.”161 This element of time is provided by the 
concern for survival, which is, recall, also a concern for longevity. Indeed, for 
Nietzsche, the strongest natures are also those whose periods of weakness are the 
darkest and the longest. Among the characteristics of the ‘strong men' Nietzsche 
                                                 
160 Nietzsche’s System, 67. 
161 HATH, I, 224. 
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repeatedly mentions patience.162 As a result, the Overhuman is vulnerable before 
she is powerful, and she needs self-protection, that is, some degree of 
internalization.  
 
ii. Tangentiality. 
a. Interdependence. 
In spite of the opposition of the principles of survival and life qua 
increase, living requires surviving and surviving requires living. Being a human 
is neither fully living nor merely surviving; it is a compromise between the two. 
Every human existence is the locus of a tension between security and power. 
This is not to say that the normative difference between increase (as a superior 
aim of existence) and survival (as a ‘despicable’ one) is irrelevant, but it means 
that between the modes of existence of survival and increase there is no sharp 
break. The separation between them is merely a question of degree, a question of  
“how far”:  
“How far to prevail against the conditions that preserve society and against its 
prejudices?-How far to unchain one’s terrible qualities through which most people perish?—How 
far to oppose truth and reflect on its most questionable sides?—How far to oppose suffering, self-
contempt, pity, sickness, vice, with the query as to whether one cannot become master of them? 
(—what does not destroy us makes us stronger—)—Finally: how far to acknowledge in one’s 
mind the rule, the commonplace, the petty, good, upright, the average nature, without letting 
oneself be vulgarised by them?”163  
                                                 
162 WP, 993 [1885]; VII [54] (Late 1886- Spring 1887), Z, IV, I. Remarkably, all these texts 
mention patience in the context of Z. 
163 WP, 934 [1887] 
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The mode of existence directed uniquely towards increase is impossible. 
So is that directed only towards self-preservation; both horizons, if attained, are 
fatal in a different way. In D, Nietzsche already asked: “do we desire for 
mankind an end in fire and light or one in sand?”164. The possibilities of human 
existence are thus spread over a line that stretches tangentially towards the 
Overhuman on the one end and the last human on the other. Nietzsche’s task is 
obviously to lead us down the path of the Overhuman.  
This horizonal range of possible modes of existence is a direct expression 
of the dehiscence that constitutes the human self and that which Nietzsche 
describes as the originary “inner world.” I have argued that the world of 
experience is tangentially structured on both sides, by two self-identical (and 
fictional) horizons: the objective and the subjective poles. This I believe, has 
consequences for Nietzsche’s anthropology as well.  
 
b. Last Human and Overhuman as Object and Subject. 
This can be illustrated most tellingly with regard to Nietzsche’s 
talk of the “objective” and “subjective” types. As may be expected, Nietzsche 
refers to the “objective men” in similar terms as he refers to the “last human.” 
Their “objectivity,” he says, is “lack of personality, lack of will.”165 They are 
incapable of attaining interest, because they deny their own interest.166 They are 
                                                 
164 D, 429 
165 WP, 79 [Spring-Fall 1887].  
166 WP 95 [Spring-Fall 1887]: “Further theories: the doctrine of objectivity—"will- less" 
contemplation—as the only road to truth; also to beauty (—also the faith in the "genius" to justify 
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in fact, “objective” in two different senses: firstly, they do not entertain a relation 
of interest with reality (this includes scientific “objectivity” as ascetic 
practice167), and secondly, and more enigmatically, they are objects themselves. 
This latter claim is unusual. For Nietzsche, being ‘objective’ means being 
“depersonalized.”168 This is because those who are depersonalized are reflective: 
they are objects for themselves. Their relationship with themselves is no different 
than their relation with others, or other things. This, remember, was the essential 
characteristic of bad conscience: as the transfer of the external relationship of 
aggressivity within the self. It allows us to re-interpret this “disinterest” as 
merely the internalization of interest; interest cannot be constrained, it can only 
be redirected. For one to be “objective” in the sense of “disinterested,” one must 
first internalize one’s drives. This is something that the true ‘psychologists’ 
understand. These ‘psychologists’ are the “subjective men,” men of interest and 
desires. While the ‘objective man’ exhibits “contempt for what is ‘natural,' for 
desire, for the ego: attempt to understand even the highest spirituality and art as 
                                                 
a right to submission); mechanism, the calculable rigidity of the mechanical process; the alleged 
"naturalism," elimination of the choosing, judging, interpreting subject as a principle.” 
167 WP, 296 [Spring-Fall 1887]: “The great crimes in psychology: [...] that everything great in 
man has been reinterpreted as selflessness, as self-sacrifice for the sake of something else, 
someone else, that even in the man of knowledge, even in the artist, depersonalization has been 
presented as the cause of the greatest knowledge and ability”; see also WP, 442 [March-June 
1888], AC, 20. 
168 WP, 382 [Spring-Fall 1887-Spring-Fall 1888]: “the moral value of ‘depersonalization,’ as the 
condition of spiritual activity, of “objective” viewing.” 
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the consequence of depersonalization and as desinteressement,” the subjective 
man169 is not introspective and is not disinterested:  
“We psychologists of the future—we have little patience with introspection: we almost 
take it for a sign of degeneration when an instrument tries ‘to know itself’ [...], we must not 
analyze ourselves, ‘know’ ourselves. [...] The great egoism of our dominating will requires that 
we shut our eyes to ourselves—that we must seem to be ‘impersonal,’ ‘désintéressé,’ 
“objective”!—oh, how much we are the opposite of this! Just because we are to an eccentric 
degree psychologists.”170 
 
c. Self-Differentiation through Ontology and Anthropology. 
I have argued above that chaos (the opposition of drives within 
the self) is an essential feature of existence. I claimed this is because existence 
constitutes itself through the experience of resistance, which is the indefinite 
alternation of the subjective and the objective. This argument led me to argue 
that the subject/object pair was closely connected to the external/internal pairs. In 
my view, this connection is at work in Nietzsche’s characterisation of the last 
human and the overhuman as the objective and subjective types. Nietzsche 
regards the last human as the internal human (she is, after all, the sick animal of 
the “internalization of man”); her horizons are internal only, and in this sense she 
is sterile. Conversely, the Overhuman could be read as the fully externalized 
                                                 
169 Those who can survive the thought of eternal recurrence are those who embrace their own 
subjectivity, and value it above objectivity, see WP, 1059 [1884]. 
170 WP, 426 [March-June 1888]. On the characterisation of the “last human” as objective and its 
opposition to the “strong human” as subjective, see in particular: WP, 79; 84; 95; 296; 379; 612, 
721, all from Spring-Fall 1887.  
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human, whose power is discharged outwards.171 This means that the thoughts of 
the “last human” and the “Overhuman” denote unattainable horizons which 
structure the range of possibilities of human existence.  
Earlier I argued that the subject and the object were equally unattainable 
horizons which structured our worldview but did not reflect reality. This 
common structure is emphasised by Nietzsche’s characterisation of these two 
types as “objective” and “subjective.” This establishes a connection between the 
anthropological horizons of the last human and the overhuman and the logical 
and ontological horizons of the subject and the object. We must recall that both 
the structure of intentionality and the structure of the individual are determined 
by Nietzsche’s analysis of the experience of “resistance.” The self arises through 
the experience of resistance. Resistance is defined by a conflict of drives both 
within organisms and among them. Thus, resistance necessarily involves ‘chaos.’ 
Here, we begin to discern the correlation between the thoughts of the ‘last 
human’ and the overhuman as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ men, and the abstract 
concepts of subject and objects. It becomes clear how Nietzsche’s tangential 
anthropology and his tangential ontology are really two aspects of the same 
fundamental experience of the impossibility of self-identity, be it full objectivity 
or full subjectivity.  
 
                                                 
171 Ken Gemes arrives at a similar characterisation of the last human and the Overman: “For 
Nietzsche, where the Overman is a labyrinth whose center is everywhere and circumference 
nowhere, the Last Man, his prescient prefiguration of postmodern man, is a labyrinth whose 
center is nowhere and circumference everywhere”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Vol. LXII, No. 2, March 2001 “Postmodernism’s Use and Abuse of Nietzsche,” 359. 
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d. Nihilism: Truth versus Values.  
The impossibility of the last human and of the Overhuman leads 
to infinite timeliness: no ‘standstill’ can be reached. Indeed, for Nietzsche, there 
is an intrinsic link between the historical order and the logical order: history 
exhausts all possibilities and “if the motion of the world aimed at a final state, 
that state would have been reached,” consequently, “becoming does not aim at a 
final state, does not flow into ‘being.’”172 This places the ideology of survival in 
a precarious situation: recall that the two pillars of this ideology are truth and 
values. Yet, as I have pointed out, they are in a dissymetric relationship: values 
depend on truth, but not the reverse, so that truth is bound to be attributed 
regardless of values. Within the period of stability of the slave rule, the 
independence of truth from values is inconsequential; it expresses itself when, 
for instance, truth is attributed to facts which are morally neutral. However, this 
means that truth itself is morally neutral. Eternal becoming guarantees that truth 
will one day contradict values. Here, we arrive at the crisis of the ideology of 
survival, or in Nietzsche’s terms, the crisis of nihilism: “Why has the advent of 
nihilism become necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw 
their final consequence. We require, sometime, new values.”173 
The crisis of nihilism is reached when truth and values oppose each other 
and their difference turns into incompatibility. Values cease to be “true” and 
truth ceases to be valuable. This involves a revision of what was hitherto called 
“truth”: so far, truth was considered to be necessarily useful. Usefulness (in the 
                                                 
172 WP 708 [Nov. 1887-March 1888]. 
173 KSA, XIII, 190. 
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sense of usefulness for survival), in turn, was the basis for values. It appears now 
that truth uncovers its own opposition to values and utility, thereby proving that 
truth itself has been misconstrued. The new truth, which is a more independent 
version of truth, exposes the other truth as a instrument of morality. Consider:  
“the position of pure knowledge, scientific integrity, is at once abandoned as soon as the 
claims of morality must be answered. Morality says: I need many answers--reasons, arguments; 
scruples can come afterwards, or not at all.”174 
 The will-to-truth uncovers itself as morally informed. Yet it exceeds its 
moral prerogatives and becomes able to will truth even against morality and 
thereby to transform truth into the highest value.175 Nietzsche calls this moment 
the “self-undercutting of truth”: the immoral truth undercuts the moral truth. The 
self-undercutting of truth, is also necessarily coincidental to the undercutting of 
values by truth.176 On the one hand, the genealogical account given by Nietzsche 
ensured the dependence of values on truth through their reference to the 
empirical world. On the other hand, it ensured truth’s independence from values: 
as I discussed earlier, values are valuable because they have a reference to truth 
(there exists a world where these values are the object of perceptual faith), but 
truth need not be good in order to be true.  
Nihilism faces mankind with a painful alternative: truth or values. 
Choosing values of course means embracing the path of survival leading towards 
                                                 
174 WP, 423 [March-June 1888]. 
175 GS 344, D, Preface, 4, GM, III, 24. 
176 “Morality itself, as honesty, compells us to negate morality” V [58] (Summer 1886-Autumn 
1887) my emphasis. 
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the last human. Values serve utility, security, and sociability, all of which which 
are the greater aspirations of the last human. Choosing truth, on the other hand, 
involves a total liberation from values. This liberation is the promise of an 
overcoming of ressentiment, bad conscience, and all sorts of sickness that plague 
the modern condition. In this respect, it means, choosing life and the path to the 
overhuman. This confronts us with the alternative of “passive” and “active” 
nihilism: is nihilism a liberation or a cause of despair? “Nihilism,” Nietzsche 
writes,  “is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as 
active nihilism. B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as 
passive nihilism.”177 We then obtain two antagonistic pairs: values and survival 
on the one hand, and life and truth on the other,178 the future of mankind will 
depend on the choice made by those who are undergoing the crisis of nihilism. 
Nietzsche rejects the first alternative. His entire project is directed towards 
saving us from the pitfall of the last human. It is, however, unclear on what 
grounds he can advance this project. This question, I believe, can only be 
addressed with regard to Nietzsche’s cosmological ontology. This will be my 
focus in chapter III.  
Nietzsche’s hope is for humanity to embrace the path of truth without 
values. This path is a “great promise,”179 but it is also a frightful prospect, 
because one cannot walk this path with the help of crutches such as values.180 
Indeed, this path involves the liberation from all falsifications, and there lies the 
                                                 
177 WP, 22 [Spring-Fall 1887]. 
178 EH, « Destiny," 4. 
179 GM, II, 16. 
180 Z, I, « On the Pale Criminal ." 
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‘great danger’: these falsifications were originally put in place as means of 
survival. Henceforth, Nietzsche shall seek those able to survive truth. This 
challenge is first presented in GS, 110 as the challenge of the incorporation of 
truth: “to what extent can truth endure incorporation? That is the question, that is 
the experiment.” I now turn to this question.  
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CHAPTER II: 
THE INCORPORATION OF TRUTH AND THE SYMBIOSIS 
OF TRUTH AND LIFE. 
 
A. GAY SCIENCE AND INCORPORATION OF TRUTH.  
 
In Chapter I, I have shown that tangentiality is an essential feature of the 
will to power: the will to power tends indefinitely towards an object and towards 
a subject without reaching them. I have also argued that determination, in the 
form of conceptualisation, is an essential feature of truth. This presents us with a 
paradox: the very nature of conceptual knowledge is in contradiction with the 
nature of reality. In this chapter, I wish to examine how Nietzsche addresses this 
discrepancy through an enigmatic recourse to the ‘incorporation’ [Einverleibung] 
of truth. Nietzsche’s invitation for us to incorporate truth is an effort to save us 
from the path that leads towards the last human. It is also a passionate attempt to 
salvage truth from its own undercutting. The young Nietzsche posited the 
opposition of truth and life, and he questioned the utility of knowledge for life. If 
faced with the alternative of life or truth, we were to choose life and delusion 
over truth. This is a view still expressed in the last aphorism of book II of GS 
entitled “Our Ultimate [letzte] Gratitude to Art”:  
“If we had not welcomed the arts and invented this kind of cult of the untrue, then the 
realization of general untruth and mendaciousness that now comes to us through science—the 
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realization that delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge—would be utterly 
unbearable.”181 
This aphorism is often read as a confirmation of Nietzsche’s earlier 
rejection of truth in favour of art182; however, as the German “letzte” expresses it 
better than the English “ultimate”, this aphorism is Nietzsche’s farewell to the 
preference for art over and above truth.183 This move is made in preparation for 
the opening of Book III, which affirms a renewed commitment to truth by 
appealing to its incorporation: “To what extent can truth endure incorporation? 
That is the question, that is the experiment.”184 In this aphorism, the subject of 
the experiment is truth itself, and incorporation is a test for truth. This test is 
designed to operate a division within truth. There is a dimension (an “extent”) of 
truth which will not endure incorporation and another which will pass the test of 
incorporation. This dimension, it is assumed, will have to be salvaged. 
Retrieving it will be the task of a “Gay Scientist," a knower who does not suffer 
from her knowledge, who “endures” it. 
In later texts, Nietzsche mentions the incorporation of truth in a different 
sense. In EH, he writes: “how much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth 
                                                 
181 GS, 107 
182 One significant example is Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, op. Cit. 
102, ff. 
183 This is asserted, I think, by the implicit references to BT in GS, 107 as well as from this note 
from the Nachlass of the same period which refers to BT in these terms: “in my first period 
appears the mask of Jesuitism, I mean the conscious adherence to illusion” GWK, XII, 212 
(1881-1883) 
184 GS, 110. I will discuss below the role of aphorisms 108 and 109 in preparing the thought of 
the incorporation of truth.  
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can a spirit dare? This has become for me more and more the real measure of 
value,”185  and in the notebooks of the period of GM: “My new path to a ‘Yes’ 
[...] ‘How much ‘truth’ can a spirit endure and dare?’- a question of its 
strength.”186 In the same year, Nietzsche clarifies what he means by ‘truth’ in his 
additions to GS by replacing it with the word ‘faith’: “how much one needs faith 
[…] that is the measure of one’s strength (of to put the point more correctly, of 
one’s weakness).”187 In these mentions, the incorporation of truth is still a test, 
but that which is being tested is not truth any longer, but the incorporator of 
truth, i. e. the individual. Nietzsche presents the incorporation of truth as a test of 
“strength” and consequently, we can read it as addressing the challenge I 
mentioned at the end of chapter I: the incorporation of truth is a device for us to 
take the path of human flourishing, and not of the “last human”. This is 
important because it indicates clearly that the re-integration of a concern for truth 
in Nietzsche’s mature period is not a departure from his project of human 
flourishing and strength. It does not indicate, for example, some ascetic 
commitment to truth for the sake of it.188 It is not the preference of truth over 
                                                 
185 EH Foreword, 3 
186 X, [3] Autumn 1887. 
187 GS, 347 
188 “‘Beauty for beauty’s sake,' ‘Truth for truth’s sake,' ‘Good for good’s sake’-for the real, these 
are three forms of the evil eye” X, [194] Autumn 1887. I agree on this point with Maudemarie 
Clark (1990; 198) who claims: “given my interpretation of Nietzsche’s analysis of the will to 
truth, it follows that he cannot advocate pursuing truth out of commitment to the ascetic ideal.” 
See also Clark (1990; 180 ff). On her part, Barbara Stiegler (2005) sees the shift in Nietzsche’s 
position but calls it an ascetic “critique of the flesh." In so doing, she overlooks the ability of the 
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strength. Rather—and more interestingly—Nietzsche’s insight is that the path to 
the superior form of humanity cannot dispense with truth.189 This discloses a 
curious internal motif in Nietzsche’s thought: Nietzsche is the philosopher by 
which truth undercuts itself by discovering its own untruthfulness. However, he 
is also the philosopher who attempts to salvage truth from the excesses of this 
undercutting. Through the appeal to the incorporation of truth, Nietzsche’s 
political-ethical program of breeding the strong humans of the future and his 
epistemological concern regarding truth become intrinsically linked. 
In this chapter, I shall examine the relations between the two roles played 
by the “incorporation of truth.” How are we supposed to understand the 
transformation occasioned by the incorporation of truth, so that it would prove to 
transform both truth and ourselves? I will argue firstly that the truth we have to 
incorporate is the the knowldge of the untruth of objective truth. I shall mean 
‘objective truth’ in the sense of conceptual judgment. Secondly, I will argue that 
this incorporation is necessary for human flourishing.  
 
 
 
                                                 
healthy organism to restrict itself without appeal to any external constraint. Consider WP, 122 
(January-Fall 1888): “What I warn against: the instincts of decadence should not be confused 
with humaneness;the means of civilization, which lead to disintegration and necessarily to 
decadence, should not be confused with culture; the libertinage, the principle of 'laisser aller,' 
should not be confused with the will to power (—which is the counterprinciple)." 
189 See for example, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, op. Cit. 30 ff. 
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i. What truth? 
Let us return to the paradox mentioned above: truth as correspondence 
relies on the objective structure which opposes a subject and an object, and 
thereby effectively rejects their union. This structure is an illusory crystallisation 
of the original fact of precisely this union. Intentionality, as the continuity 
between the subjective and the objective horizons, is primary; the poles are mere 
abstractions arousing from the tangential structure of intentionality. This 
tangentiality constitutes the “will to power” in general and the “drives” or 
“instincts” in particular; it is the ultimate reality. Truths are truthful if they are 
adequate representations of this tangentiality. Yet the very structure of truth as 
correspondence assumes a separation of the subject and the object. 
Consequently, truth as correspondence is in contradiction with what it is to be the 
truth about: namely the fact that reality is tangential and not polar; or, in negative 
terms, the fact that the objective structure is fallacious. It seems that in 
Nietzsche’s view, predicative truth is necessarily untrue. This was, in fact, 
always Nietzsche’s argument, at least since 1873’s TL.  
 
a. Gay Science 
What is new about GS is the realization that this untruth was 
perhaps not essential to truth, that there could be something about truth that one 
might benefit from saving. For Nietzsche, the new (“gay”) science must not “ask 
the question how error is possible, but how a kind of truth is at all possible, in 
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spite of the fundamental untruth in knowing.”190 Here, Nietzsche distinguishes 
between two questions: the question of how error is possible, and the question of 
what kind of truth is possible, in spite of the untruth in knowing. Nietzsche seeks 
to replace the former question with the latter. The opposition between these two 
questions is curious. It is not clear how an answer to the second question would 
address the first. We must see the second question (what kind of truth is still 
possible?) not as a rejection of the first (why is there error?) as being a “wrong” 
question to ask, but instead, as Nietzsche’s proposal for a more fruitful way of 
posing the same question. In this reading, Nietzsche’s question is part of the 
broader question posed in I: how is it that untruth exists? This question asks 
about error, but it also asks about a certain reality that is revealed by error, 
namely that error is possible. By asking this question, Nietzsche wants to go 
beyond identifying truth as error, but he wants to explain the error of the belief in 
truth. In short, he recognises that what I called in the Introduction the 
‘phenomenon of truth’ is a faktum. Untruth signals a real potentiality of being 
although it signals it in a false manner. Remember, reality is self-differentiation, 
and as such, it is the possibility of error about itself. However, this possibility 
may be misrepresented by presenting itself as the possibility of truth as self-
identity; or accurately represented by presenting itself as the possibility of error 
arising from self-differentiation. There is still truth and error even if being is self-
differentiated: it is self-differentiation and nothing else (that is to say, not self-
                                                 
190 M, III, [1881] Note 325, Quoted by Keith Ansell-Pearson, 240; which is my source for all 
references to the Nachlass of 1881 used in this chapter. See Keith Ansell-Pearson (2006), “the 
Incorporation of Truth: Towards the Overhuman,” in A Companion to Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson 
(Ed.) Blackwell, 2006, 230-249. 
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identity). What is important is that both the belief in predicative truth and the 
belief in its impossibility rely on a reference to the phenomenon of truth. The 
knowledge of this fundamental truth, Nietzsche believes, is expressed—albeit 
inadequately—in what was hitherto taken as truth (that is to say, predicative 
truth). This is why we cannot do away with truth: the belief in truth reveals the 
‘phenomenon of truth.' It is the nature of this phenomenon to signal an authentic 
experience of reality, (which I called ‘perceptual faith’) whilst exemplifying the 
self-falsifying properties of reality (it is structured by fictional entities such as 
subject, object and the thing-in-itself). As I have discussed in the previous 
chapter, the experience of this self-differentiation is identical to the experience of 
reality, for reality is the experience of reality and this experience is falsifying. 
The problem then, is that truth, when predicative, expresses the only truth there 
is (self-differentiation) with the only lie that is possible (self-identity).  
 
b. Purification. 
In an interesting article entitled “Gay Science and Corporeal 
Knowledge,” Robert Pippin lays great weight on Nietzsche’s peculiar claim from 
the Preface to GS: “we no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils 
are withdrawn.”191 Pippin remarks that “it is extremely difficult to imagine what 
Nietzsche might be getting at here,” and pursues it by offering the suggestion 
that “[h]ere, the language of appearance and reality breaks down in a way that 
                                                 
191 GS, Preface, 4 (This text is from 1887). See also, Keith Ansell-Pearson, “The Eternal Return 
of the Overhuman; the Greatest Weight and the Abyss of Light," Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 
Issue 30, 2005, 1-22 
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Nietzsche clearly signals as a model for what he means by, hopes for, in a gaya 
scienza, where that breakdown is taken to heart.”192 I have referred—against 
Clark—to this phenomenon as Nietzsche’s replacement of the “thing-in-itself” 
with an “in-itself for us”: if it excludes subjective representation, truth is a 
distortion. We must not strive towards correspondence unless correspondence is 
meant as correspondence with the “”for-itself” (‘perceptual faith’). This is 
crucial because it means that we do have an experience of the object of truth, and 
that this experience can be retrieved193. Regrettably, Pippin does not mention the 
theme of the incorporation of truth in his article. It is all the more striking that, 
by simply following the textual implications towards an understanding of the 
concept of “gay science," he arrives at the conclusion that the gay science is a 
“taking to heart” of the ruin of the “language of appearance and reality.” This 
“taking to heart” must, I think, be interpreted as “incorporation” and the ruin of 
the objective model as the truth we must incorporate. This must be grasped 
clearly if we are to understand why Nietzsche sees both truth and untruth to co-
exist within what was hitherto called truth, and further, why Nietzsche wishes to 
both half-salvage and half-reject truth. So: what Nietzsche sets out to do is to 
                                                 
192 Robert Pippin, “Gay Science and Corporeal Knowledge,” Nietzsche-Studien, Issue 29, 2000, 
151.  
193 Let me point out that interpreting Nietzsche as a standard sceptic who rejects truth because he 
is committed to a correspondence-theory of truth, and finds it impossible, makes one unable to 
account for Nietzsche’s appeal to incorporate truth. Only if one believes that we do possess some 
truth, can one grasp the thought of the incorporation of truth. This, I believe, explains the peculiar 
lack of references to the incorporation of truth in Clark and other authors who see Nitetzshce as 
committed to the correspondence theory of truth. 
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purify truth of its erroneous character in order to bring out its truthfulness. In an 
aphorism from GS entitled “Long live Physics!,” Nietzsche appeals to physics as 
a path towards the purification of truth. ‘Physics’ here stands for a fully 
immanent form of knowledge, based not on the unity of concepts but on the 
manifold of experience. “[L]et us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of 
our opinions and valuations,”194 writes Nietzsche. Our comitment to “physics”, 
he hopes, will teach us truth as the limitation of truth-discourses and as precisely 
the unification of the predicate of reality with the world.195 
 
c.The incorporation of Truth as Incorporation of the Death of God. 
“But my truth is dreadful, for hitherto the lie has been called truth.” 
EH, “Why I am a Destiny,” 1. 
In the third book of the Gay Science, Nietzsche introduces 
altogether the themes of the Death of God and of the incorporation of truth. The 
very first aphorism announces the Death of God and presents it as a task for us. 
However, the task is not for us to kill God himself, but his “shadow”, that is to 
say, God as a belief:  
                                                 
194 GS, 335 
195 In line with the symmetry between the incorporation of truth as a test for both truth and the 
human, this appeal for the purification of truth finds an echo in Zarathustra’s appeal for the 
purification of man: “Through knowing, the body purifies itself; experimenting with knowing, it 
elevates itself; for the one who understands, all drives sanctify themselves; for the one who is 
elevated, the soul becomes joyful” (Z, I, 22 “On the Despisers of the Body.”) This joyful soul, of 
course, is no other than the soul of the “gay scientist.” 
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“New Struggles.—After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a 
cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still 
be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.—And we—we still have to 
vanquish his shadow, too.”196 
 The next aphorism appears upon first reading to be disconnected from 
this one and to be offering another challenge: to overcome the traditional 
anthropomorphisation of nature and replace it with its “naturalization." Thus 
there seems to be two tasks: the first is to rid ourselves of the belief in the dead 
God, and the other is to change our worldview, to no longer see it as subject to 
“laws in nature”, with “purposes," “accidents” and hierarchy. In the very next 
aphorism however, Nietzsche calls such beliefs “shadows of God.”197 Hence the 
two aphorisms unite into one characterization of the challenge posed by the death 
of God and make it a greater task than expected; for ‘vanquishing God’s shadow’ 
also means renouncing the apparently secular concepts of science and rationality. 
In the rest of book three, Nietzsche’s aim will be to find how this challenge can 
be met, and the next aphorism will propose the “incorporation of truth” as a tool 
towards that end: “to what extent can truth endure incorporation? That is the 
question; that is the experiment”198. The three opening aphorisms of book three 
of GS thus establish the link between the death of God and the incorporation of 
truth. The challenge of the former shall be met thanks to the latter. My 
hypothesis suggests that Nietzsche equates the following phrases “how much 
                                                 
196 GS, 108. 
197 GS, 109. 
198 GS, 110. 
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truth can be incorporated” and “how much the death of God can be 
incorporated.”  
We are now in possession of two hypotheses as to what Nietzsche means 
by “truth” in the expression “incorporating truth.” Firstly, it is the truth that truth 
fails; or in other words, it is the ruin of predicative truth. Secondly, it is what 
Nietzsche calls in GS the “death of God.” We must ask what relations these two 
truths entertain.199 
The first occurrence of the thought of the death of God is in the first 
aphorism of Book III (quoted above) and is more concerned with the overcoming 
of the “shadows of God,” than of the death of God itself: in other words, the 
death of God makes no difference if no one ‘hears’ it. This is a clear indication 
that “God” is here meant as a set of beliefs. As I have argued in chapter I, the 
structure of belief is an epistemic structure and relies on the abstraction of reality 
from what is real and its re-formulation in terms of “truth.” In this sense, the 
death of God appears as the new-found impossibility to believe in certain truths. 
The next aphorisms give a series of examples of the sort of beliefs that have now 
lost crediblity. Remarkably, these are not limited to religious or moral truths. 
Indeed, Nietzsche does not seem so keen to reject these beliefs as he is to reject 
those which we may think will survive God, but he says will not. These are in 
fact only extensions of God wearing a secular mask. This is ascertained by GS 
                                                 
199 Let me stress that these two hypotheses arise from texts that belong to different periods in 
Nietzsche’s writings. My first hypothesis is largely based on the discussions from chapter I, 
which concerned the texts of 1886-8. On the other hand, the theme of the death of God is strictly 
contemporaneous to the first mentions of the incorporation of truth in GS, III (1882). The second 
hypothesis (the ruin of predicative truth) is in fact a re-formulation of the death of God.  
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110 which calls the “errors” that “proved useful” and helped preserve the 
species” “articles of faith.” Among them are the “logical,”200 any positing of 
“meaning” in nature,201 and so forth. In book V of GS, added in 1887 (at the time 
of the texts examined in I), Nietzsche explicitly refers to the belief in ‘God’ as a 
concept that belongs to the epistemic realm. The first aphorism of this book is a 
reminder of the death of God as “the greatest recent event” and poses again the 
problem of our taking stock of the unexpected implications of this event. Among 
those consequences, Nietzsche does mention “for example, the whole of our 
European morality.” However, immediately after this aphorism, Nietzsche 
proposes we understand even more remote consequences. In GS, 344,  entitled 
“How, we, too, are still pious,” Nietzsche declares that “science also, rests on a 
faith,” and that “the will to truth at any price” amounts to the positing of an 
“other world” which negates “its counterpart, this world, our world.” This will, 
Nietzsche says, is “God himself” and it “proves to be our most enduring lie.” 
Nietzsche’s main point is that there is a will to truth which is ascetic, it is the will 
of the last human, objective truth, truth for its own sake. We have seen that it is 
against this will that the incorporation of truth stood as a purifying device. What 
is more crucial, I believe, is that in this passage “God” is the name of any two-
world theory. The belief in God and the belief in truth as self-identity and 
objectivity are one, insofar as they are the affirmation of a world other than the 
                                                 
200 GS, 111. 
201 GS, 109. 
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one we live in202 and I have argued in I that it was the basis of morality as well. 
In this sense, killing God must be understood as rejecting the predicative form of 
attribution of truth. This aphorism from 1887 is thus a bridge between the 
thoughts of the death of God and the incorporation of truth from GS in 1882, and 
their development into the critique of the “true world” of 1887-8. In my view, the 
identification of ‘God’ and the ‘real world’ allows us to apply the arguments of 
chapter I to the death of God; namely, that the ‘true’ world is the result of the 
human ability to predicate truth. This is asserted in Nietzsche’s farewell to the 
adhesion to art and its delusions in GS, 107; without it, Nietzsche says, “the 
realization that delusion and error are conditions of human knowledge would be 
utterly unbearable.” Art offered protection against the unbearability of the 
“realization” of the truth about “human knowledge,” an unbearable truth that 
Nietzsche decides to confront three aphorisms further by appealing to the 
incorporation of truth. In my reading, then, when Nietzsche calls for us to 
incorporate the death of God or to incorporate truth, he calls for none other than 
the overcoming of predicative knowledge.  
This explains how Nietzsche intends to use ‘incorporation’ as a 
method for the purification of truth. However, this is not enough to explain why 
we must retrieve this truth for the sake of “strength,” “power,” and “value.” The 
model I used above (whereby truth appears as being altogether a support for 
values and—as the free-spirited truth—a threat to their credibility) may help us 
clarify this: by undercutting the truth of values, the ‘free-spirit’ undercuts values 
                                                 
202 This is a thought that recurs often in the writings of 1887-8, see for example WP, 7 [Nov. 
1887-March 1888] 573 [Jan. Fall 1888]. 
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themselves, and thereby liberates the sick animals we have become. It is 
expected then that truth will offer us the chance to regain health. However, the 
loss of values may make life unbearable for those who cannot survive without 
the stabilising fictions that were hitherto offered by truth-discourses.  
 
ii. Stronger with Truth 
“Dead are all Gods: now we want the Overhuman to live.” 
Z.I, “On the Bestowing Virtue” §3. 
 
Like the English ‘incorporation,' the German ‘Einverleibung’ denotes an 
organic form of assimilation. Quite literally, organic incorporation (of a body by 
another body) involves the subduing of some material object by some other. 
Through incorporation, the incorporator expands to the detriment of the 
incorporated. It is in this sense that Nietzsche describes incorporation as the 
modus operandi of the will to power, which always seeks increase: “It is part of 
the concept of the living that it must grow—that it must extend its power and 
consequently incorporate alien forces.”203 The main feature of incorporation, 
therefore, is litterally assimilation.204 As a result, the incorporator transforms a 
qualitative difference into a quantitative one: by making the other similar it 
becomes more of the same. As Eric Blondel points out, the very possibility of the 
dissimilar becoming similar stands only against Nietzsche’s larger monistic 
                                                 
203 WP, 728 (1888). 
204 “The process of making equal is the same as the process of incorporation of appropriated 
material in the amoeba.” WP, 501. 
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framework according to which the dissimilar is always only different in degree 
and the difference of nature is only provided by value.205 
The incorporation of truth further, belongs to another type of 
incorporation: the incorporation of spiritual things.206 It is here that the idea of 
incorporation becomes paradoxical: how can something spiritual become 
something physical? The key to this question resides in the Nietzschean 
genealogy of the soul as presented in GM II and GS 354 and elaborated upon in 
chapter I. As I have discussed, Nietzsche’s purpose in these texts is to draw the 
“human” from “the animal.” I have argued that in doing so he emphasises the 
continuity of the human and animal realms. This involves some degree of 
naturalisation of the human while simultaneously it spiritualizes nature to the 
extent that the spiritual realm is originary (and not derived from the physical).207 
In light of the expansion of the primitive memory and soul into a long-term 
memory, and further into a full-fledged capacity of abstraction and 
consciousness, one can trace the quasi-material descent of all spiritual things. 
However, whilst it is perfectly intelligible how amoebas (a favorite example of 
                                                 
205 See Eric Blondel, Nietzsche, le Corps et la Culture: la Philosophie comme Généalogie 
Philologique, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2006; 210-215. 
206 The application of the digestion model to the incorporation of something spiritual is justified 
by Nietzsche in several instances hence in GS, “joke, cunning and revenge”, 54 entitled “to my 
reader”: “I am the cook/ Good teeth, strong stomach with you be!/And once you have got down 
my book/You should get on with me,” in Z, III, “of the old and new tables” 16, Zarathustra 
proclaims: “verily, my brothers, the spirit is stomach.” 
207 As I have argued, Nietzsche can be viewed as a naturalist only according to a spiritualised 
notion of nature. 
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Nietzsche’s208) increase in size through incorporation according to the simplest 
model of nutrition and digestion, it is less clear how one becomes “more” 
through the incorporation of ideas.   
 
a.  Incorporating Errors versus Incorporating Truth.   
“Ah, much ignorance and error has become body in us!”  
Z: I. “On the Despisers of the Body” §2. 
Nietzsche distinguishes two forms of spiritual incorporation: the 
incorporation of errors and the incorporation of truths. It is clear that he thinks 
errors cannot be incorporated in the same sense that truths can be. To be sure, 
Nietzsche’s texts are replete with references to the incorporation of errors and 
fictions;209 however, contrary to organic incorporation, such incorporation is 
never accompanied with increase on the part of the incorporator. Precisely 
because fictions fall within the domain of survival and because survival is 
                                                 
208 See WP, 501 (above), 653 [Spring-Fall 1887], 656 [Spring-Fall 1887], 702 [March-June 1888] 
passim. 
209 See for example D, 148, where erroneous devaluations cause the actions thereby condemned 
to be carried out less often: “Will they from now on be performed less often because they are 
valued less highly? –Inevitably!” In a certain sense this question occupies the whole of book II of 
Daybreak. Here, Nietzsche explores the interactions between thoughts, representations and 
opinions and our body, it explores the themes of habituation, practice and ascesis as an exercise 
of the body on the spirit or vice versa, as figures of the incorporative process. This constitutes 
Nietzsche’s first account of the incorporation of errors (essentially moral values) and it is 
performed from the angle of the loss of self this incorporation involves. As such, it is 
diametrically opposed to the incorporation of truth that gives the self back to itself; see in 
particular D, 108, 109, 116, 142. 
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“preservation” as opposed to increase, one cannot attain true increase through 
fictions210. It is thus apparent that the incorporation of errors does not bring 
increase in the same sense that we can exp ect through the incorporation of truth. 
But in what sense shall the incorporation of truth bring this increase about? This 
question is contextually bound and applies only to the sick animal created by all 
sorts of ascetic ideologies, by the birth of consciousness and of all spiritual 
matters through “the internalization of man.” Overlooking this point would make 
us unable even to understand the task of incorporation:  
“the task is to incorporate knowledge and make it instinctive- a task which will only 
be seen by those who have grasped that so far only our errors were incorporated and that all our 
consciousness relates to errors!”211.  
Thus, the incorporation of truth becomes a “task” only now that errors 
have been incorporated. The apparent clash of levels on which the phrase 
‘incorporating truth’ seems to be operating raises yet another question: if truth is 
not something bodily, then why should one incorporate it? The story given by 
Nietzsche in GS 354 and GM makes it apparent that beliefs (in values or in 
‘backworlds’) are something bodily. In this sense, the ruin of truth is more than a 
piece of knowledge and requires more from us than merely knowing it as a fact: 
it demands a bodily change. As “incorporation,” this change has to bring about 
an increase for the incorporator. What then does the incorporation of truth entail 
for the physico-psychological structure of the individual? 
                                                 
210 As we shall see below, there is in fact an increase brought about by the incorporation of 
errors, insofar as it leads to the creation of new drives, however, this increase is of a very peculiar 
type, that makes us weak and sickly and can only be redeemed by the incorporation of truth itself. 
211 GS 11. For a development of this idea, see Keith Ansell-Pearson, op. Cit. 236. 
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b. Re-direction and Increase. 
Under a number of forms, this question has caused great debates 
among commentators. This is, I think, because Nietzsche’s writings are 
vascillating between two descriptions of incorporation, which are rooted in the 
ambiguity of Nietzsche’s treatment of the phrase “to be or become more.” As 
was shown above, incorporation, in its simplest physical form is always linked to 
an increase. This is constant in all of Nietzsche’s descriptions of incorporation in 
nature. However, the physical model seems to meet its limits here: indeed, we 
remember that Nietzsche characterizes man as a “sick animal," and identifies 
sickness with humanity. In this specifically human context the meaning of the 
phrase ‘becoming more’ is unclear. If I say ‘thanks to incorporation, X will 
become more’ what does ‘more’ apply to? Is it to X, in which case, X’s 
incorporation would follow the same model as the amoeba’s? Or is it to ‘be,' in 
which case X will be seen to have attained a higher degree of being? This 
question goes to the root of Nietzsche’s treatment of the relationships between 
quantity (which man shares with nature) and quality (which is specifically 
human). What we have for certain is a negative thought: the death of God. This 
only allows for an annulment of incorporated error, not for positive increase. 
Nietzsche’s most explicit –but by no means only- statement of this view reads 
thus: “if we removed the effects of [the basic worldview that God stands for], we 
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should also remove humanity, humaneness and ‘human dignity.’”212 Here, like in 
GS 354, Nietzsche establishes a correspondence between all things human and 
sickness. The challenge is therefore to reduce humanity, maybe even to save the 
human from humanity as sickness.213 This aphorism is situated among the texts 
that announce the thoughts of the death of God and of the incorporation of truth. 
Indeed, it appears as a characterisation of what is to be overcome and for a 
moment it seems that Nietzsche’s aim is merely to remove errors and humanity 
qua sickness. However, later texts indicate that Nietzsche sees in the death of 
God the opportunity for a greater achievement than simple re-establishment of 
man as the animal he once was. In the terms of our present question, the problem 
can be formulated thus: does the incorporation of the death of God expand the 
self’s degree of being (first option), or does it expand its amount (second option), 
and if it does, in what fashion? 
In a short but defining contribution to the Royaumont debate of 1964, 
Jean Granier pleads for the first option:  
“For Nietzsche however, negation often presents itself as a truly creative work. This 
theme appears clearly in the texts of GM I, 6 and II, 16, where Nietzsche speaks of the 
                                                 
212 GS 115, see also TI, “The Four Great Errors” and GM, II, 18-25 where the humanity of the 
animal man is shown as sickness and where Nietzsche calls for its “reversal,” “a reverse 
experiment should be possible in principle, but who has sufficient strength?” (GM, II, 24). 
213 Through different channels, Keith Ansell-Pearson (op. Cit.) arrives to the conclusion that the 
incorporation of truth is Nietzsche’s path towards the overhuman. Insofar as the overhuman may 
be understood as the human who attained the “great health” (GS 382, EH “books”, “Zarathustra” 
2—in this text, the great health is associated not to the Overman but to Zarathustra himself), that 
is to say, the perfect unison of all his drives, I think my argument is largely parrallel to Ansell-
Pearson’s. 
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phenomenon that makes man ‘interesting.' He says that man in a certain way made himself sick, 
tore himself apart, and turned his instincts against himself. Nietzsche speaks there of negation. 
This negation elevated man from the animal self to the spiritual self.”214 
In other words, for all its negativity, the sickness of the animal man 
itself holds a place in the process that takes us to a superior, “more interesting” 
existence. As regards truth and its incorporation, this view would entails that the 
incorporation of truth as the death of God is more than a mere correction, but 
that it brings increase: “to overcome everything Christian through something 
over-Christian, and not merely put it aside” says Nietzsche.215 According to this 
view, one has to support the stronger possibility, namely that  the incorporation 
of the death of God and its errors cannot be conceived in terms of a return to our 
original animal selves. Instead, one has to appreciate that the having been of God 
is impossible to annul: “a reversion, a turning back in any sense and to any 
degree is quite impossible,”216 The thing that is to be overcome and redeemed 
acts as a stepping stone towards its own redemption as overcoming,217 and this 
overcoming itself, is a stepping stone towards a higher state.218 In this view then, 
incorporation preserves what it incorporates whilst it overcomes it.  
                                                 
214 Jean Granier, in Gilles Deleuze, (Ed.) Nietzsche, Actes du Colloque de Royaumont, Seuil 
Minuit, Paris, 1967, 36. 
215 WP, 1051 [1885]. 
216 TI, 9, 43. See Wolfgang Müller-Lauter op. Cit. 37 for an elaboration. 
217 See Z, II, “On Redemption.” 
218 For another version of this argument and its Hegelian undertones, see Granier, op. Cit. 46-52: 
“Nietzsche preserves the great Hegelian idea according to which the negative—the 
contradiction—possesses a mediating and creative energy," 52. Granier insists in 39-43 that 
Nietzsche opposes metaphysical dualism, one sees here how he uses negation as the mechanism 
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1. (redirection of) Drives. 
In his Nietzsche, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter gives an 
analysis of the self informed by Zarathustra’s teaching that the human (and in 
general any organism) is “a herd and a herdsman.”219 As a herd, it is multiple; as 
a herdsman, it is unified. Müller-Lauter directs his efforts towards understanding 
in precise terms what kind of unity Nietzsche has in mind when he says that the 
self both unifies its drives and maintains its own inner diversity. The solution, he 
finds, is in understanding “the organism as an inner struggle” within which the 
opposition of drives involves their bond. As the term “struggle” suggests, the 
opposition referred to here is an opposition of contact.220 In this sense, the unity 
of the organism is not threatened but constituted by its containing disharmonies.  
If one understands this struggle as a struggle between drives, the 
picture can be refined. For Nietzsche, drives are defined by two factors: a 
quantum of power and a direction towards which one directs this quantum. They 
are conceived on the model of geometrical vectors that possess a ‘direction’ and 
a certain ‘length’ (which, as the quantifying element of the vector, would stand 
for its quantum of power). Now, Nietzsche repeatedly claims that the essence of 
                                                 
of overcoming missing in any monism: negation permits without recourse to anything external, to 
move to another level. This is largely why, in Nietzschean Genealogy, historical becoming starts 
with the no, the original yes making being unable to create anything else than itself from itself. 
“[H]uman history is the continuation of the history of the organic, which itself has no beginning” 
Müller-Lauter, op. Cit. 32  
219 Z, I, 4 “On the Despisers of the Body.” See also WP, 561. 
220 Müller-Lauter, 131, 176. 
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the world is one, it is “will to power.”221 It is not my purpose here to examine 
this claim as such; however, we can already see that this gives an ontologically 
essential status to the quantum of power in all drives (it unifies the drives), 
leaving the status of its direction (which distinguishes them) secondary.222 
Bernard Reginster gives a clear overview of the major interpretations of the 
relations between the specific drives and the will to power as unique principle. 
He outlines six possible interpretations, the last of which is his own. I shall not 
discuss all six here because it seems to me that most of these views (numbered 2-
5 by Reginster223) are inescapably entangled in a dialectic of ends and means 
which is foreign to Nietzsche’s thoughts on the will to power. Two views 
remain: the so-called reductionist view which emphasises that “the will to power 
is the essence of life” (a view I endorse); and Reginster’s own interpretation, 
                                                 
221 This does not mean that this essence cannot divide and re-arrange itself. Indeed, this 
rearrangement is the basis of the ontology of becoming. 
222 For a detailed account of this claim, see Müller-Lauter, 175. Müller-Lauter shows that a drive 
always maintains its own quantum of forces; however, its direction depends on “perceptions” of 
where the resistances are lying, so that resistances actually attract the discharge of the drive onto 
themselves. In drives, quanta of power are essential and directions are contingent. This direction 
is precisely the domain of the self and its agency. It is only by understanding this that one can 
understand Nietzsche’s alleged determinism along with the fact that his works are saturated with 
the language of command. Agency has no directly essential role, in this sense, it is 
inconsequential and refuted by Nietzsche. However, the self can change the direction of its 
drives, and every task that Nietzsche ever assigns to man is the task of redirecting drives. This 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
223 Bernard Reginster, the Affirmation of Life, op. Cit. 127-129. 
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namely, that “the will to power is the will to the overcoming of resistances.”224 
This view, I think, is untenable from the start insofar as Nietzsche makes it clear 
that resistance presupposes a striving. As a result, Reginster’s approach seems to 
make the will to power a circular concept at best. Reginster seems to admit this 
objection, and his solution is to posit drives before the will to power. The drives 
would then be in charge of doing the striving for a resistance, and the will to 
power would do the overcoming.225 For this view to distinguish itself from the 
first view (mine) it must involve an essential distinction between drives and will 
to power. Alas, Nietzsche explicitly states that the will to power is not distinct 
from the drives.226 
Let me say a word about why Nietzsche rejects a dialectic of ends and 
means (those Reginster numbers 2-5). In Nietzsche’s view, this dialectic would 
operate across two distinct levels. It is clear that Nietzsche sees drives as 
distinguished from the overall will to power by their object, the ‘end’ they 
pursue. For example, ‘drives to knowledge,' ‘preservation’ or ‘sexual instincts’ 
are determined according to the object of their striving. Those readings assume 
that this distinction is essentially relevant, that is to say, that it supplants the 
general characteristics of the will to power. In these readings, the ends of a drive 
(what it is a will to) is just as essential as their being a will to power at all. In my 
view on the contrary, these distinctions take place within the possibilities defined 
by the will to power. This is because Nietzsche never describes the essence of 
                                                 
224 ibid. 131-132. 
225 ibid. 132. 
226 For example, WP, 481 [1883-1888] 
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the will to power as end-directed in the sense of ‘representational.’227 If it is 
indeed teleologically structured, it does not by any means imply that it represents 
its own object in its striving. On the contrary, this striving is blind: as Nietzsche 
writes as early as his lecture courses of 1869-1870, “that something may be 
                                                 
227 This is not to say that the will to power does not provide representations (indeed, there are 
representations, and in the hypothesis of the will to power, anything that is is will to power); my 
point is rather that representations are not essential to the will to power. One can seek power 
without doing so consciously, or even, without any awareness of any sort that they are indeed 
seeking power. Nietzsche sometimes expresses this idea by saying that there is no ‘will’ in the 
sense that ‘will’ is a psychological metaphor. See John Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 
Oxford, 2006; 27-34. Richardson goes on to claim that Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power 
can only be understood as non-mental if explained in terms of Darwinian evolution. I cannot 
subscribe to this view insofar as it places the principle of selection prior to that of will to power. 
Richardson is aware of this objection, however; but claims, I think unconvincingly, that 
Nietzsche does not reject such an idea. In my view, this bias of Richardson’s is based on his 
starting hypothesis that Nietzsche’s criticisms of Darwin can be boiled down to the claim that 
Darwin (allegedly) misses that living things seek increase and not preservation. In my view, on 
the contrary, Nietzsche’s most profound qualm with Darwinism is the quite different view 
according to which Darwin believes that the stronger survives. This is a blatant misunderstanding 
of Darwin’s idea of ‘fitness’ but it involves a consequence which, I believe, poses difficulties for 
Richardson, namely, that the will to power is not an empirical fact identified by Nietzsche in 
actuality, but instead, a philosophical hypothesis. One of the strong consequences of this is that 
Nietzsche can use the will to power as a critical tool against some natural facts. This would be 
impossible were Nietzsche holding only the view Richardson attributes to him. I shall discuss 
this last point in chapter III. See Richardson, 1996, “Nietzsche Contra Darwin,” op. Cit. esp. 556-
570.   
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finalised without consciousness is the essence of instincts.”228 As I will discuss 
in the next chapter, the will to power is determined by an origin point (the 
organism that seeks power) and a direction, not an ‘end.’ This I believe, concurs 
with the discussion of the tangentiality of the will to power from chapter I, but let 
me just point to the following argument. Nietzsche’s entire view of history relies 
on the reversibility of drives. The change in the end-directionality of a drive is 
the key mechanism for any incorporation229 or for any reversal (e.g. the slave 
revolt in morality, which relies on the internalization of drives), or any 
sublimation (the sexual libido re-directed towards knowledge in the libido 
sciendi.)230 Nietzsche explicitly states that this does not mean that for every 
                                                 
228 RL, “On the Origins of Language” 81. I will discuss this claim in the next section. For now, let 
me just stress that this idea is not specific to the young Nietzsche, consider this very important 
remark from EH: “ that one becomes what one is presupposes that one doesn’t have the remotest 
idea what one is” (“Why I am so Clever” 9). 
229 “[W]hat has been overpowered [incorporated] can, with some remodeling [redirection], be put 
into service by the overpowerer”. Müller-Lauter, 175, see also Nachlass KGW VII, 220 and 
KGW VIII, 88, and Richardson (1996), 33: “Mastery is bringing another will into a subordinate 
role within one’s own effort, thereby ‘incorporating’ the other as a sort of organ or a tool."  
230WP, 255 [1883-1888]: “All virtues physiological conditions: particularly the principal organic 
functions considered as necessary, as good. All virtues are really refined passions and enhanced 
states. Pity and love of mankind as development of the sexual drive. Justice as development of 
the drive to revenge. Virtue as pleasure in resistance, will to power. Honor as recognition of the 
similar and equal-in-power." On applying the concept libido sciendi to Nietzsche, see Paul-
Laurent Assoun, Freud and Nietzsche, (Trans. Richard L. Collier), Continuum, London & New 
York, 2006, 105 
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incorporative event there is an essential transfiguration of the drives but rather, 
that they are simply re-directed.231 Therefore the end-directionality of a drive is 
not relevant on the same level as its being a drive altogether. One can only 
conceive of drives as particular wills to power differentiated in their mode of 
being, but not in their being.232 As a result, we must consider that two drives 
belonging to the same organism and directed in the same direction are essentially 
unified.  
  
2.  From Sickness to Power through “Creation.” 
Nietzsche writes:  
“Appropriating and incorporation are above all a desire to overwhelm a forming, a 
shaping and reshaping, until at length, that which has been overwhelmed has entirely gone over 
into the power domain of the aggressor and has increased the same.”233  
On the one hand, we have a constant quantum of power within an 
organism, on the other; we have an increase through appropriation. Furthermore, 
we know that incorporation involves the subjugation of the incorporated object 
to our own ends, and that incorporation signifies a redirection of drives. 
Appropriation thus brings about an increase, but only in a certain sense, since the 
amount of power in an organism can increase only through the incorporation of 
                                                 
231 VII [1], X [7], X [21], X [154] 
232 I find support for this claim in Wolfgang Müller-Lauter’s discussion of the difference between 
‘will to power’ and ‘the will to power.' Müller-Lauter states clearly that the second phrase only 
denotes a specification within a general and overarching principle which is ‘will to power.' See 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, op. Cit. 1999, 133 ff. 
233 WP 656 [Spring-Fall 1887] 
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external drives. In other words, there is properly speaking no creation of power, 
but only a rearrangement of the forces across the inside-outside divide. Our 
question however applies to the incorporation between drives within one 
organism. Let us assume a set of three drives: drive D) is the overall drive (i.e. 
the organism), drive a) of quantum 5 and drive b) of quantum 5 too, are parts of 
D but they are in conflict with each other (i.e. they have opposite directions). The 
overall (net) power quantum of D is clearly 10; however, D finds itself incapable 
of incorporating any new drive from the outside insofar as a) and b) neutralize 
each other, making the available power quantum of D null (it always takes 
power to incorporate234). In other words, D’s quantum of forces is unchanged, 
but D is impotent235. This phenomenon is precisely what Nietzsche calls 
“sickness” and that is why he describes it as the “internalization of man” in GM, 
II: the drives “turn inwards,” against each other, instead of unifying towards the 
outside. One understands here how the self can hold the keys to its own being 
“more” or “less” without changing the amount of its power. If it redirects its 
opposing drive towards one unique direction, it will turn its power outwards. On 
the other hand, if it creates opposition within itself, its will cause its own 
sickness. Health and sickness do not depend on one’s instincts, but on their 
direction. The mere re-direction of such drives is “inconsequential” in the sense 
that no more power is created, but on the other hand, it increases the power 
                                                 
234 The most reliable demonstration of this claim of Nietzsche’s is Mark Letteri, “the Theme of 
Health in Neitzsche’s Thought," op. Cit.  
235 ibid. Letteri defines “sickliness” as the inability to incorporate (p. 411). The distinction 
between “sickness” and “sickliness” is largely Letteri’s and I will overlook it in the present 
discussion. 
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available to one, and thus in this sense it is creative. This clarifies the 
ambivalence of Nietzsche’s concept of “creation”: creation is not ex nihilo, it is 
actualisation.236 
This may help us decide how the incorporation of the death of God can 
provide us with greater strength, power or health. We have a certain set of life-
denying errors called God. These errors have been incorporated into the self. On 
the other hand, we have one truth called the death of God. This truth will in turn 
be incorporated. Most of all, we have the surrounding drives among which these 
errors and this truth have been and will be incorporated. The question is how 
these errors will relate to the other drives. The answer, as it were, is contained in 
the premise: any life-denying drive will find itself in opposition with all other 
drives within an organism. In the case of God, which is precisely the name of all 
life denying drives, its incorporation leads fatally to an internal struggle and an 
internal expense of power. What happens with the incorporation of truth is not an 
annulment of the errors as drives, but a re-direction of them. In short, what is 
annulled is not the drives, but their erroneous character, which was transcribed 
into the organism as an erroneous direction (self-hatred for example). In this 
process of course, the ‘human animal’ attains a superior level, becomes more 
powerful: not only does the incorporation leads her to annul her internal struggle, 
but it turns the previously struggling drives into allies, increasing her external 
outpouring of power.  
 
                                                 
236 See Joan Stambaugh, “the Other Nietzsche” in Graham Parkes (Ed.), Nietzsche and Asian 
Thought, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996, 25. 
 118 
This helps illuminate the redemptive power of incorporation: 
incorporation does not annul sickness, it transforms it into health237. In an article 
entitled Nietzsche’s Agon with Ressentiment, Herman Siemens emphasises that 
Nietzsche faces the challenge of promoting an overcoming (of morality, 
asceticism, christianity, etc.) whilst still maintaining a purely affirmative attitude. 
For Siemens, this means that we must be careful not to construe Nietzsche as 
seeking “redemption” since this would amount to negation238. Of course, 
Nietzsche however, does not use redemption in this sense but rather, he sees it as 
the device that allows negation to be comprised in a larger program of 
affirmation. This is made possible through incorporation: if, as I contend, 
redeeming errors means re-directing them and if the direction of drives is merely 
contingent, then it follows that incorporating these drives would re-direct them 
towards health without -strictly speaking- negating them. On the contrary, as 
Nietzsche asserts repeatedly, incorporation preserves the drives it 
incorporates.239 This model is I believe, not so remote from that of Siemens. For 
him, we must heal sickness (a “deficit” in power) through the emulation of 
agonal contest. Unfortunately, Siemens’s account falls short of providing a 
description of this increase in power. It locates what Siemens calls Nietzsche’s 
“energetic problem”, that is to say the problem of how one moves from sickness 
                                                 
237 “[T]o redeem that which has passed away and to re-create all “it was” into a ‘thus I willed it!’ 
that alone should I call “redemption!” says Zarathustra to the cripples in need of a cure Z, II, “On 
Redemption”.  
238 Hermann Siemens, “Nietzsche’s Agon with Ressentiment: Towards a Therapeutic Reading of 
Critical Transvaluation,” Continental Philosophy Review, Issue 34, 2001, 69-93. 
239 See Richardson, 1996 op. Cit. 115 
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to health without increasing one’s quantum of power, but it doesn’t solve it. In 
my view, this is because Siemens fails to perceive the distinction between 
quantum and availability of power.  
In my reading therefore, the health attained through the incorporation of 
truth amounts to a unification of the self’s drives. Health must be thus 
understood as the unity of the self. In general, the few authors to comment on 
Nietzsche’s concept of spiritualization conceive it as a spiritualization of drives. 
They take it as a certain instance of the self’s redirecting its own drives 
according to the pattern described above.240 However, there is another kind of 
spiritualization in Nietzsche, and this is the name of the human’s attainment of 
this higher, “more interesting” form of life.241  
 
B. SELF-BECOMING AND MODES OF BEING. 
 
Nietzsche affirms self-becoming and health as figures of human 
excellence. It is clear from the discussion in chapter I that sickness involves a 
                                                 
240 For example John Richardson, in Nietzsche’s System, offers several insights on 
“spiritualization,” drawing mainly on TI, V, where “spiritualization” is meant in much the same 
way as Freud will later define “sublimation” (“the spiritualization of sensuality is called love” TI, 
V, 3). However, I wish to explore spiritualization as an event in the history of man, where it 
accompanies the attainment to a higher level.  
241 Drawing on Nietzsche’s very first sketch of the eternal return from August 1881, Keith 
Ansell-Pearson forcefully establishes a network of connections between several key thoughts of 
Nietzsche, including Amor Fati, and the incorporation of truth as a path towards the thought of 
the superhuman. See Keith Ansell-Pearson (2006); op. Cit. 
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sort of antagonism with oneself, and consequently, that it is tightly connected to 
alienation: “the antagonism of passions, two three, a multiplicity of ‘souls in one 
breast’: very unhealthy.”242 In what follows, I will therefore assimilate ‘being 
healthy’ with ‘being oneself’ and ‘being sick’ with ‘being divided.' This means 
that we may already reformulate the questions posed above. As I stressed in the 
first part of this chapter, the mature Nietzsche values truth on account of its value 
for health. I also emphasised that the incorporation of truth shall provide us with 
an access to reality which would not be mediated by conceptual judgment. 
Consequently I think a more fruitful way to formulate our question is in asking 
after the relations of health and reality. Nietzsche addresses this question by 
affirming that man and world share—to some extent—the same nature, so that 
being healthy or being one with oneself would ideally entail being one with 
reality. This would suggest an identity of truthfulness and health. This is a 
problematic claim because it seems to render sickness in principle impossible: 
how can we differentiate ourselves from the world (to become sick) if our full 
identity with the world were ever possible? Before turning to Nietzsche’s 
finessing of this claim through his affirmation of the essential self-differentiation 
of being, I shall turn to the first, cruder claim.  
 
i. Oneself and the World. 
a. The Self as Granite of Fate. 
The relationship with one’s own nature appears as a challenge of 
crucial importance for the young Nietzsche in the context of his relationship with 
                                                 
242 WP 778 (1888). 
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Schopenhauer (and later, in any portrait of the true philosopher until Ecce 
Homo’s subtitle: “how one becomes what one is”). In 1868, Nietzsche writes:  
“Schopenhauer’s ethics is often criticised for not having the form of an imperative. 
What the philosophers call the character is an incurable disease. An imperative ethics is one that 
deals with the symptoms of the disease.”243  
In other words imperative ethics is absurd because it wrongly assumes 
that human beings are educable in their “character” and therefore deals only with 
the expressions of a character. Nietzsche objects that strictly speaking this 
renders it impossible to judge anyone:  
“[P]hilosophically speaking, it makes no difference whether a character expresses itself 
or whether its expressions are kept back. Not only the thought but the disposition already makes 
the murderer; he is guilty without any deed.”244  
If, on the other hand, one decides to take ethics seriously, that is, to be 
able to judge not only actions (“symptoms”) but an individual's “character”, then 
ethics must change one’s character. However, Nietzsche argues that character is 
“incurable”. In this early text already, Nietzsche’s main concern is to draw a 
radical separation between one’s character (“disease”) and the expressions 
(“symptoms”) thereof. One is changeable, the other is not.  
In 1874’s Meditation on Schopenhauer, Nietzsche has replaced the 
Schopenhauerian term “character” with his own concept of “self” and uses it in 
opposition to becoming:  
“to the question: ‘to what end do you live?’ they would all quickly reply with pride: ‘to 
become a good citizen, or scholar, or statesman’- and yet they are something that can never 
become something else.”245  
                                                 
243 Nachlass, I, 404 in Walter Kaufmann (Trans. Ed.) The Portable Nietzsche, 30-31. 
244 Ibid. 
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Here, Nietzsche affirms the self as an unchangeable substratum outside of 
becoming. This is a thesis that remains throughout his work.246   
Most importantly, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche re-affirms his 
belief in some unchangeable nature intrinsic to the individual:  
“deep in us, really ‘down there,' is naturally something uneducable, a granite of spiritual 
fate, of predetermined decisions and answers to predetermined selected questions. In every 
important problem a steadfast ‘that's what I am’ speaks out.”247  
If it is apparent that Nietzsche offers us this “granite” as a challenge, as 
the self that we must become, we now need to appreciate in what sense this 
“granite” already is. As we saw above, Nietzsche understands all beings in terms 
of drives. At first sight, it is difficult to see such a granite in terms of drives 
because Nietzsche seems to describe it as altogether opposed to becoming (“they 
are something that can never become something else”) or at least something 
fixed and motionless (“granite”). However in this passage from BGE, Nietzsche 
describes this granite as an instance of preference, choice and selection. This 
presents a striking similarity with the will to power which is “this creating, 
willing, valuing ‘I’ that is the measure and value of being”248. In fact, Nietzsche 
                                                 
245 UM III, 155. 
246 Zarathustra for instance defines what he considers to be his own self as both unchangeable 
and distinct from its expressions when he declares: “by me I mean what is inexorable and silent 
in me” Z, I “on the Despisers of the Body.” 
247 BGE, 231. Strikingly, the analogy of the self as “granite” comes from Nietzsche’s preparatory 
notes to the Meditation on Schopenhauer, in the Nachlass of 1874, he writes: “[schopenhauerian] 
philosophy transports us to the icy purity of the highest alpine air so as to let us read the 
primordial granite characters inscribed there by nature,” 34 [21] see also BGE, 264. 
248 See WP, 662 (1883-88). 
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understands the granite self as a drive or a set of drives, which has its own 
“favourite desire”: “to create above itself.”249  
 
b. The Non-Self, the “Sick Animal Man.” 
Zarathustra laments, however, that the self “is not able to do what 
it would prefer […] it has now become too late for that,—so [the] self wants to 
go under”250: her drives are being restricted.251 Nietzsche’s appeal to self-
becoming as a liberation of this initial set of drives is clear since UM III:  
“The great man […] is contending against those aspects of his age that prevent him from 
being great, which means, in his case, being free and entirely himself, […] his hostility is at 
bottom directed against that which, though he finds it in himself, is not truly himself: against the 
soldering of time-bound things on to his own untimeliness.”252  
Here, Nietzsche portrays the self as oppressed by the non-self lying 
within the individual. This means that we are not defined by our empirical being 
(since it incudes the non-self too) and leads us to the next question: if we are not 
what we are, what are we? And in what sense? The answer to the first question is 
clear for Nietzsche: we are “the sick human animal.”253 The re-direction of 
drives that turned the healthy beast man once was into a sick animal was 
                                                 
249 Z, I, 3. “On the despisers of the body”. 
250 Z, I, “On the despisers of the body”. 
251 See TI, “Skirmishes of an untimely man,” §45; where the “physiological degenerescence” of 
bad conscience is described in the same terms as in GM, II, 16 and also in terms of the inability 
to do what one “prefers.” 
252 UM III, 145-6 my emphasis. 
253 AC, 2; This is a key theme made explicit in GM and that remains constant in all of Nietzsche’s 
subsequent writings. 
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described in Chapter I. Yet, we encounter a new question at this point: if the self 
is a set of drives and at the same time some “ineducable granite of fate”, how are 
we to construe this sickening re-direction? As I argued above, all wills can be 
reduced to will to power; there is no intrinsic difference between drives, except 
for their direction. A direct consequence of this is that “educating” such drives is 
to be understood as re-directing them. The individual’s drives, however, are 
precisely said to be “ineducable." How can they at the same time be 
“ineducable” and subject to redirection? In other words, if the self is 
“ineducable," how can we ever not be ourselves? This question is related to the 
question that occupied us earlier with regard to Nietzsche’s claim that man 
became “more interesting” through the “incorporation of errors." I concluded 
that some of the drives now inhabiting the human had been incorporated through 
her history. This leaves us with two “kinds” of drives within the self: One set 
was given us through our very existence, as it were, by birth (they are our 
‘untimeliness’)254; the other is acquired and does not derive its existence from 
our character but from our history (they are 'time-bound’)255. The challenge of 
                                                 
254 The starting point of Nietzsche’s investigation in the nature of the self and its individuality is 
deeply aristocratic in inspiration; one is born with such and such ethical rank: « there is an ethical 
aristocracy just as there is a spiritual one. One cannot enter it by receiving a title or by marriage » 
Nachlass,  I. 404 f. (1868); see also BGE’s section IX entitled “What is Noble.” That section 
addresses questions of racial nobility and inherited fate as without reach from education and 
‘culture’ in the sense of the ‘culture’ of the ‘last humans.'  
255 The distinction between these two sorts of drives is formulated in various different ways by 
Nietzsche. Attention must be drawn to the apparent paradox of these acquired drives being called 
“instincts” in GM II, 16 for example: “the instincts turned inwards.” Here the theme is the 
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self-becoming can now be located as the “soldering” of the two sets of drives 
mentioned in the quote above from UM III.  
This “soldering” can take three possible forms:  
a) The acquired drives align under dominion of the “granite of fate”: the 
granite of fate ‘incorporates’ them.  
b) They oppose each other. 
c) They align under dominion of the the acquired drives. 
b) is obviously a formulation of sickness. a) and c) both represent figures 
of health, for health is defined as the unison of drives towards one direction.256 
However, only a) represents Nietzsche’s project. Before discussing the 
impossibility of c), let me turn to the question of how we can re-direct our drives. 
 
 
 
                                                 
education of the granite of fate as well as the acquired drives. Yet this re-direction is possible 
only through the division of the self, which is itself acquired. We are left with two models to 
describe one reality: either one sees the drives are still (albeit only formally) directed outwards 
(to the other half of the split self) and creating internal tensions only from the point of view of the 
unity of the self; or one sees the drives as turned within the self against some other drives 
inhabiting the same self. This question reminds us of the importance of Nietzsche’s positing the 
relativity of the inside and the outside. Given this key thesis, it the distinction between these two 
formulations becomes very faint: in both cases, what is described is an internal struggle, made 
possible by the incorporation of errors.  
256 “[T]he dominating passion, which even brings with it the supremest form of health; here the 
coordination of the inner systems and their operation in the service of one end is best achieved-
but this is almost the definition of health!”WP 778 (1888) 
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c. Agency 
With both a) and c) we have the project of self-becoming: 
“educating” the drives that are educable in order for them to align with those of 
our granite of fate. As we have seen in the previous section, the re-direction of 
drives is the realm of agency. We can see from Chapter I that, from a 
genealogical point of view, agency is a direct consequence of its very object: the 
re-direction of drives. Nietzsche sees the start of history in the expansion of 
consciousness and sickness. This event is a re-direction of drives and can be read 
as the disjunction of the direction of the drives from the quantum of power. This 
disjunction can in turn be read in modal terms: there are now two ways to be, 
“sickness” and “health”. Once the direction became contingent, room was made 
for agency to appear. We encounter here another formulation of the “great 
promise” announced in GM II, 16: the possibility of agency, which has hitherto 
stood for the possibility of sickness is also the possibility for reversing the 
direction of the opposing drives and attain health again on a higher level257. The 
appearance of agency is both a condition of decadence and a great promise 
because it is the appearance of the reversibility of drives altogether258. 
The question of agency is of course one of the most hotly debated topics 
among Nietzsche commentators. Let me just stress that I am not taking any 
commitment here regarding the nature or consequentiality of the agency I am 
                                                 
257 I find the claim that agency is grounded in the inner separation of the self in Rosalyn Diprose, 
The Bodies of Women, op. Cit. 85 
258 This is also the thought that infuses Nietzsche’s views on nihilism. Being divided into 
“passive” and “active,” nihilism appears as the double-faced chance of agency, leading to 
sickness or health. 
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describing. More specifically, I do not imply that agency involves any radical 
affirmation of free-will. On the contrary, for my present purposes I simply mean 
agency in the sense of contingency. There is agency insofar as the actions of 
individuals are determined by motives that are specific to them, their nature or 
their state. This I believe is an acceptable claim for even the most deterministic 
readings of Nietzsche. In a work already cited, Brian Leiter gives one of the most 
explicit descriptions of Nietzsche as a radical determinist. However, even Leiter 
admits that contingent conditions are among the determinations that compel us to 
act in such and such ways or to believe so and so259. He also admits that such 
                                                 
259 Brian Leiter, “the Paradox of Fatalism and self-creation in Nietzsche”, op. Cit.  250. Here, we 
may discern a very pressing issue with regard to Nietzsche’s entire philosophy; namely, the 
question of ‘Nietzsche’s voice’: what place does Nietzsche give to himself in his own 
worldview? If he really is a fatalist, why does he even bother to command, inspire, and summon 
us to do so and so? I unfortunately do not have the space here to address this question. Let me 
point out to some ways we can approach the problem. The question of Nietzsche’s voice is the 
question of the efficient power of opinion, and of expression. Nietzsche may trigger an effect in 
our actions by a) causing us to hold an opinion (indirect effect), b) compelling us in some way to 
do so and so (direct effect). In a), we should include the possibility of our holding an opinion—
expressed by Nietzsche—to be a transformative experience (there is indication that Nietzsche 
believe such thoughts exist, and that Eternal Recurrence for example, is one such thought). In b), 
we should include the possibility that Nietzsche may have an implicit mechanical view of the 
power of language, spoken or written. In this hypothesis, our research should perhaps start with 
Nietzsche’s reading of Empedocles and of the Sophists such as Gorgias, who both believe that 
language has a mechanical power that robs one of her free will. Some indication of Nietzsche’s 
interest in those theories may be found in his early lectures on Greek and Roman rhetoric of 1872 
and more largely, the lectures of the years 1869-78. See for example Nietzsche’s Werke Vol. X, 
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beliefs can have causal effects on our actions. However he says, these beliefs are 
themselves conditioned. This may perhaps contradict other claims of Leiter’s 
(for instance, the claim that “one becomes what one is necessarily”260), but in 
any case, it gives room for different degrees of determinism, and thereby 
introduces contingency. Some of our acts are determined directly, and some 
others are determined by the whole chain of our past experiences and memories. 
Beyond the fact that this threatens to make determinism meaningless, it lends 
great importance on our being ‘us’ (whether that means ‘being ourselves’ in 
Nietzsche’s more demanding sense or not) and no one else. Our actions, that is to 
say, our directing of our drives in such and such a way are ‘ours’ in a strong 
sense. In this sense at least, I think we may define Nietzsche’s view of agency: 
agency is for X to do something because X is X and not, say, Y. It is in this sense 
that I claim: agency is the realm of the direction of the drives.  
 
d. Fate  
Nietzsche understands health as the unison of all the drives of the 
organism under the rule of a single dominating drive. This involves either the 
overpowering of the “granite of fate” by the acquired drives (-c) above), or the 
reverse (-b)). Yet, for Nietzsche, c) is impossible, the granite of fate being 
precisely uneducable. Here we uncover the reason for Nietzsche’s re-integration 
of truth into his project of health. As I mentioned, the younger Nietzsche’s 
                                                 
edited by C. G. Naumann, 1896, Leipzig, 450-451. For Bibliographical references, see Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s “presentation” to RL.  
260 Brian Leiter, op. Cit. 223 
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philosophy placed the illusions of art above the drive to truth.261 Starting from 
GS, however, becomes impossible. This is because Nietzsche considers that the 
adherence to illusion would amount to turning the acquired (illusory) drives 
against our granite of fate. The presence of this granite of fate, which constitutes 
the umbilical cord between us and reality, would always be in opposition to our 
illusions and therefore, c)  is impossible. This seems to leave us with the problem 
of an essential diversity of drives. Yet, I argued above that Nietzsche 
differentiates between drives only modally (according to their direction: health or 
sickness) and hence, only relatively to each other. This essential set of drives that 
constitutes our personal “kernel”262 is seen by Nietzsche as granite of fate. Fate is 
one of Nietzsche’s names for reality. As always in his complex webs of 
synonyms, Nietzsche chooses one expression over the other to insist on one 
aspect of a reality seen as unified. The expression “fate” [Fatalität] amounts to 
reality seen as necessity.263 Another name for reality is, of course, “will to 
power." The expression will to power however is used in order to insist on the 
directional aspect of reality. If one assembles these two aspects of reality, we 
encounter the necessity of the directions that one’s basic drives follow: the 
fatefulness of the direction. Yet, as we saw, Nietzsche gives only a relative status 
to a drive’s direction: a direction is only assignable to a drive as opposition or 
                                                 
261 In a note contemporaneous to GS, Nietzsche writes: “in my first period appears the mask of 
Jesuitism, I mean the conscious adherence to illusion” GWK, XII, 212 (1881-1883), see also 
Letter 147 of 1888 where Nietzsche writes: “Wagner was a genius of the lie and I was a genius of 
the truth” The letter is quoted by John Richardson, Nietzsche's System, op. Cit. 255. 
262 “Wholly external, without kernel,” UM III. 128. 
263 See for example WP, 586 [March-June 1888]; 204 [Spring-Fall 1887]. 
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concurrence to another drive. There is no absolute direction. How are we to 
make sense of the “necessity” and the “fatefulness” of the direction of our basic 
self? Isn’t the affirmation of the fatefulness of our direction another way to 
affirm an absolute direction?  
Fate is will to power, and all reality is will to power. Consequently, all 
reality is fate. Both the self and the ‘outside’ world are of the same nature. The 
‘granite of self’ that we ‘are’ ensures an umbilical bond between self and world. 
I have argued that for the self to align her drives to her granite of fate involves 
that she also aligns her drives with the direction of reality itself. In other words, 
one’s “granite of self” is of one piece with the the whole of reality and its 
outwardness is impaired only by the acquired drives that oppose it:  
“The fatality of [man’s] essence is not be disentangled from the fatality of all that has 
been and will be. [...] One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one is in 
the whole.”264  
Here, we become confronted by a question of balance of powers. In the 
conflict that takes place within the sick individual, which of the opposing drives 
has the most power? Nietzsche’s answer is definite: the fate of the world cannot 
be overpowered, therefore any opposition to it can only cause sickness, never a 
reversal of the power balance towards a new health. This makes c) an impossible 
option, and any attempt to achieve it is guaranteed to lead to mere struggle and 
sickness.  
                                                 
264 TI, “the Four Great Errors,” §8.  
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ii. Three Beings. 
 
We now arrive to the question of Nietzsche’s use of “being.” Nietzsche’s 
critique of values is made from the point of view of reality: values involve our 
renouncing the ‘only world’ by appealing to the imaginary ‘true world.' For 
Nietzsche, the ‘only world’ is our priority. In Eugen Fink’s words, Nietzsche is 
committed to the “basic ontological equation of being and value.”265 By urging 
us to “become ourselves," however, Nietzsche invites us to refine the simple 
claim that being is the criterion of values. In fact, this command expresses a 
preference not between ideals and reality, but between two sorts of realities. If 
we are to understand Nietzsche’s preference then, we have to begin by clarifying 
what distinction he draws between these two realities. We are now in a better 
position to clarify the two senses of “being” implied in the expression: “become 
the one you are.”266 
The first remark we should make in order to understand this distinction is 
that for Nietzsche neither of the two selves at play here (the self that we are and 
the self we must become) totally is. They both exist as a failed attempt at being, 
nothing more. Although they both are in a certain sense, and although both 
senses are required for complete being, neither possesses all the attributes 
required in order to truly be; in other words they are, but only in a modal sense.  
                                                 
265 Fink, (2003), see also 8: “the question of being gives way to the question of value.” 
See also, among many others, Schacht, (1983-95/196-7). 
266 Z, IV, 1 
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a. Being of the Granite: Potential. 
When Nietzsche attributes certain “granite of fate” to every 
individual by birth, he attributes us a certain potential. In order to understand this 
notion of the self as a potential, we need to get back to Nietzsche’s general 
account of fate.  
Nietzsche’s treatment of fate is generally understood as some sort of 
“fatalism”; that is, first and foremost, a denial of any sort of agency or free will. 
Yet Nietzsche’s accounts of fate are never presented only as a metaphysical 
claim about freedom; instead, they always assume an ethical tone. Fate is not for 
the human self a fatality, but a challenge. This seems paradoxical: if fate is a 
challenge, why call it fate at all for the mere term “fate” involves some 
inescapable fait accompli, not just a future project, but a present and binding 
necessity. In fact, the self is both a challenge and a fait accompli, again, in two 
different senses.  
In BGE 230, Nietzsche describes our “granite of spiritual fate” as a 
constraint, a stubborn reluctance to be educated. He links this limitation not to 
the negation but to the affirmation of the self’s identity for this refusal is always 
expressed on the mode of “that is what I am.” It is helpful to remember this 
thought from TI: “nowadays, one could make the individual possible only by 
circumscribing it” (significantly, this thought is presented as a definition of 
freedom267). Here Nietzsche re-affirms the psychologically constructive value of 
                                                 
267 TI, “Skirmishes of an untimely man” 41. The aphorism, entitled “Freedom which I do not 
mean”, offers Nietzsche’s rejection of the anarchist understanding of liberty as making man a 
slave to his internal struggle and external circumstances by depriving him of a focus.   
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negation as negation of the non-self. For Nietzsche, the possibility of the 
“individual” is open not by the “yes” but by the “no” of restriction. Let me also 
stress that this claim is merely contextual for Nietzsche: it applies to 
“nowadays”.There is something specific in the modern self that requires a “no” 
in order to be accomplished. As we saw above, the individual of nowadays is the 
sick animal made up of internal struggles between the self (his uneducable 
granite of fate) and the non-self (the acquired drives) within himself. What is 
crucial to our problem here is the affirmation that the modern self will be 
achieved not through a ‘yes’ but through a ‘no.’  In other words, if the self is not 
achieved, it is not because it is incomplete but because it is confronted by an 
obstacle (an obstacle that the “no” will remove). We know that drives discharge 
themselves constantly268. This means two things about the mode of being of the 
self: the quantum of power is actual but the ‘available’ power of the self is only 
potential. Indeed, the sickness stands precisely as the obstacle between the self 
and its goal. Here Nietzsche again draws our attention to the disjunction that 
occurred between the drives and their direction as a distinction between the 
potential and the actual.  
 
b. Actuality: the Sick Animal. 
The second being at play here is the being that we currently are: 
the sick animal. For Nietzsche, it is obvious that this type is all that there actually 
is. In this sense, the sick animal man is on the mode of the actual, and the self is 
                                                 
268 “[T]here is no law; every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment” WP. 634 
(1888) 
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not achieved yet: “be your self! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring is not 
yourself”269. Yet, we can assert that this actuality is deprived of any potential: the 
sick animal man is able to maintain itself, yet it is incapable of expanding. The 
sick man’s “available power” is null although the self in question contains the 
same amount of power as its healthy version. It is sick insofar as it is incapable 
of increase.270 
The paradox of “self-becoming” seems clarified by a modal approach; 
however, we must ask why Nietzsche prefers one of these beings over the other. 
Even more, one can ask why Nietzsche privileges the potential over the actual. If 
the sick animal is indeed the only thing we’ve actually got, is it not a perverse 
form of asceticism to prefer the potential to it?  
Nietzsche’s standard answer to this question, which he re-iterates in 
many instances, is that only by privileging the potential can we achieve it, and 
                                                 
269 UM, III, 127. Emphasis added. 
270 There is a third type of being involved in the paradox of self-becoming when expressed as a 
command: that of agency. Agency is a modal device, that is to say, in terms of drives, a device 
that acts upon the direction of the drives. In terms of self-becoming, it is the possibility for the 
potential self to be actualised, it operates through modal transformations. Because one is an 
agent, one is given the chance to achieve one’s own potential. In this sense again, agency is a 
“great promise,” just like the sickness of consciousness on which it depends. In terms of being, 
we can now say that agency’s own being is the actuality of the potentiality of the healthy self 
described above. Thanks to it, Nietzsche’s appeal for us to overcome the actual on behalf of the 
potential avoids appearing as some sort of ascetic preference for a non-existent ideal over the 
present reality.  
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that it is this achievement which is the ultimate goal.271 At first sight, this is not a 
sufficient response, for one would have to explain the shift from a value drawn 
from being to one drawn from flourishing. However, Nietzsche’s solution is 
precisely to reduce flourishing to being, or rather, to make flourishing an 
essential part of being. In a sense, this is the novelty of seeing the world as will 
to power.272 The will to power contains in its essence an “intention”. Nietzsche 
writes: “one has eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its 
content, its whither”273. Hence, the concept of “will to power” incorporates ek-
stasis within Being: Being is not full unless we also include what it is towards. 
Here, it becomes apparent that actuality has no privileged relationship to being 
for Nietzsche.274 It is for him only a mode of being, but by no means being 
proper, or even reality itself.275 
                                                 
271 “value is the highest quantum of power that a man is able to incorporate.” WP 713 (1888) 
Emphasis added, see also WP 674 (1887-88).  
272 For Nietzsche, “whatever has being does not become; whatever becomes does not have being” 
(TI,  “Reason in Philosophy,” 1) and reality is becoming (WP, 12 [Nov. 1887-March 1888] see 
also Karl Jaspers, op. Cit. 350). This allows for a distinction, at least heuristic, between ‘being’ 
and ‘actuality’ insofar as actuality does not become. At any rate, if being is the highest value, one 
should not infer from it that actuality is self-justifying, since for Nietzsche, “reality [actuality] is 
not morality”WP, 685 (1888). 
273 WP, 692 (1888), see also WP. 2 (1887). 
274 In the healthy realm, which is ruled by fate, actuality is equated to fate, or necessity. What is 
at stake here however is precisely the gap that has occurred between actuality and necessity, and 
that is signposted by agency: not every actuality is necessary. In a certain way, the reunion of 
actuality and necessity is the challenge of self-becoming: “I am not injured by what is necessary; 
Amor Fati is my innermost nature” (EH, “Why I write such good books” “the Wagner case," 4). 
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c. Potential more “Real” than the Actual. 
"[W]hoever discovered the land ‘Human’ also discovered the 
land ‘Human Future.'" 
Z, III, “on the Old and New Tablets,” 28. 
When Nietzsche opts for a dynamic Being over the static 
traditional one, he posits at the same time a more demanding task for Being: to 
have ‘actuality,’ to have a direction, a “whither,” and above all, to join the two, 
or, in Nietzsche’s terms, “to create.”276 From a static point of view, one finds a 
contradiction between Nietzsche’s call for creation (for example for “self-
creation”), and his repeated claim that there is a fixed and unchangeable amount 
of power in the world.277 From a dynamic point of view, however, the paradox is 
                                                 
In fact, this is actually the crux of Nietzsche’s rejection of “Turkish fatalism”: For Nietzsche, 
Turkish fatalism is a passive relationship to fate. Instead of affirming or challenging fate, the 
Turkish fatalist affirms -not fate, but the fatality thereof (its inescapability). Turkish fatalism thus 
appears as the affirmation of actuality. Nietzsche’s doctrine of Amor Fati on the other hand 
which has led many to call him a “fatalist”(Solomon, 2003, Leiter 2006, Clark, 1990) consists in 
a realization of fate: in other words, “Amor Fati complements fate” (Jaspers, 369, 1965), seen, 
here again, as a project.  
275 This is the significance of Nietzsche’s rejection of the Eleatic univocity of the being: “one 
must accept nothing that has being-because becoming would lose its value and actually appear 
meaningless and superfluous” WP, 708 [1887-88]. 
276 Nietzsche understands creation as realization: “Creation-as selection and finishing of the thing 
selected”. WP, 662 (1883-88). 
277 WP, 1067 (1885). 
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solved: as we saw, the joining of actuality and its direction is to be understood in 
terms of a re-direction of drives:  
“Regarded mechanistically, the energy of the totality of becoming remains constant; 
regarded economically, it rises to a high point […] That which constitutes growth in life is an 
ever more thrifty and more far-seeing economy, which achieves more and more with less and less 
force. As an ideal, the principle of the smallest expenditure.”278  
For Nietzsche, creation is a question of good economic management. The 
amount of wealth (or, in this case, of power) at one’s disposal is unchanged; but 
its ‘buying power’ (or ‘creating power’) can be increased.  Creation must be 
conceivd as the movement by which a power becomes ‘available’ (thereby 
acquiring a “healthy” direction).  
Nietzsche’s view of being thus proves more demanding than the 
traditional “Eleatic” view insofar as it includes within its essence a “whither.”  In 
short: for Nietzsche being is also what it aims at. In terms of self-becoming, this 
implies that the actual human, the “sick animal,” is amputated from any 
significant future.279 She is, as it were, locked up into her own actuality and has 
no chance to escape it, her power being neutralized. Therefore, and in line with 
the equation of being and value, the “sick animal man” is to be overcome. On the 
other hand, the potential self described above possesses both its own quantum of 
                                                 
278 WP, 639 (1887). 
279 One should bear in mind that the instances of time are always differentiated qualitatively for 
Nietzsche, so that any future is marked by an event. An uneventful time is equated in many 
instances to a perennial present. Besides, we know that an event for Nietzsche is always said of 
an attainment of power: “every event presupposes a resistance overcome.” WP, 702 (1888). An 
individual with a future is an individual able to overcome resistances, one whose power is 
directed outwards. This is precisely what the sick animal man is not for Nietzsche.  
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power and the possibility of directing this power outwards (this possibility is 
figured by agency). It now becomes apparent that the healthy self becomes the 
only project possible for Nietzsche.  
We are now in a better position to address the question of the relations 
between health and truth. The premise of this chapter was that in GS and after, 
Nietzsche came to the realization that truth was necessary to his project of 
human excellence. However, Nietzsche’s critique of predicative truth had shown 
the concern for truth to have led primarily to more sickness. He uses the 
incorporation of truth as a device which would allow truth to bring health whilst 
disposing of the sickness-enducing aspect of truth namely, its predicative aspect. 
I also argued that health must be understood as the unity of one’s drives. In 
section A, I concluded that the incorporation of truth brought health by re-
directing outwards the drives resulting from the incorporation of error, thereby 
increasing the power of the healthy human of the future. This harmonization of 
the self’s drives is a figure of Nietzsche’s cherished ‘self-becoming.' In section 
B, I sought to answer one question raised by my previous argument: why was the 
redirection offered by the incorporation of truth preferable to that put forward by 
the younger Nietzsche: namely, the incorporation of illusions? My answer 
resides in Nietzsche’s later insistence on our being essentially of a piece with 
Being itself. Nietzsche expresses this consubstantiality of self and world by 
saying that we possess a “granite of fate” and that the world too, is fate. 
Consequently, illusions run the risk of creating an opposition  between the self 
and its granite nature (hence sickness). Only the incorporation of truth, which 
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clears us from illusions, can achieve our unity with our granite self and thereby, 
lead us towards health.  
The incorporation of truth is Nietzsche's model for our overcoming of the 
self-undercutting of truth and of nihilism. With regard to our more general 
question concerning truth, however, we must inquire further: is the incorporation 
of truth nothing more than the figure of our renouncing our will to truth? It is 
quite apparent that this is impossible: insofar as the event of the self-undercutting 
of truth showed us that erroneous beliefs lead to sickness, we must maintain 
truth. However, as I argued, we must stop thinking of truth in terms of 
predicative knowledge. In what sense then can we conceive of truth? I now turn 
to this problem. 
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CHAPTER III: 
SELF-BECOMING OF THE WORLD AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF 
BEING. 
 
A. THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONS OF TRUTH AND SELF. 
 
At the beginning of Chapter II, I emphasised that Nietzsche approaches 
the incorporation of truth from two angles. Firstly, in the texts of GS from 1882, 
he seeks a way to address what I called the ‘question of truth,’ that is to say, he 
seeks to retrieve what is true about truth in spite of the untruth he finds in 
predicative knowledge.280 Secondly, in book V of GS and other texts from 1887, 
Nietzsche intends the incorporation of truth to provide a purification not of truth 
but of ourselves. This is clarified by the reciprocal nature of incorporation: 
incorporation transforms both the incorporator and the incorporated. If an 
individual incorporates truth, both truth and herself shall be transformed. Truth 
will become something of flesh and blood, and the self will attain health. This is 
why Nietzsche regards the incorporation of truth as a symbiotic process between 
                                                 
280 This inquiry into the authentic experience of truth (perceptual faith) which is at the root of the 
inauthentic predication of truth characterises Merleau-Ponty’s concept of  “interrogation” 
“Philosophy interrogates the perceptual faith-but neither expects nor receives an answer in the 
ordinary sense because it is not the disclosure of a variable or of an unknown invariant that will 
satisfy this question and because the existing world exists in the interrogative mode. Philosophy 
is the perceptual faith interrogating itself about itself.” VI, 103/137. 
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the individual and truth. Through this process, the individual’s health becomes 
an instrument of truth, and reciprocally, truth becomes an instrument of health. 
Here, we reach a point which is essential for both Nietzsche and Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophies: the unity of the self (expressed in terms of health by 
Nietzsche) coincides with the unity of self and reality (insofar as it provides non-
predicative knowledge). In a note conteporaneous to the thoughts of the 
incorporation of truth and of the death of God, Nietzsche writes: 
“Completely false valuations of the perceiving world towards the dead one. How we are 
it! Belong to it! And yet, superficiality, deception begins with perception [...]-and the greatest lust 
for knowledge aims at opposing this false arrogant world with the eternal laws where there is no 
pleasure and no pain and deceit.”281 
This note is enigmatic in many ways, but it clearly states that the 
separation of the self and the world is illusory, and the the “greatest lust for 
knowledge” is the lust for overcoming this illusion. In the next chapter, I shall 
seek to gain more clarity as to the meaning and importance of the unification of 
the self for health and for truth. In what sense does Nietzsche think that health is 
an instrument of truth?  
 
i.  The Economics of Health. 
The relationship between “self-becoming” and Being has just been 
clarified in modal terms. It is now apparent that Being is in the full sense only 
when the potential and the actual are unified (this is not the same as saying that 
the potential is actualised). We now need to ask what consequences can be 
expected from our achieving our individual task of self-becoming, for if one 
                                                 
281 11 [70] (Spring-Fall 1881). 
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needs to become oneself for the sake of Being, the benefits must be expected on 
a higher level than the mere individual herself. If I am right to interpret this 
individual ethics as drawing its value from the nature of Being qua will to power, 
this means that this ethics may be a fruitful medium to use in order to reveal how 
Nietzsche conceives of the ontological relations of self and world; and, it is 
hoped, to provide clarifications of the unity of Being oneself and possessing 
truth.   
  
a. Anti-Darwin: the Re-Establishment of the Healthy Power-
Relations. 
As I have previously indicated, Nietzsche’s refusal to draw values 
from actuality is made from the perspective of a more demanding being, one that 
requires more than actuality. This is exemplified in most of Nietzsche’s attacks 
on Darwinism. Darwin describes a world where the strong dominate the weak, 
but for Nietzsche this world is not the one we live in. It is the world we must 
achieve and he attacks Darwin for presenting it as an actual state of affairs. In a 
note entitled “anti-Darwin,” Nietzsche asserts:  
“Strange though it may sound, one always has to defend the Strong against the Weak; 
the fortunate against the unfortunate; the healthy against those degenerating and afflicted with 
hereditary taints. If one translates reality into a morality; this morality is: the mediocre are worth 
more than the exceptions.”282  
In other words, there is a disjunction between power and domination: the 
weak dominate the strong and before Darwin (or what Nietzsche believes to be 
                                                 
282 WP, 685 (1888). 
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Darwin’s position) can be proved right, the relations of power have to be 
reversed.283 The story of this disjunction is told in GM and I have presented it 
already: ressentiment and the slave revolt in morality bring about a society in 
which powerful individuals become weakened, so that the weak come to 
dominate them. The re-establishment of a hierarchy based on power and not on 
sickness is one of Nietzsche’s priorities.284 Therefore Nietzsche views the goals 
of humanity and of culture as the promotion of the great individuals. For him 
“people obviously refuse to admit that the great human beings are the apex for 
whom everything else exists,”285 and he insists, “the many are only a means.”286 
Nietzsche’s reasons for positing the final goal in the single individual has always 
oscillated between two views: one cosmological, and the other political, before 
being re-united at the very end of Nietzsche’s writing career.  
 
                                                 
283 In the recent years, John Richardson (2002, 2006) has forcefully investigated the relationships 
of Nietzsche and Darwinian evolution. Nietzsche addresses two main criticisms to Darwin. The 
first is presented here; it is Darwin’s alleged claim that the strong are better at surviving than the 
weak. The second is that living organisms seek reproduction and not increase. John Richardson 
builds this latter claim into the kernel of Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin, and regards the first one 
as an extension of it. In my view, it is more relevant to Nietzsche’s project to affirm the first 
claim instead. On my differences with Richardson on this question, see chapter II, Section I, A, 2, 
b), i) ft. For some clarification on the former claim and its relation to other claims, see Lewis 
Call, « Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Critique of Darwin and Darwinism," 
Science History, Issue 26 (1998), 1-22. 
284 WP, 287 (1883-88). 
285 WP, 351 (1888). 
286 WP, 681 (1883-88) see also WP, 766 (1886-87). 
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b. The Cosmological Role of Culture. 
The cosmological view became one of Nietzsche’s main concerns 
in the year 1874, while preparing the manuscript to the Meditation on 
Schopenhauer. In section 7 of this text, Nietzsche discusses the appearance in the 
world of a true philosopher. For him, “Nature propels a philosopher into 
mankind like an arrow; it takes no aim but hopes the arrow will stick 
somewhere.”287 Of course, we must remark the reference to nature as the 
intentional cause for the appearance of a philosopher: a philosopher achieves a 
purpose assigned to him or her by nature. More important however, is that 
Nietzsche expresses a problem that will remain in his thought till the end: nature 
shoots at random. This means two things: Firstly, each individual is to be 
understood as a mere experiment, a trial, an “arrow” whose purpose is only very 
seldom attained. Secondly, one holds the justification for one’s existence from 
the very purpose that she is a trial towards. For Nietzsche, this aim can only be 
achieved by those he calls the “lucky strokes,”288 the Strong. At this stage, the 
young Nietzsche still presents his views in metaphysical, quasi-mythical ways, 
by anthropomorphising nature and attributing to it goals and purposes. However, 
as the notes from 1887-1888 quoted above demonstrate, I do not think that the 
structure of this worldview, especially the idea that only the exceptions are 
valuable, changes very much in his subsequent work.  
                                                 
287 UM III, p 177. 
288 See UM III, 2. This is an expression that never left Nietzsche’s vocabulary until the very end. 
See for example WP, 684 (1888). 
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This opens up two possibilities for the weak. Firstly, they can be put to 
use for the enhancement of the life of the strong, as slaves “simply because we 
feel it is not possible for man, fighting for sheer survival, to be an artist.”289 In 
the Greek State, which precedes UM III by two years, Nietzsche encounters the 
same problem in his analysis of the social structure that promotes human 
greatness, that of the Greeks. This point is taken over in UM III and later through 
Z and the later notes: in subjection, the weak find redemption to their weakness, 
they make themselves useful to a greater aim, that of the great man; as Fink puts 
it: “life creates the mass of average people as the basis for a higher type of 
man.”290  
The second possibility is for the weak to simply vanish and die. As failed 
experiments, they have no right to existence. To this line of argument belong 
Nietzsche’s repeated claims that “all that exists that can be denied deserves to be 
denied”291 and his characterisation of eternal recurrence as a “great cultivating 
idea”292 that “gives to many the right to erase themselves”293. The reason for 
                                                 
289 The Greek State, 165. 
290 Fink (2003), 158. Fink’s reading is ambiguous insofar as it uses anthropomorphisations to 
describe life and the world. It is difficult, from Fink’s text, to establish whether this is only a 
stylistic feature or indeed, a philosophical claim on his part. In any case, I shall not follow his 
lead on this issue.  
291 UM III, 153. Admittedly, this remark applies to all cases and not only to human, yet, the 
context makes no doubt that it applies to humans too, insofar as the argument which declares that 
the unnecessary is superfluous is precisely an economical argument.  
292 On eternal recurrence as a breeding device, see Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 
(2006), 70, §4. In the rest of his section, Deleuze stretches this aspect to ontological dimensions 
without recourse to an appeal to anthropological transformation in ways that are difficult to relate 
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Nietzsche to envisage the pure and simple annulment of the failed experiments is 
to do with their place in the world. For Nietzsche, all the attempts, which 
constitute the masses, are brought about by an essentially blind and wasteful 
nature, which exhausts itself in spending on the weak. Consider:  
“Nature is just as extravagant in the domain of culture as it is in that of planting and 
sowing. It achieves its aims in a broad and ponderous manner, and in doing so it sacrifices much 
too much energy [...] nature is a bad economist, its expenditure is much larger than the income it 
procures”294.  
The weak appear as the superfluous expenditure, as “dead weight” to the 
world: “life itself recognises no solidarity, no ‘equal rights,' between the healthy 
and the degenerate parts of an organism, one must excise the latter.”295 
The analogy with economics reappears surprisingly in an aphorism from 
Nietzsche’s very last active months. This aphorism brings together the two 
aforementioned options as two sides of an alternative which is to be decided over 
in terms of an optimization of power. When Nietzsche ponders the balance one 
has to achieve between the largest proportion of Strong “races” and their chance 
                                                 
to Nietzsche’s own writings. In his view it is through a rejection of all life-negation that the 
eternal recurrence trnasforms the structure of the individual. In consideration of Paolo d’Iorio’s 
keen criticisms of Deleuze’s interpretation, it seems to me that we must present the selection 
provided by eternal recurrence as foremost anthropological, and only consequently, ontologico-
cosmological. This is the approach I will be taking in the remainder of this chapter. See Paolo 
d’Iorio, “l’Eternel Retour, Genèse et Interpretation,”  Cahier de l’Herne, Nietzsche, l’Herne, 
Paris, 1998. 
293 WP, 1056 (1884) see also WP, 1058 (1883-88). 
294 UM III, 177-8. 
295 WP, 734 (1888). 
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of survival (which implies the existence of the weak, better at preserving the 
species and at serving the strong) Nietzsche concludes: “we stand before a 
problem of economics.”296 In other words, it is a dialectic of cost and advantage 
that decides whether the weak are to be used or destroyed.  
Nietzsche’s view of culture and breeding is thus concerned with the 
management of the overall and fixed quantum of power of the world. As I 
discussed in II, b, in a world where the quantum of power is not subject to 
becoming, the task can only become to “optimise” this power.297 In the case of 
the human, this is achieved through a re-direction of the drives that constitute the 
individual. Once this is achieved, the hitherto balance of power between 
individuals becomes reversed: the weak lose their power and become conquered 
by the strong. Strength and domination are reconciled.  
This domination takes two forms: the death of some of the weak and the 
subjection of some others. In the first case, this involves liberation of the 
quantum of power of the deceased weak, the “superfluous," whose death, 
Nietzsche says, is a “promise” of health for the world.298 In the other case, their 
power is not liberated but incorporated into the power of the master: as a slave, 
the weak submits her power to her master, and just like a protoplasm becomes a 
function of a higher organism through incorporation, the weak becomes a 
function of her master, who increases (in power) by the same measure. In such a 
human world, human quanta of power are optimised. This economical view is at 
                                                 
296 WP, 864 (1888). 
297 WP, 639 (1887). 
298 See for example, Z, I, “on free death”. 
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the root of Nietzsche’s politics. However, we must now ask what gives the 
political project its value: what is at stake in the political realm for Nietzsche? 
The answer is cosmological. 
 
ii. The Self-Becoming of the World and the New Truth. 
The strong human is not herself the final aim; instead, she is presented as 
a means, responsible for an adequate management of the energy available in the 
world. We know however that the human occupies a specific place in the world, 
but this is by virtue of the fact that she is the only sick being. As the only locus 
of sickness in the world Nietzsche thinks, the human represents the challenge of 
the optimisation of the overall quantum of power.299 In Chapter I, I have argued 
that this sickness must be viewed as the reversibility of our drives. In Chapter II, 
this reversibility has appeared as the possibility of agency. Agency is a promise 
because it contains our ability to regain health on a higher level. Now, thanks to 
agency, the human has in her hands the key to the overcoming of human 
sickness, that is to say, of the sickness of the world. We must ask ourselves if this 
positing of the human’s sickness with reference to the world is of any relevance 
for Nietzsche. Indeed, Nietzsche repeatedly uses the expression “the world” to 
refer to reality as a whole, but he also consistently claims that there is no “world” 
[All]. A chronological approach to this question throughout Nietzsche’s writings 
will provide some clarifications.  
 
                                                 
299 We remember that sickness comes from consciousness, which is itself, the product of man’s 
original distinctive feature: he is the weakest creature in the world (GS 354). 
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a. The aims of nature (1874). 
As above, we must start with the year 1874 and the Meditation on 
Schopenhauer. In this text, Nietzsche expresses his basic intuition as to the 
frightening300 responsibility of the healthy man, the one he there calls the 
“healthy philosopher” and has the characteristics of being “untimely,” and 
entirely “himself”: his role and his greatest ambition is to complete “nature” with 
knowledge:  
“[I]t is the fundamental idea of culture, insofar as it sets for each of us but one task: to 
promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the saint within and without us, and 
thereby to work at the perfecting of nature.”301  
Here, Nietzsche poses his definition of culture, which will still be at play 
in his later conceptions: it is the form of civilization that promotes the greatest 
men and their self-becoming, towards a goal posited by “nature” itself. The 
young Nietzsche envisaged the great human as a means and not a final end: she 
had a task that went beyond herself: completing the world by leading becoming 
into being.302 
 Although it is not elaborated as precisely as in the later texts, it is 
important to stress that the discussion of the complementarity of man and world 
(human action is the key to the world’s attaining self-identity) is done from the 
point of view of a dialectic of Being and becoming. For Nietzsche, one becomes 
oneself by reconnecting with the untimely in oneself, with what he calls in UM, 
                                                 
300 See Nachlass (1874), 35 [14] and UM III, 157-8. 
301 UM III, 160. 
302 UM III, 161. 
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III nature’s original intention.303 The way for the self to achieve this is, as we 
saw, to struggle against all that is not “him” in himself, and these alien elements 
are consistently linked to becoming by Nietzsche. They are a result of social 
uniformisation and pressure standing between one and oneself: “this eternal 
becoming is a lying puppet-play in beholding which man forgets himself.”304 We 
can now understand what Nietzsche calls the “truthfulness”305 of the philosopher: 
a refusal of becoming in favour of Being.  
Yet for Nietzsche this truthfulness involves an ontological leap that 
transcends subjectivity: a truly truthful philosopher will lose himself at the very 
moment he becomes himself, for “[the aspiration to be truthful is a] destructive 
aspiration, yet it makes the individual great and free, perhaps he will perish from 
it outwardly, not inwardly.”306 This note from the middle of 1874 potentially 
contains most of Nietzsche’s later ethics. Let us stress that Nietzsche links man 
and the world in an ontological manner: if one is truly oneself, she will not die 
“internally” (which Nietzsche will go on to characterise as “sickness”—the 
“internalization of man”), but “externally,” (that is, her “ego” will die)  
“There are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we 
cease to understand the word ‘I.' There lies something beyond our being which at these moments 
                                                 
303 UM, II, 177-179. The anthropomorphisation of nature, which is central in UM, III, will of 
course disappear in the later texts.  
304 UM III, 155. 
305 UM III, 153. 
306 Nachlass, (1874) 34 [36]. 
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move across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and 
there.”307 
This is Nietzsche’s first approach of the question of subjectivity, and as it 
were, of its overcoming through the consubstantiality of man and “nature.”308 
 
b.  The World as “Chaos” (1885). 
In 1885, Nietzsche was led to re-examine the question of a so-
called self-becoming of the world and the eventual responsibility of man with 
regard to it. For him, this question became problematic because he now saw the 
world as “chaos.”309 Some authors310, attempt to do away with the difficulties of 
Nietzsche’s account of the world as chaos by presenting it as merely “a 
preventive concept, one forbidding us from essentializing, eternalizing, and 
deifying nature”311 and not one positively presenting Nietzsche’s doctrine. I 
think, on the contrary, that the concept of the world as ‘chaos’ pertains directly to 
Nietzsche’s investigation of time and eternal recurrence which led into a new 
idea: “if the motion of the world aimed at a final state, that state would have been 
                                                 
307 UM III, 161 See also EH, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” in “Why I Write Such Good Books” 
where the Zarathustran man, he who is himself “is not estranged from or entranced by [reality], 
he is reality itself.” 
308 This is a view Nietzsche still explicitly holds in much the same terms in 1881, see 11 [70] 
(Spring-Fall 1881), quoted above. 
309 WP, 711 (1888): “the world is not an organism at all, but chaos.” 
310 For example, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, op. Cit. Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, op. Cit. 
and to a lesser extent, Michel Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, SUNY, Albany, 1996. 
311 ibid. 115. 
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reached.”312 For Nietzsche, the present historicity, that is, the instability of the 
world, is a proof that stability is impossible. I will return to this thought later 
with regard to the doctrine of eternal recurrence, but let me already suggest that 
this induces a clear shift in Nietzsche’s preference of being over becoming.313 
This leads us to the core of the question that occupied Nietzsche in the years 
1885-6: the connection between monism and plurality, or in other words, the 
question of difference.  
In Z, Nietzsche gives his first mentions of the “will to power.” At this 
point, it is mainly presented as a psychological314 or a psycho-sociological 
principle,315 but most importantly, Nietzsche presents it as a metaphysical 
discovery, it is the essence of life: “where I found the living, there I found Will 
to Power.” This discovery however, is still only applied to the living: “only 
where life is, there too is will.”316 This leads to conceiving of life as having a 
double structure. First, it is unified under one principle, the will to power. 
Secondly, because the will to power is essentially relational, it introduces 
                                                 
312 WP, 708 (1887-88). See also WP 639 (1887): “That the world is not aiming at the final 
condition is the only thing that has been proved.”  
313 This discovery follows directly Nietzsche’s thoughts of 1885-6 on the genealogy of the 
concept of “being” which Nietzsche sees as derived from the concept of the ego. See for 
example, WP, 518 (1885-6). 
314 Z, “on self-overcoming.” 
315 Z, “on the thousand and one goals.” 
316 Z, “on self-overcoming.” 
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difference. Thus in the realm of life, identity and difference coexist.317 This is 
essentially what the double affirmation of “chaos” as the generalisation of 
difference and “will to power” as a unifying principle. Chaos, as we saw, is 
differentiation through opposition; it is the unique essence of the will to power. 
This combination of identity and difference informs the eternal becoming of the 
world (cf. I, B, b. ii, 4). 
With the discovery of the “fact” that the world’s journey has no end, 
Nietzsche is led to affirm becoming against Being because the only possibility of 
maintaining Being was to posit a potential point of stability at the end of the 
becoming.318 This possibility is ruled out by experience.  
For Nietzsche, this leaves the value of anything, and especially of human 
existence and human actions problematic: we cannot aim at anything anymore 
and, as Nietzsche repeatedly insists, the meaning is now to be found only in 
ourselves. This means that the criterion of valuation shifts from Being to health. 
As a result, the project of the individual is now disconnected from any cosmic 
reference. Nietzsche’s wish for us to place goals in ourselves can be understood 
only if we understand our own existence as always-already ek-static, whilst 
avoiding representing a point that we must project ourselves towards. For 
Nietzsche, it is by placing our preference on the present that we place our 
preference on what this very present projects itself towards because our present 
itself is ek-static. This has the advantage of clearing any structure of other-
                                                 
317 This is what Fink has called Nietzsche’s “negative ontology of the thing," where a ‘thing’ is 
defined as a point of opposition between wills to power. See Eugen Fink, Nietzsche’s Philosophy, 
op. Cit. 145-54. 
318 GS, 109. 
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worldly valuation from Nietzsche’s doctrine, but leaves us with nothing more 
than a form of eudaemonism albeit a sophisticated one. I will return to this 
question shortly. 
 
c. The Reconciliation (1886-1888) 
The last phase in Nietzsche’s treatment of the role of man towards 
a supposed aim of the world is initiated with Nietzsche’s transformation of the 
doctrine of the will to power from biology to ontology. The term ontology should 
not deceive us here. If it has been applied to Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to 
power, it is only in the sense of a description of the entirety of being qua reality. 
‘Ontology’ here should not be taken in the most demanding sense inherited from 
Heidegger for instance. Even if it will appear that this purer sense was not 
overlooked by Nietzsche, it is clear that the Nietzschean doctrine of the will to 
power does not, for example, address the question of what it is to ‘be’ a will to 
power. Rather, ontology here refers to a doctrine that applies to all instances of 
existence, to all the beings.  
Nietzsche’s unification of all beings under the concept “will to power” 
comes from his late rejection of the separation between the “organic” (which was 
so far the only realm of the will to power) and the inorganic. Nietzsche now 
writes, “[t]hinking, in primitive conditions (pre-organic), is the crystallization of 
forms, as in the case of crystal,”319 this implies that from now on “the world is 
                                                 
319 WP, 499 (1885). This note is from 1885, however at odds with the characterisation of will to 
power as applying only to Life in Z, which it is only slightly posterior to, it presents the pre-
organic and the organic, the mineral and the intellectual as consubstantial. This is also a reprise 
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essentially will to power.”320 Despite his former reluctance, Nietzsche re-
establishes “the world” as a single essence, which he names will to power. The 
immediate consequence of this move is that Nietzsche henceforth is able to view 
the world as a fixed321 “overall quantum of power.”322 This establishes a link 
with the characterisation of “creation” discussed above. There, creation was 
understood as actualisation and actualisation as the “externalisation” of power. If 
creation in the strong sense (ex nihilo) becomes impossible, the only becoming 
possible for the world is a re-organisation of its own forces:  
“supposing that the world had a certain quantum of force at its disposal, then it is 
obvious that every displacement of power at any point would affect the whole system—thus 
together with sequential causality there would be a contiguous and concurrent dependence.”323  
For Nietzsche, such a re-organisation can only be brought about through 
incorporation, which is the basic mechanism of the will to power. Let me recall 
three basic traits of incorporation: i) incorporation is the means by which an 
                                                 
of a theme introduced in 1882 in GS 109: “the living is merely a type of what is dead and a very 
rare type.” I believe that the disappearance and re-appearance of this theme is linked to the 
paradox described above: Nietzsche was torn between the need to account for difference and 
unity. With the will to power, he found a solution to merge both separation and consubstantiality. 
However, Nietzsche’s first conception of the will to power relied on the sharp distinction 
between organic and inorganic. In the years 1886-8, Nietzsche solves this problem by 
generalising the will to power to everything that is (while at the same time trying to avoid 
jumping from the unity of the world under one will to power to the organicity of the world).  
320 BGE, 186 emphasis added.  
321 WP, 639 (1887). 
322 WP, 1067 (1885). 
323 WP, 638 (1885-86). 
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organic ensemble of forces increases its power at the expense of the organism it 
subjects; ii) it is characterised by the re-direction (and thus preservation) of the 
drives of the incorporated towards a goal posited by the incorporator; and iii) this 
re-direction unifies formerly opposing drives into one single drive of a greater 
quantum. If the world itself is will to power, and incorporation is the basic 
mechanism of the will to power, this means that we now must conceive of the 
world as a quantum of power forever re-configuring itself through the internal 
struggles and incorporations of its components. The becoming of the world is 
nothing other than the world’s self-incorporation.   
  
iii. Teleological Cosmology.  
In the following discussion, I investigate this conception of the world. I 
will be ignoring—for the time being—the crucial addition whereby “if the 
motion of the world aimed at a final state, that state would have been 
reached.”324  It is only by clarifying the worldview in which this claim takes 
place that we can clarify its consequences. Nietzsche himself sometimes 
proposes the hypothesis that the becoming of the world is headed towards a high 
and final point.325 
From the description of the world as an overall quantum of power, 
comprising a diversity of conflicting drives, one comes to a pyramidal structure. 
                                                 
324 WP, 708 (1887-88). 
325 Nietzsche calls this high point, surprisingly, “God”: “the sole way of maintaining a meaning 
for the concept ‘God’ would be: God not as a driving force, but God as a maximal state, as an 
epoch -a point in the evolution of the will to power by means of which further evolution just as 
much as previous evolution up to him can be regarded” WP, 639 (1887). 
 157 
Indeed, if every healthy structure is healthy precisely because it is ruled by only 
one drive, this structure resembles a pyramid whose body is constituted by a 
cooperation of drives ruled by the “top” drive.326 In the case of a political 
organisation, we already know that this is exactly Nietzsche’s conception of a 
healthy society, with the Strong at its summit.327 Nietzsche’s monism also leads 
him to state that everything in the world is a potential master or slave to 
everything else; everything can be incorporated by everything else. In theory, 
there is no obstacle stopping the world from being someday unified under the 
rule of one supreme organism, which would contain the ensemble of the former 
                                                 
326 In his « Nietzsche: Perfectionist," Thomas Hurka proposes a figure of human perfection 
according to Nietzsche as pyramidal. It is worth noting that all « perfectionist » readings of 
Nietzsche operate in the scope of this section, that is to say, they do not include Nietzsche’s idea 
that an end of history, as end of chaos, is impossible. In my view, this does not make the 
perfectionist readings of Nietzsche wrong, but it does make them partial: Nietzsche may be 
aiming at perfectionism, but his cosmology makes human excellence always imperfect. Thomas 
Hurka, « Nietzsche: Perfectionist," in Brian Leiter and Neil Shinhababu, (eds.) Nietzsche and 
Morality, Oxford, 2007, 25-26. On the perfectionist readings of Nietzsche, see for example, 
James Conant, « Nietzsche’s Perfectionism," in Richard Schacht, (ed.) Nietzsche’s Postmoralism, 
Cambridge, 2001. For a valuable assessment of perfectionism (albeit without references to 
Nietzsche’s cosmology), see Vanessa Lemm, “Is Nietzsche a Perfectionist?,” Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies, Issue 34, 2007, 5-27. 
327 See for example, the early “Greek State” of 1871.  
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organisms as its “functions.” In fact, Nietzsche multiplies the descriptions of 
specific organisms as these pyramids of pyramids.328 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that this is the aim Nietzsche 
attributes to the development of the overall quantum of power, i.e. the world. In 
this case, the first requirement is that of the alignment of all drives in the world. 
The discussion from Chapter I entails that the alternative of health or sickness is 
specifically human, because only the human is given the ability to split herself 
into two opposing halves (as is described in GM II, 16). We know as well that 
self-becoming stands precisely for a human’s attaining her uttermost health. 
Here, the responsibility of the human becomes cosmological again: she is the 
locus of sickness in the world; hence, she is the site of the project of the self-
becoming of the world and holds the key to it, in the form of agency. This sheds 
new light on Amor Fati. Amor Fati is for Nietzsche a criterion of greatness, of 
“virtue.” Virtue, on its part, is said by Nietzsche of one’s becoming a “function” 
of something greater, be it society for the individual329 or some greater organism 
for the organic cell.330 I have pointed out above that any incorporation involves 
                                                 
328 WP, 703 (1888): “The whole organism is such a complex of systems struggling for an increase 
of the feeling of power”; See also Müller-Lauter’s exposition of « the organism as inner 
struggle,” in Müller-Lauter, 1999, 160 ff. 
329 GS, 21: “the unreason in virtue that leads the individual to allow himself to be transformed 
into a mere function of the whole.” 
330 “Is it virtue when a cell transforms itself in a function of a stronger cell?” GS, 118; To be sure, 
here, Nietzsche denies that this could be called the virtue of a cell, not because this action would 
not be virtuous, but rather because it is not, properly speaking, an action, that is, it does not fall 
 159 
the loss of identity of the incorporated cell, precisely because it becomes a mere 
“function” and now holds its identity from the higher being it is now 
incorporated into. This means only one thing as far as the individual is 
concerned: Nietzsche has reactivated his early intuition that the achievement of 
the self is a loss of self, as described in UM III whereby in the “fire of love 
[amor fati]… we cease to understand the word ‘I’.”331  
Here, we arrive at a crucial point with regard to our general question 
concerning truth: through this experience of the loss of self through self-
becoming, Nietzsche proposes a new and higher type of truth, which I shall call 
“ontological,” insofar as it is a truth that transcends the subject-object distinction. 
For Fink, Nietzsche promotes “the divinatory intuition of the essence of the 
cosmos” and demonstrates that “the highest truth is ‘showing’.”332 Fink means 
this showing in opposition to any predicative distortion: the showing does not 
transform what it is about into symbols, and consequently, it avoids the critique 
of predication. In this sense, Nietzsche tries to maintain an idea of truth beyond 
the subject-object distinction; that is, a truth that remains once the subject has 
merged into the object. In Müller-Lauter’s words: “the new truth (which was 
always the only truth, but in the past was hidden) consists in being at one with 
the will to power.”333  
                                                 
within the realm of morality and agency. When it comes to the agent however, which is our 
concern here, this provides Nietzsche’s idea of a virtue: becoming a function of a higher being. 
331 UM III, 161. 
332 Eugen Fink, 2003, 169. 
333 Wolfgang Muller-Lauter, op. Cit. 70. 
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Here we are confronted with a truth that breaks the predicative 
framework. This truth was, as I said, ‘salvaged’ by the incorporation of truth. 
This truth is the authentic experience which provides the basis for the beliefs 
exemplified in untruth; it is, in the most general terms of this thesis, the 
‘phenomenon of truth.' Again, Fink declares, “The real distinction is not one 
between any intuition and any concept but between cosmic intuition and the 
categorical concept.”334 It is a truth that is brought about by the “surrender” of 
the great man, whose agency—as it were—commits suicide. This is expressed by 
Nietzsche with the expression “amor fati” which represents “the last and the 
greatest will [namely] to will the necessary.”335 For Müller-Lauter, such a 
paradox as wilful submission of free-will “can be understood not as a transition 
but only as a qualitative leap.”336 This leap is precisely the leap from the 
metaphysical to the ontological and it takes place beyond the subject-object 
distinction, precisely because it takes place at the very moment that the subject 
disappears as such.  
This second form of truth, however, should not be opposed to the first 
one. On the contrary, it is clear that Nietzsche envisages the truth about God to 
be the dialectical device by which we can arrive at this second, more enigmatic 
truth. As I have argued in II, B), the movement that goes from a predicative truth 
about predicative truth (namely, that is it is false) to a non-predicative one such 
as this ontological truth is mediated by our attainment of health. This is made 
                                                 
334 Eugen Fink, op. Cit. 150. 
335 Ibid. 94. 
336 Ibid. p 78. 
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possible by the former and leading into the latter. It is in this sense only that we 
may understand the thesis that existence is an instrument of truth.  
 
B.  ETERNAL RECURRENCE: the Failure of Teleological Becoming. 
 
I have just examined a worldview that could have been Nietzsche’s final 
cosmology. Such a worldview is teleological; it generalises the teleological 
structure of the singles wills to power to what Nietzsche calls ‘the overall 
quantum of power,’ i.e. the world. In this view, the world itself is like an 
organism. It is going somewhere and the final point of its evolution is absolute 
Being, understood as self-identical. Here, the ontological role of the human 
becomes apparent: by holding the key to her own health, the human individual 
holds the keys to the health of the entire world, and the self-becoming of the 
world depends on the self-becoming of every human individual. This final, 
perfect stage is equivalent to the full incorporation of the world. The overall 
quantum of power in the world becomes one unique drive. What would this drive 
oppose itself to? There is no answer to this question. This means, I think, that the 
doctrine of the will to power is not ontological but metaphysical. It is a doctrine 
that describes accurately the world not in its essential identity but in its essential 
difference. Indeed, for a theory to give a truly ontological account of the world as 
we describe it, it should be able to give us an account of what it would be for the 
world to “be” self-identical. Yet, an account of self-identity in terms of will to 
power is impossible because a will to power exists only against another will to 
power, in other words, the world as will to power is by definition self-
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differentiated.337 “[C]onsequently” Nietzsche says, one must conceive [the 
world’s] climactic condition in such a way that it is not a condition of 
equilibrium.”338  
 
i. the Disparity of Power and Time. 
 
In a note from 1887-1888, Nietzsche writes: “If the motion of the world 
aimed at a final state, that state would have been reached.”339 This is a 
fundamental remark for Nietzsche’s project because, he writes, “every 
philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e.g. mechanistic theory) which necessitates 
such a final state is refuted by this fundamental fact.”340 In other words, this 
discovery has to be granted the status of a fact in the strong epistemological 
sense: a fact has a critical power, it can refute.341 This, for Nietzsche, constitutes 
                                                 
337 See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, II (Trans. Ed. David Farell Krell), Harper Collins, San 
Francisco, 1987, 205-207. 
338 V [54] (Summer 1886-Autumn 1887). 
339 WP 708, (1887-88). 
340 Idem. 
341 On the interactions between Nietzsche’s readings on thermodynamics in the years 1881-1887 
and their consequences on his doctrine of eternal recurrence, and in particular on the 
prefiguration of this view by Otto Caspari, see Paolo d’Iorio’s admirable “Cosmologie de 
l’Eternel Retour,” Nietzsche-Studien, Issue 24, 1995, 62-123, in particular, 108-112. The 
philological elements presented by d’Iorio strongly unify the thoughts of the death of God, the 
eternal recurrence, and the incorporation, largely through their interconnectedness in Notebook, 
III, 1 of 1881. For a philosophical elucidation of this web of implications in this notebook, see 
Keith Ansell-Pearson, 2006, op. Cit.  
 163 
a challenge: “I seek a conception that takes this fact into account,” he writes. Let 
us stress that the first mention of this fact occurs late in Nietzsche’s work, in his 
penultimate notebook in 1887, and it becomes a challenge only in the later 
fragment quoted above, about four years after the first mention of the will to 
power and its development into a metaphysical ontology. Although the fragment 
is explicitly (but not exclusively) intended as an attack on the “mechanistic 
theory,” it seems highly plausible to read in it Nietzsche’s awareness of the 
incompleteness of his own will to power doctrine.  
This note relies on a conception of time whereby time itself extends 
infinitely into the past. If the past is infinite, then everything that is possible must 
have already happened. In WP 639, Nietzsche addresses the same question in 
terms of a disparity between a limited number of possible “events”342 and the 
eternity of time which events take place into  
“the absolute necessity of similar events occurring in the course of one world, as in all 
others, is in eternity not a determinism ruling events, but merely the expression that the 
impossible is not possible.” 
                                                 
342 WP, 639 [Spring-Fall 1887). This point is crucial and problematic. Nietzsche thinks through 
this point in two alternate ways.  Firstly, if there is a certain limited quantum of power within the 
world, then there are only a certain number of possible combinations thereof (events). On the 
other hand, Nietzsche affirms that will to power has no “atoms," no elemental unit, so that, in 
theory at least, it can be indefinitely divided, making the number of possible events infinite. 
Müller-Lauter calls this a plain “contradiction” on Nietzsche’s part: “Nietzsche accepts more 
than a limit to the possible number of power-situations. In so doing, he contradicts himself: 
Infinite divisibility of forces, which excludes any thoughts of a quasi-substantiality of wills to 
power leaves room for the thought of infinitely many power-combinations”. Muller-Lauter 
(1999), 140. 
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Here, Nietzsche opens the space that the thought of eternal recurrence 
takes place in343: “the principle of conservation of energy demands eternal 
recurrence.”344 The disparity between the finitude of the number of possible 
events and the infinity of time can only be resolved into a repetition of events, 
and of sequences of events, the repetition itself being not an event but simply the 
conjunction of time and events and the expression of their disparity345. Nietzsche 
still conceives of becoming as a sequence of incorporative events346.  
 
a. The Non-Birth of Consciousness and the Eternity of Past 
History. 
Both of the aphorisms under scrutiny imply that the teleological 
form of becoming is an illusion: there is no absolutely healthy (self-identical) 
state of the world. Although it is never formulated in these terms by Nietzsche, I 
                                                 
343 To be sure, the thoughts of eternal recurrence and the will to power are contemporaneous to 
each other and precede the explicit formulation of the problem at hand, in late 1887. There is no 
denying that the thought of eternal recurrence stands on its own; my assumption here is that 
Nietzsche’s worldview was transformed by his thoughts of 1885 on time and was revised into a 
mature worldview, largely based on the affirmation that there will never and has never been any 
totally healthy and stable state. This renewed worldview was brought about by the transitional 
years 1885-6.  
344 V [54] (Summer 1886-Autumn 1887). 
345 This point can contribute to the general question of what kind of repetition is involved here. It 
is clear in my analysis, that the repetition cannot be perceived as accumulation, but rather as the 
repetition of the first as first, eternally.  
346 I find the claim that becoming is the temporality of incorporation developed in Rosalyn 
Diprose, The Bodies of Women, op. Cit. 84-87. 
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would like to suggest the following hypothesis which permits us to trace the late-
found impossibility of cosmological teleology to the roots of Nietzsche’s 
understanding of history.  
In GM, II, 1, Nietzsche calls history the becoming of consciousness. 
There is for Nietzsche no history before the birth of consciousness precisely 
because history is the history of disease, convalescence and overcoming brought 
about by consciousness. I claimed at the end of chapter I that the absolute 
overcoming of consciousness was impossible a priori, because sickness and 
health, while opposed to each other, need each other. Consequently, I have 
described absolute sickness and absolute health as mere horizons and the stake of 
history altogether was to be seen in terms of degrees of life, not in absolute 
terms. This realisation blocked the future from any leap into absolute health. In 
accordance with my analysis of Nietzsche’s “animal psyche” and his metaphor 
of the inner world as “stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin," the 
notes at hand here indicate that it is precisely the past that never saw such a leap 
happen, for we can now see that this leap amounts to a necessarily impossible 
leap from self-differentiation to self-identity. If self-identity were possible, it 
would have happened already, and if it had, it could not have been lost. 
Nietzsche’s conclusion is that some sickness was always here. 
 
b. Being and Becoming.  
This, of course, has consequences for Nietzsche’s views on 
ontology. First, the question of time; in 1886-87, Nietzsche declares: “That 
everything recurs is the most extreme approximation of a world of becoming to 
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one of being”347. Nietzsche’s project is not to affirm becoming over Being but to 
reconcile them. For Nietzsche becoming is only said of a succession, that is, of 
events. An event is not only a re-organisation of drives, but it is a re-organisation 
that affects the overall “economical energy”348 of the world, making the quantum 
of power of the world more or less effective, more or less healthy. On the other 
hand, Being as self-identity349 is understood by Nietzsche as stability through 
time that is, not the negation of time, but the negation of the qualitative 
difference between instants in time. In other words, in Being, time becomes 
ineffective, a mere abstraction. Being is time without becoming.  
If this characterization of Being and becoming is accurate, it follows that 
eternal recurrence can be the thought that links the two together. In more than 
one way, eternal recurrence is a thought of inefficiency. For the human agent, it 
is a despairing thought, precisely because it amounts to the impossibility for any 
difference to occur in the future, for any better tomorrows for example. 
Inefficiency of time within eternal recurrence makes all moments qualitatively 
similar to each other. Yet eternal recurrence is foremost an affirmation of 
becoming as sequence because it is thought from the point of view of the so-
called 'cosmic year' which is nothing but the overall possible (hence necessary) 
sequence of events. Here, absolute becoming and absolute Being seem to merge 
into the thought of eternal recurrence; or, to borrow Löwith’s words, “by means 
                                                 
347 VII, [54] Late 1886-Spring 1887. 
348 WP, 639 (1887). 
349 See KGW, VII, 1, 422 & 424, (Summer 1883) quoted above. 
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of the eternal recurrence of the same, Eleatic being is transferred into Heraclitean 
becoming.”350 
 
ii. Metaphysics and Ontology. 
 
The reference to the divide between Parmenides’ philosophy of Being as 
the self-identical One and Heraclitus’ becoming as the self-differentiated 
multiple leads us to a deeper insight into Nietzsche’s thoughts regarding the 
relationship between ontology and metaphysics. In fact, if we look at it from a 
traditional point of view, the merging of becoming and Being remains on the 
level of the metaphysics of time. However, in Nietzsche’s case, the relationship 
between Being and becoming is the foundation for the distinction between 
metaphysics and ontology. For Nietzsche, metaphysics is understood “only in the 
sense of a two-world theory.”351 We saw in chapter I that for Nietzsche, any 
“two-world theory” amounts to the possibility of “passing sentence,” of the 
disjunction between reality and justification.352 In other words, the rejection of 
any two-world theory is the rejection of the structure of moral judgment. Yet 
Nietzsche insists everywhere that the will to power is precisely one such instance 
of valuation, from GM I’s “pathos of distance,” to all forms of Christian morality 
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351 Müller-Lauter, (1999), 122 
352 See for example TI, “Expeditions of an untimely man”, §32: “What justifies a man is his 
reality—it will justify him eternally. How much more valuable an actual man is compared with 
any sort of merely desired, dreamed of, odious lie of a man? With any sort of ideal man?” 
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and down to the protozoa. This is largely because the will to power is an 
essentially relative concept, which operates on the mode of difference as the 
“me” and the “non-me," and consequently, in terms of ‘interest.' Indeed, I have 
argued in chapter I that the “me” and the “non-me,” as subject and object, were 
constituted in the very experience of resistance. We have seen above that the 
concept “will to power” stands for the whole realm of becoming. In a note from 
1888 Nietzsche describes all becoming as “an encroachment of one power over 
another power,”353 making difference the prime engine of becoming. On the 
other hand, we recall that the will to power operates through assimilation, and 
thus is ultimately directed to overall unity (this is the cosmological paradox of 
the will to power outlined above). This is all evidence that Nietzsche thinks 
throuh becoming within a metaphysics of difference. In my view, it is plausible 
to discern in the discussion of becoming and Being a discussion of Being as 
opposed to metaphysics. This is an unusual claim, given that Nietzsche seems to 
affirm becoming as the only Being, thus apparently granting it an ontological 
status. Yet, it has now been made apparent in such claims that Nietzsche is really 
working his way not towards a description of Being, but rather towards a 
description of what stands between metaphysics and ontology. For Nietzsche, the 
crucial point is that ontology is not an accurate way to look at the world, because 
ontology is concerned with Being and that Being appears to him as an 
unattainable challenge. All we have left is the metaphysical difference in 
becoming.   
                                                 
353 WP, 689 (1888) 
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This has consequences for the the relationship between ontology and 
metaphysics. Here, I shall mean metaphysics as the theories concerned with what 
things are and ontology as concerned with what it is for anything to be. As we 
know, Nietzsche’s chief metaphysical thought is the will to power. It is 
metaphysical because it describes accurately the things, but it is an ontologically 
invalid concept because it is incompatible with self-identical Being. As a 
fundamentally relative concept, the will to power is the warrant of becoming. 
This is a crucial point: for Nietzsche, being is unattainable through becoming and 
becoming is all there is.   
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TRANSITION :  
VICIOUS CIRCLES, VIRTUOUS CIRCLES, AND MEETING 
MERLEAU-PONTY IN THE MIDDLE.  
 
A.  DETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY. 
“‘The earth,' he said, ‘has a skin; and this skin has diseases. One of these 
diseases is called, for example,‘humanity.'” 
Z, II, « On the Great Events. » 
Nietzsche’ goals are all directed towards health and against sickness. In 
this sense, the concept of self-becoming represents the crux of Nietzschean 
ethics. However, Nietzsche’s fundamental monism envisages both the 
individual’s self and the very structure of reality as “fate” and it does not allow 
for any event in the individual to be severed from the overall fate of the world 
itself. As a result, self-becoming attains a cosmological status: by becoming 
healthy again, man makes the world healthy again. The human is the locus of 
self-differentiation qua sickness in the world. The existence of the human is thus 
fundamental to the fate of the world, and mankind’s mission is to achieve the 
self-becoming of the world by overcoming its own sickness. For Nietzsche, this 
overcoming has everything to do with truth: the very reason that humanity is “the 
hidden spring in the ‘great clock of being’”354 is the promise of a new 
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relationship with the world for the human individual, a relationship based on the 
consubstantiality of man and the world, of the subject and the object, and taking 
the form of a truth beyond intentionality, an ontological truth. This means that 
human health is not by necessity the ultimate Nietzschean value; rather, it is seen 
as a mere means towards the health of the world, which Nietzsche calls “Being.” 
This Being assumes the role of the ultimate value for Nietzsche.  
This value still must be re-considered in light of the discovery of the 
impossibility for becoming to ever lead into Being. This impossibility, which at 
the individual level is the impossibility for the ontological truth to be fully 
attained, is secured by the necessary existence of sickness in the form of 
consciousness. What Nietzsche refuses to explain in his original accounts of 
consciousness (chapter I) becomes what makes him unable to fully account for a 
final state: strictly speaking, sickness was never born, but was always already 
here, and consequently, it will never totally be overcome. This leads Nietzsche to 
reject any teleological cosmology because the world is not aiming towards any 
endpoint. However, health remains the criterion of value, because it may be 
gradual. Although absolute health is impossible, it remains possible for one to be 
more or less healthy. The challenge thus becomes to obtain the most health for 
the world, moving from the formerly envisaged jump into the fully self-identical 
Being to a question of “how much,” a question of degree echoing the question 
posed at the end of chapters I and II. 
The resulting worldview is torn between Being and becoming, the latter 
standing for the only reality there actually is, and the former for its unattainable 
horizon. Nietzsche’s formula for this is “eternal recurrence.” This involves a 
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characterisation of becoming as metaphysics: becoming is determined by the 
existence of opposition. Here lies Nietzsche’s final vision of the relationship 
between becoming and Being, and further the relationship between metaphysics 
and ontology: in the same way as subject and object are abstractions drawn from 
the tangential structure of intentionality, Being is represented through becoming, 
but it is not thereby affirmed. The human therefore holds in her hands more than 
the fate of Being (its movement towards self-identity), she holds its essence as 
self-differentiation.  
What I called above ‘ontological truth’ must in the final analysis be 
reformulated: for Nietzsche, self-becoming does not offer us Being as an object 
of knowledge, but instead, it offers us ontological truth in flesh and blood, that is, 
in our existence. We can now clarify in what sense existence becomes a means 
of knowledge. We know from chapter II that self-becoming makes one fully 
healthy (Nietzsche calls this the “great health”355). We also know from chapter 
III that self-becoming involves that we « become one with Being." On the other 
hand, we know from II that health means power and power is always actually 
discharged. The discharge of power is incorporation. In short, being at one with 
being means incorporating and nothing else. As a consequence, it becomes clear 
that Nietzsche envisages Being as none other than incorporation: Being is in fact 
the process of incorporation, a process which Chapter I has revealed is foremost 
a process of falsification. 
In his Holzwege as well as in his lecture course on Nietzsche, Martin 
Heidegger exposes the view that Nietzsche represents the end of metaphysics as 
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its culmination. This grants Nietzsche a privileged position within metaphysics, 
but it also entails that his philosophy must be overcome alongside metaphysics. 
Both Nietzsche and Heidegger conceive of metaphysics as a ‘two-world’ theory, 
or a worldview directed by the opposition of subject and object.356 Heidegger’s 
claim relies heavily on the consistent affirmation by Nietzsche that Being is will 
to power. In fact, I have myself construed the will to power as a principle that 
does not permit us to go through and beyond metaphysics; it is, in my view too, 
‘only’ a metaphysical concept. For Heidegger, however, the will to power is 
Nietzsche’s only attempt at ontology, one that remains within metaphysics to the 
point that Heidegger assumes that Nietzsche knows how to say “Being” only in 
the metaphysical sense: “‘Being’” for Nietzsche “thinks being as a whole [das 
Seiende im Ganzen]. We call such a thought ‘metaphysical’.”357 From this 
understanding of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, Heidegger goes on to 
deny that Nietzsche had any awareness of the “question of Being.” It is not the 
place here to engage in depth Heidegger’s position; however, what has been said 
hitherto can help examine a few of his postulates.  
The first remark we must make is that Heidegger paradoxically seems to 
be overlooking the role of the question of time in Nietzsche’s philosophy. I have 
argued  above that Nietzsche’s reflections on time led to a profound re-
evaluation of the relationships between Being and becoming. More importantly, I 
have claimed that the question of Being and becoming led Nietzsche to the 
question of Being: precisely because Nietzsche understands becoming as will to 
                                                 
356 See Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, op. Cit. 122/130/218. 
357 Martin Heidegger, op. Cit. Vol. II, 184. 
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power and will to power as metaphysics, he is led to offer an account of the non-
metaphysical. Because the will to power is unable to account for its own ultimate 
achievement (a totally unified and healthy world) Nietzsche becomes acquainted 
with the idea that Being is the background against which all events (as beings) 
unfold. This co-existence in Nietzsche’s thought of ontology and metaphysics 
bears the name “eternal recurrence.” Yet Nietzsche’s originality surfaces and 
shows him to have arguably gone one step further than Heidegger believes: for 
Nietzsche, Being and becoming merge into eternal recurrence only as an 
approximation.358  
Let us pause here. Heidegger reads in Nietzsche’s thought of Amor Fati a 
genuine ontological questioning359 but, he complains, Nietzsche’s philosophy 
does not live up to this thought. Heidegger interprets Amor Fati—rightly I 
think—as the effective identification of self and Being. In terms of my 
discussion above, this amounts to the attainment of ontological truth through 
self-becoming. Heidegger thinks that one must locate the culmination of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy in this thought. However, he regrets that Nietzsche 
passes this thought by in his later texts and returns to an imperfect view of our 
relations with Being. As I have argued, eternal recurrence is the name of this 
failed relationship. Nietzsche understands that Being cannot be envisaged from 
the world of becoming. Still, the world of becoming is the world all subjects are 
actually embedded in. For Nietzsche, unlike Heidegger; Being is a challenge, it 
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is not always already here. Our response to Heidegger hence takes an unusual 
form: yes, Nietzsche refuses to do “ontology” in the Heideggerian sense; no, it is 
not because he overlooks the question of Being but because he considers this 
question to be irrelevant as long as Being is not achieved: it is inauthentic to 
view inauthenticity from an authentic point of view. It is not Nietzsche’s thought 
that locks us up into metaphysics as a way of thinking, but rather the world as 
metaphysics itself.360 For Heidegger, Nietzsche represents the moment where 
“the essential possibilities of metaphysics are axhausted.”361 Nietzsche would 
read this as the end of chaos, an idealisation indeed.  
In fact, for Nietzsche neither metaphysics nor ontology is of great 
importance, only mundane reality (or in Heidegger’s language “being as a 
whole”) is. The question has to be re-formulated: which of metaphysics and 
ontology is most able to account for reality? It is obvious that reality strives 
towards being, but it also fails, locking itself up into metaphysics. In a sense 
then, metaphysics is the only true way of looking at the world, because the world 
is itself metaphysical, structured by the subject-object distinction. Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s position is strikingly radical insofar as it shows the structure of the 
world to be affected by how the human views it.362 If the human sees things in a 
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metaphysical way, it is because she is sick, and because the human is sick, the 
world itself is sick, split between subject and object, metaphysical, and the 
human is proven right to see the world metaphysically.363   
On the other hand, one must admit that this metaphysics itself is 
structured around a horizon constituted by Being. This puts Nietzsche in 
opposition to both traditional metaphysics (that sees being as a fixed thing or 
collection of things) and modern ontology (which considers being as the 
background against which everything that is is, and not as a challenge). If 
Nietzsche refuses to do ontology, it is not because he was unable to come out of 
metaphysics, but rather because he was able to come out of both metaphysics 
and ontology, and consider reality as being defined by the irrelevance of both.  
The vantage point from which this view is formulated constitutes a new 
philosophical ground. Modern ontology, in Heidegger’s sense, has overcome the 
dualities which constituted the foundation of traditional metaphysics. In so 
doing, it has established the duality of metaphysics and ontology. Nietzsche’s 
task, as I have attempted to present it here, seeks to overcome this new duality 
itself. The impossibility of Being qua self-identical Being is constituted by the 
irreducible self-differentiation at the heart of human existence, what we may call 
a ‘quantum of sickness.’ This quantum of sickness is presented as the 
reversibility of the subject-object relations which I have described in chapter I. 
For Nietzsche, this reversibility is the essence of reality. Heidegger, however, 
thinks that “we must grasp Nietzsche’s philosophy as the metaphysics of 
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absolute subjectivity.” I think that this is the crucial mistake in Heidegger’s 
account: for Nietzsche, it is not the subject but intentionality which is first. In my 
discussion of the “idealist readings” of Nietzsche in chapter I, I insisted that 
Nietzsche conceives of the subject as secondary. Univocity and self-identity arise 
as fictions from this unstable ground. Yet, this very ‘arising,’ which I called self-
falsification, is the essence of this reversibility. This places the human ‘subject’ 
in a crucial position within reality insofar as she is what this falsification is for. 
Being falsifies itself in the eyes of the human subjects. This poses what Merleau-
Ponty calls the problem of a “genuine ‘in-itself’ for us.” Because reality is 
intentional, it is ‘for us’ but because it is anterior to us (which it constitutes), it is 
‘in-itself.'  
In chapter III, I have sought to draw the cosmological consequences of 
this point from chapter I. The essence of the will to power lies in opposition, and 
in this sense, self-identity is unattainable. Self-identity is impossible insofar as 
all reality is will to power and the essence of the will to power is differentiation 
through opposition. Nietzsche implicitly places an opposition here, or (in the 
terms used in chapter I) he places a resistance as the grounding principle behind 
the will to power. There is no will to power without resistance. Resistance is not 
a consequence of the will to power but its essence.364 
This leads us to Heidegger’s other complaint. For him, Nietzsche’s 
metaphysical outlook commits him to providing “ways of being” in place of 
“Being.” What was said hitherto should address this claim: ways to be is all there 
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is. Nietzsche’s ontology takes stock of the impossibility of complete self-
becoming or of becoming to ‘flow into Being.’ These two impossibilities are 
really one and the same, since we now know that anthropological and ontological 
self-identity are coincidental. The integration of the fact of this impossibility 
within Nietzsche’s ontology transforms the way we must conceive of Being: 
Being can no longer be thought of as an object of knowledge, or even of 
experience. It is no longer what we must rejoin, it is the rejoining itself. 
Nietzsche’s account avoids this duality between Being and ways of being. It does 
so not—as Heidegger believes—by proposing the beingness of beings (while 
forgetting about Being), but by proposing Being as way to be. This, is repeatedly 
asserted after 1886 and the enigmatic preface of GS: “we no longer believe that 
truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn.” Here, and elsewhere, 
Nietzsche means that Being must be represented as represented, because 
representation is both its Being and its way to be.  
Here, the problem of truth gains prominence. In Nietzsche’s view, the 
phenomenon of truth exemplifies these two aspects of reality by representing it 
as unrepresented. It does so inaccurately, however. Because truth presents itself 
as compelling, Nietzsche understands that it denotes an authentic experience, but 
because it transforms indeterminate experience into determinate objects, it is 
inacurrate. Yet this inacurracy is uncovered by truth itself, which reflects upon 
itself in a self-undercutting movement. This entails a certain doubling out of the 
very doubling out of self-differentiation: reality is self-differentiation (first 
doubling out) which presents itself as different from itself, (i.e. as self-identical) 
in truth-discourses (second doubling out). Truth, in turn, presents itself again as 
 179 
self-differentiation (falsification of the perceptual faith) when it undercuts itself 
(separating itself from this falsification). Is this analogical structure of truth and 
reality a mere coincidence? Hardly; in fact, it is apparent that the self-
differentiated structure of human existence and the self-differentiated structure of 
the reality which constituted it are coincidental. This is valid at the level of the 
constitution of the self (chapter I) as well as the cosmological level (chapter III). 
All this gives an ontological value to truth. Truth represents the essence of reality 
as self-falsification: reality falsifies itself through truth, and self-falsification is 
all there is. For Nietzsche, once again, Being is the movement of truth as 
falsification. 
 
B. THE AMBIGUITIES OF ONTOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY: Nietzsche 
and Merleau-Ponty. 
 
From the point of view of Heidegger's ontology therefore, Nietzsche’s 
position is ambiguous. This ambiguity itself is ambiguous, because it is both 
'good' and 'bad' ambiguity. The ‘bad’ ambiguity is, I think, best illustrated by the 
circularity of Nietzsche’s argument for self-differentiation. It is now apparent 
that the self-differentiation we found at the heart of the self in Chapter I 
coincides with the self-differentiation we encounter in Chapter III at the 
cosmological, and even (in the sense defined above) ontological levels. Yet 
‘coincidence’ is too vague a word. It seems to cover two possible senses. Firstly, 
this coincidence may denote the central role of the self for the structure of 
Being : Being is self-differenciated because the self is self-differenciated, and 
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consequently, Being is constituted by the self. This is suported by Nietzsche's 
unification of perception and aperception and of consciousness and self-
consciousness. Secondly, and conversely, it may signify that Being (as will to 
power) determines the structure of the self as self-differentiation. In the first 
case, the thought of the will to power would be posterior to the definition of the 
self as self-differentiation. In this case, one finds the will to power as an 
explanation of the self-opposition within selves and the opposition between 
organisms (and therefore, of self-consciousness and consciousness). In the 
second case, the will to power is posited first, and the self-opposition of the self 
becomes formulated in accordance to it. The vagueness of the term ‘coincidence’ 
to describe the relation between the structure of the self and the structure of 
Being requires clarifications in terms of anteriority : which of the two determines 
the other. The consequences are bound to be significant : if we grant priority to 
the structure of the self, we will take the path of a phenomenological ontology. 
This is because in this case, Being shall be structured by the nature of the self, 
and of its relations with other beings. In the other case, we will be dragged back 
into a metaphysics of the will to power of the kind Heidegger suspected. As 
Lawlor writes : “in Heidegger’s eyes, beings still determine Nietzsche’s 
fundamental metaphysical position ; the most basic principle of Nietzsche’s 
thinking –the will to power- still revolves around the being. Such a beginning in 
the Being implies that his thinking remains firmly entrenched in Platonism.”365 
Nietzsche, to my knowledge, does not provide any explicit answer to the 
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question of which of beings (selves and perceptual objects) or Being precedes the 
other. On the contrary, one can find in his writings hints that lead in either 
direction. As I mentioned earlier, the will to power is first presented by 
Zarathustra as a literally meta-physical discovery, it qualifies everything that has 
“life”. No problematisation of the subject who makes such a discovery can be 
found here. On the other hand, it is clear that the critique of the subject, which I 
have discussed in I, B, 1, b, i) makes the will to power anterior to the subject 
itself, as the only necessary candidate for Being.  
This ambiguity may be conceived as 'good' ambiguity if we take it to be 
an acknowledgment of the interdependence between beings and Being. In this 
view, which has directed my reading of Nietzsche, this ambiguity reveals the 
need for us to unify phenomenology and ontology. Let me clarify this. On the 
one hand, Nietzsche overcomes metaphysics in a way more radical than 
Heidegger seems to have considered because it overcomes the dialectic of 
representation and the structure of objectivity. On the other hand, however, it 
refuses to provide any account of Being outside of experience, that is to say, 
outside the beings. This ambiguity questions Being and ontology in a single 
gesture. For Nietzsche, the question of Being involves the question of the 
relationship of the beings (and in particular the sentient beings) to Being. This 
relationship of course, being instantiated in all perceptual and intentional acts, is 
the object of phenomenology. It is however, also instantiated in ontology, since 
ontology is one of the ways we relate to Being. This means that if it is to truly be 
an ontology, ontology must include a phenomenology of ontology, and I think 
this opens the space for an original philosophy.  
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These are the two ambiguities that Nietzsche leaves us pondering. If 
Nietzsche is to remain a driving force for philosophy, we must find a way to 
make the 'good' ambiguity triumph. In order to do so, we must ask two 
questions : a) what are the relations between the beings and Being ? Can one, 
like Zarathustra, discover the essence of Being by observing the beings ? and if 
so, what does it imply for the primacy of Being ?  b) As I said earlier, it must ask 
whether it is possible to do a phenomenology which would at the same time be 
an ontology. Of course, it is only by finding a way of answering these two 
questions by the affirmative, that Nietzsche’s philosophy can justify the interest 
that modernity has reserved for it. In the other case, Nietzsche is merely the end 
of an obsolete metaphysics.  
The project of answering these two questions affirmatively defines the 
scope of Merleau-Ponty’s investigation. In a writing he describes as his 
“Merleau-Ponty book," Leonard Lawlor remarks that “Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontologization of phenomenology” was made “following Heidegger’s 
ontologization of phenomenology.”366 The reason why Merleau-Ponty’s 
“ontologization of phenomenology” is not a mere repetition of Heidegger’s is his 
disagreement with Heidegger on the question of the primacy of Being over the 
beings. For Merleau-Ponty, it is possible, in a sense, to place the beings before 
Being. This disagreement pertains to the point of conflict between Heidegger and 
Nietzsche : for Heidegger, Nietzsche places being before the Beings, and 
therefore, misses the chance to provide an authentic ontology. This, we can now 
see, follows only if the ‘bad’ ambiguity of Nietzsche’s account reveals itself 
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inreadicable. In my reading, Merleau-Ponty’s project allows us to conceive of a 
philosophy where this ambiguity becomes clarified. Merleau-Ponty famously 
encounters Nietzsche’s “circulus vitiosus Deus” in his own philosophy.367 As I 
shall argue in a moment, Merleau-Ponty saw this circle as representing the 
crossing of the logical and ontological orders which his ‘intra-ontology’ commits 
him to. Contrary to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty accepts the anteriority of the 
beings over Being, in a sense only. In his intra-ontology which seeks “Being in 
the beings”, Being is granted ontological priority, as the essence of the beings, 
but it is, logically speaking, accessible only through the beings, and therefore, it 
is in this sense, posterior to them. This distinction between the two orders, the 
logical and the ontological, as is apparent from my discussion so far, is absent in 
Nietzsche. Secondly, as I mentioned in chapter I, Merleau-Ponty’s guiding 
question is the enigma of “an in-itself for us”. This question, in short, 
summarises what Lawlor calls Merleau-Ponty's “ontologization of 
phenomenology.” There is some hope, therefore, that Merleau-Ponty might 
provide us with some clarifications of the question posed by Nietzsche’s 
ambiguous relationship with ontology.  
In fact, the two questions are correlative: Merleau-Ponty's clarification of 
the circle we found in Nietzsche as the opposition of the logical and the 
ontological orders does not release the tension between metaphysics (which 
considers beings) and ontology (which considers Being) because it affirms the 
interdependence between beings and Being. Merleau-Ponty's solution, as we 
know, is to establish a ground which stands, as he writes, “half-way” between a 
                                                 
367 VI, 179/231. 
 184 
thing and an idea, which he calls an “element.” This element, which he describes 
as “flesh” is the object of Merleau-Ponty's ontology. This half-thing stands in the 
middle between the ontic and the ontological, and therefore, it offers new insight 
into the ambiguity which constitutes the heart of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty's 
concerns. Indeed, this middle between Being and the beings is the point of 
encounter between the two thinkers. 
Nietzsche's ambiguous relationship to ontology, which goes beyond the 
ontic but falls short of affirming Being as the object of its investigations is 
echoed by Merleau-Ponty's “intra-ontology," which places its object in-between 
metaphysics and ontology. Here, we find, in the difference between Merleau-
Ponty and Heidegger's “ontologizations of phenomenology,” a difference which 
echoes the difference I have discussed between Nietzsche and Heidegger, and 
clarifies the kinship between Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche: it is in the double 
movement which takes the thinking subject from the beings to Being and which 
makes beings arise from Being that Merleau-Ponty stands, alongside 
Nietzsche368. It is this position of Merleau-Ponty's that I shall seek to examine in 
order to dissipate Nietzsche's bad ambiguity while bringing to light his good 
ambiguity: it is no longer confusion on Nietzsche's part to affirm the essence of 
the will to power as structuring the self or vice-versa. Thanks to Merleau-Ponty, 
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I think, it will become apparent that this ambiguity reflects the necessary 
conjunction of Being and phenomena (or the beings) within a truly 
phenomenological ontology. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
THE ORIGIN OF TRUTH. 
 
 
“What is it in us that really wants the ‘truth’? It is true that we paused 
for a long time to question the origin of this will.” 
Nietzsche, BGE, 1. 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s masterwork the Visible and the Invisible was originally 
to be titled ‘the origin of truth’369 or ‘genealogy of truth.' For Merleau-Ponty, the 
question of the origin of truth synthesised both the critical and the positive 
aspects of his project. Finding the origin of truth meant finding what the truth 
criticised by phenomenology was a falsification of. It also meant finding what 
object we now must posit for our philosophical endeavours; it was finding the 
authentic truth expressed (wrongly) by the objective truth of traditional 
philosophy. As I argued in chapter II, Nietzsche too reads the phenomenon of 
truth as the sign of an authentic experience. It is no longer enough to reject truth 
for its errors, since the very belief in truth points to an experience of reality that 
we must retrieve. For Merleau-Ponty as well, critique cannot define itself as 
rejection:  
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"If reflection is to justify itself as reflection, that is to say, as progress towards the truth, 
it must not merely put one view of the world in place of another, it must show us how the naive 
view of the world is included in and transcended by the sophisticated one. Reflection must 
elucidate the unreflective view which it supersedes, and show the possibility of this latter, in 
order to comprehend itself as a beginning."370 
Like Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty encounters this as a genealogical 
challenge;371 and further like Nietzsche, who contends that the origin of truth 
determines the range of possible events (I, B, b, i) Merleau-Ponty writes: 
"Genesis properly understood must exhibit a relation to the whole."372 
Even if the full-scale project of an inquiry into the origin of truth comes 
to the fore in the preparatory work to VI, it is by no means the first occurrence of 
such reflexions. In 1947’s "The Metaphysical in Man," which was written 
immediately after the publication of PP, Merleau-Ponty announces in a footnote 
that an important task shall be for him to  
"give a precise description of the passage of perceptual faith into explicit truth as we 
encounter it at the level of language, concept, and the cultural world. We intend to do so in a 
work entitled ‘the Origin of Truth.’"373  
In VI, Merleau-Ponty will locate the origin of truth in what he calls 
"perceptual faith." The experience of perceptual faith is the forgotten object of 
any authentic search for truth; it is the originary reality. Let me stress that 
nothing, even objective reality, is anterior to perceptual faith. Thus even our 
most primary encounter with the world involves distance, a certain aboutness 
                                                 
370 PP, 213/247 
371 HATH, 1; BGE, 2. 
372 N, 292-293. 
373 SNS, 94/115. 
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which roots the pre-predicative dimension of our experience: perceiving X is 
always also affirming X to be true. Before calling it "perceptual faith" in VI, 
Merleau-Ponty defines this pre-predicative  dimension as an originary form of 
certainty:  
“certainty is, [...] a prerequisit for analyses and perception: it is certainty that makes 
them possible. This experience of truth must be there first. If I call it into question, my search for 
truth loses all meaning. »374 
 Let me insist on this expression: certainty is the "experience of truth." By 
tying truth to an experience, Merleau-Ponty establishes that one can make a 
phenomenology even of truth.375 This will be his ambition in VI.   
 This ‘faith’ or ‘certainty’ is necessarily contained in all perceptions 
because perceptions present their objects as external to us, as being at a distance 
from us: « the distinction between appearance and reality immediately 
[d’emblée] has its place in the perceptual 'synthesis.'»376 This distance is 
described by Merleau-Ponty as a certain ‘zone of subjectivity’ which stands 
between the subject and the object of perception, and thereby, maintains the link 
between the two. Even though this will be thematised more rigourously in VI and 
will be analysed in Chapter VI, it is clear as early as PP that this ‘zone of 
subjectivity’ is reversible: it is alternately located between self and world (in 
                                                 
374 IS, 74/66. 
375 One may say this amounts to a phenomenological ontology. On Merleau-Ponty’s efforts to 
provide a philosophy of sensory experience and not just a phenomenological description, see 
Renaud Barbaras, le Tournant de l’Expérience, Vrin, Paris, 1998. 14 f. 
376 PP, 432/376 t.a.   
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perception), or within the self (in aperception). This ‘zone,' which is as primary 
as perception (it is its condition), places differentiation at the heart of being. 
In this chapter, I wish to present some preparatory—and relatively 
uncontroversial— remarks on Merleau-Ponty’s account of the ‘Origin of Truth’ 
in his works from the forties. Although most of the ideas from these works will 
be re-elaborated upon later I think it signals the structural importance of these 
claims that they appear prominently in the earlier works too. My aim is to clarify 
the structural role played by the ‘zone of subjectivity’ for the constitution of 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. Firstly, I shall give an account of the structural role 
played by the ‘zone of subjectivity’ in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of perception. I 
shall insist on the fact that it construes perception as what Merleau-Ponty calls 
the "open infinity of the perceptive process."377 that is to say, a temporal process 
of infinite determination. Secondly, in the same way as I have emphasised the 
role of the originary ‘inner world’ Nietzsche sees stretching ‘as between  two 
layers of skin’ in GM, II, 16, I will focus on the way the ‘zone of subjectivity’ 
secures the impossibility of an end of history and how it structures it tangentially 
by precluding the attainment of self-identity in Being. Like Nietzsche, Merleau-
Ponty believes that the distance represented by the zone of subjectivity has 
ontological importance. It is eternal and informs all possibilities, as he writes: 
"there is a transtemporality which is not idealistic, it is that of the deepest, 
incurable wound."378  
                                                 
377 NL, 330. 
378 PW, 45 ft./63 ft. t.a . Fabrice Colonna has forcefully established the influence of Charles 
Peguy’s posthumous text on history, Clio, as Merleau-Ponty’s source for this expression. In 
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A. THE ZONE OF SUBJECTIVITY.  
 
If perceptual faith is the origin of truth, this places the zone of 
subjectivity at the centre of our question. As I have discussed, it informs the 
structure of perception as including perceptual faith. For Merleau-Ponty,  
“When I do concentrate my eyes on [a visual object], I become anchored in it, but this 
coming to rest of the gaze is merely a modality of its movement: I continue inside one object the 
                                                 
Peguy’s text, the similarity with Nietzsche’s view is, if possible, even more striking. See Fabrice 
Colonna, « l’Eternité Selon Merleau-Ponty » in Alter, Issue 16, 2008 148-149. In a very inspiring 
article entitled “l’Institution Spatio-Temporelle du Corps chez Merleau-Ponty," Koji Hirose takes 
the same note as his departure point and goes on to describe this fracture as determining both our 
bodily existence (and thereby the coincidence of bodily consciousness and self-consciousness) 
and the nature of permanent becoming. He writes: “coincidentally to the indefinite doubling out 
of the event, a deep crack appears within bodily existence [corporéité], by which the outside 
introduces itself. This is why bodily existence [la corporéité] is defined as ‘two-faced or two-
‘sided’ being’ (RC, 177). Koji Hirose, “l’Institution Spatio-Temporelle du Corps chez Merleau-
Ponty," Alter, Issue 16, 2008, 182. The similarity between this account and my analysis of 
Nietzsche’s “two layers of skin” is striking insofar as it finds this inner separation to be a 
determinating feature of the openness of becoming through the external character of perception, 
and gives it an ontological dimension, placing self-differentiation in the ontological realm. See 
also Merleau-Ponty’s remark: “This is time: sedimentation and fracture [déchirure]-
sedimentation means that the new situation erases everything, that being is always complete-and 
yet, we very well know that there has been something else [...]. There is something else: the 
present torn apart by sensation” (RC, 208, quoted by Hirose, 181) 
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exploration which earlier hovered over them all, and in one movement I close up the landscape 
and open the object. The two operations do not coincide fortuitously.”379 
 Here, Merleau-Ponty presents the structure of perception under two key 
aspects that are correlated intrinsically: distance and dynamics. When the 
distance seems abolished (in the anchorage of my glance into the object), the 
glance is not stopped. Instead, it continues internally the movement it was 
performing externally. Or so it seems; if Merleau-Ponty maintains the language 
of movement for the new form of inquiry taking place here, we should not be 
mistaken: the spatial movement that transcended distance has now become a 
temporal gesture. Perception is shown in the play of mutual sollicitation of the 
object and the subject, a dialogue that involves intentionality, and therefore a 
certain distance. This distance precludes transparency between the subject and 
the object of perception, and this non-transparency translates into indeterminacy 
of perception. The very structure of perception is non-completeness, and this 
elemental indeterminacy provides the milieu of a quest for greater determinacy. 
This quest is grounded in the structure of perception itself, and it cannot abolish 
the distance which makes itself possible. As a consequence we must understand 
this distance to ensure that the act of perception will never come to a stop. It is 
these two features of perception, its indeterminacy and its temporality, that I 
shall examine. 
 
 
                                                 
379 PP, 67/81-2 t.a. 
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i. The Teleology of Determinacy and The ‘Prospective Activity’ of 
Perception.380 
 
Perception has a paradoxical structure. As a relation, it dwells in distance 
but aims at union; or as Françoise Dastur says, “the distance that separates us 
from Being is also what attaches us to it.”381 “But,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “such 
indeed is our initial situation: we feel ourselves to be the indispensable 
correlative of a being which nevertheless resides in itself. Such is the 
contradiction which links us to the object.”382 There can be perception only if the 
perceiver and the perceived are external to each other: presence and absence are 
conditions of each other; they find stability and determinacy in no middle term. 
Merleau-Ponty’s insight is precisely to interpret this “contradiction” as a 
relation.383 This move opens up the possibility of what Merleau-Ponty calls a 
                                                 
380 P2, 38. 
381 Françoise Dastur, “Thinking from Within”, in Patrick Burke and Jan Van Der Veken (Eds.) 
Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993, 32. 
382 SNS, “the battle over Existentialism”, 73/91 emphasis added. See also S, 157/255 « mediation 
is only the resolute recognition of a paradox that intuition, willy-nilly, suffers: to possess 
ourselves we must begn by abandoning ourselves; to see the world itself, we must first withdraw 
from it » and in VI: « this distance is not the contrary of this proximity, it is deeply consonant 
with it, it is syonymous with it » VI, 135/176 
383 This distinctive move is at the root of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the Sartre of Being and 
Nothingness, in 1947, he writes: « in my opinion, the book [Being and Nothingness] remains too 
exclusively antithetical: the antithesis of my view of myself and another’s view of me and the 
antithesis of the for itself and the in itself often seem to be alternative instead of being described 
as the living bond and communication between one term and the other," Ibid, 72/89-90.  
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"zone of subjectivity,"384 that is to say, a distance which is the condition of 
possibility of the relation and the impossibility of identity. Yet the paradox of 
relation remains: distance is maintained as a function of the closeness within the 
structure of perception and also as an obstacle to absolute presence, a presence 
that Merleau-Ponty describes as pure determination. This absence of absolute 
determination implies that we only ever interact with degrees of reality, but 
never with a pure, wholesome reality: “there are degrees of reality within us as 
there are, outside of us, 'reflections,' 'phantoms' and 'things.'"385 If perception is 
indeed transcendance, that is if we do not reduce perception to either aperception 
or a purely mechanical reflex, then it becomes clear how the perceived thing 
must remain distant from me while still being accessible. This is why Merleau-
Ponty writes “the absolute positing of a single object is the death of 
consciousness.”386 
                                                 
384 PP, 212/246; « If seeing or hearing involved extricating oneself from the impression in order 
to lay siege to it in thought, ceasing, that is, to be in order to know, then it would be ridiculous to 
say that I see with my eyes or hear with my ears, for my eyes and ears are themselves entities in 
the world and as such are quite incapable of maintaining on the hither side of it that zone of 
subjectivity from which it is seen or heard.» t.a. 
385 PP, 378/433 see also PP, 377/432, where Merleau-Ponty defines ‘things’ as only ever 
pertially apprehended: « It is absolutely necessarily the case that the thing, if it is to be a thing, 
should have sides of itself hidden from me, which is why the distinction between appearance and 
reality straightaway has its place in the perceptual 'synthesis' » 
386 PP, 71/86. Rudolph Bernet understands this claim as affirming the impossibility of 
individuation: « a thing can only be perceived through and according to the things that surround 
it." In doing so, Bernet rightly emphasises that Merleau-Ponty sees objects as impossible to 
abstract from their context, however, a look at the textual context shows that Merleau-Ponty’s 
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Consciousness, that is to say perception, feeds on indeterminacy; yet, and 
this is crucial, this very indeterminacy maintains consciousness alive only insofar 
as it is the milieu of its movement towards determinacy. In a famous passage, 
Merleau-Ponty describes the experience of the state of indeterminacy:  
“If I walk along a shore towards a ship which has run aground, and the funnel or mast 
merges into the forest bordering on the sand dune, there will be a moment when these details 
suddenly become part of the ship, and indissolubly fuse with it. As I approached, I did not 
perceive resemblances or proximities which finally came together to form a continuous picture of 
the upper part of the ship. I merely felt that the look of the object was on the point of altering, 
that something was imminent in this tension, as a storm is imminent in storm clouds. Suddenly 
the sight before me was recast in a manner satisfying to my vague expectation.”387  
The movement towards determinacy feels itself incomplete, which results 
in a “tension” that can only be overcome in the “satisfaction” of final 
determinacy. This helps characterise further the “zone of subjectivity”: because it 
is an ambiguous milieu, this very zone aims beyond itself and cannot stay at rest. 
The essential unachievement of perception due to this zone expresses itself in a 
quest: the desire for determinacy is not superadded to perception, it is its nature. 
This teleological structure also includes the dimension of temporality. 
Our perception, being always local, operates through “perspectives," that is to 
                                                 
point has farther reaching consequences. Merleau-Ponty writes: « the absolute positing of a 
single object is the death of consciousness, since it congeals the whole of existence, as a crystal 
placed in a solution suddenly crystallizes it." For Merleau-Ponty, as the metaphor of the crystal 
shows, the necessary indeterminacy of intentional objects establishes becoming: consciousness is 
a dynamic process. Rudolph Bernet, « the Subject in Nature," in Patrick Burke and Jan Van Der 
Veken (Eds.) Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993, 64. 
387 PP, 20/24 
 195 
say, structures which give us a restricted access to the object.388 This 
indeterminacy can only be solved by gathering a larger number of different 
perspectives of the same object, or as Merleau-Ponty says, by turning around 
it.389 Here, the quest for determinacy clearly involves temporality because it 
involves movement.390 The original paradox of perception finds yet another 
expression in the paradox of a necessarily indeterminate perception seeking full 
determinacy. This paradox is again solved by transferring the tension that 
opposes teleology and its impossibility into teleology itself, by appealing to the 
synthetising notion famously borrowed from Husserl of a “horizon.”391 A 
“horizon” is the name of an unattainable object of quest, which accounts for both 
                                                 
388 “The object-horizon structure, that is to say the perspective, is no obstacle to me when I want 
to see the object: for just as it is the means whereby objects are distinguished from each other, it 
is also the means whereby they are disclosed.” PP, 68/82 t.a. 
389 See the enlightening comments on this question by Etienne Bimbenet, “Un Motif 
d’Etonnement Majeur: le Perspectivisme”, Alter, Issue 16, 2008, 99 f. 
390 PP, 83-4. Here then, we must re-interpret what Merleau-Ponty called the “satisfaction” of 
determination since it is obvious that this determination will never be reached. It seems such a 
satisfaction does not express a reaching absolute determination, but merely a satisfactory state of 
determination. Yet, if satisfaction can occur “suddenly” within a continuum of indeterminacies, it 
is clear that the feeling of satisfaction is extrinsically given: this satisfaction arouses through its 
reference to a purpose: the determinacy is satisfactory because it is “good enough” for what we 
need it for. Even though Merleau-Ponty does not investigate this extrinsic incursion of personal 
projects or interests within perception in this form, preferring to attach it to his theory of sense, it 
is obvious that the contingency of the satisfaction provided by determination is a key link 
between Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche’s theories of consciousness as presented in GS 354. 
391 I will discuss Merleau-Ponty’s use of the concept of horizon in VI, B, a, i). For now, see for 
example, Mauro Carbone, the Thinking of the Sensible, 39 ff.  
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its unattainability and the directionality it provides as representing a “goal." As 
such, it provides structure to a dynamic without having to be proven real or 
attainable392 and introduces a new intentionality which does not establish its 
object, but only its own directionality towards it. In the case of perception, the 
concept of horizon opposes the objectivity of scientific inquiry whose project is 
not structured by positing a horizon but by positing a fully determinate object 
understood as attainable. For Merleau-Ponty, the horizon is understood as a 
horizonal synthesis of horizons:  
“Thus the positing of one single object, in the full sense, demands the compositive 
bringing into being of all these experiences in one act of manifold creation. Therein it exceeds 
perceptual experience and the synthesis of horizons—as the notion of a universe, that is to say, a 
completed and explicit totality, in which the relationships are those of reciprocal determination, 
exceeds that of a world, or an open and indefinite multiplicity of relationships.”393 
We are now in a better position to understand the status of “perceptual 
faith” and its relations with the “zone of subjectivity." In fact, “perceptual faith” 
may just as well be read as “faithful perception” since we now know how the 
very structure of perception is the structure of faith and vice-versa. Indeed, we 
have seen how perception involves both the affirmation of distance and of 
proximity, the maintaining of the subject/object distinction and its 
problematisation, and the very structure of certainty and confusion (as 
satisfaction and indeterminacy).  
 
                                                 
392 This of course can only emphasise the Kantian inspiration that underlies this concept. 
393 PP, 71/85 This of course will be a defining factor of Merleau-Ponty’s forecoming ontology of 
openness.  
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ii. The Pre-Objective. 
There is a nuance in the word “faith” [la foi] however, which 
involves a distinction from “knowledge,” or even “certainty." Faith is the germ 
of knowledge, like the subject-object distinction is the germ of the subject-object 
divide. Faith is the experience of truth and thereby it is the origin of the search, 
belief, and concept of knowledge. Merleau-Ponty somewhat problematically 
expresses this relation on the mode of the “pre-”: faith is a pre-knowledge like 
perception is “pre-objective”394; “pre-scientific,”395 “pre-personal,”396 or “pre-
conscious.”397 The use of the prefix “pre-” implies a transitional concept. To take 
up an analogy made by Merleau-Ponty himself, in the same fashion as Freud’s 
topic of personality places the unconscious between the “organism” and 
“ourselves as a chain of deliberate acts” as its ground, Merleau-Ponty places the 
pre-objective as a ground and a justification for the objective398. Indeed, the pre-
                                                 
394 “It is this pre-objective realm that we have to explore in ourselves if we wish to understand 
sense-experience” PP 12/14; “the reflex, in so far as it opens itself to the meaning of a situation 
and perception; in so far as it does not first of all posit an object of knowledge and is an intention 
of our whole being are modalities of a pre-objective view that we call being-in-the-world.” PP, 
79/92. 
395 PP, 178/207. 
396 PP, 208/241. 
397 PP, 242/279. 
398 S, 229/374. Yet, contrary to Freud whom he criticises precisely on this point, Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledges that an experience that is not experienced is nothing to us, and rejects the non-
objective like he rejects the unconscious to find the ground in the pre-objective. In fact, there is 
no absolutely objective ground whose expression into a subjective level needs to transit through 
the pre-objective, rather, the pre-objective is the very ground itself. It remains true however that 
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objective is a transitional concept insofar as it is wholly directed towards its own 
extasis into the objective as horizon:  
“there is an opinion which is [...] both the oldest or most rudimentary, and the most 
conscious or mature form of knowledge—an opinion which is primary in the double sense of 
'originary' and 'fundamental.' This is what calls up before us something in general, to which 
positing thought [la pensée thétique]—doubt or demonstration—can subsequently relate in 
affirmation or denial"399.  
The pre-objective is that whose destiny is the objective, and it progresses 
towards the objective through the dynamics of determination I have described 
above. Therefore, one may place the origin of truth in the realm of the pre-
objective: it is an instance of pre-objective knowledge which necessarily 
becomes objective knowledge. 
The problem of the origin of truth then becomes understanding the 
process by which the “pre-objective” has been turned into the objective. In a 
certain way, it is obvious that there is a dimension of fallacy in the positing of a 
transitional realm. Merleau-Ponty himself opposes the Zeno-like attitude which 
                                                 
even though the ideas leading to this conclusion are well under way at the time of PP, Merleau-
Ponty lacks any formal thematisation of it until the Lectures on Passivity and Institution of 1954-
55, the consequences of which we will soon turn to. 
399 PP, 396-7/454 t.a. I have omitted Merleau-Ponty’s statement that this form of knowledge is 
not “destined to be replaced by absolute knowledge” for reasons of clarity. This statement seems 
to contradict my claim that the pre-objective is towards the objective. However, the context 
shows clearly that Merleau-Ponty simply means that the pre-objective does ot lead into absolute 
knowledge, not that it doesn’t lead into the objective outlook (this interpretation would obviously 
contradict the second part of the quotation). The same point is stated even more explicitly in S, 
“the Philospher and his Shadow” and I shall discuss it in chapter V.   
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multiplies the discrete points to explain a transition that can only be expressed 
outside of the discrete. In PP, he writes: ‘if we want to take the phenomenon of 
movement seriously, we shall need to conceive a world which is not made up 
only of things, but which has in it also pure transitions.”400 This suggests that we 
should read the concept of the pre-objective not as referring to a new 
intermediary instance but to a “pure transition." Yet it is clear that the concept of 
the pre-objective can only deliver solutions if it is taken as a solidified and 
discrete element. Otherwise, it will remain the name of a problem rather than a 
solution. We are thus entitled to worry as to whether the transition between the 
pre-objective and the objective is any easier that the transition between the 
objective world and the subjective one stipulated by both naturalism and 
intellectualism. Merleau-Ponty postulates this very problem in his endeavour to 
place the ambiguity of perception at the core of a new philosophy, forcing one to 
choose between unconceivable concepts (“pure transition”) or irrealisable 
concepts (discrete entities). Yet, unlike the other ambiguous concept examined 
above, the concept of the pre-objective is not a synthetic concept that unifies the 
opposites within itself; in fact, it seems to be an analytic one that breaks the 
relation between perception and objective thought away from them by the very 
act of naming it.401  
                                                 
400 PP, 275/318 See also for example PP, 276/320: ‘if we want to take the phenomenon of 
movement seriously, we shall need to conceive a world which is not made up only of things, but 
which has in it also pure transitions”  
401 We shall see that this distinction is the battleground of Merleau-Ponty’s evolution towards 
ontology. 
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The reason for this move on Merleau-Ponty’s part is open to 
interpretation. Renaud Barbaras makes the strong case that Merleau-Ponty 
remains trapped in the conceptual framework of the very intellectualism he seeks 
to oppose and Barbaras locates the core of this problem in Merleau-Ponty’s use 
of the ‘phenomenological cogito’402 in PP. Indeed the answer to the question of 
whether the pre-objective can be understood as “pure transition” or as a discrete 
entity must pass through an examination of the role of the Cogito. This is 
because, if Barbaras is right, the ‘phenomenological cogito,' by giving priority to 
the subject’s body, commits Merleau-Ponty to an account of intentionality in 
traditional terms. That is to say, in terms of intellect and matter.  
It is clear from the working notes of VI that Merleau-Ponty relinquishes 
his phenomenological cogito (I will return to this), and it is just as clear that 
Barbaras is right to see the affirmation of the cogito (albeit arguably re-worked 
to the point of inconsequentiality) as revealing some “awkwardness”403 on 
Merleau-Ponty’s part in PP. Furthermore, Barbaras is right to point out that the 
cogito highlights a tension that is constitutive of the whole of PP. According to 
him, this tension stems from the inadequacy of Merleau-Ponty’s concepts to the 
consequences of his thoughts.404 These consequences, Barbaras thinks, remain 
                                                 
402 Le tournant de l’expérience, ch. VII. See in particular: p 160: “His goal would then be to 
grasp in light of this originally Certesian concept, some results that in fact, represent a radical 
questioning of Cartesianism." 
403 Barbaras, cf. infra, 180 
404 “This move is but the expression of a more general inconsistency which indicates the 
unbridgeable gap between the perceptual world revealed by Merleau-Ponty and the conceptuality 
thanks to which he approaches it”. Ibid.   
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'unthought' by Merleau-Ponty due to his obsolete conceptual framework. 
Barbaras’ view is that Merleau-Ponty uses the conceptual field that he seeks to 
oppose because he is still a victim of a constraining philosophical tradition from 
which he borrows his concepts for want of better ones, and gets trapped into 
them.  
By 1947' "The Metaphysical in Man," Merleau-Ponty proposes to correct 
it by seeking a ground beyond this divide, and he finds this ground in 
transcendence.405 Indeed both intellectualism and naturalism are grounded in the 
impossibility of transcendance, and this is the proper locus to aim at when 
attacking objective thinking. My contention is that Merleau-Ponty maintains the 
structure of the cogito in order to be led beyond it. He maintains subject and 
object as absolute and incommensurable poles in order to interrogate their origin, 
an origin he finds not in their opposition but in their union. He finds this union in 
the ‘prereflexive cogito’ (as pre-aperception) or ‘perceptual faith’ (as pre-
perception). This is, I think, why Merleau-Ponty defines the prereflexive cogito 
in the following way:  
                                                 
405 See also, Ted Toadvine, « Singing the World in a new Key, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology of 
Sense," Janus Head, 2004, 7(2), 273-283. Toadvine describes the break in Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought as a move away from the phenomenological Cogito to the primacy of Nature as sense. As 
will soon become clear, I fully agree with Toadvine that this is the key to Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology. In my opinion, it is however possible to construe this claim as resulting not from a 
break, but from a natural evolution in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. It is, believe, not obvious that the 
phenomenological Cogito does anything more than actually positing already this primacy of 
sense over the subject, albeit, admittedly, in a less than explicit way.  
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“Once reflection had occurred, once the ‘I think’ had been pronounced, the thought of 
being became so much part of our being that if we try to express what preceded it all our effort is 
only directed at proposing a prereflexive cogito.”406 
This helps us further unravel Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the pre-
objective. In PP, Merleau-Ponty introduces pre-objectivity as a middle term 
between sensation and objective thinking. It is obvious that the aim to bridge this 
gap is valid, as will be proven by VI. However, by introducing this new concept 
within a framework that it indeed threatens, Merleau-Ponty adds a non-
philosophical ambiguity to his very philosophical ones: the pre-objective is 
described with reference to the object and the subject and thereby affirms them 
as such. Yet, for a subject to be fully a subject and for an object to be fully an 
object excludes any transcendance because we remain in a framework of discrete 
entities and differences seen as leaps.407  
In fact, by retaining the basic structure of objectivity whilst adding to it a 
dimension which unifies them, Merleau-Ponty opens two alternating problematic 
zones. He writes: 
 “Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we 
would not be looking for it, and intellectualism fails to see that we need to be ignorant of what 
we are looking for, or equally again we would not be searching it.»408  
                                                 
406 S, 152/246 t.a. 
407 At the time of writing VI, Merleau-Ponty accuses those he calls the “humanists” of falling into 
the trap of explaining a continuum in term of discrete entities: « they presupposed a second man 
behind the retinal image who had other eyes, another retinal image in charge of seeing the first. 
But with this man within man, the problem remains untouched.” S, 240/392 t.a. 
408 PP, 37/36 t.a. 
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This alternative is a distinctive feature of existential philosophies since 
Pascal’s “Mystery of Jesus-Christ,”409 and traditionnally leads to a discussion of 
alienation: if I ignore what I know, it is because there is a divide inside me and 
the acquisition of knowledge becomes understood as a movement of knowledge 
from the side of the self that possesses it to the side that ignores it.410 It is clear 
that this is the sort of problem Merleau-Ponty has in mind when discussing 
aperception in his chapter on the cogito. We can see how the project of 
addressing empiricism and intellectualism in one single gesture involves proving 
empiricism wrong; this project refutes the gap that empiricism draws between 
subject and object and it simultaneously proves intellectualism wrong for 
establishing a fully self-transparent subject.411 As a consequence, Merleau-Ponty 
actually doubles his task because he now confronts two divides: the “zone of 
subjectivity from which [the world] shall be seen or heard »412 which represents 
the divide posited by intellectualism, and its counterpart (representing the divide 
posited by empiricism) which he calls a “primal acquisition”:  
                                                 
409 See Blaise Pascal, Pensées, (trans. Roger Ariew) Hackett, Indianapolis, 2005, Fragment 209 
§2 (S749/L919) « the Mystery of Jesus-Christ » 274. See also SNS, 92/115: « a truth which, as 
Pascal said, we can neither reject nor completely accept."  
410 In his Foreword to PP, Merleau-Ponty defines the task of philosophy as this making manifest. 
PP, xv. 
411 This is the line of argument that Emmanuel Alloa brings out most prominently in La 
Resistance du Sensible, Kimé, Paris, 2008. 
412 PP, 212/248 t.a. 
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“Between my sensation and myself there stands always the thickness of some primal 
acquisition which prevents my experience from being clear for itself.”413  
This means that we are now confronting a divide separating objectivity 
from the pre-objective and another separating the pre-objective from the 
world.414 The unity of empiricism and intellectualism under the heading of 
‘objective thought’ as well as the two separations involved are rejected in 
Merleau-Ponty’s defence of the life-world:  
“[when] I cease to adhere to my own gaze, and when, instead of living the vision, I 
question myself about it, I want to try out my possibilities, I break the link between my vision and 
the world, between myself and my vision, in order to catch and describe it. When I have taken up 
this attitude, at the same time as the world is atomized into sensible qualities, the natural unity of 
the perceiving subject is broken up."415 
This explains the alternating theme in PP of placing perception here 
between the bodily self and the world and there between the worldly body and 
the subject. Consider these three utterances from PP:  
“Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not my own being, the one for 
which I am responsible and for which I make decisions, but another self which has already sided 
with the world, which is already open to certain of its aspects and synchronized with them.”416 
                                                 
413 PP, 216/250 t.a. Even though this “primal acquisition” is here presented as the separation 
more than the link between me and myself, it is clear that this only reflects the ambivalence of 
the “zone of subjectivity” in external perception.   
414 I find a similar idea in Ted Toadvine, « le Passage du Temps Naturel » (Trans. R. A. 
Fonkoué), in Alter, Issue 16, 2008, 161. 
415 PP, 227/262 my emphasis. 
416 PP, 250/216. 
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« thus we are not perpetually in possession of ourselves in our whole reality, and we are 
justified in speaking of an inner perception, of an inward sense, an 'analyser' working from us to 
ourselves”417,  
 “What has been said of external perception can equally be said of the internal one: that 
it involves infinity, that it is a never-ending synthesis.”418  
Here, Merleau-Ponty seems to be hesitating between attributing primacy 
to the objective or the subjective pole in much the same way as Nietzsche does in 
his notebooks of Spring-Fall 1887 (cf. chapter I). This ambivalence translates 
into a lack of clarity as to the status and place of the pre-objective (and 
consequently, of the cogito), and signals a tension in Merleau-Ponty’s thought 
which he will relieve S and VI by turning the subjective and the objective into 
horizons.419 In any case, Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation of perception as a pre-
objective instance allows him to escape the traditional model of physical 
sensation and intellectual synthesis and to replace it with ‘perceptual faith.' This 
‘faith’ involves the recognition of the perceived object as both external and 
accessible. Thereby, it softens the alternative of externality and accessibility by 
                                                 
417 PP, 435/380. 
418 PP, 439/383. 
419 This hesitation can only be expressed as some inconclusive to-and-fro as long as one remains 
on the level of its terms. One can discenr here how this problem led to Merleau-Ponty’s passage 
to the ontological level in VI. There, as I shall discuss in VI A, a, i), Merleau-Ponty is no longer 
schackled in the three terms (self, being-in-the-world and in-itself) and their two possible 
combinations (self and being in the world vs in-itself- the intellectalist solution; and self vs 
being-in-the-world and in-itself –the realist solution). In VI, it is the middle term itself which 
attains to the status of Being and grows to include the other two terms as its horizons. This will 
be developped in VI. 
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making the object always indeterminate; the externality is not radical enough to 
stop this constant movement towards determination. In fact, as we have seen, this 
movement itself takes place inside the translucid “zone of subjectivity,” which 
acts altogether as a conducible and as a resistance to pure coincidence of the 
subject and the object.420 
The translucidity of the ‘zone of subjectivity’ is crucial for understanding 
the birth of the idea of truth. Translucidity means a combination of transparency 
and opacity. The quotient of transparency is responsible for the experience of 
truth that we always try to recuperate. The quotient of opacity accounts for the 
impossibility of reaching such truth and leaves us with perhaps the most striking 
feature of the notion of truth: it is desired by us, but forever distant. This desire 
(for what Merleau-Ponty calls “satisfaction”) and this distance together ensure 
the dynamism of the movement towards determinacy.  
We now understand how the structure of perception pre-figures that of 
predicative knowledge. Yet this is only the first step in explaining the movement 
that goes from perception to "truth" as we now it. Of course, Merleau-Ponty 
maintains a distinction between perception and knowledge: the former gives 
"presences" and the later gives "truths". As he writes, "this formula: ‘It is true,' 
does not correspond to what is given me in perception. Perception does not give 
me truths like geometry but presences."421 The next step in Merleau-Ponty’s 
archeology of truth is thus to account for the move from "presence" to "truth." Or 
                                                 
420 On the question of the difference between transparency and translucidity, see Emmanuel 
Alloa, La Resistance du Sensible, op. Cit.  esp. 17 ff.  
421 PriP, 45/14. 
 207 
as he puts the question elsewhere: “what could be the relation between this tacit 
symbolism, or undividedness, and the artificial or conventional symbolism, 
which seems to be privileged, to open us towards ideal being and to truth?”422 
The problem is defining of philosophy itself: how do we move from “mute 
experience” to predicative truth? Marc Richir insists that this question was left 
unresolved by Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death. This is made plausible by the late 
date of the quote cited above and has the advantage, for Richir, of maintaining 
the possibility that if he had lived to answer this question, Merleau-Ponty would 
have done so along Richir’s own lines (lines that run the risk the obliteration of 
the level of “brute being” itself).423 In fact, there are clear indications that 
Merleau-Ponty did investigate this question in PP and that he sought to do so in 
ways almost contrary to Richir’s: instead of positing, as Richir does, 
incommensurability between the pre-objective and the objective,424 Merleau-
Ponty seeks to maintain the contrast within the continuity of the two realms. 
Consequently, he regards the movement that goes from the pre-objective (or as 
he says later, “the logos of the sensible world”425) to the objective (or “the 
explicit logos”426) as a translation, not a leap. This translation Merleau-Ponty 
                                                 
422 TL, 180/131. 
423 Marc Richir, “Communauté, Société, et Histoire”, in Marc Richir and Etienne Tassin (Eds.) 
Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie et Expériences, 2008, Jerôme Millon, Grenoble, 23. 
424 ibid. 24. Richir sees the broken link between the pre-objective and the objective in terms of an 
impossible passage from the “tacit symbolism” to the “conventional symbolism” because he fails 
to see that the objective  is the destiny of the pre-objective.  
425 PW, 69/97. 
426 Praise, 199. 
 208 
calls ‘sedimentation’ and the device in charge of this translation is the experience 
of error: perception "cannot present me with a 'reality' otherwise than by running 
the risk of error"427 and consequently, the truth of objectivity finds its grounding 
in the experience of error. In Merleau-Ponty's words, "critério-logical philosophy 
[is] based on the experience of error" contrary to a "philosophy [true 
phenomenology] supported by the experience of truth”428. Merleau-Ponty 
continues:  
« the express recognition of a truth [...] presupposes questioning, doubt, a break with the 
immediate, and is the correction of any possible error»429.  
In other words, truth arises from the experience of verification.  
 
iii. Dialectics. 
The distance from presence to truth is thus travelled thanks to the 
mechanics of dialectic. Let’s take the following example: I am walking in the 
woods and come across a puddle of water that I need to jump over. My 
perception pre-linguistically includes: “I can jump over this puddle” (all 
perception, says Merleau-Ponty, is performed on the mode of the ‘I can’430). 
When I jump, however, I realise that a reflection on the puddle made it look 
smaller than it really was, and I land in a splash. My pre-objective “I can” proves 
erroneous and leaves me with an experience of unfullfilled expectation. It is the 
                                                 
427 PP, 377/432. 
428 IS, 74/66 Emphasis added. 
429 PP, 295/341 see also: TL 120/167: « the true cannot be defined outside of the possibility of the 
false." 
430 PP, 137/160: “Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can.' » 
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experience of this disappointment—and nothing before it—that highlights the 
expectation that lined the fabric of perception into the consciousness of an “I 
thought I could,” triggering the project of verification. It is clear here that the 
experience of the anti thesis (the error: the puddle was larger than I perceived it 
to be) serves as a bridge towards explicitation in a typical dialectical 
movement.431  
Now, if we consider the aformentioned retention of a past perception into 
a present one (which includes me as a past perceiver and then a present one), we 
obtain again a dialectical structure: this past perspective remains inside me as 
“sense”432 which will couple with the new one (‘I was wrong’) to create a 
determinate synthesis, a concept. This synthesis is only possible as a synthesis of 
perspectives; the ability to synthesise perspectives involves an extraction of the 
perception from its temporal context to create an object seen from many 
perspectives, but one from which the time factor is absent. This ability to unify 
perspectives coming from different viewpoints bears our ability to abstract our 
perception from the spatio-temporal context that we are; that is to say, to 
understand perspectives in a non-personal way. This transcendance has important 
                                                 
431 It is remarkable that Nietzsche proposes the same account of the becoming conscious of the 
object of our perception: “Our knowledge of what is was only the outcome of our asking: ‘How? 
Is it possible? Why precisely like that?’ Our wonder at the discrepancy between our wishes and 
the course of the world has led to our becoming acquainted to the course of the world." In both 
cases, of course, what must be retained is the continuity of the movement that leads from the pre-
objective to the objective. VII [15] (Late 1886-Spring 1887). 
432 On this specific question, Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl’s theory of temporal retention in the 
lessons on the intimate consciousness of time. 
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consequences for Merleau-Ponty: we can include someone else’s perspective 
into our synthesis, given that we can acknowledge the other as another viewpoint 
on the same object,433 i.e. as another perceiver.434 The means for the inclusion of 
the other’s perspective is, of course, language.  
Through the notion of perspective, then, Merleau-Ponty deepens the 
structure of dynamic determination into the structure of alterity and yet again 
into the structure of language. We now understand how with recourse to no 
structure other than perception, one goes from presence to “truth.” This 
mechanism is crucial for Merleau-Ponty’s project to go beyond the mere 
description of perception into a philosophy thereof, because it shows how 
perception can give rise to its other, the abstract (in this case, objective 
synthesis) and hence, how it qualifies as an explicative principle.  
 
B.  SEDIMENTATION. 
 
I have just been describing a gradual strengthening of the thesis of the 
primacy of perception. This movement has great metaphysical consequences: it 
establishes the link between the natural and the human, between the “mute 
experience” and the instituted world and it defines the world of objective truth as 
derived from the world of perception. It is not my concern here to investigate the 
                                                 
433 VI , 11/27: « And it is this unjustifiable certitude of a sensible world common to us that is the 
seat of truth within us." 
434 PriP 17/52: « The thing imposes itself not as true for every intellect, but as real for every 
subject who is standing where I am." Empathy is described in VI, 10-11/26-7 as the specific “I 
can” that accompanies the perception of the other (“autrui”). 
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relationship of truth to culture or society, but we have to note readily that the 
inclusion of a linguistic element within truth entails that truth belongs to the 
cultural world. In Merleau-Ponty’s earlier texts, the process by which the 
development of the world of perception gives rise to the cultural world goes 
under the heading of “sedimentation,” before being partially replaced by the 
concept of “institution." For the inquiry into the origin of truth to be conclusive, 
we need to account for the final stage of truth, the sedimentation of the 
predicative into the “in-itself."  
In PP’s chapter “the body as object and mechanistic physiology," 
Merleau-Ponty examines in great detail the case of the “phantom limb," a mental 
condition whereby an amputee behaves as if she was still in possession of the 
severed limb. This phenomenon was used by Descartes in his 6th meditation to 
prove that the locus of sensation was not the body but the soul. Merleau-Ponty 
takes the same example to diametrically opposed conclusions:  
“The phantom limb is not the mere outcome of objective causality; no more is it a 
cogitatio. It could be a mixture of the two only if we could find a means of linking the 'psychic' 
and the 'physiological,' the 'for-itself and the 'in-itself, to each other to form an articulate whole, 
and to contrive some meeting point for them."435  
For Merleau-Ponty, the solution lies in understanding the subject as 
existence, that is, as being-in-the-world [être-au-monde]. He describes ‘l’être-au-
monde’ as the middle term between the first person (of the ‘for-itself’) and the 
third (of the ‘in–itself’) because its structure is preobjective like that of 
                                                 
435 PP, 77/92 and 322/372 
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perception.436 In the case of the phantom limb, there is a discrepancy between the 
being-in-the-world of the subject and his or her objective body,437 the first one 
has an arm, while the second one does not. This case allows Merleau-Ponty to 
place transcendence at the heart of the pre-personal constitution of the subject. 
There is a “for-itself” and an “in-itself” of the subject herself. I have examined in 
the previous section how this question leads to difficulties for Merleau-Ponty;438 
however, it is clear here that this distinction between in-itself and for-itself is 
given through the experience of their communication. I take my “for-itself” to be 
an “in-itself” when I set out to walk although my left leg is missing: my for-itself 
is by nature about my in-itself.  
                                                 
436 “It is because it is a preobjective view that being-in-the-world can be distinguished from every 
third person process, from every modality of the res extensa, as from every cogitatio, from every 
first person form of knowledge—and that it can effect the union of the 'psychic' and the 
'physiological.’» PP 80/95 
437 Which Merleau-Ponty calls respectively, the “habitual” and the “actual” bodies: “our body 
comprises as it were two distinct layers, that of the habit-body and that of the body at this 
moment. In the first appear manipulatory movements which have disappeared from the second, 
and the problem how I can have the sensation of still possessing a limb which I no longer have 
amounts to finding out how the habitual body can act as guarantee for the body at this moment 
[se porter garant pour le corps actuel] » PP, 82/ 98. 
438 In fact, Merleau-Ponty includes an argument of the sort described earlier in his present 
account: in the same way as seeking is paradoxical because one has to both ignore and know 
what they seek, si is denial as described by psychoanalysis: “The patient therefore realizes his 
disability precisely in so far as he is ignorant of it, and is ignorant of it precisely to the extent that 
he knows of it. This is the paradox of being in the world” PP 82/97. 
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The key move in Merleau-Ponty’s account comes out of this very point 
and essentially amounts to a dramatisation of the use of error described above:  
“It is precisely when my customary world arouses in me habitual intentions that I can no 
longer, if I have lost a limb, be effectively drawn into it, and the utilizable objects, precisely 
insofar as they present themselves as utilizable, interrogate a hand which I no longer have."439  
This « interrogation » is the key to one’s thematisation of the implicit in-
itself towards which her habitual self was always directed. Because I experience 
this inability to grab the doorknob (as earlier my effective inability to jump over 
the pool), I am thrown into an interrogation which highlights the objective 
directionality of my subjectivity. As a result, I become able to understand an 
object as “to be grabbed” outside of my personal relationship to it: I become able 
to think on a third person mode, to see what was the “for-itself” of my habitual 
self as an “in-itself” of the object, to transfer the ability to grab that my habitual 
self reserved for itself into a ‘grabability’ of the object.440 
                                                 
439 ibid. t.a. 
440 “The manipulatable must have ceased to be what I am now manipulating, and become what 
one can manipulate; it must have ceased to be a thing manipulatable for me and become a thing 
manipulatable in itself.» PP, 82/98 It is crucial to point out that most of the work is performed by 
the notion of habitude, that is, of a survivance of the past experience into the present. This will be 
one of the avenues Merleau-Ponty will explore later on in his accounts of sedimentation. Here 
already the minimal memory involved in the process of determination becomes sedimented as 
habitude: as we mentioned earlier, the process of determination relies on the possibility to remain 
the same through time in front of an intemporal object. In a significant note, Merleau-Ponty 
writes: “Bergson saw that the body and the mind communicate with each other through the 
medium of time, that to be a mind is to stand above time's flow and that to have a body is to have 
a present.” PP, 78, ft, 2/93, ft, 2. The present case offers a sedimentation of the persistence of the 
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This first sketch of sedimentation already contains the seeds of its further 
developements. These cover an impresssive range and their common essence as 
sedimented beings is the key to the systematic dimension in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work. In fact, sedimentation is Merleau-Ponty’s name for the unfolding of time, 
so that his account of it holds for all things temporal, that is all things human, for 
"[m]an is a historian because he belongs to history, and history is only the 
amplification of practice."441   
 
i. From Being-in-the World to Being-in-the-Word. 
 
There remains for us to establish how the concept of truth, which we have 
seen described as derived from experience, became understood as truth beyond 
experience. It is clear for Merleau-Ponty that the descent of truth is not only the 
archetype for all sedimentative processes, but it is also the starting point of any 
institution. In a certain way, we have already addressed this question by locating 
the birth of the explicit realm out of the experience of error, and further tracing it 
back to the primordial source of dynamism which is none other than the quest for 
determination at work within perception. Thanks to the descent of truth described 
above, we now understand how the history of truth amounts to the truth of 
history: defining truth (the history of truth) requires a clear concept of how truth 
was lost (the truth of history).   
                                                 
self through time into a habitual self and a sedimentation of the object into an essence whose 
qualities become essential (from “I can grab it” to “it is to be grabbed”). 
441 TL, 33/50. 
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If we are now to address the problem of the self-forgetting of truth that 
we see at play within the traditional concept of truth as beyond perception, we 
need to turn to another aspect of sedimentation. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
sedimentation of an “I can” into a “there is”442 is correlative to that of a 
phenomenon into a thing-in-itself; that is, it involves the disjunction of 
‘perception’ from ‘faith.' Although Merleau-Pony is indeed borrowing the 
concepts of Stiftung and Urstiftung from Husserl, his preference for the French 
equivalent is meaningful: beyond a simple building up suggested by the German 
terms, the French word sédimentation contains mineral connotations, and 
Merleau-Ponty’s sedimentation indeed appears often as a figure of 
crystallisation. Through sedimentation, he writes, “that which is true [le vrai], 
constructed though it may be [...] becomes as solid as a fact.”443 This 
crystallisation into a “fact” understood as the sedimented version of a presence 
(“le vrai”), shows the history of sedimentation to be equivalent to the history of 
objectivism.444 Sedimentation is therefore the process by which the chiaroscuro 
of the “zone of subjectivity” becomes solidified into full opacity (intellectualism) 
or full transparency (realism), and further, into a divide445. To be sure, the 
concept of sedimentation itself makes this disjunction impossible since it 
                                                 
442 PP, 137/160. 
443 S, 154/250. 
444 TL, 115/161, t.a.: « Ideality et historicity have a common source. In order to discover it, one 
has only to locate between the flow of events and the intemporal meaning, a third dimension, that 
of history of depths [l’histoire en profondeur] or of ideality in genesis [l’idéalité en genèse]," that 
is, as we have seen, the intentional structure of perception. 
445 S, 174/284. 
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proceeds through a dialectic that warrants the continuity of all events. Yet 
according to Merleau-Ponty, truth is mistaken about itself, insofar as it takes 
itself to be independent from experience, that is, insofar as it is unaware of being 
the result of a sedimentation. This error made by objective thought becomes a 
problem for Merleau-Ponty. If he wishes to maintain sedimentation as the unique 
mechanism of history, and thus make it an explicative principle—as part of the 
overall project to create a philosophy of perception—Merleau-Ponty needs to 
account for the possibility of this very error in terms of sedimentation.   
 
ii. Sense. 
 
First of all, there is no question that the solution will have to do with the 
notion of “sense” developed in the second half of Merleau-Ponty’s career. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty uses this concept in order to account for the birth of 
language, and it is obvious that the story he has to tell on this side is analogous—
if not included in—446 the one told above about the movement from the pre-
objective to the objective. ‘Sense’ is the pre-word, like “I can” is the pre-“there 
is” and presence is “pre-truth." To put it in trivial, yet not incorrect, terms, the 
‘sense’ of a word is what I have when I have the word on the tip of my tongue. In 
                                                 
446 Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on language has led many of his readers to see him as a 
philosopher of language. However, he himself always insisted that he interrogated language to 
clarify Being. In 1960, he declares: “I someteimes feel an unease when I see the category of 
language take all the space," and in the report to his lecture on “Language and the subconscious," 
he is said to have insisted that “in his view, the openness to Being is not linguistic: it is in 
perception that he locates the birthplace of speech.” P2, 273-274. 
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the upwards movement from the pre-objective to the objective, sense plays a 
transitional role that allows the dialectic to operate: it is the common element in 
the word and the experience. Therefore, it is the warrant that a word has a 
relatum in the world of experience. Hence, in the opposite movement which is 
that of Merleau-Ponty’s archaeological inquiry,447 the sense of ‘truth’ must be 
able to open up to the perception which gave rise to it. Let me pause here to refer 
to Nietzsche’s views on the very same question as I have examined it in I, A, b, 
i). For Nietzsche, a concept is the contingent and falsified expression of an 
authentic manifold of experiences. The value of the concept (that is to say, its 
ability to present itself as representing reality, as true) is warranted by this 
concept’s sharing with all experiences a ‘tiny  amount of emotion.' Recall 
Nietzsche:  
"[T]he collecting together of many images in something nonvisible but audible (word). 
The tiny amount of emotion to which the "word" gives rise, as we contemplate similar images for 
which one word exists—this weak emotion is the common element, the basis of the concept. That 
weak sensations are regarded as alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact. Thus 
confusion of two sensations that are close neighbors, as we take note of these sensations; but who 
is taking note? Believing is the primal beginning even in every sense impression: a kind of 
affirmation the first intellectual activity! A "holding-true" in the beginning! Therefore it is to be 
explained: how "holding-true" arose! What sensation lies behind ‘true’?"448  
This leaves us with an elemental theory of error: a wrong concept is a 
concept that is not attached to any experience, a concept with no sense. This 
would seem to provide a simple criterion for the validity of the concept of truth. 
However, it will not help Merleau-Ponty to prove that “absolute truth” is an 
                                                 
447 S, 267. 
448 WP, 506 [1884].  
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absurd concept because it would throw us back into the question of the fact of its 
existence (as concept or as belief), or as it were, its birth ex nihilo. It is to 
account for this fact that the entire theory of sedimentation is designed to account 
for. Recall that the same realisation caused Nietzsche to abandon his pure 
rejection of truth and his preference for  life-affirming artistic delusions (II, A, 
a). Merleau-Ponty, like Nietzsche, adopts a middle way: yes, “absolute truth” is a 
concept drawn from experience, but it is a concept that is mistaken about this 
experience. This is what the concept of “negintuition” in VI449 allows for: we 
have an intuition of absolute being, but, it is a negative intuition, the intuition of 
an absence.450 In other words, there is no absolute sedimentation into solid facts 
and the absence of a pure object entails the absence of any in-itself, saying 
                                                 
449 Merleau-Ponty’s use of ‘negintuition’ is complex. First, he presents it through Sartre’s thesis 
of the negintuition of nothingness and rejects it (VI, 53/77). Yet, it is clear that what is rejected 
there is not the intuition of an absence, but the idea of this intuition applying to nothingness in 
the radical sense developed by Sartre. In a note from June 1959 (VI, 196/247), when Merleau-
Ponty was working on his critique of Sartre as exposed in the chapter entitled “Interrogation and 
Dialectic," he writes: “the negintuition of nothingness is to be rejected because nothingness also 
is always elsewhere” (this idea of absence as presence elsewhere will udergo great reworking 
later, in May 1960, VI, 251/300). Indeed, Merleau-Ponty uses negintuition against Sartre himself 
when he shows that one must choose between negintuition and absolute nothingness. There, he 
chooses negintuition: “if on the contrary [to Sartre], we follow out the consequences of the 
negintuition all the way, we understand how our transcendental being and our empirical being are 
the obverse and the reverse of one another” VI, 61/87. I shall discuss Merleau-Ponty’s own 
concept of “imperception”, which is the perception of the presence of the absent in chapter III.  
450 In his superb article entitled “le corps, la chair," Claude Lefort makes the profound point that 
“Au nombre des sens, il en compte un désormais qui les modifie tous, le sens du manque” 15. 
See also, Martin Dillon, “Love” in Dorothea Olkowski, (Ed.) Rereading Merleau-Ponty, 335. 
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otherwise would lead to negating precisely the “zone of subjectivity” which is 
the original step towards sedimentation.451 We know from PP that “negintuition” 
finds its primary example in the tangential movement of determination which is 
regulated by a horizon in which we seek “satisfaction." The problem with the 
negintuition of the in-itself is that it turns its meaning around and is reinterpreted 
as presence. Here, it becomes possible to put Merleau-Ponty’s critique of truth in 
a nutshell: “absolute truth” excludes the écart (“zone of subjectivity”), but the 
écart makes the sense.452 Absolute truth has no sense, instead, the sense wrongly 
attributed to it is the sense of its absence. The absence of absolute truth has 
hitherto been taken for its presence. 
 
iii. The Commensurability of the Sedimented World. 
 
 Now that we have located the place of “sense” in the primary dialectic of 
sedimentation, it is possible to complete our account of the movement from 
perception to culture. The core of the question is concentrated in Merleau-
Ponty’s re-working of Ricoeur’s notion of “advent.”453 For Merleau-Ponty, the 
traditional view of history as a succession of events “leads to scepticism as long 
as it is objective history because it presents each of its moments as a pure event 
                                                 
451 “this separation [écart] which, in first approximation, forms meaning, is not a no I affect 
myself with, a lack which I constitute as a lack by the upsurge of an end which I give myself -it is 
a natural negativity, a first institution, always already there” VI, 216/266. 
452 VI, 273/223. 
453 S, 68/109. 
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and locks itself up into the single moment where it [history] is written.”454 In 
other words, objective history surrenders its historical endeavour to its objective 
method and squeezes the historical out of history: an objective account of history 
alienates its very object (continuous becoming) just like a Zenonian account of 
movement talks of everything but movement. In order to re-establish history in 
its dynamics, Merleau-Ponty needs to build upon Husserl’s idea of a temporal 
retention allowing for an overlap (“empiètement”) between events, or rather, that 
turns “events” [“évènements”] (that break the temporal chain down to discrete 
entities) into “advents” [“avènements”] (that arise from the general movement of 
history). Merlea-Ponty writes:  
“We propose on the contrary to consider the order of culture or meaning as an original 
order of advent, which should not be derived from the order of mere events, if it exists, or treated 
as simply the effect of extraordinary conjunctions. If it is characteristic of the human gesture to 
signify beyond its simple factual existence, to inaugurate a meaning, it follows that every gesture 
is comparable to every other and that they all arise from one single syntax, that each is both a 
beginning and a continuation which, insofar as it is not walled up in its singularity and finished 
[révolu] once and for all like an event, points to a continuation or recommencements. It applies 
beyond [il vaut au-delà] its simple presence, and in this respect it is allied or accompliced in 
advance to all other efforts of expression.”455 
 This claim is particularly radical insofar as it involves considering history 
as an essential link between all events that become “comparable,” that is, 
                                                 
454 PW 31/36, t.a. admittedly, this remark is directed at the history of language; yet, we have seen 
how language, being the prolongation of truth, and truth appearing as the thread that holds all 
institution together, is not only the privileged archetype of all sedimentation, but its most general 
determination.  
455 S. 68/109-10 t.a. 
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commensurable on the basis of a “unique syntax.” Of course, everything we said 
so far shows that this syntax is informed by the structure of perception. It is the 
“zone of subjectivity” with its dynamic potentialities and its primordial temporal 
retention, that provides the space of infinite sedimentation. Because it introduces 
the dynamics of determination into the world, perception triggers the dialectical 
movement of history; but because it introduces the principle of indetermination 
in the world, perception ensures that all events will be contained within the 
homogenous milieu of indeterminacy which is the vital element of consciousness 
and further, of history itself. This amounts to saying that the structure of 
perception as self-differentiation (within the self and of the self with the world) 
imposes its heredity over human history. This is an essential and structural 
similarity between Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche. In very much the same way as 
Nietzsche, who sees the separation at the heart of the human self (which 
coincides with the separation of self and world) imposing its heredity over the 
rest of human history, Merleau-Ponty sees the ‘zone of subjectivity’ as the thread 
that informs all events. For both philosophers, the mark of this initial sef-
differentiation is the same. It is the impossibility of complete determinacy.  
We can now understand how Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of communism 
was soon followed by the rejection of Marxism itself as positing an end to 
history:  
“what then is obsolete is not the dialectic, but the pretension of terminating it in an end 
of history, in a permanent revolution, or in a regime which, being the contestation of itself, would 
no longer need to be contested from the outside and, in fact, would no longer have anything 
outside it.”456 
                                                 
456 AD, 206. 
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 Indeed, the warrant of becoming is the margin of negativity, which 
makes room for movement. An end of history is correctly understood as the 
eradication of such a “zone," but incorrectly, it takes this zone to be contingent 
when sedimentation itself and the dialectic that arises from it establish it as 
necessary. A dialectic with an end is inconceivable.457 
 It becomes clear from his critique of the notion of events that Merleau-
Ponty has ceased to consider history in successive terms altogether. History is 
the milieu of becoming insofar as it is the unfinished unfolding of a certain 
syntax. However, insofar as it is merely the unfolding of a pre-existing syntax, it 
is grounded in Being to the point that Merleau-Ponty can affirm: “perhaps time 
does not flow from the future or the past."458 In other words, there is an 
atemporal structure to time. To be sure, this pre-existing "syntax" is not to be 
understood as implying that the adventures of history will not exist.459 In fact, 
history and sedimentation carry in themselves the atemporal style that informs 
their being and which lays nowhere outside them; it exists only as their principle, 
for « there exists a place [lieu] where everything that is and will be, is preparing 
itself for being said. »460 The ‘saying’ itself shall take place in time. 
                                                 
457 Ibid. 
458 S, 27/48. 
459 S, 68/110, “The difficult and essential point here is to undestand that by positing a field 
distinct from the empirical order of events, we are not positing a Spirit of Painting [...] Cultural 
creation [la création de la culture] is ineffectual if it does not find a vehicle in exernal 
circumstances.” 
460 PW, 6/11. 
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 The unity of this source (which is the unity of perception insofar as it 
informs the consubstantiality of all historical developements) leads Merleau-
Ponty to a vertical view of history in the sense that the present contains the past 
and appears as its summit: sedimentation is an incorporative process which 
maintains the past into the present461. This has two implications: the past is 
always present and history is one single, transtemporal event always being 
completed.462 By placing becoming as the infinite movement taking place 
between the two terms of the « en-soi » and the « pour-soi » and not allowing it 
                                                 
461 This is what underlies the very endeavour of an archaeology of truth: to find the forgotten not 
through a backward glance to the past—time is irreversible—but through an inquiry grounded 
into the present. 
462 Merleau-Ponty talks of the « event of the world » (VI, 199/249) and states: «all the gestures by 
which a culture exists are by principle parttaking in a consubstantiality by which they are but 
moments of one unique task » (PW, 81/113) He understands the diversity of advents only against 
the background of the unity of the general event that is history. PP proposes the striking analogy 
of the water fountain [jet d’eau] as the eternal milieu of becoming: « We say that there is time as 
we say that there is a fountain: the water changes while the fountain remains because its form is 
preserved; the form is preserved because each successive wave takes over the functions of its 
predecessor: from being the thrusting wave in relation to the one in front of it, it becomes, in its 
turn and in relation to another, the wave that is pushed; and this is attributable to the fact that, 
from the source to the fountain jet, the waves are not separate; there is only one thrust, and a 
single air-lock in the flow would be enough to break up the jet. Hence the justification for the 
metaphor of the river, not in so far as the river flows, but in so far as it is one with itself. This 
intuition of time's permanence, however, is jeopardized by the action of common sense, which 
thematizes or objectifies it, which is the surest way of losing sight of it. » PP, 421-422/483. See 
also the comments on this passage by Fabrice Colonna, « l’Eternité Selon Merleau-Ponty » in 
Alter, Issue 16, 2008, 141. 
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to reach either term (what I called the ‘tangentiality’ of perception), Merleau-
Ponty resolutely engaged in a view of history as homogenous:  
"Thus what we understand by the concept of institution are those events in experience 
which endow it with durable dimensions, in relation to which a whole series of other experiences 
will acquire meaning, will form an intelligible series or a history. "463  
 This persistance of the past into the present (that is, sedimentation) raises 
the following question: what makes the past past and the present present if they 
are both here now?464 As always, the answer lies in the careful appeal to 
distinction without divide; there is a difference in modes of being present 
between the past and the present, the past is present as forgotten (that is to say, as 
sedimented).  
« Constitution escapes the alternative of the continuous and the discontinuous. It is 
discontinuous, since each layer is made from forgetting the preceeding one. It is continuous from 
one end to the other because this forgetting is not simply absence (as if the beginning had not 
existed) but a forgetting what the beginning literally was in favour of what it has subsequently 
become—internalization in the Hegelian sense."465 
                                                 
463 TL, 40/61. 
464 On the Husserlian roots of this question in Merleau-Ponty, see David Farrell Krell, 
“Phenomenology of Memory from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research,  Vol. 42, No. 4 (Jun., 1982), 492-505. Krell establishes a contrast 
between Merleau-Ponty’s incorporative model of forgetting and Locke’s. Curiously, I find a 
similar argument which draws an opposition between Locke’s account of memory and forgetting 
and Nietzsche’s own incorporative model in Rosalyn Diprose, the Bodies of Women, op. cit. 84. 
Merleau-Ponty discusses this question most explicitly in the context of his engagment with 
Bergson in VI, and I shall discuss this in chapter VI.  
465 S, 176/286. 
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Hence, sedimentation requires that the past be past. In his analysis of the 
phantom limb, Merleau-Ponty writes: "The phantom arm is, then, like repressed 
experience, a former present which cannot decide to recede into the past [ne se 
décide pas à devenir passé]."466 The discrepancy observed earlier between the 
"habitual body" and the "objective body" informs the temporality of the trauma 
as well: the objective pastness of one’s arm is resisted by the historical self 
whose temporality is at odds with the objective one: the habitual body still lives 
before the amputation, while the objective body is amputated;467 as a result, the 
past and the present are present in different modes. 
In VI, Merleau-Ponty examines the phenomenon of forgetting not as a 
disappearing but, on the contrary, as the ultimate remembering. Forgetting is 
solidification into sedimentation and an incorporation into the self. It appears as 
the healthy counterpart to the trauma described above. For Merleau-Ponty, 
forgetting is the opposite of perception. Perception presents the outside as 
outside, whereas forgetting obliterates the difference:  
"[T]o understand perception as differentiation, forgetting as de-differentiation. The fact 
that one no longer sees the memory=not a destruction of a psychic material which would be the 
sensible, but its desarticulation which makes there be no longer any separation [écart], any 
relief ."468  
                                                 
466 PP, 85/101. 
467 This structure which takes place within the space of intentionality and turns one’s objective 
half against her subjective one and creates an internal tension is precisely the structure of 
sickness arising from self-consciousness in Nietzsche, with the result that it creates fantasies that 
maintain both the sickness and the survival by avoiding having to face one’s trauma.  
468 VI, 197/247 t.a. 
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Characterising forgetfulness as "de-differentiation" makes it the process 
by which a « psychic material » becomes part of, assimilated into the self. In the 
case of the trauma however, the trauma continues to behave as an external body 
and to cause tensions within the self. In other words, forgetfulness preserves the 
experience by changing its status and this movement is necessarily attached to 
the movement of "making past."469 
This "making past" in turn needs to be qualified. Merleau-Ponty affirms 
sedimentation through the negative process of forgetfulness. It is a matter of a 
negation seen as a preserving force: "already in Plato, as is shown by the famous 
parricide in the Parmenides, the notion of genesis or historical filiation is 
included among those negations which interiorize and conserve."470 We can see 
more clearly how the movement into the past is a movement into the untimely by 
which the fleeting thought becomes immortalised:  
                                                 
469 Just as the trauma is described in PP as a present that refuses to be past, memory is 
understood in VI as impossible as coincidence: memory cannot be coincidence for this would 
preclude memory to appear as past, in order for a memory to appear as past, there has to be a 
coefficient of non-presence: sedimentation: “there is no real coincidin with the being of the past. 
If the pure memory is the former present preserved, and if, in the act of recalling, I really become 
again wat I was, it becomes impossible to see how it could open to me the dimension of the past 
[...] The truth of the matter is that the experience of a coincidence can be, as Begson often says, , 
only a ‘partial coincidence’”. VI, 122/161 see also PP, 413/472: “But these traces in themselves 
do not refer to the past: they are present; and, in so far as I find in them signs of some 'previous' 
event, it is because I derive my sense of the past from elsewhere, because I carry this particular 
significance [signification] within myself."  
470 TL, 57/81 see also SNS  94/115: « the history of humanity [...] is not empirical, successive 
history but the awareness of the secret bond which causes Plato to be still alive in our midst." 
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"If [the action of thinking] holds out, it does so through and by means of the sliding 
movement which casts it into the inactual. Indeed, there is the inactual of forgetting, but there is 
also the inactual of that which is acquired [l’acquis]."471  
This has one important consequence: the making past that allows for 
sedimentation is, paradoxically, a leap into the untimely. By making the memory 
past (by forgetting it), I assimilate it so that it becomes unaffected by time, and, 
paradoxically again, ever present. In fact, it is present of my own presence, 
because it is now a part of me472. We are now dealing with two possible  modes 
of presence. The first one is on the mode of the "differentiation":  it is the 
presence of the present, which presents itself as external.473 The second one is 
the mode of the "de-differentiation": it is the present of the sedimented past.  
 This connects to Merleau-Ponty’s search for the origin of truth insofar as 
such a project presupposes that the origin of truth is totally forgotten, as 
sedimented. Consequently, any account of descent will be seen not as 
rememoration, but rather as archaeology: archaeology, unlike rememoration, is 
always made on the impersonal mode.474 This is important because it allows for a 
                                                 
471 S, 14/26 
472 The idea of a making past as integration and preservation has not changed since as PriP: “Do 
I not know that there is a life of ideas, as ther eis a meaning of everything I experience, and that 
evryone of my most convincing thoughts will need additions and then will be, not destroyed, but 
at least integrated into a new unity?” PriP, 20/58. 
473 To this mode of presence, we should add the presence of the traumatic past insofar as it has by 
definition not been « made past." 
474 Here we perceive the deep connection between Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche’s genealogies, 
and their common opposition to Foucault’s archaeologies. For Merleau-Ponty, documentation, 
which provides the subjective of then to the subject of now is not truthful. The only possible 
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generalisation of the domain of the origin. Archaeology does not lead into the 
origin of such and such a thing. On the contrary, it seeks  matrix of all things. As 
a consequence Merleau-Ponty discovers the origin of truth everywhere and 
particularly in the individual development and in history. Let me clarify: 
sedimentation is the stuff that the human world is made on and as such, its origin 
is everywhere present, albeit sedimented. In his fine article entitled « Présence 
entre les signes, absence » J-B Pontalis writes:  
«the search for a ‘primal layer’ [couche primordiale] of langage, for a coat of ‘brute 
meaning’ [sens brut] is strictly correlative to the search for ‘wild being.' Neither is to be 
understood as a form of nostalgia for the origins. It is in the present, in the incomplete 
[lacunaire] fabric of the unachieved present that one is to grasp the originary.»475  
Since our access into this immense sedimented mass is not our position as 
a result of it (forgetfulness precludes it) but as part of it, the archaeology that 
seeks to operate the reverse movement can only be achieved at the general level 
of ontology. This means that sedimentation gains an ontological status as not 
only the mechanism of the dynamic of human history, but beyond it, as the 
eternal rule of existence itself. In one of his final notes, Merleau-Ponty writes:  
                                                 
archaeology is ontological: (we cannot uncover facts, but only their structure. Merleau-Ponty will 
develop this idea in his ‘intra-ontology’ which I discuss in VI: it seeks the origin in the present 
like the intra-ontology seeks Being in the beings). The method is necessarily deductive and 
regressive. In contrasting Merleau-Ponty and Foucault’s ideas of archaeology in this way, I 
follow Leonard Lawlor’s superb “the Chiasm and the Fold," in Thinking through French 
Philosophy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2003, 25-46 esp. 36 f. 
475 J-B Pontalis, “Présence entre les signes, absence” in Merleau-Ponty, l’Arc, Duponchelle, 
Paris. 59. 
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« It is a question of finding in the present the flesh of the world (and not in the past) an 
‘ever new’ and ‘always the same’- [...] The sensible, Nature, transcend the past-present 
distinction, realize from within a passage from one to the other --Existential eternity. The 
indestructible, the barbaric Principle.»476.  
Merleau-Ponty’s archaeology of truth brings to light the process through 
which perceptual faith becomes sedimented into predicative truth, and it shows 
sedimentation to be the unique structure which informs both history and 
perception. Merleau-Ponty describes sedimentation as an infinite process of 
determination and temporalisation, is exemplified in the dynamics of perception 
as the temporal progress towards the determination of the perceptual object. In 
turn, this movement informs historical sedimentation. Both processes are 
necessarily tangential, that is to say, they are infinite and gradual.  
                                                 
476 VI 267/315 (Notes from November 1960), in the Preface to S. written  two months earlier 
(September 1960), Merleau-Ponty praises Marxism for having “discovered all the abstract 
dramas of being and nothingness in history. It had invested it with an enormous metaphysical 
charge –and rightly so, since it was thinking of the overlap [membrure] of the architectonic 
structure of history, of the merging of mind and matter, man and nature, and consciousness and 
existence” S, 6/14 t.a. 
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CHAPTER V: 
EXISTENTIAL REDUCTION AND THE OBJECT OF 
TRUTH. 
 
The previous chapter was dedicated to understanding the implications of 
a search for the "origins of truth." Firstly, it appeared that ‘truth’ (that is to say, 
the concept of truth) was the result of a development of the very elements 
contained in the primary structure of perception. Secondly, it was highlighted 
that this very development led into a misconception of truth. The works of the 
forties examined above do place perceptual faith at the heart of any perception, 
and thereby include differentiation as the structure of all experience. However, 
they fail to provide a clear idea of this originary experience that stands as the 
origin of truth and as the link between reality and truth. In order to clarify this 
issue, I now turn to an examination of Merleau-Ponty’s use of reduction. 
 
A.  EPOCHE: MERLEAU-PONTY contra HUSSERL. 
 
The phenomenological reduction is the locus of normativity in Merleau-
Ponty’s   philosophy. It is assigned the task of discriminating between the true 
and the false within the phenomenal world. Thanks to it, Merleau-Ponty 
conquers the chance to build –beyond a descriptive phenomenology—a 
philosophy of perception. I argued that the original openness of perception (as 
described in PriP and PP) provides the origin of the movement of sedimentation. 
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It is apparent now that the same openness becomes—in a strictly symmetrical 
movement—the final result of Merleau-Ponty’s reduction. Indeed, this reduction 
functions as a movement of de-sedimentation. This is possible only if the 
reduction provides access to the openness of perception as such, irrespective of a 
conceptual content (which, Merleau-Ponty writes, constantly and "in 
principle" always "fills it")477. In this sense, the phenomenological reduction 
Merleau-Ponty embraces is directly inherited from Husserl’s.  
However, Husserl’s version of the reduction is often taken to be the root 
of his so-called "transcendental idealism." Merleau-Ponty understands the 
subject through its openness to the world while Husserl ultimately understands 
the openness with reference to the subject.478 We thus need to ask ourselves how 
Merleau-Ponty was able to give it such a crucial place when his project precisely 
seeks to oppose such idealism. Merleau-Ponty’s reworking of Husserl’s 
reduction is spelled out most directly in two key writings. Firstly, in the 
“Foreword” to PP, written at the end of his work on this book, Merleau-Ponty 
takes the pretext of a presentation of phenomenology to present his own 
reworking of Husserl’s concept. Secondly, S’s beautiful essay and tribute to 
Husserl "the Philosopher and his Shadow" stages the dialogue between Husserl’s 
“thought” [pensé] and his “unthought” [impensé] even more explicitly than in PP 
and Merleau-Ponty devotes its first section to the question of the reduction. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the span of Husserl’s work is larger than his writing, for it 
                                                 
477 “the opening is in principle [par principe] immediately filled” S, 14/27. 
478 « In the pure attitude [...] the objective becomes itself something subjective," says Husserl in 
the Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (subsequently Krisis), 
David Carr (Trans.), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1989, 179. 
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contains and delimits an « unthought » which still belongs to Husserl but was 
passed on to us as a "task."479 In fact the entire argument of "the Philosopher and 
his Shadow" is structured by a dialectical movement whereby Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledges the conventional interpretation of Husserl while simultaneously 
putting forward its counterbalancing « shadow » position. In this context, there is 
no doubt that Merleau-Ponty allows himself to sometimes overlook Husserl’s 
“letter” in order to stay faithful to his “spirit” and, further, to present his own 
work as the continuation of Husserl’s inspiration, beyond apparent paradoxes. 
Even though it has given rise to wide discussion, the debate as to whether 
Merleau-Ponty’s reading is faithful to the Husserlian inspiration beyond the 
Husserlian writings is of little concern to our problem. However this encounter 
of Merleau-Ponty with Husserl on the question of reduction will help 
characterise further the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s project.  
 
 i. From Phenomena to Phenomenality. 
 
 Husserlian reduction is based on three assumptions: 
a) there is a thesis of the world (Weltthesis), which affirms the existence of the 
world. 
b) this thesis of the world is a result of the “natural attitude.” 
c) this thesis blocks our access to “the things themselves,” pure phenomena. 
These three assumptions lead to describe reduction as: 
                                                 
479 Recall how the thesis of sedimentation made it possible to see in Descartes the outline of his 
own overcoming.  
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-a reduction of the natural attitude. 
-a reduction whose method is “epochè,” the suspension of judgment.480 
 The result expected by Husserl is a reduction to phenomena (“hyletic 
reduction," and, for the later Husserl, to essences -“eidetic reduction”). 
 
a. Natural Attitude versus Weltthesis. 
 
It is clear that Merleau-Ponty subscribes to both ends of this 
reduction process. Judgment does stand between us and phenomena, and 
reduction should lead us to pure phenomena, that is to the essences (in a sense 
that we will define shortly). Merleau-Ponty departs from Husserlian orthodoxy 
however by requalifying the “natural attitude.” For Merleau-Ponty, the thesis of 
the world—like any thesis—is already sedimented. It does not belong to the 
world of what he will later call the “savage being” or even “Nature.”481 In fact, 
seeing the natural attitude as thetical is a contradiction:  
“[W]hat is false in the ontology of blosze Sachen is that it makes a purely theoretical or 
idealizing attitude absolute, neglecting or taking as understood a relation with being that grounds 
                                                 
480 The distinction between “epochè” and “reduction,” the latter being the method of attainment 
of the former is often overlooked by both Husserl and his readers.  
481 It will become increasingly clear as we unfold Merleau-Ponty’s movement toward an 
ontology as a consequence of his reappraisal of reduction, that Merleau-Ponty’s interest in the 
concept of Nature has a lot to do with a coming to terms with his own disagreement with Husserl 
on this very concept. See for example, Ted Toadvine, “Singing the World in a New Key”, op. 
Cit. 
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[it] and measures its value. Relative to this scientific naturalism, the natural attitude involves a 
higher truth that we must regain. For the natural attitude is nothing less than naturalistic.”482  
What is truly natural then is perception, and in it the “perceptual faith” 
which is, as we know, pre-thetic. This distinction is also present in Husserl. In 
Ideen I, for example, he writes: « When we express this judgment, we very well 
know that we have transformed what was already implied in the primary 
experience into a ‘theme’ and grasped it in a predicative way.”483 This only 
strengthens the importance of the disagreement between the two thinkers. 
Husserl sees a distinction but deliberately refuses to give it any philosophical 
significance. For him, the implicit character of perceptual faith has no bearing on 
the concept of reduction so both the pre-thetical and the thetical are subject to 
suspension: “we may impose on the potential and implicit thesis the same test as 
that of the explicit judgment.”484 Merleau-Ponty on the contrary greatly 
emphasises the distinction between perceptual faith and Weltthesis thereby 
allowing himself to substract it to the grip of reduction: “seeking the essence of 
the world does not mean seeking what it is as an idea, once it has been reduced to 
                                                 
482 S, 163/265 the French goes thus: “Ce qui est faux dans l’ontologie des Blosze Sachen, c’est 
qu’elle absolutise une attitude de pure théorie (ou d’absolutisation), c’est qu’elle omet ou prend 
pour allant de soi un rapport avec l’être qui fonde celui-là et en mesure la valeur. Relativement à 
ce naturalisme, l’attitude naturelle comporte une vérité supérieure qu’il faut  retrouver. Car elle 
n’est rien moins que naturaliste” The original English translation reads “celui-là” in the feminine, 
as if referring to “the purely theoretical attitude” (“une atitude de pure théorie”). The grammatical 
context makes this impossible. The text quoted is thus corrected by myself, with “celui-là” taken 
to refer to “l’être”.  
483 Ideen, §31. 
484 ibid. 
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a theme of discourse; it is seeking what it is in fact for us prior to any 
thematisation.”485  In other words, the truly natural attitude, which is that of the 
pre-objective, is not to be reduced. Instead it is the objective attitude which is the 
proper target of reduction. We are left with a tripartite structure of intentionality 
comprising of subjectivity, pre-objectivity, and objectivity. For Husserl, the latter 
two are assimilable insofar as they are two instances of the Weltthesis, and he 
seeks to reduce them. It is clear here that by reducing these, Husserl de facto 
reduces all intentionality, and finds refuge in the subject, above experience: "The 
epochè," says Husserl, "gives us the attitude above the subject-object correlation 
which belongs to the world.”486 For Merleau-Ponty however, it is a question of 
reducing objectivity only, which allows to aim “below” this relation, to its 
condition of possibility. This is a move he attributes to Husserl himself: “From 
Ideen II onwards Husserl’s reflections escape this tête-à-tête between pure 
subject and pure things. They look deeper down [au-dessous] for the 
                                                 
485 PP,  xvii/x, my emphasis Merleau-Ponty attributes even this thesis to Husserl, by building up 
on Husserl’s acknowledgment of the pre-objective (a “below” of objectivism), and overlooking 
the characteristic Husserlian move to not grant any ontological bearing on this distinction, in “the 
Philosopher and his Shadow," Merleau-Ponty writes: “Even as Husserl’s reflection tries to grasp 
the universal essences of things, it notes that ‘in the unreflected, there are sytheses which dwell 
beneath [en-deçà] of any thesis,’” S, 163/266 t.a. 
486 Krisis §53. For Merleau-Ponty, Maine de Biran’s anti-idealism has « often remained below 
[au-dessous de] philosophy”, IS 66/56 t.a. It seems clear here that the “above” of Husserl and the 
“below” of Maine de Biran, constitute the two terms whose middle is the object of Merleau-
Ponty’s  quest.  
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fundamental.”487 In this sense, both the subjective and the pre-objective remain 
possible bases from which to perform the reduction.  
 
b. Reduction as Successful Failure. 
We are now in a better position to define the movement that takes 
Merleau-Ponty from the preface of PP to “the Philosopher and his Shadow,” and 
consequently, to delineate his concept of reduction. In the foreword to PP, 
Merleau-Ponty puts forward two strong theses: phenomenological reduction is 
not idealistic,488 and “the most important lesson that the reduction teaches us is 
the impossibility of a complete reduction.”489 These two theses are necessarily 
linked in Merleau-Ponty’s general argument about Husserl: the difference 
between Husserl and those non-orthodox phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty calls 
“existential dissidents” is a mere “misunderstanding”490 for there is in Husserl 
the possibility of an existentialist reduction. This possibility is formulated by 
Fink: “the best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen 
                                                 
487 S, 163/265. It is significant that Merleau-Ponty emphasises the term “au-dessous” as a 
response to the generally acknowledged view of Husserl as aiming “above” the subject-object 
relation. Merleau-Ponty presents this contrast as a chronological evolution when it is obvious that 
Husserl maintained his idea in the subsequent  Krisis. See also: IP, 168: “returning beneath  
reflective consciousness, in order to find the way out of these antinomies [of the in-itself and the 
for-itself]” (my emphasis). 
488 PP, xii/vi. 
489 PP, xv/viii. 
490 PP, xiv/viii. 
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Fink, Husserl’s assistant, when he spoke of ‘wonder’ in the face of the world.”491 
Such a sense of wonder, Merleau-Ponty continues, teaches us “nothing but the 
unmotivated upsurge of the world.” This account of reduction presents the 
“upsurge of the world” as “unmotivated," that is to say, non-thetical. 
 Regarding the thesis of the “impossibility of complete reduction," there 
remains an ambiguity as to from whose point of view (Merleau-Ponty’s, 
Husserl’s or both) the reduction’s ‘failure’ is its own greater achievement. The 
paradoxical phrase implies one of two things: 
-Reduction was a blind endeavour not destined to attain any particular 
thing, launched as it were, “just in case,” and there is no contradiction between 
its failure and its success, because there is no original aim against which one 
could actually measure success or failure.  
-Reduction was destined to achieve one thing, and eventually achieved 
something else, which is an achievement anyway, albeit not at the level expected 
but rather according to another coexisting endeavour.  
 It is obvious from Husserl’s texts that reduction is intended as a method 
destined to solve a pre-existing problem; therefore the first option must be ruled 
out. The second option however, leads to further complication because we now 
need to ask ourselves what original inspiration a failed reduction fulfills, and 
whose achievement is great enough to override the failure itself. Reduction as the 
reduction of the ‘sense-giving’ [Sinngeben] was always aimed by Husserl to give 
access to pure hyletic phenomena. Its failure means that the Sinngeben can never 
be entirely reduced and consequently that pure phenomena cannot be reached. If 
                                                 
491 PP, xv/viii. 
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there is a higher purpose that this discovery fulfills, it is a purpose that only an 
emphasis on Husserl’s shadow philosophy can bring to light.  
Merleau-Ponty’s affirmation that reduction is the breakthrough of 
Husserlian phenomenology was often opposed to Sartre’s earlier emphasis on the 
discovery of intentionality.492 It seems however, that the contrast between 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre is—in this case—misleading. The only way to make 
sense of the paradox of the successful failure of reduction is to detach it from the 
theme of phenomena. My contention is that, instead of phenomena, the 
successful failure of reduction shifts its success to the theme of intentionality: it 
is a success because instead of giving us pure phenomena, the reduction teaches 
us something about the essence of phenomenality (or, in Husserl’s terms, 
Erscheinung). The great acquisition is thus the primacy of intentionality and its 
advantage over the primacy of phenomena. Here lies the origin of the bifurcation 
of phenomenology into existentialism and idealism: with the impossibility of 
absolute reduction, we no longer attain phenomena but phenomenality, that is to 
say the structure that gives rise to them. This also implies that intentionality is 
anterior to intentional subject and objects. Merleau-Ponty clarifies this move 
while attributing it to Husserl: 
“[W]hat is this internality which will be capable of the relationships between interior 
and exterior themselves? The fact that Husserl, at least implicitly and a fortiori raises this 
question means that he does not think that non-philosophy is included in philosophy from the 
outset, in the immanence of constituting consciousness [not more than the transcendant 
“constituted” is included]. It means that he at least glimpses, behind transcendental genesis, a 
world in which all is simultaneous, omon in panta. Is this last problem so surprising? Had not 
                                                 
492 Emmanuel Alloa, op. Cit. 13. 
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Husserl warned from the outset that all transcendantal reduction is inevitably eidetic? This meant 
that reflection does not coincide with what is constituted but grasps only the essence of it.”493 
This passage should draw our attention to four things. First we find a 
reformulation of what we have called phenomenality as "this internality which 
will be capable of the relationships between interior and exterior" and as "non-
philosophy," that is to say, the pre-objective. Secondly, the acknowledgment of 
this pre-objective dimension allows for a distinction between "immanence" and 
"constitution." Thirdly, the reduction that brings this underlying ‘dimension’ to 
light is described as an "eidetic" reduction. This dimension is the "essence" of 
phenomena, phenomenality. Finally, we access only this essence and not pure 
phenomena. (I shall discuss the idea that the essence is in the instituted objects 
"omon in panta" in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s intra-ontology in the next 
chapter). In other words, pure phenomena are paradoxically hidden behind the 
essence that supports them.  
We now understand better the success of a failed reduction: the reduction 
is failed from the point of view of Husserlian idealism insofar as it provides no 
access to pure phenomena. It does not succeed in bridging the primeval ‘zone of 
subjectivity,' instead, it encounters it. In terms of Husserl’s "shadow philosophy" 
(Merleau-Ponty’s own), it is a success because it opens up to the essence of 
phenomenality as the ‘zone of subjectivity.’494  
                                                 
493 S, 179/291-292 
494 « it seems clear that reflection [the movement of reduction] does not install us in a closed, 
transparent milieu, and that it does not take us (at least not immediately) from « objective » to 
« subjective," but that its function is rather to unveil a third dimension in which the distinction 
becomes problematic » S, 162/264 See also N, 103-4 «the unreflected [l’irréfléchi], in [Husserl], 
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Saying that the lesson of reduction is its impossibility entails three main 
claims. Firstly, it is one thing to reduce the Weltthesis and quite another to reduce 
the intentional (extatic) structure of perception. Secondly, what the reduction 
brings out is the reality of the distinction between the objective and pre-objective 
(the former can be reduced, the latter cannot). Finally this involves a shift in the 
object of the phenomenological reduction: no longer pure phenomena but 
phenomenality, no longer hyle but eidos.495 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
is neither maintained as such, nor is it suppressed, it remains a weight and a launchpad for 
consciousness. It plays the role of a foundation and a founded, and reflecting, thus, means 
unveiling the unreflective. Hence a certain strabism of phenomenology.” It seems Merleau-Ponty 
was never so close to acknowledge that Husserl’s philosophy and its shadow were irreconcilable. 
495 Merleau-Ponty does write, in his notes on Gurwitsch that “the eidetic method is responsible 
for Husserl’s intellectualism." This claim does not mean, I think, that the reduction shall not give 
essences, only that Husserl’s use of it relies on the wrong idea of essences. Husserl seeks 
essences as the essences of intentional objects, while Merleau-Ponty seeks the essence of 
intentionality itself. The quote continues: “the eidetic method turns the perspectivism and the 
infinite which is open to the thing into into an ideal truth, when it is its opposite” (p. 328); in the 
next page, Merleau-Ponty disapprovingly describes Husserl’s otion of essence as “the principle 
of identity” and comments: “in fact, essence is an invariant, i.e. it is a hinge, not a quiddity” (p. 
329). In this sense, intentionality is, of course, not the essence Husserl seeks.  For an example of 
the alternative reading of this claim, see Ted Toadvine, “Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl” in 
Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, op. Cit. 278. 
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ii. The Method of Reduction. 
 
a: The Ambiguity of “Wonder.” 
This may help us clarify the question of the sense of “wonder” 
which according to  Merleau-Ponty (through Fink) is the defining feature of 
reduction. It is well-known that  reduction—whether existential or intellectual—
is a “bracketing” of judgment.496 Yet there is something paradoxical with the 
idea of “wonder” without judgment. On the one hand, the making familiar that 
judgment involves is bracketed and the world now appears to us as unfamiliar, 
which seems to account for some sense of wonder. On the other hand however, 
let us recall that the French word “étonnement," translated as “wonder," contains 
a strong element of “surprise," of unexpectedness. It is difficult to think of 
surprise with no judgment whatsoever: how can we find something to be 
unexpected and how can we even consider it if we do not see it against the 
background of the not wondrous, of the expected? In fact, this characterisation of 
reduction borrowed from Fink (which Merleau-Ponty attempts to present as 
Husserl’s own)497 contains already a rejection of the Husserlian project to access 
pure phenomena. For Husserl, pure phenomena are “flat”498: were judgment 
entirely reduced and were phenomena entirely pure, there would be no 
                                                 
496 See for example, Krisis, §18. 
497 “Fink, Husserl’s assistant” PP, xv/viii  my emphasis. 
498  Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction et Donation, 97. Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty uses the same 
term to qualify the object of science according to the Kantian’s transcendental idealism in, S, 
155/253.  
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possibility to even feel them as surprising, or relate to them on the mode of 
“wonder," they would not stand in contrast to anything. This rejection itself leads 
to Merleau-Ponty’s main thesis of the impossibility of absolute reduction.499  
 On the other hand, it is impossible for Merleau-Ponty to make room for 
conceptual judgment at the core of this “étonnement." In his famous analyses of 
the sublime, Kant arrives at a position very close to Merleau-Ponty’s. For Kant, 
the sense of the sublime is given by the indeterminacy of the movement of the 
understanding: we feel the awe of the sublime through judgment precisely 
because judgment is denied access to full determinacy. The feeling of the 
sublime is given by the faculty of judgment as opposed to any specific 
judgment.500 This ambiguity of a judgment giving rise to a feeling through its 
inachievement is in profound agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of 
intentionality. In the sublime, the faculty of concepts shows itself before any 
concept is given in very much the same way as Merleau-Ponty shows 
phenomenality to appear in reduction before any phenomenon is given. 
Secondly, the Kantian account strikes a right balance between the presence and 
the absence of judgment which accounts for a feeling of “astonishment."  
 This account is considerably reworked by Merleau-Ponty whose major 
move is to distinguish strongly between the realm of the pre-objective and those 
                                                 
499 As I discuss in VI, C, b, Merleau-Ponty makes a similar point against Bergson in VI. This 
insistence on accounting for what he calls in PP “the indicator of reality," is of course, directly 
correlative to the importance of the question of truth.  
500 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, (trans. Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, 128 ff. 
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of the objective and the subjective501. As a result, what is found is not a primary 
‘faculty’ which would belong to the subject and take us back to a sort of 
transcendental idealism. Hence, it looks like Merleau-Ponty entitles himself to 
locate a certain “astonishment” experienced from the point of view of ‘reduced 
consciousness,' because reduction does not apply to the pre-objective. In other 
words, one may be pre-objectively expecting something and thereby experience 
astonishment. This is the mechanism I have described in IV: our pre-objective 
perception is an ‘I can,' which attains objectivity when ‘stunned’ by its failure. 
Hence, the incapacity of determinative movement to reach a satisfactory level 
accounts for the feeling of “astonishment” to the point that this feeling becomes 
the privileged empirical manifestation of the pre-objective. As I suggested 
earlier, the reduction’s success is to bring out the realm of the pre-objective, and 
this is precisely what the sense of “wonder” performs. In Merleau-Ponty’s 
words: “In order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break with 
our familiar acceptance of it.”502 This break is experienced as “étonnement." 
 
 
                                                 
501 This is of course a distinction foreign to Kant due to his quasi-substantialisation of the 
faculties, which makes it inconceivable to distinguish between the successful quality of 
determinative judgment and its unsuccessful one which is at play in the experience of the sublime 
in any other way as precisely the difference between success and failure. The comparison 
between both thinkers should not lead one to think that Merleau-Ponty is committed to any such 
substantialisation of the faculties. One should always bear in mind that the only reality referred to 
here is the experience of intentionality. 
502 PP, xv/viii. 
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b: Reduction versus Epochè. 
We are now ready to turn to the question of the method of the 
reduction. Oftentimes, there is confusion in the literature as to the respective 
statuses of ‘reduction’ and ‘epochè’ and as to the significance of their distinction. 
In most cases, they are simply read as synonyms. For those readers, the very 
status of this one thing with two names is unclear: it is here supposed to be a 
phenomenologal “method,”503 there a “discovery.”504 The blame for this 
confusion lies partly on Husserl’s writings themselves and on the earlier 
conflation of the objective and the pre-objective. If both are one, then reduced 
objectivity becomes another name for intentionality and as a consequence, 
reducing judgment means reducing all intentionality. As we saw, this is cause of 
satisfaction for Husserl’s: “thanks to our method of the epochè, all the objective 
is now subjective.”505 This move is attributed to epochè, a fundamentally 
subjective act. Yet there is an ambivalence in Husserl (the very ambivalence that 
Merleau-Ponty builds on in “the philosopher and his shadow”) whereby it seems 
conceivable to speak of reduction without involving epochè. In other words, the 
link between epochè and reduction does not seem to be necessary, and their 
assimilation by Husserl is less than grounded. As a consequence, I must disagree 
                                                 
503 For example, Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, Pierre Vermersch, On Becoming Aware, 
John Benjamins, Philadephia, 2003, 4. 
504 For example, Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, Routledge, New York, London, 
2000, 124 ff. 
505 Cf. Infra, my emphasis. In NL, Merleau-Ponty sees the same claim in Gurwitsch and rejects it 
abruptly: “Gurwitsch: ‘the ultimate task of philosophy...accounting for all sorts of objects, and 
for objectivity in all possible senses in terms of subjectivity’ (P. 137) No”. NL, 329-330. 
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with those phenomenologists who claim that epochè cannot necessarily lead to 
idealism on the basis that many existentialist philosophers subscribe to the 
project of reduction506 because reduction is not strictly speaking, epochè. In fact, 
I shall argue that epochè does lead to idealism, not necessarily reduction.  
 We must understand this contingency of the link between epochè and 
reduction as grounded in their difference of status: epochè is the method chosen 
by Husserl to perform reduction. Reduction is the aim, epochè the tool. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s case, it means that by subscribing to the project of reduction, he 
is not compelled to endorse epochè.  
The fact that Merleau-Ponty never uses the term epochè to describe either 
his or Husserl’s project is generally overlooked, presumably as a consequence of 
the general neglect of the distinction between reduction and epochè.507 In order 
to understand the overdetermination that epochè forces onto reduction, we must 
ask how the method can affect the outcome. Husserl defines the suspension 
(epochè) as the suspension of judgment; an act whose intellectual nature is 
confirmed by the fact that it leaves the world as it is. It is thus a reflexive act: a 
judgment about judgment. This is only possible if one can draw a strict 
distinction between the realm of the intellectual and that of the world and 
attribute all transcendance to subjective judgment. This is indeed the root of 
                                                 
506 This position is expressed most candidly by Jean-François Lavigne in Husserl et la Naissance 
de la Phénoménologie, Paris, PUF, [Epiméthée], 34. 
507 For example, the argument presented by Natalie Depraz in her fine article entitled “What 
About the Praxis of Reduction?” is somewhat impaired by the absence of such a distinction. See 
Natalie Depraz, in Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (Eds.) Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, 
Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002, 115-127. 
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Husserl’s “transcendantal idealism,” and it removes any external grounding to 
transcendance.508 Consequently, epochè stems from idealism before it leads to it: 
we must understand that the only way for the reduction to be achieved without 
transforming its object is for it to be a fully intellectual act. This attitude single-
handedly commits us to idealism. This means that if one—like Merleau-Ponty—
wants to avoid idealism, he needs to accept a change in the very object he is 
looking at: reduction must be carried out in an existential way. This exposes 
another development of the successful failure of the reduction. Insofar as this 
failure gives access to phenomenality before the pure phenomena, it also makes 
pure phenomena impossible to attain. It makes local phenomena invisible in 
order to bring the structure of phenomenality to light. The non-idealistic use of 
reduction thus necessarily entails the rejection of epochè. Here, one is led to give 
up phenomena for phenomenality.  
Merleau-Ponty’s departure from Husserlian orthodoxy on the question of 
the reduction (although presented as nothing else than a reading of Husserl 
himself), has great philosophical consequences. In fact, the difference can be 
traced back to the disagreement over the distinction between the objective and 
the pre-objective. For Merleau-Ponty, this distinction prevents the pre-objective 
from being reduced alongside the objective. This distinction in turn allows for a 
distinction between the natural thesis and the Weltthesis, the truly natural attitude 
being pre-thetical. This means firstly that the object of the phenomenological 
                                                 
508 Merleau-Ponty sees this move in Husserl, but sees in Husserl’s shadow philosophy its 
opposite too: “the very transcendence of this world must retain a meaning in the eyes of 
‘reduced’ consciousness and transcendental immanence cannot be simply its antithesis” S, 
162/264. 
 247 
inquiry has now shifted from pure phenomena to phenomenality: there is a 
reversal of priority (both in the logical and ontological senses) between 
phenomena and phenomenality.509 Secondly, epochè is no longer the preferred 
method attached to the reduction. It has now become possible to bring the pre-
objective to light from within the pre-objective itself. For Merleau-Ponty, it is no 
longer a question of performing some negative act like ‘reduction,' but it is to 
“re-awaken”510 the sedimented, pre-objective structure of intentionality—the 
truly natural attitude precisely— because it is only this that will give us the 
“world”:  
"[T]he natural attitude really becomes an attitude –a tissue of judicatory and 
propositional acts- only when it becomes a naturalist thesis. The natural attitude itself emerges 
unscathed from the complaints which can be made about naturalism, because it is ‘prior to any 
thesis,' because it is the mystery of a Weltthesis prior to all theses. It is, Husserl says in another 
connection, the mystery of a primordial faith and a fundamental and original opinion (Urglaube, 
Urdoxa), which are thus not even translatable in terms of clear and distinct knowledge, and 
which –more ancient than any ‘attitude’ or point of view gives us not a representation of the 
world but the world itself ."511 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
509 In his notes on Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty is explicit that his own starting point in the 
Lebenswelt involves a reversal of Husserl’s method. NL, 338. 
510 PP, xv/viii. 
511 S, 163/266. 
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B. PERFORMING THE EXISTENTIAL REDUCTION. 
 
"Forgetting the individual case involuntarily is philosophical –but wanting to 
forget it, deliberate abstraction is not: rather, the latter characterises the non-
philosophical nature." 
Nietzsche, Notebook IX [66] Autumn, 1887. 
 
The confrontation with Husserl allows us to approach Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of reduction anew on the basis of its object: no longer phenomena but 
phenomenality, that is to say, neither the self nor the world, but their 
consubstantiality [‘connaturalité’]512. From now on, Merleau-Ponty understands 
the phenomenological project as an effort to bring out this dimension of being. 
We must now ask what it means in practice to perform this renewed form of 
reduction.  
First, let me stress that as a result of our discussion so far, the movement 
of reduction implies that we must conceive of reduction in a positive way (as 
bringing something out).513 To be sure, it is the aim of Husserlian reduction as 
                                                 
512 PP, 217/251. 
513 S, 187/304: « Perceived being is this spontaneous and natural being which the Cartesians did 
not see because they were seeking being against a background of nothingness, and because, 
Bergson says, they lacked what is necessary to conquer ‘non-existence.' Bergson himself 
describes a pre-constituted eing that is always presuspposed at the horizon of our reflections, and 
is always already there to lift the fuse out of the anguish and the vertigo that are about to explode 
within us." Through a different route, Renaud Barbaras encounters the necessary links of 
Merleau-Ponty’s reduction and positivity. See Desire and Distance 44-61 and « Merleau-Ponty 
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well to bring out pure phenomena by un-covering them. This un-covering, 
however, is a negative gesture. In the case of Merleau-Ponty’s reduction, there is 
nothing to be un-covered: intentionality is itself uncovered. It is merely 
misunderstood insofar as it is taken to be secundary to the intentional subjects 
and objects. The task of philosophy then, is to reverse this order of priorities. 
Yet, one may object, if the object of reduction is in fact not reducible, if it is 
ever-present and indeed omnipresent, what need is there for a reduction to bring 
it to light? The answer was addressed in the previous chapter: what needs to be 
reduced is not so much an attitude as it is a mistaken judgment precisely about 
phenomenality, namely, that phenomenality is a relationship between a subject 
and an object as fully external to each other. It is the same mistake that gave rise 
to the fallacious concept of the in-itself discussed in Chapter IV. In order to 
correct this mistake, the task of Merleau-Ponty’s existential reduction should be 
to reduce this judgment. However, it has appeared earlier that the attitude that 
understands phenomenality as an external relationship does not do so by 
accident, but rather that it is the nature of judgment to see relations as external. 
Here appears another motive for Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Husserlian epochè. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl makes the reduction dependent on a 
decision514 on the part of the subject, thereby affirming judgment as it reduces 
                                                 
and Nature," Research in Phenomenology; 2001; 31; 22-38. On this question, see also Hiroshi 
Kojima, « From Dialectic to Reversibility: A Critical Change of Subject-Object Relation in 
Merleau-Ponty’s Thought," in Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (Eds), Merleau-Ponty’s Reading 
of Husserl, op. Cit. p 99. 
514 In IP, 157-8, Merleau-Ponty criticises along the same lines the Sartrean account of liberty 
within determinism as a “decision”: a decision can only affirm the determinisms that lead to it: it 
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it.515 If it was judgments (plural) that were to be suspended, then the reflective 
power of the faculty of judgment would be sufficient for this: one can use a 
judgment to oppose another. However, the whole sense of Merleau-Ponty’s 
reduction is to move from phenomena to phenomenality; it is to reduce judgment 
as a general attitude, not any number of single judgments. As a result, the entire 
Husserlian setup finds itself transposed at the level of essences (in a sense that 
will be clarified in the next chapter): the reduction of the judgment of existence 
(the ‘weltthesis’) supposed to lead to pure phenomena becomes the reduction of 
judgment altogether, leading to phenomenality. This poses a new problem: once 
deprived of the reflexive power of judgment, Merleau-Ponty needs to provide a 
new factor of reduction which would not appeal to self-reflective judgment. The 
solution is provided by the very failure of reduction. If the failure of reduction is 
accounted for by the omnipresence—and irreducibility—of pure intentionality 
                                                 
is not an act of freedom. We will discuss in the next chapter how these criticisms will develop 
into a full-fledged reflextion on the concept of a transition and lead Merleau-Ponty to reject both 
Husserl and Sartre’s ontologies on the basis that they are unable to account for transitions. In the 
present case, the question asked to Husserl is: how can one make the transition from judgment to 
reduction? That asked to Sartre is: how can one make the transition from determinism to 
freedom? See also Sara Heinämaa’s interesting article “From Decisions to Passion: Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl’s reduction” in Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (Eds.), 
Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, op. Cit. 127-146. In Heinämaa’s view, Merleau-Ponty’s 
opposition to the decisional aspect of reduction is supported by an opposition to the idea of an 
active reduction, and a preference for passive reduction. It will become clear in a moment that 
this view is according to us untenable. Instead, we will argue that it is the very opposition 
between passivity and activity that Merleau-Ponty seeks to dispute.   
515 “Reflection never lifts itself out of any situation" says Merleau-Ponty; PP, 42/53. 
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and if pure intentionality is at the same time the aim of reduction,516 then this 
reduction can actually be performed by this intentionality itself.  
 
i. Transcending the Passive/Active Divide.  
 
To be sure, if this reduction is to be truly a philosophical act and not 
simply an inconsequential description, it has to demand from intentionality to 
exist on a mode that will affect the judgment Merleau-Ponty seeks to reduce, that 
is, the misconception that intentionality is objectively structured. This mode, I 
shall argue, is the mode of saturation.517  
 
 
a. Saturation. 
"Seeing is not having to form a thought."  
Merleau-Ponty, P2, 274. 
I have suggested that the judgment that is to be reduced is at once 
a singular judgment (that intentionality is objective) and a general faculty 
(judgment as the objective attitude). It is clear that one cannot reduce the first 
                                                 
516 the incompleteness of reduction “is the reduction itself,” VI, 178/230. 
517 In recent years, the question of saturation in phenomenology has received overdue attention, 
especially in the works of Michel Henry (who describes saturation in terms of “auto-affection”) 
and Jean-Luc Marion, “the Saturated Phenomenon,” Philosophy Today, April 1, 1996. On the 
question of saturation in Merleau-Ponty, see Anthony J. Steinbock’s “Merleau-Ponty, Husserl 
and Saturated Intentionality” in Lawrence Hass and Dorothea Olkowski (Eds.), Rereading 
Merleau-Ponty, 2000. 
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without reducing the latter. We have also seen that for the same reason, one 
cannot expect judgment to reduce itself (Husserl’s solution), but one must rather 
rely on another attitude. We know that Merleau-Ponty reversed the Husserlian 
project by seeking no longer to reduce pure intentionality, but instead to bring it 
to light. Therefore, the original Husserlian setup, according to which perception 
is the locus of the competition between phenomenality and judgment, is 
maintained. Merleau-Ponty perceives this "rivalry" "between perception and 
thought"518 as the chance for a renewed concept of reduction: if one wishes to 
bring out intentionality and to reduce judgment, one needs to give a competitive 
advantage to intentionality itself.  
For Merleau-Ponty judgment is "the surplus of our existence over natural 
being."519 If the reduction is to be the reduction of judgment, it must annull this 
“surplus.” Merleau-Ponty suggests that we saturate our “existence” with “natural 
being” (i.e. the world of perception), and immerse ourselves in perception:  
"As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject; I 
do not possess it in thought, or spread out towards it some idea of blue such as might reveal the 
secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery, it 'thinks itself within me,' I am 
the sky itself as it is drawn together and unified, and as it begins to exist for itself; my 
consciousness is saturated with this limitless blue."520 
                                                 
518 NL, 336 this clearly anticipates Jean-Luc Marion’s definition of saturation as the excess of 
intuition over intention (Cf. infra). 
519 PP, 197/229. “Speech is the surplus of our existence over natural being.” For the equivalence 
between speech and reflective judgment in this context, see 174/202. 
520 PP, 212/245 emphasis added. See also N, 351: «it is the sensing [le sentir] itself insofar as it is 
not the thought of sensing (possession) but de-possession, ek-stasis, parttaking or identification, 
incorporation or ejection. In one word, coincidence, blind acknowledgment [reconnaissance] (of 
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 The saturation of consciousness occasioned by the purity of perception 
presents itself as the forgetting of subjectivity according to the mechanics of 
perception described above and consciousness is presented as a container in a 
way that prepares the metaphor of saturation:  
"my act of perception occupies me, and occupies me sufficiently for me to be unable, 
while I am actually perceiving the table, to perceive myself perceiving it. When I want to do this, 
I cease, so to speak, to use my gaze in order to plunge into the table, I turn my back on myself 
who am perceiving."521 
By saturating intentionality, sensation leaves no room for reflective 
judgment and thereby brings out phenomenality.522 Of course, this saturation can 
never be totally achieved but is itself tangential, it represents a ratio: a maximum 
of perception for a minimum of judgment. As Merleau-Ponty writes:  
                                                 
the touching and the touched, of me and my image over-there). Non-difference, degree zero of 
difference. The felt [le senti] = I do not know and I’ve always known, we do not need to know 
what it is we are seeing since we are seeing it. Being towards [Etre à]... fascination or deduction 
of the sensible. To see is to think. » 
521 PP, 238/275 t.a. On the metaphor of the container, see also the formula from S, 14/26 quoted 
above: « the opening is by principle immediately fulfilled » 
522 At this point, one may ask what mechanism makes this saturation possible, that is, how it is 
possible that reflective consciousness be as it were distanced by perception. It is a question that 
Merleau-Ponty does not address directly, but we may propose the following conjecture: the 
determining process was described as taking place in time, as never immediate. It seems that this 
temporality of reflective consciousness confronted to the supposed instant grasp of perception 
would allow for the competition between perception and reflective consciousness to be described 
as a race:  if there is saturation of perceptual contents, then, reflexive consciousness lacks the 
time to perform determination and is thereby “short-circuited."  
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"I can at each moment absorb myself almost wholly into the sense of touch or sight, and 
even that I can never see or touch without my consciousness becoming thereby in some measure 
saturated, and losing something of its availability."523 
This "almost" will be discussed in the next chapter, but it is worth noting 
here that it is a consequence of the necessary link between pure intentionality 
and judgment, the phenomenon by which pure intentionality always becomes 
"filled" by judgment. This leads into further difficulties which account for a 
certain ambivalence on Merleau-Ponty’s part in PP. It seems from the passages 
quoted above that saturated perception allows for a reduction of subjectivity in 
favour of the object insofar as it is the "I" that is forgotten in the extasis of 
perception. This is the line of argument that Sara Heinämaa has in mind when 
she defines reduction as performed thanks to the "passion" of "wonder," making 
it an essentially passive process.524 However this reading overlooks the fact that 
                                                 
523 PP, 256/221, emphasis added. It is clear from passages like this and those quoted above that 
the treatment of saturation in PP remains ambiguous, and needed to be completed by the course 
of 1954-55. In PP, the tangential nature of saturation and reduction, if clearly intuited (as shown 
in this passage), is either played down or ignored (as in the passages quoted above). It seems that 
the first clear declaration that reduction is necessarily tangential is to appear in the “Foreword” to 
PP discussed above and it is useful to remember that it was not until after having completed the 
full draft of PP that Merleau-Ponty added this foreword, at Brunschwig’s insistence. In any case, 
it is only later, in the courses of the fifties, and largely thanks to a clarification of his rejection of 
Sartrean existentialism, that Merleau-Ponty will make the tangentiality of reduction the 
centrepiece of his philosophy. See also, for a somewhat tentative approach to tangentiality, PP, 
331/382.  
524 See Sara Heinämaa, “From Decisions to Passions”, in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, 
Toadvine and Embree (Eds.) 140, ff. Heinämaa, like many others, emphasises passivity over 
activity. 
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the « passion » envisaged by Merleau-Ponty is really a synthesis of activity and 
passivity. As early as the introduction to PP, in the section entitled « ‘Attention’ 
and ‘Judgment,'" Merleau-Ponty demonstrates a clear awareness of a task whose 
fulfillment will direct the course of his further investigations: to succeed in 
thinking the passive and the active together.525 In this text, Merleau-Ponty 
approaches this task through his rejection of both empiricism and intellectualism. 
Empiricism promotes « attention » as an essentially passive form of 
intentionality, attributing to the object the privilege to reach the subject. 
Intellectualism, on the contrary, promotes « judgment » as an active positing of 
the subject by the object. In both cases, one pole ‘owns’ the access to the other 
one, making itself active and the other pole passive. Eventually, they are both 
wrong for operating within the objective framework. For Merleau-Ponty, of 
course, transcendence is anterior to its subject or its object. We must therefore 
account for the encounter of self and world, and consequently, we must 
overcome the duality of the passive and the active. For Merleau-Ponty:  
"Where empiricism was deficient was in any internal connection between the object and 
the act which it triggers off. What intellectualism lacks is contingency in the occasions of 
thought."526  
As Heinämaa points out rightly, this ‘contingency’—which is 
incompatible with the spontaneity promoted by intellectualism—characterises 
what Merleau-Ponty means by « wonder » [étonnement]. However, as I pointed 
out earlier, if one takes wonder to be simply passive, then it becomes impossible 
to account for the element of « surprise » in the term and one becomes unable to 
                                                 
525 PP, 26-51/34-64 
526 PP, 28/36. 
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perform any "sedimentation." Therefore, I think that the emphasis on passivity 
fails to bring "mute experience [...] to the pure expression of its own 
significance."527 In short, seeing the reduction as purely passive is ignoring that 
the pre-objective is always towards the objective.  
 In his lecture course of 1954-55 devoted to passivity, Merleau-Ponty 
says: 
"[T]he antinomy of activity and passivity cannot be overcome frontally, on the basis of 
these notions, and if we say that what is true is their couple, me positing myself [moi 
m’autoposant], then we obtain a third position."528 
A few pages further, Merleau-Ponty clarifies this notion of 
« autoposition »: « the Self-positing-Doing [l’Autoposition-Faire] » he writes, 
« it is indeed the only solution»529. If pure extatic perception runs the risk of 
falling back into some form of empiricism, he continues, it is because by 
transcending objectivity, it transcends it too much, making itself unable to 
account for the fact of the meaningfulness of the objective structure (that is to 
say, to the fact that perception is always pre-objective). This leads us to mere 
"insanity."530 Merleau-Ponty therefore insists that "absolute plenitude is a result 
                                                 
527 This formula from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations is quoted in many occasions by Merleau-
Ponty, starting with PP, 219/254. 
528 IP, 157, note d). 
529 Ibid. 161, emphasis added.  
530 Merleau-Ponty criticises the Sartrean position for making obsolete the distinction me-the 
world: “le sujet sartrien est absolue individualité et par là immédiatement absolue universalité. 
De là, unité immédiate du pour soi et du pour autrui. Il faut, pour échapper à cette équivoque ou 
folie (je suis ceci et je suis tout, ceci est tout et tout est ceci) que l’individualité du flux et de son 
corps, l’universalité absolue du sujet soient l’une et l’utre rompue...” IP, 162. 
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of the isolating analysis."531 This poses the challenge encountered by Husserlian 
reduction anew: saturated perception as passivity gives me the phenomenon (the 
pure blue of the sky, beyond the concept of blue), not phenomenality. In a sense, 
it gives us only the pure object, when what we are after is the link between the 
object and the subject. In order to move again to the level of phenomenality, 
Merleau-Ponty needs to introduce activity within his concept of reduction. 
This is precisely what the understanding of a "third way" as 
"autoposition" and in turn, of « autoposition » as « faire » is intended to perform. 
The concrete praxis of existential reduction is praxis itself, and the saturation of 
perception becomes the saturation of perceptivity. Here, I think, lies the key to 
Merleau-Ponty’s equation of perception and motricity532: the action to move 
towards the object is always correlative to a passive impression of the object. 
Merleau-Ponty understands activity as the transcendence of the active/passive 
duality and as such, as the mode of saturated intentionality.533  
It is with activity that Merleau-Ponty finally succeeds in finding a 
concrete experience of non-objectivity, because activity provides the experience 
of an intentionality described neither from the point of view of the subject (the 
                                                 
531 Ibid, 167. 
532 See for example, Renaud Barbaras, “Phenomenalité et Motricité chez le Dernier Merleau-
Ponty” in le Tournant de l’Expérience, op. Cit. 225-240. 
533 PP, 102/119: “it is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being, and an 
analysis of one's own movement should enable us to arrive at a better understanding of it. By 
considering the body in movement, we can see better how it inhabits space (and, moreover, time) 
because movement is not limited to submitting passively to space and time, it actively assumes 
them." See also N, 270 ff. 
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activism of intellectualism) nor from the point of view of the object (the 
passivism of empiricism). Therefore, we must explain how Merleau-Ponty 
regards activity as performing two syntheses, or to be more accurate, to refute 
two distinctions affirmed by objectivism: the internal, of the body and the soul; 
and the external, of the self and the world. 
 
b. The Union of the Self. 
It is significant that even as he struggles with the duality of 
passivity and activity in the opening of PP, Merleau-Ponty refers to Descartes’ 
letter to Elisabeth of June 28th 1643534 where Descartes writes:  
"it is only thanks in the use of [en usant de] life and of ordinary conversations, and by 
refraining from meditating and studying the things which stimulate our imagination, that one 
learns how to conceive of the union of the soul and the body.”535  
Earlier in the letter, Descartes wrote that the interaction of body and soul 
is experienced in the “senses” and “movements,” and we must, I think, interpret 
                                                 
534 “When Descartes says that the understanding knows itself incapable of knowing the union of 
soul and body and leaves this knowledge for life to achieve, this means that the act of 
understanding presents itself as reflection on an unreflective experience which it does not absorb 
either in fact or in theory." PP, 42/52 see also PP, 198-99/231: "Thus experience of one's own 
body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, 
and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the 
experience of the body or the body in reality. Descartes was well aware of this, since a famous 
letter of his to Elizabeth draws the distinction between the body as it is conceived through use in 
living and the body as it is conceived by the understanding." PP, 198-99/231 
535 René Descartes, Lettre à Elisabeth du 28 Juin 1643, René Descartes, Correspondence avec 
Elisabeth et autres lettres, Paris, GF. Flammarion, 1989, 74. 
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‘life’ in this quote in the sense of ‘perceptual life’ and ‘activity.' It is remarkable 
that Descartes talks of “using [...] life” to philosophical ends, readily admitting 
that there are realities that our soul cannot apprehend, and, more importantly, 
that our functional body may prove an instrument of knowledge. Descartes’ 
position therefore anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s by merging a negative move 
towards judgment (“refraining from meditating”) with a positive one towards 
“life” as activity, thereby shifting the balance within intentionality towards a 
saturation of perception in order to “conceive” the union of the body and the 
soul.536 The unity of the self is conceived in actu and the self as subject and the 
self as object of aperception become one within activity. In VI, for example, 
Merleau-Ponty writes: "the passive-body and the active-body are welded 
together in Leistung”537.  
 
                                                 
536 See for instance, VI, 8/23: “the ‘natural’ man holds on to both ends of the chain, thinks at the 
same time  that his perception enters into the things and that it is formed this side of his body. 
Yet, as much as the two convictions coexist without difficulty in the exercise of life, once 
reduced to theses and to propositions, they destroy one another and leave us in confusion” t.a.; 
and OE, 54-55: “[the soul] conceived as unified with the body, it cannot, by definition, be 
conceived entirely. One may practice it, exercise it, and as it were, exist it." 
537 VI, 246/295 [April 1960]. See also PP, 295/343: “My absolute contact with myself, the 
identity of being and appearance cannot be posited, but only lived as anterior to any 
affirmation. » (my emphasis); PP, 358/410-11; every commitment [...] testifies to a self 
contiguous with itself before those particular acts in which it loses contact with itself » and PP, 
382/438: « All inner perception is inadequate because I am not an object that can be perceived, 
because I make my reality and find myself only in the act."  
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c. Self and World. 
Thus for Merleau-Ponty there is no essential distinction between 
aperception and perception: they are one in activity. By allowing for the 
transcendence of both the internal and the external divide, activity opens up to 
the experience of the body as the milieu of transcendance:  
«the usual alternative: the body as one thing among others, or the body as vantage point 
on things, is questioned [...] the relationship to the world is included into the relationship of the 
body with itself.”538  
Indeed, by revealing aperception and perception as transcendence, and by 
revealing both transcendences to be essentially the same, Merleau-Ponty reduces 
all transcendentality to the intentional body, which extends its intentionality 
inwards and outwards. This is the key to understanding the body as flesh.539 
Conceiving activity as transcendence is crucial, because it takes one more step 
towards unifying the passive and the active; it does so by preliminarily unifying 
the inside and the outside.540 In S, Merleau-Ponty writes: « to possess ourselves, 
we must begin by abandoning ourselves; to see the world itself, we must first 
withdraw from it.”541 This two-way movement from the world towards us and 
                                                 
538 N, 287. 
539 VI, 271/319 [Dec. 1960]: « the flesh of the world = its horizonthaftigkeit (internal and external 
horizon) surrounding the thin pellicle of the strict visible between these two horizons." See also 
VI, 132/173: « a visible is not a chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being, offered all naked to a 
vision which could be only total or null, but is rather a sort of straits between exterior horizons 
and interior horizons ever gaping open » This « straits," of course, is intentionality itself qua 
flesh. 
540 See PP, 382/438. See also Renaud Barbaras, le Tournant de l’Expérience, op. Cit. 171.  
541 S, 157/255. 
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from us to the world emphasises the thesis inherited from Maine de Biran that 
perception is always also aperception542, so that the nature of the flesh itself pairs 
up every affection with an equal auto-affection. At this point, the 
internal/external divide disappears, and with it, the active/passive one.  
In his important article "the Thinking of the Sensible," Mauro Carbone 
adopts a position close to the one I have just defended, with one important 
difference. Carbone does locate Merleau-Ponty’s intentionality "beneath" the 
"distinction between activity and passivity."543 He construes this position by 
contrast to Heidegger’s claim that the "letting-be" of disinterestedness is in fact 
"the supreme effort of our essential nature."544 Here, says Carbone, Heidegger 
entrenches the duality of activity and passivity, leaving us with an "oscillation" 
between these two poles545 in the same way as Husserl’s idea of epochè 
                                                 
542 This is what Maine de Biran calls “the reflectible element of our sensations," see for example 
Maine de Biran, Mémoire sur la Décomposition de la Pensée, I;1952, Presses Universitaires de 
France, pp 239 ff. On Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Biran, see IS, 59: “Biran seems to direct 
himself towards a philosophy which would be indifferent to the distinction of the inside and the 
outside." On the question of auto-affection, see Renaud Barbaras, le Tournant de l’Expérience, 
op. Cit. 137-155. 
543 Mauro Carbone, “the Thinking of the Sensible”, in Chiasms, op. Cit. 126.  
544 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, 107, quoted by Carbone, op. Cit. 125-126. 
545 Mauro Carbone, op. Cit. 125, remarkably, this reading of Heidegger, which makes him lean 
towards Husserl, is echoed by Husserl himself in his concept of a “phenomenological flickering” 
or ‘oscillation.' This is a problem arguably overcome by Merleau-Ponty. It is significant, with 
regard to Marc Richir’s Husserlian reading of Merleau-Ponty, that he overlooks Merleau-Ponty’s 
responses to this and maintains that this “flickering” is a core porblem of phenomenology in his 
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entrenches this duality precisely by affirming the subjective pole. The level 
which lies ‘beneath’ the passive-active duality also lies ‘beneath’ the  duality of 
subject and object, it is what I have called ‘intentionality.' Carbone thinks that we 
may attain this level through the experience of a "shock."546. This shock, he says, 
"causes the dispossession of the ability to distinguish between the active and the 
passive poles."547 This account however maintains the model of passivity 
because the shock is a passive experience (« disposession »). Here I think, 
Carbone describes a gesture contrary to Merleau-Ponty’s. Merleau-Ponty seeks 
to undo the illusion of the existence of this divide, not to obtain the illusion of its 
inexistence.  
In order to escape the passivist interpretation we must give up placing 
ourselves ‘beneath’ the duality of activity and passivity. Instead, Merleau-Ponty 
wants us to think of activity and passivity in a different way whereby they are 
not transcended but unified. Carbone does refer to Merleau-Ponty’s appeal for 
philosophy to talk of "the passivity of our activity," but he does not seem to take 
it as an affirmation of activity as the level where passivity and activity are re-
united. I think, however, that here, Merleau-Ponty means that activity and 
passivity become parts of activity itself. He speaks of activity in two senses: the 
active principle (the activity of our activity) and the activity one undertakes (the 
process of acting). The latter comprises the ‘activity of the activity’ and the 
‘passivity of the activity.' In my view, Carbone is unable to account for a method 
                                                 
very interesting “l’Aperception Transcendentale Immédiate et sa Décomposition en 
Phénoménologie," Revista de Philosophia, 2001, Issue 26, 7-53.   
546 Ibid. 126. 
547 Ibid.  
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to overcome the duality because he conflates these two senses of activity. In 
seeking to reject activity taken in a sense that opposes passivity, he also rejects 
the activity which operates the union of these two. I think instead that the 
experience of the unity of activity and passivity is attainable within activity. In 
the notes from May 1959, Merleau-Ponty calls this a ‘lateral apprehension.' I 
shall further develop this notion in chapter VI, but let me use a schematic 
account of it here. The ‘frontal’ apprehension is indeed purely active (maybe 
even on the mode of ustensility described by Heidegger), but in the action that I 
unfold towards an objective end, I attain (laterally) a state of being where the 
active and the passive become unified. This, I think, permits us to think of 
Merleau-Ponty’s reduction not only as an idealisation but as an actual method.548 
This poses the problem, now recurrent, that the authentic apprehension (if 
lateral) cannot be the apprehension of an object, but only of Being itself. Here we 
encounter Merleau-Ponty’s "intra-ontology," which seeks ‘Being in the beings’ 
as ‘lateral’ experience: by aiming towards an object, I attain (laterally) the "realm 
                                                 
548 In an interesting aricle entitled “What about the Praxis of Reduction? Between Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty," Natalie Depraz addresses the same question as I just discussed. She concludes, 
in a way reminiscent of Heinämaa, that what she calls the “praxis of epochè” involves three 
elements, none of which is active in more than an intellectual, Husserlian sense (p. 122, a)). She 
concludes that we must “let-go” and “transform our looking-for” into a “letting-come” thanks to 
a “turning of the direction of attention from the exterior to the interior” (p. 124). This 
sophisticated account amounts to seeing the reduction as a mode of passivity and more, 
importantly, it overlooks the lateral experience of Being which we encounter regardless of the 
object of our activity.  
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of reduction."549 Hence it is only under the condition that we do not posit the 
‘frontal’ object of our activity at the same time that we experience ‘laterally’ the 
unity of activity and passivity. This proviso, I believe, is satisfied by what 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘perspectivism.'  
 
ii. Perspectivism. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of truth is often summarised under the foggy brand 
of "perspectivism.550 Most readings rely on intersubjectivity and language to 
describe this perspectival truth as a social, sedimented one.551 I shall argue, by 
contrast, that one should read Merleau-Ponty’s perspectivism in the context of 
existential reduction seen as activity: if it is understood that reduction now seeks 
phenomenality and no longer phenomena, and that it can only be reached through 
praxis, the claim of perspectivism may be construed as the existential, analogous 
to Husserl’s movement of constitution: the movement that rises from pure 
experience to the awareness of its essence. In fact, it is clear that activity always 
                                                 
549 S, 162/264. 
550 See for example David Schenck, “Merleau-Ponty on Perspectivism, with References to 
Nietzsche," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Dec., 1985), 307-314; 
and Etienne Bimbenet, « Un Motif d’Etonnement Majeur: le Perspectivisme » op. Cit. See below 
for more examples. 
551 Of course, this leads—or stems from—the so-called post-modern readings of Merleau-Ponty. 
See for example, Bernhard Waldenfels, "Vérité à Faire: Merleau-Ponty’s Question Concerning 
Truth," Philosophy Today, Summer 1991, 185-194 and Douglas Low, "Merleau-Ponty on Truth, 
Language and Value," Philosophy Today, Spring 2001, 69-76. 
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reveals general intentionality by way of particular endeavours, and the 
interaction with particular objects:  
"How have we managed to escape from the dilemma of the for-itself and the in-itself, 
how can perceptual consciousness be saturated with its object, how can we distinguish sensible 
consciousness from intellectual consciousness? Because: (1) Every perception takes place in an 
atmosphere of generality and is presented to us anonymously. [...] My perception, even when 
seen from the inside, expresses a given situation: I can see blue because I am sensitive to 
colours."552  
 This involves a redefinition of the method of attainment of truth, but also 
of the object of truth. The truth attained by perspectivism should not be 
conceived as the truth sought by the perspectives (which is the business of 
“intellectual consciousness”); if A and B have two different perspectives on X, 
perspectivism will not seek to construe X from these two perspectives; instead, it 
will gather from these perspectives some insight about what a perspective is (it is 
a perceiving, not my perceiving, for example). For Merleau-Ponty, there is a 
single element of generality in all experiences, an element which is not limited 
by its being A or B’s perception, but rather one which, through saturation, 
generalises A or B’s individuality. This is the element that perspectivism seeks 
to bring to light.   
 
a. Towards Ontology.  
In PP, perspectivism is introduced within the process of 
determination or objectivation: a cube reveals itself as an object through a 
                                                 
552 PP, 215/249 
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synthesis of the successive perspective views that I grasp of it.553 This draws 
Merleau-Ponty’s attention to the interdependence of perception and motricity.554 
This interdependence installs a relationship of the active and the passive on two 
different levels: Firstly, by moving my body around the object, I ascertain that I 
am myself an agent of my perception, so that any complete perception contains a 
bodily act as well as a sensible and passive impression. Secondly, this affirms 
the activity of the synthesis which I carry out in order to unify the different 
perspective views into the view of one object, an active synthesis which, again, is 
coupled to a passive sensation.555 The experience of synthesis is thus granted 
great importance, because in Merleau-Ponty’s view it associates the experience 
of the transcendental “I” of traditional metaphysics with that of the bodily self 
through motion.556 This means, even more importantly, that the unity of the 
object of perception is correlative to that of the subject and vice-versa because 
this synthesis is the result of an encounter between the perceiver and its object. 
Consequently, intentionality must be conceived as the ground of objectivity, that 
is to say again that phenomenality is given logical priority over phenomena. As I 
                                                 
553 PP, 198/235, ff. 
554 PP, 137/160: "motricity as original intentionality." 
555 PriP, 14/45:  "perception is a practical synthesis" t.a.; see also  IP, 193 which discusses the 
relations between "perceptive [passive] consciousness" and "imaging [active] consciousness." Of 
course, these two aspects are readily unified if we consider that the synthetic unity of the self is 
itself made possible by the pre-objective unity of the bodily self through motion “In the inner and 
outer horizon of the thing or the landscape, there is a co-presence and co-existence of outlines 
which is brought into existence through space and time.” PP, 330/380 f. 
556 PP, 360-361/458. 
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have argued, this phenomenality is precisely the object of philosophy and it is 
brought to light only in activity, in motion associated to perception.  
Some readings of Merleau-Ponty’s perspectivism make it an cumulative 
form of relativism which would seek as many perspectives over one “thing” as 
possible in order to deduce from it an approximation of objective truth, 
proportional to the number of different perspectives available. In this reading, 
perspectivism becomes a method to attain objectivity through universality. This 
ignores that Merleau-Ponty’s project is precisely not to reach objectivity.557 
Merleau-Ponty aims below objectivity for what supports and altogether refutes it: 
perceptual faith. For Merleau-Ponty, we must find this perceptual faith behind 
the manifold of perspectives, for it is “the formula that permits one to pass from 
one real perspective [...] to another and which, being true of all of them, goes 
beyond the de facto situation of the physicist who speaks.”558 
Perspectivism is not designed to offer a cumulative view of the object 
or of the universe that would be placed on the same level as the perspectives 
themselves, assuming that every perspective is a partial truth. Instead, it seeks to 
attain a truth placed at another level, a truth found through a mutual reduction of 
the singular perspectives to their essence. The truth of perspectivism is not about 
objects, it is about perspectivity itself. In this way, general intentionality 
(perspectivity) will be brought out of the the manifold of intentional objects 
(perspectives). 
                                                 
557 In fact, Merleau-Ponty explicitly repudiates any idea of “the Great Object." See VI, 14/30 the 
section is entitled “Science presupposes the perceptual faith but does not clarify it.” 
558 VI, 15-16/32. It is useful to remember that for Merleau-Ponty, “l’univers” (the universe) is 
opposed to “le monde” (the world) as its objective-metaphysical version. See PP, 44/51. 
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The error of the cumulative view stems, I believe, from a 
misunderstanding as to the place of language and science in Merleau-Ponty’s 
perspectivist project. For Merleau-Ponty, language and science do not offer the 
cumulative rules that supposedly implement  perspectivism. These rules are 
perspectives themselves:  
“it is a question, to acquaint ourselves with the being that surrounds [embrasse] 
altogether the perceived in the restricted sense and the so-called objective i. e. idealised being by 
way of this lived experience [vécu] or this perceived [perçu]. Science is rejected as a dogmatic 
ontology of the in-itself, but it is integrated to the realm of the perceived, and true within this 
horizon.”559 
Unlike objects, which could only be approximated through cumulative 
perspectivism, phenomenality is fully present in any act. Merleau-Ponty’s 
concern is no longer to multiply the perspectives themselves but to multiply the 
perceptual acts which are embedded in them in order to obtain saturation. This 
                                                 
559 IP, 171. In fact, this is a point that Merleau-Ponty has made time and time again. In PriP for 
example, he praises science because, in its “mature” form, it “leads us back to the structures of 
the perceived world, and somehow recovers them." PriP, 37/92 (emphasis added). On the same 
argument made about language, see VI, 113/146. On the idea that "everything is true" (not just 
science) as long as it is interrogated correctly not just science, see PriP, 35/89. Against the 
cumulative view of perspectivism and its scientific forms see PP 291 f./337f. Against the view 
that science is able to overcome its computative method into interrogation, see P2, 337 and 290, 
VI,16/32 ("blindness towards being was the price that [science]  had to pay for its success in the 
determination of beings."t.a), VI, 231/179 [27th Feb. 1959] ("[the pre-scientific] is even disclosed 
through the constitutive movements of science on the condition that we reactivate them, that we 
see what left to themselves they verdecken," my emphasis). On a differing interpretation of 
Merleau-Ponty's relation to science, and the idea that Merleau-Ponty confides in "scientific 
thought", see Miguel de Beistegui, “Science and Ontology”, Angelaki, 10:2, 2005, 113. 
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saturation will in turn provide access to pure transcendence by disabling 
reflective consciousness according to the mechanism I have described above: 
Beyond what the perspectives are about, it will show the essence of the world as 
perspective. It is only in this sense, I think that we can understand Merleau-
Ponty’s repeated claim that “everything is interesting, and in a certain way, 
true—in the sole condition that we take things as they are presented in our fully 
elucidated experience”560.  
Both saturated intentionality and perspectivism present themselves as 
paradoxical: by placing themselves “below” judgment, they seek the one by way 
of the multiple and the general by way of the local. “My point of view" Merleau-
Ponty writes, "is for me not so much a limitation of my experience as a way I 
have of infiltrating [me glisser] into the whole world.”561 This reveals the very 
nature of the generality that is to be uncovered: it is the generality of the 
‘phenomenality,' ‘transcendence’ or ‘subjectivity’: "subjectivity is neither thing 
nor substance, but the extremity of both the particular and the universal."562 
More than making intentional acts both particular and general, “Subjectivity” 
makes them the substance of the relation between the particular and the general.  
 According to the dynamics of perception described in chapter IV, 
perspectives (intentional acts) are essentially directed towards determination and 
consequently, objectivation. However Merleau-Ponty makes them his method for 
the overcoming of objectivation, seeking intentionality through intentional acts. 
                                                 
560 PriP, 35/89. Emphasis added. 
561 PP, 329/380 t.a. see also NL, 328 “just like the world, this generality is before the one and the 
multiple.”  
562 S, 153/250 t.a. 
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This very directionality of perspectives towards objectivation makes it blind to 
the underlying essence that supports it. This paradox is why saturation must be 
understood in connection to perspectivism: only saturation can achieve the 
reduction from the intentional acts to intentionality and find the single through 
the multiple. Only in the manifold do intentional acts exhibit their specific 
determinations (their object) as specific563. Consequently, they exhibit—as it 
were negatively—their common centre. According to Merleau-Ponty,  
“for a truly phenomenological philosophy, the relations between regional ontologies and 
philosophy is not the subsumption of the special under the general, but the relationship between 
concentric circles.”564  
This common centre which is the object of the reduction565 can only be 
uncovered as a centre through the apprehension of the circles it generates. This 
indirect move, which makes us acquainted not with phenomena but with 
phenomenality, is destined to bring out what Merleau-Ponty’s ontology will call 
the “invisible." This move constitutes the essence of Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology566. 
                                                 
563 VI, 15-16/32  
564 IP, 164.  
565 Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that he considers phenomenology to be defined as the practice 
of reduction (PP, foreword). 
566 VI, 231/179 [Feb. 1959]: “one cannot construct a direct ontology, my indirect method (being 
in the beings) alone corresponds to being -negative philosophy like negative ontology » The 
problem of « direct ontologies » is exposed as early as the opening of PP with regard to the 
possibility and prerogatives of reduction: « 'Natural judgement' is nothing but the phenomenon of 
passivity. »  (PP, 42/53) writes Merleau-Ponty. This implies that any direct ontology is 
impossible because it would construe Being as an object, abstracting the philosopher from it or 
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b. Conclusion: Indirect Ontology.  
The re-elaboration of the reduction is the decisive move that 
informs the rest of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and particularly his ontology. 
Naming intentionality as the obstacle that confronts reduction involves a double 
reversal of the traditional structure of phenomenological ontology. Firstly, it 
exposes neither the subject nor the object but intentionality itself as primary. 
Secondly, it presents the unity of intentionality as anterior to the objective 
duality. This move also adds to the traditional « order of reasons," still followed 
by Husserl, an « order of matters » rigorously reverse to it. To Husserl’s 
transcendental idealism, the logical origin of the thought process was grounded 
in its ontological priority. Hence, thought and matter were equated. In Merleau-
Ponty’s contrasting view, if philosophical reasoning is indeed grounded in 
dualism, the same is not true of Being. We encounter subjects and objects first, 
but these are sedimented signs of the underlying reality of transcendence; only 
this transcendence is ontologically primary. In order to attain this transcendence, 
objective thought must be used towards its own overcoming; this is what 
Merleau-Ponty means by reduction, and it is achieved through perspectivism. For 
Merleau-Ponty then, the reduction is the discovery of transcendence through the 
                                                 
abstracting it from the philosopher. It is because natural judgment cannot be bracketed that one 
needs to seek reduction not outside judgment but beyond it, leading to an ontology necessarily 
indirect insofar as it knows itself to be incapable of seeing being as such. This is one of the many 
points where the continuity of PP and VI seems flawless: this invisible being which can only be 
approached indirectly is the “Invisible” of VI which will be approached, through “imperception." 
(cf PP, 42/53).  
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praxis of transcendence. The subject of Merleau-Ponty’s reduction is perception, 
and so is its object: "It will always be the task of perception to know 
perception."567 
                                                 
567 PP, 42/53 
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CHAPTER VI:  
MERLEAU-PONTY’S SOFT ONTOLOGY OF TRUTH 
AS FALSIFICATION 
In this chapter, I examine the implications of the conception of Being 
outlined in Chapter V. Like Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty conceives of Being as 
essentially self-differentiated; that is to say, incomplete. However, this 
incompleteness is not a failure of Being: it is positive incompleteness. Merleau-
Ponty describes what he calls this ‘soft’ being as ‘flesh.' Flesh is defined by its 
indeterminacy. It is not determinate, and paradoxically, this constitutes its main 
determination. As a consequence, being has no place for fully determinate 
entities. Yet, as was demonstrated by the archaeology of truth, such determinate 
fictions arise from the fabric of the flesh through the process of sedimentation. 
This movement of sedimentation is in fact the essence of the flesh. In other 
words, the essence of Being qua flesh is to falsify itself. As I argue, it is 
indeterminate and presents itself as fully determinate. As regards the 
phenomenon of truth, it is given a central place as the very process through 
which being falsifies itself: it is through the belief in truth that Being presents 
itself as fully determinate. Let me emphasise that I do not mean that self-
falsification is a feature of Being or that it is its essential comportment or an 
attribute of Being of any sort. On the contrary self-falsification is identical with 
Being. Being is not self-falsified, it is self-falsification.  
Merleau-Ponty’s version of the reduction amounts to a reduction down to 
the ontological. In his last and unfinished work entitled the Visible and the 
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Invisible, Merleau-Ponty describes the object of ontology (i.e. Being) as an 
"existential eternity." This expression denotes what I described as ‘intentionality’ 
in chapter II and as the ‘zone of subjectivity’ in Chapter I.568 In this chapter, I 
will argue that Merleau-Ponty conceives of Being as self-falsification and truth 
as the movement by which Being falsifies itself.  
In order to reach this conclusion, I shall first argue that Merleau-Ponty 
rejects any idea of self-identical being (A). Instead, he envisages Being as 
including non-being. This is what I shall describe as Merleau-Ponty’s ‘softening’ 
of Being. Next, I shall examine Merleau-Ponty’s account of the dynamics of 
Being that ensue from this definition of Being as self-differentiated (B). I shall 
find that this instability of Being is creative of history. Finally, I draw the 
consequences of these two arguments by examining how Being is conceived as 
less-than-actual and creative, that is to say, as potential, and what this potential is 
the potentiality of; namely, as I shall argue, error (C). 
 
A.  PRESENCE AND THE SOFTENING OF BEING.  
 
There is no question that VI is concerned with Being and that is how 
Merleau-Ponty scholarship has always envisaged this work.569 It is therefore 
                                                 
568 VI, 267/315. Fabrice Colonna, in “l’Eternité selon Merleau-Ponty”, op. Cit. encounters this 
“existential eternity” as the infinity of becoming in the sense I have given to the ‘syntax of 
history’ in chapter IV. Colonna also links, the two phrases. See esp. 148-153. 
569 This has been established most strongly in the wake of Renaud Barbaras’ the Being of the 
Phenomenon, (Trans. Ted Toadvine & Leonard Lawlor), Indiana University Press, Bloomington 
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striking that, in a working note to VI  entitled « Metaphysics-the Infinite/World-
Offenheit » Merleau-Ponty writes unequivocally: "I am for metaphysics."570 This 
ambiguity is a direct consequence of the philosophical method which Merleau-
Ponty calls his "indirect ontology" or "intra-ontology," and which, by seeking 
"Being through the beings,"571 avoids the distinction between the metaphysical 
and the ontological. On the contrary, it places their link at the core of its inquiry.  
In the chapter of VI entitled "Interrogation and Dialectics," Merleau-
Ponty embarks on a criticism of the Sartrean ontology of Being and nothingness. 
There, he criticises Sartre’s sharp opposition between Being and Nothingness. 
This opposition, Merleau-Ponty believes, makes ontology nothing more than a 
form of metaphysical dualism. The cost of this ontology is too high insofar as it 
sacrifices precisely the « transcendence »572 that Merleau-Ponty places at the 
centre of his philosophy. In a dualistic ontology, one does not see how Being and 
nothingness can meet. Yet, it is precisely the lesson of perception that their 
meeting—not their purely conceptual opposition—is the proper domain of 
philosophy573. It is this transcendence, the commensurability of Being and 
nothingness, that Merleau-Ponty seeks in « interrogation and dialectics."  
 
 
                                                 
and Indianapolis, 2004; and Martin Dillon’s Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988. 
570 VI, 251/300 [May 1960]. 
571 VI, 225/275 [15th Jan. 1960]. 
572 VI, 193/244 [20th May, 1959]. 
573 VI, 72/100. 
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i. Two Dualisms. 
If this project is indeed widely acknowledged in Merleau-Ponty 
scholarship, there remains an ambiguity in most analyses as to the structure of 
Merleau-Ponty’s way out of this dualism. Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is an effort 
to overcome two correlative dualisms: the dualism of the subject and the object, 
and that of Being and nothingness. There are two standard ways to overcome 
dualism: the first one is to add a middle term to the two incommensurables, 
thereby replacing a dualism by a trialism.574 The second is to incorporate the two 
opposites into a greater whole. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, neither is acceptable. 
In la Résistance du Sensible, Emmanuel Alloa claims that Merleau-Ponty 
chooses  the first path and states that « Merleau-Ponty failed to detach himself 
from a conception of the world directed by a subject-object divide»575, and that la 
« distance, which makes vision possible, is still thought [by Merleau-Ponty] on 
the mode of the ‘void’ between vision and what it sees, as in Democritus’ 
theory.»576 He concludes that: 
"we fail to shake off the impression that Merleau-Ponty is stuck in his own trap. Even as 
he seeks to overcome the diplopia of Western dualism thanks to what resembles a correction of 
the gaze, he confirms the relevance of this diplopia."577  
                                                 
574 I described in IV how this is the solution Merleau-Ponty endorses implicitly in PP, by placing 
the pre-objective between the objective and the subjective, before transforming the subjective and 
the objective into horizonal poles. It is this transformation I describe in this section.  
575 Emmanuel Alloa, la Résistance du Sensible, op. Cit. 99.  
576 Ibid. 100. Merleau-Ponty insists that this “void” is “not an ontological void, a non-being”, VI, 
192. 
577 Ibid. 97 
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Even though he seems to endorse another reading in earlier works such as 
his remarkable analysis of the phenomenological reduction in Desire and 
Distance,578 some of Renaud Barbaras’ more recent contributions seem to return 
to a reading of this sort. In 2003’s "Life as Perceptual Intentionality," he writes:  
"Merleau-Ponty [...] radically criticizes the philosophy of consciousness and recognizes 
that it is necessary to take another starting point; that is, he recognizes that one must seriously 
take into account the fact of embodiment. However, this new starting point still maintains the 
duality of subject and object, consciousness and the material body, because it is described in 
terms of the visibility of the seeing and the unity of touching and touched."579  
This way of reading Merleau-Ponty’s final efforts is in fact omnipresent 
in Merleau-Ponty scholarship, in forms often subtle and sometimes even 
contradictory.580 The argument developed by these readings, namely that one 
cannot maintain subject and object in their radical form while maintaining their 
union on the other, is correct. However, the premise that Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
maintain these is erroneous. In fact, as early as his course on passivity of 1954-
55, Merleau-Ponty defends himself sternly against such misunderstandings of his 
position:  
                                                 
578 Renaud Barbaras, “the Phenomenological Reduction as Critique of Nothingness » in Desire 
and Distance, (trans. Paul B. Milan) Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 2005 45-61; see also, 
“de l’Ontologie de l’Objet à l’Ontologie de l’Element," in Le Tournant de l’Expérience, op. Cit. 
201-223 
579 Renaud Barbaras, “Life and perceptual Intentionality”, Research in Phenomenology, 33, 2003, 
p 159. It is apparent here how the reader might get confused in what Merleau-Ponty called the 
“vicious circle” of his philosophy: expressing the non-conceptual through the conceptual does 
not affirm the latter. This will be examined in VI, B. a. i) and in the Conclusion.  
580 See for example, Douglas Low’s “Merleau-Ponty on Truth, Language and Value” op. Cit. 
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"objection (Lachièze-Rey): so, if this is the case, if the body is indeed the mediator of 
our relation with the world, and if you reject the radical distinction between res extensa and res 
cogitans, it is finalism or vitalism. You admit that there is a pre-ordination of the body to its 
fields and to the ‘things’ through a finality that transcends you; or else, a presence of the whole in 
the parts thanks to a quasi ‘soul of the body’"581   
This exemplifies the contradictory position which would allegedly be 
Merleau-Ponty’s: one rejects the distinction of body and soul only to express this 
union in dualistic terms remaining with an unfruitful choice between "finalism" 
or "vitalism."582 This position appears not as a choice in favour of the 
transcendence between two poles, but rather as a choice in favour of one of them. 
Merleau-Ponty rejects this view is as a misconstruction of his ideas and wishes to 
"make [his] project understood, and thereby [to make understood] the 
overcoming of the problem of activity (idealism) and passivity (finality)" by 
"venturing further into the elucidation of the world and the subject."583 This will 
                                                 
581 IP, 165 ff.  
582 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty does not see this objection as an obstacle to his doctrine but as a 
misunderstanding: “in short, they are trying to pull me towards idealism or towards monadology 
when my goal was to affirm the identity with the perceived world as such. In order to explain 
this project—and thus the overcoming of the problem activity (idealism) and passivity 
(finality)—one must enter further into the elucidation of the world and the subject,” IP, 166-7, 
emphasis added. 
583 IP, 166-7. I have made clear in chapter V how we consider that the flesh can only be attained 
through an overcoming of the passive/active divide. In fact, it seems clear to us that the 
« trialist » option must be ruled out on account of Merleau-Ponty’s departure from Husserlian 
orthodoxy. The impossibility of total reduction is in fact the mark of the irreducible and originary 
union between subject and object. It is also remarkable that Merleau-Ponty’s re-formulation of 
the subject/object divide in terms of activity and passivity offers some insight into Alloa’s 
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be achieved in VI. Yet this "elucidation" of an ontology of the union will have to 
avoid a double trap:  
"Philosophy is itself only if it refuses the comforts [facilités] of a single-entry world [un 
monde à une seule entrée] as well as those of a multiple-entry world, which are all accessible to 
the philosopher. Philosophy stands, like the natural man, at the point where one passes from the 
self [le soi] into the world and into the other. At the crossroads."584 
The first danger is to integrate these two poles within an all-
encompassing third term. The second one is to place a middle term between the 
two poles; this is the ‘trialism’ I have just mentioned. The problem of the first 
strategy is that it makes itself unable to account for the distinction of the two 
poles. If he seeks to examine the relation itself, to "place himself at the 
crossroads," Merleau-Ponty will have to navigate between these two traps by 
inaugurating a novel osmosis between them, one that would accomodate for both 
the ontological unity and the dualism of objective thought. He calls this his 
challenge to "open the concept without destroying it"585, to maintain the 
meaningfulness of the concept without maintaining its impossible self-identity.  
 
a. The Subject/Object Distinction. 
The project of Merleau-Ponty in VI is therefore to make of the 
subject-object relation the milieu of reality. This involves a peculiar model of 
                                                 
misreading which takes place in a context that considers that "la chair offre a Merleau-Ponty le 
modèle d’une ontologie de la passivité." Emmanuel Alloa, op. Cit. 96. 
584 VI, 160/210. 
585 S, 138/224. 
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Being because it ceases to understand the relation as derived from its terms.586 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy was revitalized by the discovery of Saussurean 
linguistics which describe language [la langue] and its syntax as being made up 
of "differences without terms."587 As it has often been remarked this discovery 
was decisive for the future developments of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
because it bore directly on the concept of intentionality, but allowed to conceive 
of it independently of its terms.588 Therefore, it offered promising perspectives 
towards answering the problematic first formulated in PP: "we must understand 
how, paradoxically, there is an in-itself for us."589 As Merleau-Ponty declares in 
VI: « I describe perception as a diacritical, relative, oppositional system."590 In 
order to do this, he must reduce subject and object to their union. 
 
                                                 
586 As I have argued in V, B, such terms as subject and object disappear in the phenomenological 
reduction, along with the internal/external and passive/active distinctions, leaving only 
phenomenality as the irreducible object of philosophy. See VI, 251/299: "what is primary, is not 
the diffuse ‘consciousness’ of the ‘images’ [...] it is Being." 
587 In S, 39/63, see also CAL, 96: “In a language, Saussure says, all is negative; there are only 
differences, and no positive terms” which is an approximation of a direct quote from Saussure in 
PW, 31/45.  
588 See for example, Leonard Lawlor’s “Essence and Language, the rupture in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy” in Essays in Celebration of the Founding of the Organisation of Phenomenological 
Organizations, Chan-Fai Cheung, Ivan Chvatik, Ion Copoeru, Lester Embree, Julia Iribarne and 
Hans Rainer Sepp, Web-published at www.o-p-o.net 2003. of 2002, and Martin C. Dillon’s 
Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 181-6.  
589 PP, 71/86. 
590 VI, 217/267. 
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1.  The Cogito. 
In the notes of January and February 1959, Merleau-Ponty 
is concerned with two issues. One is the application of diacriticism to ontology; 
the other is a self-critical evaluation of the "phenomenological cogito" he 
elaborated in PP. What is the connection between these two questions? The 
discovery of diacriticism implied for Merleau-Ponty the awareness that language 
was logically anterior to the objective structure of the world, not the reverse. 
This realisation led to the rejection of the apparently necessary pairing of relation 
and terms. As regards the cogito, this means primarily that there cannot be a 
"pre-linguistic" or "pre-objective" cogito because the affirmation of the 
subjective pole it implies is derived from language and not anterior to it: "what I 
call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the idea of ‘thinking’ [...] it is 
necessary to have words."591 As I pointed out in IV, A, this re-balancing of the 
subjective and objective poles through a withdrawal of the subjective was 
                                                 
591 VI, 171/222. The self-criticisms regarding the Cogito have led to read Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought as having undergone a break somewhere between PP and VI. This question depends on 
the structural weight one places on the Cogito in For Lawlor (cf infra) and Barbaras (“Conscience 
et Perception, le Cogito dans la Phenomenologie de la Perception”), the Cogito informs the rest 
of Those who seek to maintain the continuity in Merleau-Ponty’s thought are sometimes led to 
minimise Merleau-Ponty’s self-criticisms and therby are led to the trialist position described 
above (see for example Douglas Low, “Merleau-Ponty on truth, language and value," Philosophy 
Today, Spring 2001; 45, 1, 69-75). There is another way to maintain the continuity of Merleau-
Ponty’s thought, which is indeed distinctly Merleau-Pontian inasmuch as it reads a unique 
inspiration beyond its successive, and sometimes mistaken, textual incarnations. Such a reading 
sees Merleau-Ponty’s evolution as an explicitation; see for example, Martin. C. Dillon, Merleau-
Ponty’s Ontology,Op. Cit.  
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already initiated in 1947’s "on the Metaphysical in Man" where Merleau-Ponty 
transferred the cogito from the subjective pole to the interpolar relation itself. 
There, he writes: "the fundamental metaphysical fact is this double sense of the 
cogito: I am sure that there is being –under the condition that I do not seek 
another sort of being than being-for-me."592 In other words, there is neither 
Being nor me, only being-for-me, only intentionality. 
 
2. The Object. 
The rejection of the objective pole, although structurally 
connected to that of the subjective one,593 is clarified by Merleau-Ponty in terms 
of a continuity of the visible and the invisible. Although I will specifically 
discuss the relation of the visible and the invisible in a moment, let me first 
mention that their interdependence emphasised everywhere by Merleau-Ponty 
coincides with the rejection of the objective pole. This interdependence shows 
                                                 
592 SNS, 93/114 t.a. 
593 This is made most obvious in the “Philosopher and his Shadow," where Merleau-Ponty, in the 
space of three pages, rejects the objective and then the subjective poles outside of being. First, he 
writes: “In the realm of reduction, there is no longer anything but consciousness, its acts and their 
intentional objects. This is why Husserl can write that Nature is relative to mind and that Nature 
is relative and mind absolute,” S, 162/264 and then to quote Husserl who writes: “‘the existence 
of mental realities, and a real mental world is tied to the existence in the first sense of the term, to 
the existence of a material nature, and it is so linked not for contingent reasons but for reasons of 
principle’ [...] We quote those lines," writes Merleau-Ponty, “only to provide a counterpoise to 
those which affirmed the relativity of Nature and the non-relativity of the mind and demolished 
the sufficiency of Nature and the truth of the natural attitude that are here reaffirmed. In the last 
anlysis, phenomenology is neither a materialism nor a philosophy of mind.” S, 164-5/268. t.a. 
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that objectivity and subjectivity are both falsification of each other.594 For 
Merleau-Ponty, in fact, the object is nothing more than the approximation of the 
fully determined object one guesses at through an essentially unfinished set of 
perceptions:  
"I say that I perceive correctly when my body has a precise hold on the spectacle, but 
that does not mean that my hold is ever all-embracing; it would be so only if I had succeeded in 
reducing to a state of articulate perception all the inner and outer horizons of the object, which is 
in the nature of things impossible. In experiencing a perceived truth, I assume that the 
concordance so far experienced would hold for a more detailed observation; I place my 
confidence in the world."595 
In other words, we do not perceive the determinate object, we guess it.596 
This essential horizonality of the object is warranted by the interdependence of 
the visible and the invisible. The "overdetermination"597 which arbitrarily 
determines the horizonal object is, like in the case of the subjective pole, derived 
from the concept as horizon sedimented into an apparence of object:  
                                                 
594 « the unity of the subject or that of the object is not a real unity, but a supposed unity at the 
horizon of experience » PP, 220/254, see also VI, 160 ff./210, ff. 
595 PP, 297/343. See also VI, 246/295, [May, 1960] « when [the visible] arises frontally [de face]; 
it is from [c’est à partir de] the horizon." 
596 For a thorough account of the Gestaltic foundations of this claim, see Henry Somers-Hall’s 
“Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: the Aesthetics of Difference”. Symposium: Canadian Journal of 
Continental Philosophy (Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale) Vol. 10, Issue 1, March 
2006,pp. 213-221. 
597 VI, 240/289 [March 1960] 
 284 
"every concept is first a horizonal generality, a generality of style—there is no longer a 
problem of the concept, generality, the idea, when one has understood that the sensible itself is 
invisible."598 
These statements point to a continuum between the visible and the 
invisible and between the determinate and the indeterminate, reducing both poles 
to the status of horizons. In fact, visible and invisible are "negation-reference" 
for each other, not so much each other’s opposite as each other’s horizon, the 
"degree zero"599 of each other. Through this concept of « negation-reference » 
Merleau-Ponty transforms the duality of the visible and the invisible into a 
continuum. 
 These remarks about the horizonal status of the subjective and objective 
poles to the benefit of their relation are simply a translation of the acquisitions of 
chapter V (which were expressed in terms of 'phenomenality' or 'intentionality') 
into Merleau-Ponty’s ontological language. However, they bring out the 
implications of the renewed concept of reduction to the ontological realm: by 
letting the two poles of the subject-object relation vanish over the horizon, 
Merleau-Ponty focuses his ontological investigation on the unity of their bi-facial 
relation. He signifies how the reduction to phenomenality was in fact a reduction 
to the general, thus installing phenomenality in the place of Being. At this point, 
it is necessary to remark that this "ontological" investigation (precisely because it 
focuses on the transcendental between the external poles, and thereby rejects 
outside of Being those very poles) was first approached by Merleau-Ponty not as 
an ontology but as the defining inquiry of metaphysics. In "the Metaphysical in 
                                                 
598 VI, 237/286, [Feb. 1960] See also VI, 272 
599 VI, 257/305, [May, 1960]. 
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Man" just after transforming the cogito into an affirmation of the link between 
man and world, Merleau-Ponty writes: "metaphysics is the deliberate intention to 
describe this paradox of consciousness and truth, of exchange and 
communication."600 Recall that it is in this same work that Merleau-Ponty first 
urged himself to undertake an inquiry into the ‘origin of truth.' This metaphysical 
caracterisation of his ultimate project is only reinforced by the note from VI 
quoted above. Although there is no question that in many instances Merleau-
Ponty explicitly refers to his project as an ontology, there is, to my knowledge, 
no significant occurrence of the words "ontology" or "ontological"601 in any of 
Merleau-Ponty’s published writings past the date of this declaration in May 
1960. This profession of faith in "metaphysicism" is intended as an opposition to 
a certain ontology which finds its ground in an opposition of Being and 
Nothingness. For Merleau-Ponty, there would be no sense in patiently 
overcoming the distinctions we have seen him undo only to finally succumb to 
this one. 
 
 
 
                                                 
600 SNS, 95/115. 
601 There is one reference to “Sartre and classical ontology” (VI, 254/302, [May 1960]) as regards 
“ontological”, Merleau-Ponty uses the word to qualify the anal instinct in the child according to 
Freud of a “concrete ontology," but it is fair to say that this hardly constitutes an affirmation of 
ontological faith, if anything, it is an affirmation of ontology beyond the ontic/ontological divide 
insofar as it is seen as “concrete ontology”. See VI, 269/317, [Nov. 1960]. In any case, none of 
these two references can be understood as self-descriptive. 
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b. Ontic and Ontological. 
Therefore, the strategy of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre’s 
dialectic of Being and nothingness, as exposed in "Interrogation and Dialectic," 
is to demonstrate firstly that the absolute externality of the two principles is 
incompatible with their communication, and secondly that the impossibility of 
their communication makes even their difference impossible. Absolute 
difference is indifference. If the two poles are determined by opposition to each 
other when such an opposition is impossible (because it would require some 
form of contact), the absolute determination of Being and the absolute 
indetermination of nothingness eventually transfer to each other. Merleau-Ponty 
writes, "we are beyond monism and dualism, because dualism has been pushed 
so far that the opposites, no longer in competition, are at rest the one against the 
other;"602 indeed, this makes Being and nothingness "synonymous."603 Further, 
the ontology of Being and nothingness which states their absolute externality, 
makes the fact of incarnation (a subject—nothingness—inside an object) 
impossible. Therefore, it is unable to provide an account for the ontic level and is 
hardly an ontology at all.  
 This critique delineates the task at hand for Merleau-Ponty: his ontology 
will have to account for an unbroken link between Being and the beings under 
penalty of missing the "most important" which is "the experience which passes 
through the wall of Being;"604 in short, it will have to account for the ontic. This 
                                                 
602 VI, 54/79. 
603 VI, 237/287. 
604 S, 22/40, t.a. 
 287 
is reinforced by a consequence of the critical remarks addressed to Sartre: the 
absolute externality of Being and nothingness problematises the voice of the 
philosopher who formulates it insofar as it drowns it into externality or 
internality, which are the same thing. For Merleau-Ponty, as we saw, "direct 
ontology" is impossible. To accesss Being as such, one would have to be a non-
perceptual being. The solution lies in his "indirect ontology (Being in the 
beings)," which allows him to elaborate an ontology from within being:  
"wild or brute being, contra sedimented-ontic being. Ontology which defines being from 
within and no longer from without: on every level, being is infrastructure, [membrure], hinge 
[charnière] and not offered in perspective and demanding the construal of what lies behind these 
appearances."605 
This signifies that the very possibility of ontology is dependent on the 
link between the ontological and the ontic, because ontology reaches Being only 
through the beings. As such, this ontology must seek Being as "infrastructure," 
that is to say, it must seek the general as located inside the particular. We can 
now understand Merleau-Ponty better when he writes:  
"the distinction physico-chemistry-life = distinction of the eventful [l’évènementiel] and 
the structural;—of the ontic and the ontological;—of individual spatio-temporal facts whose 
localisation is unique and the architectonics."606 
This remark is precious because it establishes a web of equivalences 
between distinctions (eventfulness and structure; the ontic and the ontological; 
the spatio-temporal and the architectonics) which will help pose the question that 
                                                 
605 N, 282. 
606 N, 268. 
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the concept of "flesh" is designed to answer: the question of the relations of the 
particular and the general.607 
One of the lessons of the critique of the Sartrean absolutisation of Being 
and nothingness is that overcoming such an opposition can only be achieved by a 
softening of the distinction between the local and the general. Indeed, how could 
we transcend the ontic world if there was no generality located within the 
"spatio-temporal objects"? Conversely, how can the general have any relation to 
the local as its principle if it is precisely deprived of locality?608 This is no 
question for traditional metaphysics for which "all the determinations are 
negation in the sense of: are only negations."609 For such a metaphysics, the local 
                                                 
607 VI, 147/191 One of Merleau-Ponty’s first concerns in VI is to reduce this manifold of dualities 
to a unified denomination. Eventually, it is the local/general divide which will show itself to be 
the central problem, under the heading of the opposition of facts and essences: “this double 
thinking which opposes the principles and the fact saves with the term ‘principle’ only a 
presumption [préjugé] of the essence” VI, 112/149. 
608 Merleau-Ponty attributes a similar point to Hegel in his contemporaneous Notes de Cours of 
1959-1961: « Principe posited by Hegel: it is by way of a phenomenology (apparition of the 
spirit) (spirit in the phenomenon) that we access the absolute. Not that the spirit phenommenon is 
a means, a ladder after whichone accesses the absolute, but because the absolute would not be 
absolute if we didn’t appear in this way." NC, 275. This is why Merleau-Ponty seeks to include 
locality as a component of being: « an impossible labour of experience on experience [de 
l’expérience sur l’expérience] that would strip it of its facticity as if it were an impurity » VI, 
112/149. 
609 VI, 169/221, [Jan. 17, 1959], this is an idea probably inspired by the study of Malebranche. 
Compare Ginette Dreyfus, answering Merleau-Ponty’s question regarding the way Malebranche 
“finds a way” between being and nothingness less than a year after this note was written: “there 
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does not have to be accounted for as such, because the general contains it. There 
is nothing that the local has that the general has not. The local is ‘merely' a 
restriction of the general. For Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, locality must be 
given a positive value precisely because its finitude is anterior to the thought of 
the infinite; it is within facts that we find essences610 and not the other way 
around. It is a consequence of Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the ontic-ontological 
divide that phenomenal reality cannot be reduced to anything else. Instead, the 
ontological principle has to be phenomenal too.  
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology will thus seek to integrate the principle of 
localisation within being. This gives being (qua flesh) a phenomenal dimension:  
“the flesh [la chair] is not matter, is not spirit [esprit], is not substance. To designate it, 
one should need the old term ‘element,' in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth and 
fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and 
the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of 
being. The flesh is in this sense an ‘element’ of being. Not a fact or a sum of facts, and yet 
adherent to location and to the now. Much more: the inauguration of the where and the when, the 
possibility and exigency for the fact; in a word, facticity. What makes a fact be a fact.”611  
                                                 
is a new for of thought," says Dreyfus, “the negative is not a diminutive Being any more." P2, 
269 
610 « the things are essences at the level of nature » VI, 273/220. 
611 VI, 139-140/181-182. This text was presumably written in the early months of 1961. The 
concept of “element” is first employed in this sense by Merleau-Ponty in his account of Bergson 
given as a paper in May 1959 and published the next year in S, and it is noteworthy that it is 
already given as a solution to the problems raised by a pure concept of essence and of an infinite 
as absolute indeterminacy: “Bergson’s God is immense ather than infinite, or He is a qualitative 
infinite. He is the element of joy or love in the sense that water and fire are elements. Like 
sentient and human beings, He is a radiance, not en essence” S, 190/309. A few months after the 
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Facticity is the essence of facts; as such it is neither essence nor fact. It 
must for this reason be ‘midway’ between the thing and the idea. Indeed, 
Merleau-Ponty rejects facts and essences as overdeterminate.612 We also know 
that overdeterminate terms are incompatible with their mutual relation. This 
makes the status of the element problematic because it means that in an objective 
world there cannot be any « mid-way » between these two poles, because 
between them, there is no « way » to speak of. So far, we have approached being 
as element only with reference to the overdeterminate terms of fact and essence, 
it is clear now that this approach is impossible. Merleau-Ponty now has to 
reverse the traditional account of relation as derived from its terms into an 
account of the terms as derived from the relation. In order to address this 
question, we must first examine the status of these terms in greater detail.  
 
ii.  Less-than-Determinacy. 
 
 Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of polar thought amounts to a rejection of 
absolute determinacy. In fact, as I pointed out in IV, the thought that absolute 
determinacy means the « death of consciousness » guided much of his work 
since PP. Now again, it becomes apparent that the solution to all dualisms for 
Merleau-Ponty is to be found in a horizonalisation of the poles. 
                                                 
text on Bergson, in the Fall of 1959, the notion re-surface in the sessions of the course on Nature 
devoted to Bergson, as a note stressing the necessity to “define a Being in-between, an inter-
Being[un inter-être]”. N, 292. 
612 « the facts and the essences are abstractions » VI, 117/154 
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In order to examine Merleau-Ponty’s use and understanding of 
indeterminacy, we must make a quick detour through his reading of Bergson. As 
regards the misconception that Being and nothingness are absolutely determinate 
and mutually exclusive poles, Bergson’s alleged positivism is in the same basket 
as Sartre’s negativism. This is because Merleau-Ponty’s target is not negativism 
nor positivism, it is the very alternative they both posit:  
“At first sight, it may seem paradoxical to compare two philosophies of which one is 
essentially a positivism, and the other a negativism. The fact of the matter is that neither accepts 
any mixture [mélange] of being and nothingness”613.  
Beyond this critique however, Merleau-Ponty detects in Bergson’s 
positivism an inconsistency which points in a promising direction for his own 
project: "the genuine sense of Bergsonian philosophy is not so much to eliminate 
the idea of nothingness as it is to incorporate it into the idea of being."614 This, of 
course, is contrary to Bergson’s intentions, but it is also in Merleau-Ponty’s 
mind, the way towards the solution of most of Bergson’s aporiae. This peculiar 
use of Bergson’s ‘shadow philosophy’ on Merleau-Ponty’s part has far-reaching 
consequences in two respects: on the question of solving the divide between 
                                                 
613 N, 101, “Note on Bergson and Sartre”. Later on, in VI, Merleau-ponty will reject the term 
“mélange” to designate the fusion of being and nothingness, the confrontation with this passage 
from Nature makes it obvious that it is not the “mélange” so much as the assumption that a 
“mélange” affirms its ingredients as primary over the mixture that Merleau-Ponty rejects: his 
ontology is one of the mélange if seen from the inauthentic point of view of the polarity of being 
and nothingness. Cf. VI, 237/285, [Feb. 1960] “for me, the negative means absolutely nothing, 
and the positive neither (they are synonymous) and that not by appeal to a vague ‘blend’ 
[‘mélange’] of being and nothingness, the structure is not a ‘blend.'” 
614 N, 97. 
 292 
"nature naturée" and "nature naturante" (Bergson’s own ontic/ontological 
divide) and on the solution to the question of history. This second point will be 
discussed later, but let me now examine the first one.  
 In Merleau-Ponty’s mind, Bergson’s inability to overcome the divide 
between "nature naturante" and "nature naturée" is due to his extreme 
positivism which leads him to construe less than rigorously the question of 
determination. In his course on Bergson, Merleau-Ponty expresses Bergson’s 
problem: "life is mobility, and it makes determinate forms appear within itself. 
However, this determinacy of the living forms separates them from the élan"615. 
This is due to the definition of the "nature naturée" as contingency, as opposed 
to la "nature naturante," seen as fully positive616. For Merleau-Ponty, the divide 
is unbridgeable so long as determination is conceived as negativity. This problem 
cannot be solved if the conception of Being it relies upon remains unquestioned. 
Paradoxically, Merleau-Ponty finds this conception of Bergson’s to be rooted in 
the idea of the "positive infinite" of Descartes and the Cartesians, and he regards 
this common ancestry between Bergson and Sartre as the third term that reunites 
them. In the case of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty explicitly refers to the dialectic of 
being and nothingness as applicable only to a Cartesian universe.617 In the case 
of Bergson, everything seems to contradict this assertion: Bergson precisely 
opposes the Cartesians who thought that "‘to triumph over non-existence, they 
                                                 
615 N, 89. 
616 ibid. 90. 
617 NC 234 « For Descartes, a philosopher is he who posits the alternative between Being and 
Nothingness," see also NC. 98-99 and N, 85. 
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needed necessity [le nécessaire]."618 The Cartesians put nothingness first and 
against this background demanded justification for existence. On the contrary, 
Bergson sees positivity as primary and rejects any idea of nothingness. Yet, 
deducing from this polar opposition an incompatibility between the Cartesians 
and Sartre on the one hand, and Bergson on the other would be to overlook 
Merleau-Ponty’s repeated claim that absolute being and absolute nothingness are 
the same619. In "Everywhere and Nowhere," Merleau-Ponty presents absolute 
positivity (in the form of the "infinite infinite") as "the secret of the Great 
Rationalism"620 of Descartes. Indeed, this absolute positivity was affirmed by the 
Cartesians precisely because a final victory over nothingness was required, and it 
                                                 
618 S, 186/304. My translation. The published translation is clearly wrong at this point. On the 
apparent proximity between Merleau-Ponty and Bergson against the Cartesians and Sartre and its 
eventual unravelling, see Renaud Barbaras, “Perception and Movement, the End of the 
Metaphysical Approach” in Chiasms, Fred Evans & Leonard Lawlor eds. 78-81.  
619 VI, 228/280. 
620 S, 149/242 t.a. Leonard brings his article "the End of Phenomenology" by quoting the same 
passage with opposite effect. According to Lawlor, this passage is "perhaps the greatest thing that 
Merleau-Ponty has ever written," and it expresses Merleau-Ponty's own commitment to an 
absolutely infinite Being. Unfrtunately, both the context of the text quoted (a presentation of the 
"Great Rationalism" of Descartes, and Merleau-Ponty's thoughts on the absolute infinite in 
connection to Descartes, Sartre and Bergson, as I have oresented here, oppose Lawlor's claim. 
Lawlor supports his claim by quoting Merleau-Ponty's affirmation that being is "infinity" in VI. 
This is not sufficient to interpret Merleau-Ponty's characterisation of Cartesianism as self-
descriptive, if we consider that Merleau-Ponty's main argument is against the infinite as absolute, 
not against the infinite tout court. Everything takes place as if Lawlor overlooked the singular 
power of the concept of infinite which can be restricted and still infinite: that not every infinite is 
"infinite infinite". See Leonard Lawlor, Thinking through French Philosophy, op. Cit. 93-94.  
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is only in this sense that one can understand determinacy as negativity. In other 
words, any limitation to absolute positivity is so much ground relinquished to 
nothingness. It appears then that the absolute positivity of the Rationalists with 
its background in nothingness represents the paradigm for both Sartre and 
Bergson’s philosophies for opposite—that is to say identical—reasons621: they 
both see restriction as negativity. This outlines a contrario the route Merleau-
Ponty needs to follow:  
"what we are seeking, on the contrary, is a genuine explicitation of Being, i.e. not the 
display of a being, even infinite, in which would take place—in a way which is in principle 
incomprehensible to us—the articulation of the beings with each other, but the unveiling of 
Being as what they modelise or cut out [découpent]."622  
By virtue of the synonymity of Being and nothingness, it is impossible to 
regard beings as failed absolutes (determinate qua restricted) because they would 
be failed with regard to literally nothing. This means that determination cannot 
be accounted for by a concept of Being that would not also exemplify 
determinacy: determinacy is not less than absolute, it is other-than-absolute, and 
any concept of Being must account for this. But, Merleau-Ponty laments: 
"Bergson never sees the positive value of our finitude."623 If he wants to provide 
a concept of Being that includes the principle of spatio-temporality, Merleau-
Ponty needs to liberate his ontology from the alternative of determinacy and 
                                                 
621 See VI, 196/246-7 [May 1959]. “it is Sartre, it is Bergson, negativism or ultra-positivism 
(Bergson)-indiscernible.” 
622 N, 266. 
623 IS, 101/102, the emphasis is in the text. It it is clear from the context that the finitude in 
question is that of incarnation.  
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indeterminacy in the same way that he liberated it from facts versus essences. 
We have seen that a semi-determinate ontological principle is approximated 
through the concept of the "element." This involves a seemingly contradictory 
double movement of promoting determinacy and indeterminacy, or, more 
accurately, of establishing a concept of indeterminacy which unifies the two. 
That is to say, we must take indeterminacy in the literal sense, as neither fully 
determinate nor indeterminate. Because of the usual sense of ‘indeterminacy’ as 
‘non-determinacy,' I shall refer to this notion as 'less-than-determinacy.' This 
concept is clarified in Merleau-Ponty's analyses of the relations of the visible and 
the invisible. 
 
a. Being as Presence. 
The visible and the invisible are both principles of restriction for 
each other.624 It is in the structured balance between these two principles that the 
perceived world—that is, the world—surges.625 This is a radical shift from the 
philosophies of the absolute because it lends the status of an ontological principle 
to restriction. Restriction is no longer the mere consequence of the (inexplicable) 
encounter of Being and nothingness. The opposition and interdependence of the 
visible and the invisible involves the impossibility of one or the other as 
                                                 
624 See VI, 215/265 [Nov. 1959]: “the Visible itself has an invisible inner framework [membrure 
d’invisible] and the invisible is the secret counterpart of the visible” and VI, 257/305 [May 1960]: 
“the invisible is [...] relative to the visible” t.a. 
625 Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon, op. Cit. 231ff. For Bergson’s version of this 
claim, see N, 84. 
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absolutes.626 In their pure form, they are but horizons ("negation-reference")627 of 
each other and in experience, they are placed in a continuum. This means that 
there is an invisibility of the visible as well as a visibility of the invisible. This is 
why it is impossible to conceive of the title of the Visible and the Invisible to be 
about a duality in the same way as Being and Nothingness. One cannot say that 
Merleau-Ponty replaces a dialectic of being and nothingness with a dialectic of 
the visible and the invisible because Merleau-Ponty’s book is concerned only 
with the "and" of the title. If strictly speaking there is no visible or invisible, 
there is no question that there is the pair of the visible and the invisible. This pair 
is anterior to either term. Merleau-Ponty unifies it under the heading 
"visibility" before designating it by his final concept of "flesh." This 
intertwinement of the visible and the invisible entails that the perceptual world is 
essentially indeterminate in the sense of less-than-determinate.  
We may now return to Merleau-Ponty’s preference for metaphysics by 
looking at the complex passage where this striking declaration takes place: 
 "World and being: their relation is that of the visible and the invisible (latency) the 
invisible is not another visible (‘possible’ in the logical sense) a positive only absent.  
It is Verborgenheit by principle i.e. invisible of the visible, Offenheit of the Umwelt and 
not Unendlichkeit—Unendlichkeit is at bottom the in-itself, the ob-ject – For me the infinity of 
Being that one can speak of is operative, militant finitude: the openness of the Umwelt – I am 
against finitude in the empirical sense, a factual existence that has limits, and this is why I am 
for metaphysics. But it lies no more in infinity than in the factual finitude."628 
                                                 
626 An absolute visible like an absolute invisible amount phenomenologically to nothing by 
anihilation of the perceiving subject or the perceptual object. See VI, 131/171. 
627 VI, 254/305 [May 1960]. 
628 VI, 251/300 [May 1960]. 
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Merleau-Ponty re-introduces negativity within Being with startling 
results. The invisible cannot be conceived as "absent," for two apparently 
contradictory reasons:  
Firstly, the invisible conceived as the absence of the visible makes it a 
positive visible only to be seen elsewhere, in another visual field. This 
contradicts the nature of the invisible because it fails to acknowledge the 
invisible as inherent to the visible,629 the fact that we imperceive even as we 
perceive. Furthermore, it contradicts the nature of the visible itself by assuming 
that the visible can be itself without being supported by the invisible630: there is a 
simultaneity of the visible and the invisible in visibility.  
Secondly, and paradoxically, seeing the invisible as the invisible of the 
visible makes it possible for it to be present while still being invisible; it is 
present precisely as the principle of this visual field.631 Thus, Merleau-Ponty 
seems to radicalise the invisible’s absence only to make its presence possible, as 
                                                 
629 VI, 257/305 [May 1960]. For the equivalence of the couple negative/positive and 
invisible/visible, see also N, 275. 
630 In fact, the naive readings of perspectivism addressed in the previous chapter, which read 
Merleau-Ponty as building perspectival truth through a synthesis of multiple perspectival truths 
without realising that the truth thus gained cannot be of the same level as those make precisley 
the mistake of assuming that all the truth is visible, only to be seen in different places, through 
different perspectives. This is made impossible because it loses precisely the crux of Merleau-
Ponty’s efforts: to understand locality as ontologically relevant. It is clear that this view of 
perspectivism which seeks the object as self-identical, as in the sciences, loses precisely the 
invisible as ontologically valid. It maintains the Cartesian idea of negativity as mere restriction.  
631 This separation of presence and visibility indeed figures the possibility of ontology itself: 
there can be access to an invisible through experience. 
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"presence of an absence."632 This presence is the object of an "imperception"633 
which is nothing other than the reverse of perception itself, its "invisible" as it 
were.634 At this point, it is worth recalling PP’s process of perceptual 
determination as described in IV, B, 1 and which is at work in VI: perceptual 
determination is an essentially infinite process whose "negintuition" of its own 
incompleteness is always somewhat perceived (as "dissatisfaction," says PP), 
although not necessarily always noticed until it raises to conceptual awareness 
through sedimentation. The pairing of the visible and the invisible seems to 
translate this impossibility of absolute determination into the ontological realm: 
visible and invisible lead into each other indefinitely. This is crucial because it 
shows a clear choice on Merleau-Ponty’s part: when confronted with the 
alternative of weakening the notion of Being in its opposition to nothingness or 
that of presence in its opposition to absence, Merleau-Ponty chooses to save 
presence. He would rather have a negative present (the invisible) than a positive 
                                                 
632 IP, 178: “What resists to objectivistic ontology: Dingwahrnemung as mute contact with a 
term: [s]elbstgegebenheit, leibhaftgegeben, presence. In fact, even at this level of Nature, it is 
presence of an absence: infinite content, presentation through Abschattungen” (personal 
translation). See also, VI, 167/219-220 [Jan 1959] and OE, 85: “the property [le propre de] of the 
visible is to have a lining of invisible in the strict sense, which it majes present like a certain 
absence." 
633 Claude Lefort, “Le Corps, la Chair," 17: “the invisible is all at once the pure difference that 
supports visibility, the common share of the visible and the seer, and pure indifference; to see is 
to overlook what allows one to see, to see is to imperceive the gap [écart] between the figure and 
the background” (personal translation). 
634 See for instance the very important note of Jan 1960 where the child’s intuitive understanding 
of the “male-female relation” is seen as a case of imperception (the other sex), VI, 226/277. 
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absent (the visible elsewhere). Contrary to the polar philosophies, presence 
unifies the opposites: there is both the presence of absence and the presence of 
presence. The choice is clear: admitting the possibility of absence would be 
affirming the "bad" infinity of positivity, which eventually leads into the "in-
itself," and the "death of consciousness" in full determinacy. It would give a 
negative ontological value to the empirical limitations of our field of vision as 
limitations ("finitude in the empirical sense"). Instead, Merleau-Ponty chooses to 
give a positive ontological value to our locality no longer as limitation but as the 
very access into generality, and he favours the odd couple of empirical infinity 
(as "openness") and ontological finitude. This is problematic however, because it 
suggests that the ‘metaphysics’ in question here is just as faintly conventional a 
metaphysics as it is an ontology. If we have just seen that ontology is the 
overdetermination of Being, for Merleau-Ponty, "metaphysics [...] is a 
sublimation of the being [l’étant],"635 a belief in absolute determinacy. It is not 
surprising then that within the perspective of building a doctrine of 
indeterminacy as 'less-than-determinacy,' the metaphysical pole seems as remote 
as the ontological one from the ground sought, since it is a ground that allows for 
a restricted kind of infinite. 
This is why Merleau-Ponty makes a choice. He chooses, as he writes, one 
« kind of infinite," the infinite of human possibilities (the "militant finitude,") 
which I shall return to later. This means that Merleau-Ponty sacrifices the 
fullness of Being to an ontological account of locality. This, he says, is "why [he 
is] for metaphysics." From an orthodox ontological point of view, however, the 
                                                 
635 VI, 186/238 [May 1959]. 
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concept of Being proposed here remains unsatisfactory because it falls short of 
respecting the ontic/ontological divide. This is why Merleau-Ponty refers to the 
flesh as "being that is not full [de l’être qui ne soit pas noyau dur],"636 or to 
presence as a weak version of the Being of traditional ontology. Of course, the 
‘weakness’ of Merleau-Ponty’s Being is an expression of its indeterminacy. 
Given the indeterminate character of both the visible and the invisible, the 
concept that reunites them must be carefully chosen in order to avoid achieving 
their unification by overdetermining them.637 It must be a "less-than-
determinate" concept whose (few) determinations must be encountered in both 
the visible and the invisible.  
The concept of presence satisfies both the visible and the invisible 
without reducing one to the other insofar as they remain horizontally distinct in 
presence. They have different modes of presence, namely perception and 
imperception. This is what Merleau-Ponty means with his famous formula: 
"seeing is by principle seeing more than one sees."638 Seeing is both perceiving 
and imperceiving. Furthermore, the concept of presence fulfills the 
characteristics of an "element." It stands half-way between a thing and an idea 
because it offers a generality which is co-extensive to the world itself (the 
phenomenal world—the only world—is entirely present as either visible or 
invisible), and at the same time, it exhibits the determinability of locality 
                                                 
636 N, 286. 
637 In PP, presence is already presented as the union of the abstract entities that are the subject 
and the object: “subject and object are two moments of a unique structure which is presence”. 
PP, 492/430. 
638 S, 21/38. 
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precisely insofar as it holds the invisible, that is to say the principle of locality, 
within itself. This union of the horizonally distinguished poles within presence, 
which contains the principles of spatio-temporal existence, amounts to a 
« softening » of the notion of being:  
"Being and the imaginary are for Sartre ‘objects,' ‘entities’—For me they are elements 
(in Bachelard’s sense), that is, not objects, not fields, soft being [des êtres doux], non-thetic 
being, being before being [...] dehiscence that knows itself as such."639 
 In a section of the appendix to VI entitled « Presence," Merleau-Ponty 
offers another description of these "fields":  
«the thing, the pebble, the shell, we said, do not have the power to exist no matter what; 
they are only soft forces [des forces douces] that develop their implications on condition that 
favourable circumstances be assembled. »640  
In these passages, there is a clear identification of the « softening » of 
Being and its indeterminacy leading into openness as contingency. 
 
b. The Human within the Infinite. 
In his critique of the absolute of the Cartesians, Merleau-Ponty 
opposes the "positive infinite" not with a negative one, but with a "restricted" 
one, what he calls, "a certain kind of infinity."641 For Merleau-Ponty, the way out 
of—or rather, the way between—both indeterminacy and absolute determinacy is 
offered by the very nature of the infinite: there are different genres of infinites, 
                                                 
639 VI, 267/314 [Nov. 1960]. t.a. See also the sidenote of 109/144: “what is not nothing is 
something, but this something is not hard as diamond, not unconditioned” 
640 VI, 161/212. 
641 The infinite of the Cartesians is « a positive infinite, or (since every restriction to a certain type 
of infinite would be a seed of negation), an infinite infinite » S, 149/241 
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and some infinites are determinate in the sense of less-than-determinate.642 The 
infinite of the perceptual movement of determination (discussed in chapter IV), 
being circumscribed by the visible and the invisible, is one of them. This infinite 
is structured (restricted) enough to provide the framework necessary to support a 
meaningful concept of Being as both general and specific enough for accounting 
for everything in its phenomenological visibility (that is, determinacy). In fact, a 
rigourous understanding of the concept of infinite reveals that there cannot be 
any indeterminate infinite:  
"Their [the Cartesians’] notion of infinity is positive. They have devaluated the closed 
world for the benefit of a positive infinity, of which they speak as one speaks of some thing, 
which they demonstrate in ‘objective philosophy’ –the signs are reversed: all the determinations 
are negations in the sense of: are only negation—this is an avoidance of the infinite rather than 
an acknowledgement of it--Infinity congealed or given to a thought that possesses it at least 
enough to be able to prove it. The veritable infinity cannot be that: it must be what exceeds us: 
the infinity of Offenheit and not Unendlichkeit—Infinity of the Lebenswelt and not infinity of 
idealization. Negative infinity therefore."643  
The infinite cannot be at the same time a thing (objectivation is 
determination-restriction) and an absolute positivity. This contradiction is 
maintained at the cost of the Lebenswelt. Indeed, positing an absolute infinite is a 
contradiction in terms because it casts outside of it a subject who posits it in a 
way that affirms an outside of this infinite. It does away with the ontological 
importance of spatio-temporal existence by depriving it of its claims to ontology: 
                                                 
642 A standard illustration of this is the relation of the series of natural numbers with the series of 
the evens: they are both infinite series although the first one is twice as long as the second one, 
which is determined/restricted  by the extra requirement to “be divisible by two." 
643 VI, 169/221, [17th Jan. 1959]. 
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yes, there is a thought that "possesses" this infinite, but no, this thought is not 
incarnate, indeed, the thought is infinite itself, since it ‘possesses’ the infinite. 
The positivism of rationalism amounts therefore to the rejection of incarnation. 
As a consequence, one believes that spatio-temporal reality is only a degenerated 
(restricted) version of this infinite. At this point, the "signs are upside down" 
because instead of seeing the infinite as arising from existence, it sees existence 
as arising from the infinite. For Merleau-Ponty—nagainst Sartre—644 the 
Lebenswelt is the world whose being is in question645 and this world is not all 
positive (in the sense of self-identical).  
This means that any consistent concept of infinite must include the 
human existence and be attributed some determination; it must be merely a 
                                                 
644 VI, 237/285-6 [Feb. 1960]. “I take my starting point where Sartre ends, in the Being taken up 
by the for-itself—it is for him the finishing point because he starts with being and negativity and 
constructs their union. For me, it is structure or transcendence that explains, and being and 
nothingness (in Sartre’s sense) are its two abstract properties. For an ontology from within, 
transcendence does not have to be constructed, from the first it is, as being doubled with 
nothingness, and what is to be explained is this doubling” 
645 VI, 185/236, [March 1959]: “this is not at all this [the analysis of Kant and Descartes] which 
Husserl’s Offenheit or Heidegger’s Verborgenheit means: the ontological milieu is not thought of 
as an order of ‘human representation’ in contrast with an order of the in-itself—It is a matter of 
understanding tha ttruth itself has no meaning outside of the relation of transcendence, outside of 
the Überstieg towards the horizon." This is a problematic that has not left Merleau-Ponty’s 
concern ever since PP, see for instance: “The contradiction which we find between the reality of 
the world and its incompleteness is the contradiction between the omnipresence of consciousness 
and its involvement in a field of presence.” In other words, a consistent ontology needs to 
account for the fact of incarnation under penalty of being contradicted by it. PP, 331/382 
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"negative infinite" in the sense of a "non-finite."646 Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of 
the absolute infinite amounts to a choice in favour of a « kind of infinite." This 
infinite will characterise both Being and the beings: it is the structure of less-
than-determinacy. Such an infinite, which cannot be restricted on all sides (it 
would be finite) must be restricted on some sides if it is to be a specific infinite. 
Merleau-Ponty uses the metaphor of openness ("Offenheit," "Béance"), or of the 
mouth whose lips647 are its lines of flight, its horizons. 
 
B.  THE MECHANICS OF THE FLESH. 
 
The openness and the metaphor of the lips that supports it should not be 
understood as casting determinacy to the outskirts of Being and leaving absolute 
indeterminacy within those boundaries. This would amount to a return to a 
Cartesian conception of Being on a background of non-being and Merleau-
Ponty’s efforts would be lost. This openness must be understood instead as a 
unique milieu. This, however, leads to the usual toils of monism: how can 
monism account for the experience of externality—illusory or not—as 
exemplified by the very dualities unraveled so far? Merleau-Ponty’s solution lies 
                                                 
646VI, 169/221, [17th Jan. 1959]. See also, VI, 166/218 [Jan. 1959]: “there was a passage to the 
infinite as objective infinity –this passage was thematization and forgetting of the Offenheit and 
of the Lebenswelt.” t.a. 
647 VI, 136/177, inexplicably, the English translation gives “laps” as a translation for “lèvres”, see 
Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill’s “Translator’s note” to Luce Irigaray’s Ethics of Sexual 
Difference, Continuum, 2004, 139. For a development of the metaphor, see also Marcel 
Gauchet’s superb article from 1971 “Le lieu de la Pensée”, 22. 
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in the notion of a certain reflexivity of Being: Being has a reflexive relationship 
to itself, as such, it is one but presents itself as two.  
 
i.  Reflexivity. 
 
a. Horizons versus Principles.  
If the lips-as-horizons are not to be conceived as the external 
limits of Being, we must question the concept of horizon. Although present in 
Merleau-Ponty’s writings since PP,648 the concept of horizon comes to 
ontological prominence in Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl’s Ursprung der 
Geometrie. In his lectures on the text,649 horizons are described as the 
transcendental that allows for the continuity between perceptual faith and 
ideality: they are explanatory ideas thanks to which the structure of existence 
may be understood650. In the notes of VI, this concept becomes doubled with 
another concept, yet to be defined: that of "principle."651  
                                                 
648 See for example, Martin Dillon’s account, in Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, op. Cit. 77-81. 
649 HLP (Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology). “Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der 
Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem”, Husserliana VI, 364-286. 
650 TL 117-8/163-4 and 119/166. See also NC, 330: “one needs a term for there to be openness, 
but a term which is not a closing, this is the horizon." 
651 VI, 23/41: “la perception, qu’elle soit donnée à elle-même en ‘introspection’ ou qu’elle soit 
conscience constituante du perçu, devrait être, pour ainsi dire, par position et par principe, 
connaissance et possession d’elle-même. Elle ne saurait ouvrir sur des horizons et des lointains, 
c’est-à-dire pour un monde qui est là pour elle d’abord, et à partir duquel seulement elle se fait 
comme le titulaire anonyme vers lequel cheminent les perspectives du paysage. L’idée du sujet 
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For Merleau-Ponty, the horizon  
"is no more than the sky and the earth a collection of things held together, or a class 
name, or a logical possibility of conception or a system of ‘potentiality of consciousness.’"652  
Conceiving the horizon in this way, says Merleau-Ponty, is a lack of 
"rigor."653 Instead, we must think of the horizon as "a new type of being, a being 
by porosity, pregnancy, or generality, and he before whom the horizon opens up 
is caught up, included within it."654 In one word: Being’s horizonality is 
intensive. The horizon, unlike our common idea of it as the meeting point of the 
earth and the sky, over there, in the distance, or like the metaphor of the lips 
might have led to believe, is not unfolded before us, as a limit to the void that 
separates us from it. On the contrary, it is given an intensive quality, it is around 
us in the sense that we are within it, its texture itself is horizonal.  
                                                 
aussi bien que celle de l’objet transforment en adéquation le rapport avec le monde et avec nous 
mêmes que nous avons dans la foi perspective." In Husserl at the limits of Phenomenology, 
Merleau-Ponty refers to another text of Husserl’s, the Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehire of 
1934 (see HLP and TL, 121-2/168-9) and shows how the “Copernican man” ceases to see the 
earth as his own point of view, and begins to reverse his worldview, from the view of the 
horizons as far away from the ethnocentric world, the Copernican man seeks to apprehend 
himself from the point of view of the horizons themselves, paradoxically making himself the 
horizon of his own view. This, for both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, is the result of a flight 
outside of phenomenological thought into objectivity. As is attested by the passage from VI 
reproduced above, Merleau-Ponty’s reading of the concept of horizon performs a reversal of the 
Copernican revolution by insisting on the locality of the point of view from which any one sees 
the world and by showing this locality to be the condition of the visiblity of the world. 
652 VI, 149/193 t.a.  
653 Ibid.  
654 Ibid. 
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However, Merleau-Ponty encounters horizons in another sense in 
Husserl’s text.655 For Husserl, a horizon is an unattained reality.656 In his 
commentary of Ursprung der Geometrie, Merleau-Ponty reads Husserl’s concept 
of Ursprung as “operative ideality,” “this, he asserts, requires that we clarify two 
terms: speech as funktion [and] world as horizon.”657 Ursprung is an operative 
ideality because it is a horizon solidified into an object of thought, and 
subsequently, an object of striving. First, let us recall that it is through the 
sedimentation of a concept in ‘speech’ that an ideality can have any “operative” 
quality and can motivate human action658. This also means that it is through 
                                                 
655 Of course, it is clear that, according to his custom to read the “invisible” of Husserl (his 
“shadow philosophy”) as his “visible," Merleau-Ponty presents his own reworking of the 
Husserlian concept of horizon to be contained in Husserl’s texts, if not explicitly, at least 
implicitly, (there is an “unreading” of Husserl by Merleau-Ponty through Husserl’s texts just as 
much as there is an imperception of the invisible through the visible) however, as Françoise 
Dastur remarks, Husserl still conceives of the horizon as a “potentiality of consciousness." 
Françoise Dastur, “Merleau-Ponty and thinking from Within”, in Merleau-Ponty in 
contemporary perspective, op. Cit. 27-28. 
656 VI, 112/149 
657 HLP, 35 
658 To be sure, there is a problem concerning the uncovering of such a principle as contingently 
sedimented because the awareness of its being sedimented deprives it of its efficacity, makes it 
less convincing, and may transform the philosophical movement of interrogation into a 
movement by which the philosopher withdraws from action (It is certainly in this sense that we 
must interpret the note of Feb. 1959 where Merleau-Ponty recalls Husserl’s remark that 
“phenomenological reduction transforms universal history” because it reveals that it is not “pure 
actualism” VI 172f./224 f.). This gives political importance to the epochè, because it uncovers 
history as an illusion. We can also sense the political questions this raises, questions left 
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language that horizonality becomes sedimented into a fact.659 This must draw our 
attention to the fact that there cannot be any horizon prior to sedimentation. 
Merleau-Ponty refers to sedimented horizons as ‘principles,' in the sense we 
encounter in expressions such as ‘in principle’ [“de principe” or “en principe”]. 
If a principle is truly an efficient cause, then we must define careful what 
precisely it causes.  
The principle is the horizon made into a thing. When Merleau-Ponty 
writes, for example, that “reversibility is not an actual identity of the touching 
and the touched. It is their identity by principle [identité de principe] (always 
abortive [toujours manquée]),”660 he posits the distinction of principle and 
‘actuality.' As “always failed," the principle can only be efficient in explicating 
the flesh, not in constructing it. This ambivalence whereby the principle exists 
(as an explanatory concept) and is always inactual (as a reality) is problematised 
by Merleau-Ponty in his response to Gurwitsch’s idea that time has “in principle” 
a continuity. Merleau-Pont replies:  
                                                 
unanswered although the rest of the commentary and the references to Machiavel in VI give some 
insight as to the direction in which to seek their answers. See for example this comment between 
brackets from a note of May 1959, presumably the period of the preparation of the course on the 
Ursprung: “Lefort’s presentation on Machiavelli, Exposé de Lefort sur Machiavel: how, in what 
sense can one intend to go to the things themselves, while denying this right to others” VI, 
186/237. On the relation to interrogation, see the following note bearing the same date, VI, 
187/238  
659 NL, 328 for Merleau-Ponty’s opposition to Husserl’s idea of horizon in this connection and 
335-336 for Merleau-Ponty’s equation of sedimentation and language: “sedimentation, that is to 
say, expression”. 
660 VI, 272/320 [Dec. 1960], my emphasis. 
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“What does ‘in principle’ mean? What possibility are we talking about? This is saying 
too much or too little. Too much: this continuity is unrealisable. It is not merely impossible in 
fact, it is impossible in right [impossibilité de droit], the present is itself unachieved, 
transcendent. Too little, the possibiliy is grounded upon the structure, hinges and setup 
[montages] of my life.”661  
If by ‘in principle’ we mean that the principles exist, allowing for the 
fullness of the present and its continuity with the future and the past, then we 
derive a reality from a possibility. Here then, we fall back into the fallacy of 
reading completeness in incompleteness. If on the contrary, we mean ‘principle’ 
as an ungrounded, fantastical possibility, then we say too little, because this 
possibility, (the thought of the self-identity which is possible only in principle), 
is itself inscribed in the structure of existence. Merleau-Ponty seeks to ground in 
the structure of Being the error of believing in the reality of horizons (Husserl’s 
error).  
One may say, for example, that the mechanics of flesh tend towards full 
determinacy (‘identity’) and thereby one sees the principle of determinacy as an 
explanatory concept for the dynamic structure of the flesh (thanks to this 
concept, we grasp the structure of flesh). Affirming the “principle” as real, 
however, is transforming the implications of horizonality into an affirmation of 
existence. The principle may be real as an explanatory concept; this does not 
make it ontologically real.662 By overlooking this distinction, we start conceiving 
                                                 
661 NL, 337. 
662 This is one form of Merleau-Ponty’s self-attributed ‘circulus vitiosus deus’ which I shall 
discuss in relation to Nietzsche in the conclusion: it takes principles to demonstrate the fallacy of 
principles. For Merleau-Ponty, as Mauro Carbone shows it in the opening pages of his 
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of the milieu of Being from the point of view of the outside,663 and no longer—as 
would be correct—from within Being. Merleau-Ponty writes: “every concept is 
first a horizonal generality,”664 and he criticises Husserlian horizonality for 
reversing this priority: the concept (qua self-identical entity) arises from the 
openness of horizonality, not the reverse.665 This is reiterated in the notes to VI 
contemporaneous to his lectures on “Ursprung der Geometrie.”666 The horizon of 
openness is self-identity. Metaphysics in the Cartesian sense, which sees the 
                                                 
article« the Thinking of the Sensible » (Op. Cit.), concepts arise from « horizonal generality." 
This ground of openness is thus granted anteriority in both a chronological and logical sense. 
Concepts are posterior to it in both these senses too. In this sense, they are sedimented. The 
movement of reduction is, however, reversed from the point of view of this order. In this sense, 
reduction is de-sedimentation. Consequently, we may think of sedimented concepts as alternately 
primary (in the reductive order) and secondary (in the ontological order). Conversely, the ground 
of openness is the origin of the movement of sedimentation, but it is also the end point of the 
reductive movement. In the reductive order, it takes indeed an ‘effort’ to move from sedimented 
objects (or in Heidegger’s language, the point of view of ustensility) to the original ground of 
openness. In the sedimentative order, it takes an intellectual act to move from the indeterminate 
to the concept.  
663 I find a similar idea in Marjorie and Lawrence Hass, “Merleau-Ponty and the Origin of 
Geometry”, Chiasms, op. Cit. 184-186. The authors see a similar disagreement between Merleau-
Ponty and Husserl with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s texts from the forties. Remarkably, they 
allude in passing to Husserl’s view as based upon an ‘explicative’ stance.   
664 VI, 237/286, my emphasis. 
665 Carbone, op. Cit. 122-123. 
666 VI, 235/284. On the evolution of Merleau-Ponty’s relations with Husserl in the last months, 
and in particular, on the question of intra-ontology, see Ted Toadvine, “Merleau-Ponty’s Reading 
of Husserl,” op. Cit. esp. 278-284. 
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absence of full Being as a scandal, affirms self-identity as a reality and turns it 
into a principle. For Merleau-Ponty, as I have discussed in IV, this is the origin 
of error: “consciousness of incompleteness is not consciousness of 
completeness.”667 In other, words, the incompleteness cannot be understood from 
the point of view of a completeness which is only secondary to it.668 This means 
that Merleau-Ponty regards the “operative” quality of the horizon according to 
Husserl as operating falsification: the horizon presents itself as a determinate 
object, it presents itself as non-horizonal. Less-than-determinacy points at 
determinacy, and as a consequence, presents itself as failed determinacy. Enter 
the ‘Great Rationalism.'   
This means that we must include within less-than-determinacy the 
possibility of imperceiving determinacy. In the same way as the pre-objective 
was always towards the objective, the concept of horizon establishes the 
continuity between perceptual faith and objective ‘truth’ and between truth (as 
less-than-determinacy) and error (as full determinacy). If the world is essentially 
horizonal, it means that it contains in its structure the thought of non-
                                                 
667 NL, 329. Recall Nietzsche’s very same complaint regarding the intellect’s tendency to 
consider self-differentiation as a failed self-identity, and thereby, of inferring the existence, 
somewhere, of this self-identity: “Psychology of metaphysics: This world is apparent: 
consequently there is a true world;—this world is conditional: consequently there is an 
unconditioned world;—this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of 
contradiction;—this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:—all 
false conclusions” WP, 579 [1883-1888]. 
668 NL, 330 Husserl, however, continues to envisage horizonality negatively as “non-
completeness”; NL, 331 
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horizonality, it presents itself as pointing towards determinacy; this is what 
Merleau-Ponty calls the “ideality of the horizon.”669 This is important: principles 
or horizons in the Husserlian sense are not false, but positing their priority is. 
Mauro Carbone expresses this continuity well:  
“the passage from the ideality of the horizon to “’pure’ ideality," from “sensible ideas” 
to “ideas of the intelligence," that is, from the “conceptless” to the “conceptual,” does not imply a 
liberation from every visibility, but rather a metamorphosis of the flesh of the sensible into the 
flesh of language.”670 
The illusion of determinacy must be included in Being: Being thinks and 
thereby creates truth about itself. This is why the archaelogy of truth is 
essentially ontological. It is what Carbone calls correctly the “thinking of the 
sensible”. This thinking, as I have repeatedly claimed, is sedimentation, that is, 
overdetermination. Overdetermination is the creation of fully self-identical, solid 
beings, as opposed to Merleau-Ponty’s soft beings. This suggests that the typical 
movement of the ‘thinking of the sensible’ is thus a movement of disentangling 
Being from non-being within the soft being of presence: every act of ‘thought’ of 
the sensible involves the sedimentation of a soft being into a hard one. Where 
then does all the non-being (which was responsible for the coefficient of softness 
of the soft being) go? This is a dangerously schematic question, but I think that 
answering it will prove helpful. There are two typical ways in which negativity 
and positivity may organise themselves. Either i) positivity holds the centre and 
casts negativity to the outer edges of the space (Bergson’s view); or ii) 
conversely, negativity may find itself holding the centre, separating positivity on 
                                                 
669 VI, 153/196. 
670 Mauro Carbone, “the Thinking of the Sensible,” Chiasms, op. Cit. 121. 
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both sides of it (Sartre’s view). These two typical cases are mere idealisations, 
and strictly speaking they are impossible because they rely on the absolute 
distinction of the positive and the negative. In fact, the attainment of these 
idealised configurations is impossible, but the movement towards them does 
exist: it is the work of the ‘thinking of the sensible.' Hugh J. Silverman, 
expresses this remarkably by saying that Merleau-Ponty’s "dialectics is more of a 
tension between existence and dialectics."671 In other words, Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of Being as torn between the unity of the dialectical poles (positivity 
and negativity) in « existence » and their opposition (« dialectics »). It is in this 
tension that it finds its equilibrium. As a result, the poles are neither unified nor 
fully separated. The result will thus be a “fabric of Being” made of relief, 
“hollows” (more-than-negative),672 and “fulls” (less-than-positive). In his course 
on Nature, Merleau-Ponty asserts:  
“there are two sorts of mass realities [realités de masse]: one is static-random [statique 
aléatoire] distribution, an entropic phenomenon, the other is counter-random distribution [la 
distribution contre-aléatoire] which does not direct itself towards equalisation and relief [la 
détente].”673  
                                                 
671 Hugh J. Silverman, « Is Merleau-Ponty inside or outside the History of Philosophy?" 
Chiasms, op. Cit. p 138. In this remarkable article, Silverman shows how the ambiguity that is 
the object of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the existence is one with the ambiguity of Merleau-
Ponty’s place in the history of philosophy, which makes existence an eminently philosophical 
principle and philosophy an eminently existential matter, and shows philosophy as the place of 
the reflexivity of being. 
672 VI, 227/276 [20th Jan. 1960]. 
673 N, 269. 
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The first option corresponds to the unity that Silverman calls ‘existence.' 
It is ruled out by the very fact that by being ‘static,' it precludes sedimentative 
events. It is of course the second one that Merleau-Ponty chooses. Therefore, 
Merleau-Ponty proposes a non-homogenous distribution of positivity and 
negativity, which creates hollows and fulls. He calls the combination of hollows 
and fulls “folds.” 674 
 
b.   Folds. 
The “fold” [pli] is a key theme in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. It 
allows him to account for the very possibility of deriving the multiple from the 
one, justifying the experience of externality without granting it existence. As is 
to be expected, Merleau-Ponty’s solution is to admit only for “soft” distinctions 
between objects, so as to maintain their whole as a unified “fabric.”675 These 
distinctions signal the uneven distribution of negativity and positivity within 
Being, and their being consequently distributed in shades. In an unpublished note 
Merleau-Ponty writes: “I am seeking an ontological midpoint, the field which 
reunites object and consciousness... but the field [...] must not be conceived as a 
cloth in which object and consciousness would be cut out,”676 as Barbaras points 
                                                 
674 VI, 93/126, 115/152, 216/265. 
675 VI, 272/320 [Dec. 1960] As I discussed in IV, this is also why Merleau-Ponty replaces the 
notion of “event” by that of “advent” in S.  
676 “le seul ‘lieu’ où le négatif soit vraiment, c’est le pli, l’application l’un à l’autre du dedans et 
du dehors, le point de retournement” The note belongs to file 22, dated 1958-9, Merleau-Ponty 
Archives, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris. It is quoted in Renaud Barbaras, “Merleau-
Ponty and Nature,” Research in Phenomenology; 2001, Issue 31 31.  
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out, “the only way out consists [...] in determining an original plan in which this 
duality is resolved internally but in the center of which it is also rooted”677. 
Indeed, it is hard to see what else other than pure nothingness could play the role 
of the scissors cutting out the objects from the world; and we know that pure 
nothingness is impossible. This motivates a move from the model of the “cut-
out” to that of the “fold."  
The chiasmatic structure of perception and its figuration in terms of 
“folds” has been well-recorded and here is not the place to propose a new 
elucidation of. However, it is worth pointing out in which sense the fold is a 
combination of positivity and negativity in order to be able to account for the 
manifold of being. A fold is a continuity of three “moments” which—precisely 
because it is a continuity—are horizons of each other: two ‘flaps’ [“feuillets”] 
separated—and linked—by the very “point of reversal,”678 which I shall call the 
folding. This “point of reversal,” Merleau-Ponty says, is made of negativity: “the 
only ‘locus’ where the negative truly is, it is the fold, the mutual application of 
the inside and the outside, the point of reversal.”679  
This “folding” is the key mechanism for what Merleau-Ponty calls the 
“chiasma” of perception, which he considers to be the general structure of the 
flesh: the chiasma is an eccentric identity, that is, a fold that is almost exact, were 
it not for the “folding” itself which maintains the non-identity of the two 
                                                 
677 Id, ibid.  
678 VI, 263/311, [16th Nov. 1960]. 
679 ibid. See also N, 275: where Being is described as « internally knit with negations." 
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“feuillets” at the same time as their junction680. In perception, the figure of the 
chiasma accounts for the fact that perception is always doubled (“lined by”) by 
aperception. It is exemplified most strikingly through the specularity of mirror-
like perceptions681 and the phenomenon of the “touched-touching”: if I touch my 
left hand with my right, I obtain a configuration of four terms, whose relations 
cross at a point blank which belongs to none of the four terms and, as a horizon, 
to all four of them: my left hand as touching encounters my right hand as 
touched, and my right hand as touching encounters my left hand as touched.682 
The center point of this relationship is the surface of both hands taken in a 
rigorous sense, in the sense of an intensive horizon (since their contact makes a 
pure surface impossible, one hand leading directly into the other).683 For 
Merleau-Ponty, this experiential simultaneity of perception and aperception is 
not absolute, because it never happens that the touching entirely fuses into the 
touched to the point that the intimacy of the relationship self-self would be 
equalled by the relationship self-other: my left hand will never take itself for my 
right hand and I will never take myself to be the other.684 The distinction is 
grounded in the difference between the “feuillets,” a difference itself grounded in 
                                                 
680 VI, 272/320 [Dec. 1960] “Réversibility is not actual identity of the touching and the touched. It 
is their identity in principle, always unachieved [toujours manquée]” t.a. 
681 VI, 145-146/189, see also, 139/181.  
682 VI, 256/303 [May 1960]. 
683 VI, 263/311 [16th Nov. 1960] See also VI, 148 ff./191 ff. 
684 VI, 147/191: “It is a reversibility always imminent and never realized in fact. My left hand is 
always on the verge of touching my right hand touching the things, but I never attain 
coincidence” t.a. See also VI, 272/320 [Dec. 1960]. 
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the negativity of the “point of reversal.” This means that the structure of the flesh 
is primarily reflexive. This is fundamental because it incorporates an intentional 
structure within being: “what replaces the antagonistic and solidary reflective 
movement [...] is the fold or hollow of being [creux d’être] having by principle 
an outside.”685 The “fold” grounds the experience of externality as it were from 
within being; there is transcendence from one “feuillet” to the other, but this is 
only because they were never truly separate:  
« One cannot account for this double ‘chiasma’ by the cut of the for-itself and the in-
itself. A relation to being is needed that would form itself within being.”686  
 
c. Expression. 
That the ontological concept of the fold and the 
phenomenological concept of the chiasma are different aspects of the same 
property of Being is crucial: it opens up to an ontology of the human. Merleau-
Ponty defines flesh as the “animated body.”687 In a certain sense, it is obvious 
that perception requires for the perceiver to be sentient, that is, animated. This 
means that animated bodies are the locus of the reflexivity of being, because the 
folds of Being designate perception688: when my hand touches my pen, it is 
                                                 
685 VI, 227/276 [20th Jan. 1960]. 
686 VI, 215/264 f [1st Nov. 1959]. 
687 S, 227/370. 
688 This clearly, in my view, brings out the intimate kinship between PP and VI, through the 
descent of the “zone of subjectivity” discussed in IV and the negativity in the fold presented here.  
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really Being touching—folding onto—itself.689 This adds a new layer to the 
rejection of the active-passive divide discussed in Chapter V: passivity and 
activity come together in subjective intentionality: because it is my 
intentionality, it is active, but because it is the intentionality of Being happening 
through me, it is passive; or “every relation with being is simultaneously a taking 
and a being taken.”690 Thus, Merleau-Ponty affirms that the “jointing and the 
hinge [membrure] of being [...] is being realised through man."691  
Yet this is not how it appears to us at first glance. At first, I assume that I 
am separate from the pen, that we are separate spatio-temporal entities and that 
our relation is external. Proving this approach to be erroneous is not as crucial 
for Merleau-Ponty as it is to prove that his idea of Being suffices to account for 
the fact of this error. If he wishes to elaborate a monistic ontology, Merleau-
Ponty needs to account for the experience of externality as illusory. We 
primarily think of an error in terms of the inadequacy of the claim it makes to the 
reality it refers to. It is this separation that makes errors possible and this is what 
Merleau-Ponty investigates. It is the guiding problem of the inquiry into the 
origin of truth, an inquiry which, as we saw, asks: 'how come error has come to 
be known as ‘truth’?' I have discussed this question in IV already appealing to 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of sense in connection to the experience of error. 
                                                 
689 This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he declares that “things have us, and it is not us who 
have the things." VI, 193-194/244 [20 May, 1959] t.a. See also, S. 19/36. 
690 VI 271/319 See also VI, 221/270 [Nov. 1959] 
691 S, 181/295. On the ontological importance of man, see Mauro Carbone’s the Thinking of the 
Sensible, 32 ff. 
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However, the examination of the chiasma can provide some further 
clarifications.  
The errors Merleau-Ponty opposes are the dualistic premisses of objective 
thought. Thanks to the description of flesh as essentially reflexive, Merleau-
Ponty accounts for the fact of the impression of objectivity. Reflexivity formally 
presents itself as a subject-object relation where the subject and the object are 
one and the same. Still, we have seen through the distinction of principles and 
horizons that the structure of intentionality does not necessarily entail the 
affirmation of its terms. In its objective and sedimented form however, 
reflexivity affirms terms that are posited and conceived of independently of each 
other and of their relation. As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty calls the 
incompatibility of these two claims “the problem of a genuine in-itself for us.”692 
We have also seen that he addresses this problem thanks to his concept of 
sedimentation which solidifies the experience into an objective relation. If 
sedimentation indeed seems to solve this problem, it might also lead us to greater 
difficulties. Martin Dillon calls sedimentation the “settling of culture into 
things.”693 This is acceptable only under the proviso that we understand “things” 
as an approximation of the object by the subject, an arbitrary stop put by the 
subject on the infinite process of determination, an “overdetermination." Indeed, 
we now know that we deal with “things” only insofar as we sediment the world 
into them. This means that “things” are nothing more than moments of our 
relationship to the world. Indeed, the term “moment” in this case must be 
                                                 
692 PP, 77/92 and 322/372.  
693Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, 101. 
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understood in its temporal sense as well. In chapter IV, I established that the 
concept of sedimentation provides the principle of historical succession, 
eventfulness and becoming. Consequently, I shall prefer to call sedimentation, a 
settling of culture into events.694  
 
ii. Truth and Error. 
 In chapter IV, I examined how the search for truth involved an inquiry 
into the origins of truth and how this entailed that truth must altogether be 
considered eternal and originary: the object of truth is the origin of truth. In this 
chapter, I have come to the conclusion that Being must be construed as the 
possibility of history. This brings us back to the question of truth. It was made 
clear in chapter IV that the very idea of an inquiry into the origin of truth was 
somewhat paradoxical: how can we establish a continuity between the true and 
the untrue? And if there is no continuity, how can we practice an archaeology 
that would lead us from the mistaken truth to the « true » truth? Furthermore, 
doesn’t this continuity involve in fact a reduction of the true to the untrue, or at 
least, some degree of unfathomable mixture of the two? In the first pages of VI, 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges this problem:  
                                                 
694 Miguel de Beistegui, while recognizing the necessity to operate “the shift [...] from beings as 
things to beings as events”, contends that this shift is not entirely performed by Merleau-Ponty, 
and calls on Simondon to complete the work. I differ from this reading on account of the 
discussion of the mechanism of perception as infinite determination provided in chapter IV that 
shows that any sedimentation is but an illusory settling into being, but is in reality a reducing to a 
“event” in the sense of fact. See Miguel de Beistegui, “Science and Ontology”, op. Cit.  115. 
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« philosophy must tell us how there is openness without the occultation of the world 
being excluded, how the occultation remains at each instant possible even though we are 
naturally endowed with light. The philosopher must understand how it is that these two 
possibilities which the perceptual faith keeps side by side within itself, do not nullify one 
another.”695  
This is a matter of explaining the contradictory possibilities lodged in 
Being. How can both the possibility of truth and the possibility of error coexist 
within a unique Being? 
 For Merleau-Ponty the traditional concept of truth as correspondence is 
erroneous. The reason for this is that it is structured according to the subject-
object distinction, a distinction which results from a process of 
overdetermination. This sedimentation process is the essence of history and 
history is the essence of Being. This amounts to saying that Being must be 
understood as the possibility of error. 
Being is the possibility of sedimentation; sedimentation, in turn, is the 
possibility of error, as overdetermination. Furthermore, we must remember 
another guise of Being: Being is also intentionality, that is to say, a relation 
without terms. This was established through the analysis of being  as reflexivity  
which  in turn allows  for the overdetermination  of reflexivity (where subject 
and object are two guises of the same) into an objective  structure (where 
subject and object are distinct). This accounts for sedimentation and 
consequently, for error. In fact, it was made clear in chapter IV that the 
infinite process of determination  lodged in perception  was the micro- origin 
of any becoming, including macro-historical  becoming. This should help us 
                                                 
695 VI, 28-29/48 
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make   some   clarifications:    if Being is   a relation without terms, and i f  
“overdetermination  always occurs,”696
 
there will always be an 
overdetermination of intentionality into an objective structure. There is no 
Being without its sedimented manifestations, and yet these are erroneous. This 
means that Being is more than the possibility of error, it is its necessity. Of 
course, the problem with defining Being with reference to error is that it 
seems to make error look rather truthful: how can error still be error if there 
is no possibility  to approach Being but through error’s distorting mirror? Is 
there even a vantage point from which we can reveal this mirror as distorted? 
In a certain way, the very possibility of a philosophy such as Merleau- Ponty’s 
is a factual response to this objection. Yet it is only factual until we recall 
that all facts reflect a possibility of Being. The possibility of a philosophy 
which is able to perceive sedimented truth and other sedimentations as 
overdeterminations—that  is,  as  errors—  emphasises  an  aspect  of  historical  
development  that  I  have mentioned  before:  history  is a process  of  
determination,  but  being  the  continual narrowing of a “less-than-
determinate”  infinite, it is itself an infinite possible. If absolute determination 
were possible, reflexivity would never show itself as such; the folds would 
appear not as reflexive but as transcendental structures and the world would be 
Cartesian. The infinity of the determination   process   ensures   the  
impossibility   of  such  a  scenario,   and  the possibility of an ontology of 
Merleau-Ponty’s type. 
                                                 
696 VI, 240/289 [March 1960] 
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The relations between the impossibility of absolute determinacy and the 
possibility to apprehending error requires some clarifications. As we have seen, 
the irreducible  quotient  of  indeterminacy  at  the  heart  of  Being  allows  for  
Being’s reflexivity by means of the folds (one of the folds being philosophy 
itself697). We have also seen how the erroneous concept of truth was 
altogether the sharp end of the historical  process  hitherto  and the 
beginning—and  grounding—of  the reverse process engaged into by the 
philosopher-archaeologist.  The possibility of reflexivity exposes objectivity as 
a contradiction insofar as objectivity affirms a structure that roots the 
philosophy  which seeks to invalidate it. It posits subjects and objects as 
self-identical and distinct, and at the same time seeks to account for their 
encounter made  impossible  by  their  very  definition.  In short,  it is incapable  
of eradicating transcendence  in the sense of the subject-object  union.698 
Indeed, this union is so ineradicable  that it is the obstacle to total reduction. 
As such it grounds Merleau- Ponty’s ontology. 
The contradictory character of error can be deepened: we have seen, 
through the discussions of Sartre’s negativism and Bergson’s positivism that the 
mere fact of perception contradicts objectivity. For a philosophy—even  an 
idealism—to account for experience, it must put to use the reflexivity of Being 
which alone ensures the possibility  of any experience,  or else it must  vanish  
into  full nothingness  or full Being (which are the same). Objectivity  
                                                 
697  See Hugh J. Silverman, Op. Cit.  
698 We have seen that this was the sense of Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the impossibility of a 
complete reduction, which encounters the obstacle of the fact of transcendance and consequently, of 
Merleau-Ponty’s departure from Husserl’s transcendental idealism. 
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ignores  this reflexivity  however,  leading itself to contradiction.  An 
interrogative  philosophy  like Merleau-Ponty’s  not only embraces and 
exemplifies this reflexivity (being a philosophy), but it reflects upon this 
reflexivity itself: it takes this reflexivity to the awareness of itself, dialectically 
moving up to the ontological level and changing the “bad” reflexivity of self- 
contradiction   into  the  “good”  reflexivity   of  expression.   This  
contradiction   is contained in the very idea of a determinate object: if an object 
is determinate, says Merleau-Ponty, it is not an object, because as determinate 
and external it would be inaccessible, intemporal, and sterile. Hence, the 
contradiction of full determination can be expressed in terms of possibles. 
Determination is the rejection of possibility; it is absolute restriction, absolute 
actuality. This, as we saw, makes the continuity of time as well as any 
productivity impossible. Determination is error because it is the denial of 
possibility, that is, the denial of Being. This is the “bad reflexivity” of error, the 
reflexivity by which Being as possibility presents itself as Being as actuality. 
Just as Being is the possibility of error, error is the impossibility of possibility. 
Error thus remains a meaningful concept. 
We asked the question of the distinction of truth and error in spite of 
their co- apartenance to Being. It seems we can now answer this: error is the 
belief in determinacy, truth is the belief in less-than-determinacy. Both are 
grounded in Being, error is grounded in the indeterminacy of Being, and truth 
into both its determinacy and its openness. It is a feature of the contradictory 
character of error that it is made possible by the indeterminacy  of Being, 
while affirming only its determinacy. Yet this contradiction  itself is 
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grounded  in the contradiction  at the heart of truth: the illusion  of 
determinacy  is the principle  driving  the s e d i m e n t a t i v e   process.  If we 
must understand history as an infinite process of determination, we must also 
accept that history itself, as Being, is to be conceived as nothing other than an 
infinite movement of self-falsification. 
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CONCLUSION. 
 
"[T]o insert truth as a processus in infinitum, an active determination, not a 
becoming conscious of something that is ‘in itself’ fixed and determinate" 
Nietzsche, IX [91] Fall 1887. 
 
 
The parallel between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the 
question of truth leads to a single ontological claim: Being is self-falsification 
through truth and the phenomenon of truth is its essence. As regards Nietzsche, I 
argued in chapter III that he views Being as the very movement by which the 
indeterminate presents itself as determinate. This self-falsification of the 
indeterminate, I said, is the movement of truth. With regard to Merleau-Ponty, I 
came to the same conclusion in chapter VI: Being is self-falsification. This claim of 
Nietzsche’s and Merleau-Ponty’s raises several questions that I shall briefly address. 
First however, let me reiterate the movement of the argument that led to this 
conclusion.  
 
Common Structure: 
The movement of Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche’s arguments have a common 
structure. Firstly, (Chapters I and IV), it is shown that the ground of experience is 
structured in a pre-objective way. The experience of X is always already the 
experience of X as being real. For Nietzsche, this is implied in the definition of 
experience as the experience of interest. I experience X through the mutual resistance 
X and I oppose to each other in our interested striving and this resistance entails X’s 
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(and my) reality (I, B, 1, b). Merleau-Ponty expresses this by placing ‘perceptual 
faith’ at the basis of all perception. ‘Perceptual faith’ is grounded in self-
differentiation (IV, A, 1). Self-differentiation offers what Merleau-Ponty describes as 
a ‘zone of subjectivity’ (IV, A, ii.) and what Nietzsche metaphorically refers to as a 
‘gap’ between ‘two layers of skin’ of the self (I, B, ii.). This void space is the 
condition for the primary and pre-objective attribution of reality of perceptual faith. 
Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty show how this gap increases to divorce the 
attribution of reality from the experience which gave rise to it, transforming it into a 
predication of truth (IV, A, ii, b). The process responsible for this phenomenon is 
what I called ‘falsification.' Nietzsche refers to it as ‘sublimation’ (I, A, i.) and 
Merleau-Ponty as ‘sedimentation’ (IV, B). This movement falsifies experience 
because it attributes self-identity and full determinacy to objects of perception, when 
the authentic perception testifies only to an indeterminate milieu.  
Secondly then (chapters II and V), Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty seek a 
method to uncover this originary experience which lies prior to its falsified, 
predicated counterpart. Nietzsche seeks those results by appealing to a process of 
‘incorporation of truth.' The incorporation of truth amounts to a transformation of 
ourselves in accordance to the discovery that all truth-beliefs are in fact arbitrary 
falsifications. Nietzsche thinks that the incorporation of truth will enable us to attain 
direct knowledge of the world insofar as it clears us of our delusions (II, A). This 
direct knowledge amounts to a unification of the self (self-becoming) and a 
unification of the self with the world qua fate (II, B). Fate, when attributed to the 
world at large, is characterised as ‘will to power,' an essentially intentional principle 
(II, A, 1, d). For Merleau-Ponty, of course, it is his version of the phenomenological 
reduction that provides an access to the ground of experience. Like Nietzsche, the 
ground of experience that he uncovers is intentionality itself (V, A, 1). This entails 
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that neither the subject nor the object of experience is primary; on the contrary, it is 
their relation which is.  
It must be stressed that both the ‘incorporation of truth’ and Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘existential reduction’ amount to a reduction to the ontological (II, B, 1/V, B). By 
this I mean that they provide us not with any particular piece of knowledge but with 
a general truth, with the essence of truth. This essence is described by both thinkers 
as the transformation of experience into predication. As a result, the ‘perceptual 
faith’ which was uncovered in chapters I and IV is granted ontological status. As the 
ground of experience, whose nature is to falsify itself (by becoming predicative 
faith), it is the very essence of Being. 
 This is what I investigate in chapters III and VI. One of the implications of 
chapters II and V is that Being is a relation without terms. It is also clear from I and 
IV that Being is a tangential movement towards such fictionally postulated terms. 
Hence, Being is in motion. Both thinkers indeed propose an ontology of becoming 
and oppose becoming to Being. Being is self-identical, whereas becoming is an 
infinite striving towards self-identity. This striving is equivalent to the process of 
determination of Being through ‘incorporation’ (Nietzsche) or ‘sedimentation’ 
(Merleau-Ponty). For both thinkers, this process is the essence of history (III, B/VI, 
B, ii.). Consequently, history becomes understood as the infinite movement of self-
determination of the world. Historical time is made of incorporative or sedimentative 
events. This is why Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty understand Being qua self-
differentiated Being in modal terms: Being is not actuality (it is, Merleau-Ponty says, 
‘softer’ than actuality), it is productivity, that is to say, the possibility of 
sedimentative or incorporative events (II, B, iii./VI, A). 
 We know from chapters II and IV that incorporation and sedimentation are 
processes of falsification, or as the later Merleau-Ponty writes, processes of 
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‘overdetermination.' This overdetermination is the phenomenon of truth, and it is a 
falsification. Yet, this falsification is the essence of Being, so that truth qua 
falsification becomes an authentic feature of Being, indeed, its essence.  
The account of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s treatments of the question of 
truth indicates their agreement in claiming that Being is self-falsification through 
truth. This is the thesis I have defended in these pages. However, the task I gave 
myself demanded altogether more and less than the simple establishment of this 
claim. It was to establish a systematic and structural link between these two thinkers’ 
philosophies. This aim is somewhat less demanding because it seeks to defend a 
mere possibility:  the possibility that it may be frutiful to compare these two 
philosophers. It is more demanding however because it requires of me more than the 
demonstration that Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty agree on such and such specific 
points. As I insisted in the introduction, this project could truly be a contribution only 
if it had no reliance on any anecdotic or local comparisons.  
 
The Primacy of Intentionality. 
I think that the establishment of the common thesis that Being is self-
falsification through the phenomenon of truth provides a link that goes beyond a 
mere local agreement. It is a claim that would prove central to any consistent 
worldview. It is, after all, a claim about Being. I pointed out in the introduction, 
however, that a comparative effort must also establish a structural link between the 
compared worldviews. I did indicate that this more demanding requirement could not 
be included in the scope of this thesis. However, I think that we are now in a position 
to analyse the structural role of the question of truth anew.  
In the introduction, I proposed the hypothesis that both Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty expressed as one of their tasks to examine the question of truth  and 
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that this would lead to interesting ways to establish correspondences between their 
two philosophies. As the discussion has shown, this project leads both Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty to posit the primacy of intentionality over and above intentional 
subjects and objects. This primacy is ontological. The fact that this move exists in 
both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty is apparent from the discussions of chapters I and 
V, but in fact, it seems to be a necessary consequence of the question of truth itself: 
the question of truth requires one to include the possibility of error within one’s 
worldview. As Kant famously remarked, all ontology is about possibility. In this case 
then, the possibility of error must be integrated within Being. Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty can only address the question of truth with an ontology of error. 
Ontology as a whole becomes irreversibly affected by the introduction of the 
possibility of error within it because it transforms it into an ontology of self-
differentiation. Indeed, as was shown by both thinkers, the possibility of error relies 
on the reality of self-differentiation, and any ontology—or at least any monistic 
ontology—cannot include both self-differentiation and self-identity side by side 
within Being. This leads us to the primacy of intentionality: the impossibility of self-
identity entails the impossibility of a pure subject or a pure object (in the senses that 
Merleau-Ponty sees Sartre to define these terms). Yet taking the question of truth 
seriously involves that the subjective and the objective have some meaning, that is to 
say, that there is an experience of objectivity. This indicates that Being must be 
conceived as inducing the phenomenon of objectivity. I expressed this by describing 
Being as a space expanding tangentially towards the subjective and the objective 
poles. This idea is contained in both thinkers’ claims that intentionality is anterior to 
subject and object, but that it is dynamically directed towards them (infinite 
determination for Merleau-Ponty, resistance-seeking for Nietzsche), which thereby 
gives rise to our belief in them. This belief is the result of a ‘sublimation’ 
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(Nietzsche), or an ‘overdetermination’ (Merleau-Ponty) which is the essence of 
intentionality.   
The positing of intentionality as anterior to subject and object satisfies both 
Merleau-Ponty’s well known opposition to the two-headed monster of idealism and 
empiricism and  Nietzsche’s rejection of idealism and naturalism. The problem with 
these dualities, they contend, is that they offer no choice about what truly matters. 
Since each pole agrees with the other that the world is bipolar, we have no choice but 
to conceive of a bipolar world. Both the idealist pole and the empiricist/naturalist one 
place the opposition of subject and object first, and then proceed to account for their 
link. This is precisely this structure that Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty opt out of. For 
them, escaping this structure means positing not subject and object (this leads to their 
opposition) but their link first. This key move has great consequences for the rest of 
their worldviews. These consequences often exhibit a profound kinship. On the basis 
of the previous discussions, I would like to briefly indicate what I think are the two 
most general ones. 
 
Ontology of Becoming.  
Both Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche subscribe to an ontology of becoming. 
They both define becoming as eventfulness. For Nietzsche, all events are 
incorporative events, and for Merleau-Ponty, they are sedimentative. We know that 
both incorporation and sedimentation are made possible by the self-differentiation of 
Being. For Nietzsche, events are dependent on chaos, and chaos is understood as the 
inner opposition of drives. This opposition is due to the self-differentiation of the 
individual. For Merleau-Ponty, sedimentation is dependent on our partial 
disconnection from the world of experience, figured by the ‘zone of subjectivity.' 
The zone of subjectivity creates an ‘écart’ between us and the perceptual objects, 
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which introduces a certain coefficient of indeterminacy in perception. It warrants that 
what Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘prospective activity’ of determination is infinite. At 
the perceptual level then, the impossibility of full determinacy involves becoming. 
This becoming is tangential and tends towards full determinacy because any event 
(sedimentative or incorporative) is a progress in determining the perceptual world. 
As Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty claim, sedimentation and incorporation are de-
differentiation, i. e. identification.  
There is more. Although this movement is first observed as the ‘micro’-
becoming of the individual world of experience, both thinkers see at work in the 
‘macro’-becoming of history. For Merleau-Ponty, history appears as a movement 
towards self-sedimentation, towards full determinacy (it is established that full 
determinacy amounts to self-identity). For Nietzsche, history is the movement of the 
world towards total self-identity. For both thinkers of course, this movement is 
infinite.  
We must however clarify what supports the passage from individual to 
historical becoming. Nietzsche expresses this passage by saying that the sickness of 
the human (that is to say, her inner chaos) is the sickness of ‘the earth.' This means 
that the human’s inner gap is also the locus of the inner gap within the world itself. 
This gap, I argued, is the condition to of possibility for the reversibility of drives and 
it expresses itself as the interchangeability of subject and object: I can alternately be 
an object or a subject for myself and for the world. I am the locus of the reflexivity of 
Being, and consequently, I am the agent of determination in the world. This 
seemingly theological language should not make us forget that Nietzsche’s major 
point is that self-identity is only a fantasy. If it gives us an accurate description for 
the becoming of the world (as a becoming towards self-identity), it remains that the 
object of this striving is illusory. The same applies for Merleau-Ponty: for him, 
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history is the history of sedimentation and sedimentation is the lot of conscious 
beings. Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the schema whereby my own inner reversibility 
is also the reversibility of Being: the human, as a fold of Being, is the locus of 
Being’s reflexivity and of its self-differentiation. Being sediments itself through the 
human.699 Again, this does not substantialise, anthropomorphise, or deify Being. In 
fact, assuming this would be forgetting the primacy of intentionality. Merleau-Ponty 
and Nietzsche’s idea is that this movement is anterior to the thematisation of the 
individual, of Being, or even of sedimentation or incorporation. Saying that the 
individual is the locus of the reflexivity of Being means that what we call the 
individual is this locus of reflexivity. It is a definition of the individual with reference 
to Being, not the reverse. The same goes for reflexivity. It is only from a worldview 
shaped by objectivity that such a claim may be taken as theological.  
 
Phenomenological Ontology. 
Another consequence of the primacy of intentionality is that philosophy must 
be ontology, and that ontology must be phenomenology. The investigation into the 
question of truth has shown that individual truths can only be considered as 
falsifications. In fact, the proper domain of philosophy is only the domain of what I 
have called the ‘phenomenon of truth.' Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty consider 
that truth is in a sense true and in a sense untrue. It is untrue because it does not exist: 
truth is impossible because it relies essentially on a fantastical setup postulating self-
identical subjects and objects and a transcendence between them. These two 
requirements are contradictory, as is shown by both Merleau-Ponty (in his critique of 
Sartre) and Nietzsche (in his critique of the thing-in-itself). As a phenomenon 
                                                 
699 “I must show that what one might consider to be ‘psychology’ (Phenomenology of Perception) is 
in fact Ontology”, VI, 176/228. 
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however, truth is true because it signals a possibility of Being, indeed, the possibility 
of Being: self-differentiation. As both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty claim, the 
ground of perception which is the ground of Being is always-already self-
differentiated. It is this self-differentiation—gap or ‘zone of subjectivity’—which 
allows for the ‘phenomenon of truth’. This means that any inquiry must be limited to 
the domain of the phenomenon of truth; that is to say, to the domain of intentionality. 
Hence any meaningful inquiry shall be phenomenological. There is more: not only is 
all reality phenomenal but it is also tangential because phenomena themselves are 
overdeterminations. As Merleau-Ponty shows, in true perception the perceptual 
object dissolves, leaving us with perception itself (that is to say, intentionality) and 
not with phenomena. This means that the only knowledge we may possess is the 
most fundamental knowledge. We know about Being (intentionality) before we know 
about the beings (intentional objects). As a result, the only foundation for philosophy 
must be sought in an ontological phenomenology.   
Here we encounter a difficulty. I have just asserted that we know Being and 
not the beings. However, both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty subscribe to an indirect 
ontology (or ‘intra-ontology’). In the case of Nietzsche, this is indicated by the 
necessity of the incorporation of truth as a movement towards ontological knowledge 
(in the form of the unity of the self with Being). This is also made most obvious in 
Nietzsche’s references to perspectivism, which I have examined only 
briefly. Nietzsche’s conception of perspectival truth is equivalent to Merleau-
Ponty’s. It is not a cumulative but a reductive view: by gathering several perspectives 
and confronting them, one draws from the manifold the general which is found in 
every one. This generality, Nietzsche says, is representation itself (II, A, 1). Merleau-
Ponty, as I have argued, uses perspectivism to the same ends and promotes his 
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‘indirect ontology (Being in the beings).' This challenges my two previous assertions, 
namely that we must do ontology and that Being is anterior to the beings. 
First, ontology. As I have argued in chapters III, VI, and in the transition, 
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s relationships with ontology are ambiguous. For 
Nietzsche, Being is will to power, an essentially relational concept, which does not 
allow for the unity of Being. In turn, Merleau-Ponty himself opposes ontology by 
affirming that he is "for metaphysics." As I have argued all through the thesis, 
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty conceive of Being only in a ‘soft’ sense. This is made 
obvious by the necessity to account for the spatio-temporality of Being. If ‘intra-
ontology’ or ‘indirect ontology’ is to be possible, it means that Being manifests itself 
fully in the beings. As a result, Being must be conceived as a spatio-temporal 
generality. Merleau-Ponty calls this Being an ‘element’ and defines an element as 
lying midway between a thing and a principle, that is to say, midway between 
metaphysics and ontology. It is only under these conditions that we may still do 
ontology. 
 
"Circulus Vitiosus Deus." 
"Philosophy is irreplaceable because it reveals to us both the movement by which 
lives become truths, and the circularity of that singular being who in a certain sense 
already is everything it comes to think." 
 Merleau-Ponty, S, 113/183. 
 
Secondly, the ‘indirect method’ in ontology, which ‘seeks Being in the 
beings’ and poses a challenge to the idea that Being is anterior to the beings, since it 
seems that our only access to Being is precisely the beings. This, Merleau-Ponty 
admits, commits his account to a certain circularity. The circle is this: beings are 
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logically anterior to Being which is ontologically anterior to them. We need beings to 
access Being as anterior to them. This circle, Merleau-Ponty says in his only direct 
quote from Nietzsche, commits him to a "Circulus vitiosus Deus":  
"This reversal itself—circulus vitiosus deus—is not hesitation, bad faith and bad dialectic, 
but return to Σιγη, the abyss. One cannot make a direct ontology. My indirect method (Being in the 
beings) is alone conformed with Being—'negative philosophy’ like ‘negative ontology.’"700 
Ontology can only be performed once sedimentation has constituted beings 
within which one finds some way of accessing Being. As I have discussed in V, 
Merleau-Ponty’s reduction is affirmative through negativity. It brings out the 
authentic ground of experience as an obstacle to reduction. It is the impossibility of 
reduction—which he returns to in the very same note—which opens our access to 
Being. 
This circularity is also expressed by Merleau-Ponty as the anteriority of the 
ontological discovery over the ontological research: "the end of a philosophy is the 
account of its beginning" he writes, and this beginning-conclusion is "a pre-knowing, 
a pre-meaning, a silent knowing."701 Although the context of Nietzsche’s text quoted 
by Merleau-Ponty here is even more enigmatic (the ambiguity of the latin even 
makes it impossible to determine how this circulus vitiosus deus must be translated), 
it is clear that it has to do with the same circle, and I think, with the idea of an 
original and final "pre-knowing": 
« Anyone who has struggled for a long time, as I have, with a mysterious desire to think 
down to the depths of pessimism [...] this person may, without really intending it, have opened his 
eyes to the opposite ideal [...] Well? And wouldn’t this then be—circulus vitiosus deus?"702 
                                                 
700 VI, 179/231. 
701 ibid. 
702 BGE, 56. 
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The key to this aphorism is Nietzsche’s mention that the desire for the 
overcoming of morality and pessimism is ‘mysterious.' Nietzsche here takes his own 
desire to be the expression of something he ignores. The negative movement of 
"thinking down [...] pessimism" is thereby associated with a positive one: the 
affirmation of this mysterious reality from which this desire arises. My hypothesis—
which I shall not defend further here—is that this mysterious desire is the symptom 
of a reality which refuses to be denied. This desire is the expression of a ‘pre-
knowing’ of the same sort as Merleau-Ponty’s, which expresses itself only as a 
reaction against pessimism and exhibits itself as an ‘ideal.' This ideal rises from the 
mysterious pre-knowing to consciousness through ‘opposition.' Here, Nietzsche 
asserts again that renouncing this original truth would be an instance of self-denial. 
In short, he poses the question of truth all over again. Like Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty 
affirms this adherence to this truth which we possess (insofar as we are the locus of 
the movement of Being) as the original intuition that led to the establishment of their 
ontologies as well as their final conclusion. Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty seem 
to agree that intra-ontology is their philosophy, that it operates through a negative 
movement, and that it is circular, insofar as it concludes to its own premisse (the 
question of truth).   
Only a few months after this note, Merleau-Ponty tackles the same themes 
together again, in his commentary of the Preface to GS (his only commentary on 
Nietzsche). The passage commences with a repetition of the theme of the "negative 
philosophy (in the sense of the ‘negative theology’)"703 and goes on to describe 
Nietzsche’s own view of philosphy as circular by way of a reminder of his indirect 
ontology (this ‘true philosophy’ gives access to "another order, which demands the 
                                                 
703 NC, 275. 
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lower order" and "is accessible only through it").704 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty sees the 
same circle as his own at work in Nietzsche, and describes it, like he described his 
own, as "abyss": "true philosophy is [...] great suspicion, abyss, non-philosophy 
arising from our loyalty to what we live in." This philosophy, Merleau-Ponty says, 
quoting Nietzsche, is "regeneration" of the lived world, circular movement of the 
lived world towards its own regeneration by way of the "true philosophy."705 In this 
circle, the lived world is the origin and the destination; philosophy is the movement. 
It becomes clear how the circle remains ‘good philosophy.' It is circular, but it is not 
inconsequential. This circle transforms the indeterminate intuition expressed by the 
mystery of the desire into determinate philosophical knowledge. This very circle 
itself is sedimentation.  
In this sense, Merleau-Ponty says, the account of Being offered by this 
ontology includes itself within its object: this ontology is nothing but a sedimentation 
of the phenomenon of truth, and thereby takes its rightful place within its own 
account, as a sedimentative event. For both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, the 
phenomenon of truth signals that we possess a certain adherence to Being, and it is 
by examining this adherence that we both clarify and falsify it. This adherence, I 
said, is nothing other than Being itself, in its movement of self-falsification. In this 
sense, the ontology that determines it thus takes place within this grand movement of 
self-falsification. It provides us with some truth insofar as it repudiates the belief in 
self-identity (this is the role of ‘negative ontology’), yet it provides more 
determination because it offers itself as a determination of Being as self-
differentiated. This determination seems to avoid the blows of its own critique 
because it proposes Being as openness, and thereby refuses to determine it too much. 
                                                 
704 NC, 275. 
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Yet, if one wishes this determination of Being to remain a philosophical thesis, it 
must has some significance. I have pointed out at the end of Chapter VI that its main 
implication is that self-differentiation is not self-differentiated. Being is self-
differentiation and nothing else, i.e. not self-identity. Here, it seems, we find the 
fundamental contradiction of indirect ontology: once again, we have made Being into 
an object which possesses determinations. Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty want 
us to think of Being as less-than-determinate, or horizonal. This horizonality is not 
extensive, but intensive (VI, A, ii, a). This thought I think, is contradictory with even 
the characterisation of Being as self-differentiation because it indicates that we 
cannot take Being as an object, that we cannot say what is Being.  
Neither Nietzsche nor Merleau-Ponty discuss this point further. However, let 
me point out that the argument outlined here shall only confirm their conception of 
history. The charge of contradiction calls for a critique, which will offer a renewed 
negative truth because it shall be a truth attained by negation of the new truth brought 
about by Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty. In doing so, it will be confirming their claim 
that history is an infinite determination of the indeterminate. Within this movement 
the history of philosophy takes place, appearing as the infinite determination of 
indeterminacy as such. It is not a matter of providing a final conclusion (this would 
be dangerously determinative), but instead, as Merleau-Ponty says, it is a question of 
‘disclosing’ "little by little by little—and more and more—the wild and vertical 
world."706  
The ontology Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty propose to us does indeed 
determine Being, and in so doing, it falsifies it. At the same time however, it 
perpetuates it (since its nature is self-falsification). In doing so, this philosophy calls 
for its own overcoming. Here, as I pointed out in the transition, ontology undergoes a 
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certain transformation. From being the subject of the discourse on Being it gets to 
sediment itself to become part of the object. This process, which is « infinite » 
because it reflects and transforms itself as it goes, is the process of history which 
constitutes itself through truth. 
We, as makers of this history, possess this truth. Yet, this possesion is of an 
unexpected sort because the essence of this truth is to disfigure itself. It transfers the 
evidence of perceptual faith to the level of fantasies, leading us to wrong beliefs. 
Truth, if adequate to Being, must be, like Being, dynamic, antepredicative, and self-
differentiated. "It is with a non-coincidence that I coincide"707 writes Merleau-Ponty. 
It is after all the truth of self-falsification, the truth of becoming, of the constant 
instability of its object, it is a truth that truth shall objectify, and thereby, falsify. "In 
a world Bewitched," Merleau-Ponty writes, "the question is not to know who is right, 
who follows the truest course, but who is a match for the great deceiver, and what 
action will be tough and supple enough to bring it to reason."708 It is the great 
deceiver that makes our world, and belief in truth outside of this great deceiver is 
belief in nothing. As Nietzsche says, in the text quoted by Merleau-Ponty, "we no 
longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn."709 The truth we 
must attain cannot have the semblance of stability which was uncovered as fictional. 
It must be tangential too; that is to say, indeterminate, infinite and therefore dynamic. 
The acquaintance with this truth is the acquaintance with becoming: it is our own 
becoming. This becoming, as we know, is the progress towards error as 
overdetermination. The object of the deeper knowledge shared by Nietzsche and 
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Merleau-Ponty is the great deceiver, the continuity that leads from truth to delusions. 
It is this great deceiver we must know, lest we know only great deceptions.  
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APPENDIX: 
TWO REMARKS  ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
NIETZSCHE AND MERLEAU-PONTY. 
 
A. DIFFERENCES AND COMPLEMENTARITY IN ETHICS. 
 
My project in this thesis was to establish a valid link between two of the 
seminal philosophies that constitute and will continue to constitute our philosophical 
environment. Such a project has meaning only as a precondition for further work. 
This should draw our attention to a certain ambiguity of any comparative project: if a 
comparison is to be fruitful, it must be profound (or as I said, ‘systematic’), but it 
must not amount to an identification of the two philosophies. Such an identification, 
besides being almost certainly bad philosophy, is sterile. On the contrary, we must 
find through any comparison an access to new thoughts, thoughts that our knowledge 
of Nietzsche or of Merleau-Ponty alone would not provide. It is not my task to 
discuss these here, but it is certainly necessary that my account does not preclude 
them. The parallel I have drawn leaves, I think, plenty of room for differences. 
However, it allows us to look at such differences as taking place within a certain 
common framework. I would like now to return to what I think is the most 
significant difference  between the two philosophers: the question of health.  
As I have emphasised, my conclusions favour conceiving of philosophy as 
phenomenological ontology. Necessarily, as a phenomenology, this ontology places 
the sentient subject at its centre. As an ontology, it considers her in her being: the 
human’s being  is to be the space of Being. This indicates, however, an ethical 
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dimension to the question of truth. This question, in my account, is the question of 
the human’s place in the world. As I indicated in the introduction, Nietzsche and 
Merleau-Ponty encounter the question of truth in different contexts. Merleau-Ponty 
repeats that if philosophy is to be true philosophy, it must account for the ground of 
experience as perceptual faith. For Nietzsche, who is wary of placing philosophy as a 
first imperative, the question is justified ethically. It is a matter of overcoming the 
‘sick animal man’ and regaining health. Soon, Nietzsche finds that one must liberate 
herself of the belief in specific truths (values and the likes), but that it is at the same 
time just as unhealthy to believe in nothing. Indeed, skepticism is nihilistic.710 It is 
now easy to see why: one’s belief in values, creates opposition with oneself, even 
self-hatred. One’s refusal to hold anything as true creates self-opposition because it 
denies our existence, which involves faith. It denies that our ‘mysterious desire’ for 
truth is deeply rooted in us. Denying ourselves truth is just as fallacious as attributing 
truth to ourselves. For Nietzsche, consequently, one must make room for health 
between these two obstacles. This space is found in what Nietzsche calls ‘perishing 
outwards,’ or being at one with becoming (II, B). In this mode of being, the 
individual neither believes in specific truth, nor is she deprived of her originary 
adherence to what she encounters. This means, of course, that this encounter is not 
with ‘objects,' but with a milieu, the perceptual world, Being qua becoming. 
Merleau-Ponty clarifies this point which in Nietzsche remains open to 
interpretation because it is so metaphorical. This unity with becoming is beyond 
judgment. It does not affirm specific truths (these are idealisations and separate us 
from ourselves), but it does not deprive us of our involvement in life (this would be 
returning to Husserl’s reduction). The stage which Nietzsche calls health is accessed 
by Merleau-Ponty through existential reduction, a reduction one achieves through 
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activity (V, B). When we leave the practical level for the theoretical level then, it 
seems Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche’s accounts accord themselves again. It remains, 
however, that Merleau-Ponty, unlike Nietzsche, does not have an ethical answer to 
the question: "why tackle the question of truth?" It is true that he—albeit rarely—
uses strikingly Nietzschean terms to characterise the role of philosophy in relation to 
health, consider: "philosophy would be overcome only if man had become the so-
called total man, clear of all enigmas and difficulties with himself"711 or "the 
‘healthy’ man is not so much the one who has eliminated his contradictions as the 
one who makes use of them and drags them in his vital labours."712 However, it 
remains that the question of truth is for Merleau-Ponty chiefly theoretical. Of course, 
the purely theoretical option is fully legitimate but I think, the awareness of the circle 
described above expresses a certain longing for a higher imperative. Merleau-Ponty 
seeks the foundation of the search for truth and searches for a justification for this 
longing outside of mere theoretical curiosity. One may find it, I think, in Nietzsche’s 
question: what is this mysterious longing for truth? It is the essence of the circle 
examined above that this longing signals a truth as much as it demands one, and 
Merleau-Ponty is aware that Nietzsche proposes the following answer: the question 
of truth is a matter of health. This is the central theme of the Preface to GS, the only 
one of Nietzsche’s texts to which Merleau-Ponty devoted any thoughts.713 My point 
is not that Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche disagree on the role of philosophy towards 
health; it is rather that this remains implicit in Merleau-Ponty, and that Nietzsche 
may provide us with some keys to help us understand this ‘unthought’ of Merleau-
Ponty’s. In the text Merleau-Ponty chose to comment upon, Nietzsche’s concept of 
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health offers prespectives regarding ethics in the contemporary sense of the ‘care of 
the self,' by building an unbroken circuit between knowledge and ethics through the 
notion of personal identity. For an individual to be (in the sense of to be someone) is 
for her to possess beliefs. We are ontologically defined as the locus of truth, and for 
us existing and knowing are conditions of each other. Their interdependence, 
combined with their opposition (as traditionally conceived) operates a mutual 
reduction which opens us up to the ground of authentic experience, the ground of the 
overlap [empiètement] of Being and knowing. This mutual reduction of Being and 
truth is the domain of the question of truth. It leads us in one single gesture to true 
Being and to authentic truth.  
 
B. A NOTE ON ETERNAL RECURRENCE. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, I argued, conceives of history as a tangential process of 
infinite determination. Nietzsche, while accepting eternal becoming, and defining 
becoming as eventfulness like Merleau-Ponty, does not seem to subscribe to the 
tangential model. On the contrary, he famously conceives of time according to a 
circular model : eternal recurrence. If my account of Nietzsche’s views on eternal 
becoming is right, and if I am right to liken it to Merleau-Ponty’s, how can both 
thinkers have a different representation of time ? On this specific question, I must 
confess that I see an inconsistency in Nietzsche’s account. In my view, Nietzsche 
establishes enough to conclude that there is eternal becoming as a tangential 
movement towards self-identity but not enough to justify eternal recurrence. 
Remember, eternal recurrence results from the discrepancy between a finite number 
of events and the infinity of time. The first requisit however, is not substantiated. 
Nietzsche affirms that there is a finite quantum of power in the world. Probably 
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because Nietzsche is thinking of events in concrete terms, he draws the conclusion 
that there is a finite number of events. Yet, nothing precludes that we think of them 
in discrete terms. In this case, there may still be an infinity of events. As Müller-
Lauter says :  
« with the presupposition of a potentially unlimited splitting of the wills to power, the 
demonstrability of the statement that all that was, is and will be returns can no longer be maintained. It 
is, indeed, not impossible that under the given presupposition disgregations and aggregate conditions 
of wills to power may recur again and again in the same constellation. But Nietzsche himself has 
eliminated the necessity of such an assumption as a consequence of his theory of the unlimited 
divisibility of the wills to power »714 
 
This seems to support my likening the worldview that resorts from 
Nietzsche’s arguments on time with Merleau-Ponty’s. If there is, indeed, a 
contradiction in Nietzsche’s account, one must choose one or the other term of the 
contradiction, and it is not illegitimate on my part to privilege the discrete approach. 
Yet, Nietzsche, legitimately or not, made the doctrine of eternal recurrence a 
centrepiece of his work. The prime consequence of this is ethical : eternal recurrence 
is a political, breeding and ethical thought. It is a thought which presents a ‘great 
danger’ but leads towards health and this thought is not shared by Merleau-Ponty. 
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